EUROPE SINCE 1815

BY
CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

WITH FIFTEEN COLORED MAPS

Revised and Enlarged Edition

VOLUME I

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

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

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PREFACE TO NEW EDITION

On Sunday, August 2, 1914, in the King of Roumania's summer residence at Sinaia, situated among the pine forests of the lower Carpathian Mountains, an interesting prophecy was made. The Queen, "Carmen Silva," asked Take Jonescu, the brilliant lawyer and statesman, what the results of the war which was then just breaking out would be. Jonescu replied that no mortal could have the presumption to claim to know or to divine all the consequences of such a conflict: "However, I know four," he said, "and these four I can state in a few words. First, there will be such a revival of hatred among nations as has not been seen in centuries. This is as inevitable as the light of day. Secondly, there will be a *lurch to the left*, toward those ideas which are called Socialistic. Certainly in the long run nothing that is absurd can permanently triumph, but in every country the drift toward the extreme left is certain, once the governing classes seem in the eyes of the masses — because of the letting loose of this frightful catastrophe — more incapable than they had thought. In the third place, Madame, there will be what I may call a *cascade of thrones*. Your Majesty, who has so often told me that she is a republican, will not be surprised at this prophecy. Only those monarchies which are in reality merely hereditary presidencies of republics, like the British monarchy, have a chance of escaping this terrible cascade which will justly issue from a war provoked by absolute sovereigns."

Jonescu then explained to the Queen that because of this war the revolutionary movement, which for several decades had deserted the field of politics in order to limit itself to the field of economics, would inevitably become political once more.

"Finally, I said," continues this discerning critic, "this war will hasten by fifty years the arrival of the United States at the moral leadership of the white race, an event which was inevitable in any case, but which the war will have accelerated. . . . As far as I am concerned this event will not be at all displeasing as the experiment which the United States is making of a new civilization, without prejudices, without castes, without monarchical or aristocratic institutions, is the most interesting experiment which mankind has ever yet seriously undertaken."

A1916

The history of the past ten years is a sufficient commentary upon the power of precise prevision of this particular prophet.

It is for the purpose of telling this later history that this new edition of Europe Since 1815 has been prepared. The original edition appeared in 1910. Since then the face of the world has been strangely and amazingly changed, and the process of accelerated evolution is still in full swing. This culminating, crowded, and strictly contemporary chapter in the annals of the race constitutes a challenge to the historian, — and perhaps a trap.

In this new edition I have reproduced the earlier one substantially intact, making, however, whatever additions and alterations have seemed desirable; enlarging, for example, my previous treatment of the Industrial Revolution, of Socialism, and of the German Empire under William II. In recounting the years from 1910 to 1919 I have freely used the material contained in my later book, Modern Europe, abridging here and amplifying there. The chronicle of events since the middle of 1919 is entirely new and constitutes more than a fourth of the book. The space alloted to the events of the past few years may be some be considered disproportionate but, in my opinion, it is justified by the exceptional importance of the period. It would, I think, be entirely mechanical and needlessly inept for the historian to seek to give the same space in his narrative to equal spans of time, for the simple reason that equal chronological periods differ greatly from one another in significance of content. The French Revolutionists thought, and complacently announced, that they had made greater progress in six years than their predecessors had made in six centuries. They exaggerated — but not as much as their predecessors would have thought. Since the French Revolution there has been no period so replete with shattering events, so charged with dynamic force, so remarkable for the changes it has witnessed, as that which began in 1914. New factors, or old factors singularly intensified, have recently entered in profusion into contemporary history, to complicate and confuse; the astounding consequences of the war, the resurrection of old states, like Poland, long supposed to be extinct, the rise of the new ones, like Czecho-Slovakia, the great enlargement of others, such as Roumania or Jugo-Slavia, the radical transformation of still others, like Austria and Hungary and Germany and Russia; the new breezes that are blowing with varying velocity throughout the vast reaches of the British Empire, subjecting the flexible framework of that structure to exceptional

stress and strain; all the varied phenomena connected with that lurch to the left of which the Roumanian statesman spoke in that fateful summer of 1914, the disruption of Socialistic parties into factions under the disintegrating alchemy of the war, the subsequent wranglings of those factions, the varying fortunes and misfortunes of the Socialist movement in different countries ranging from the establishment of arbitrary, undemocratic and militaristic Communism in Russia to the stalemating of Socialism by "big business" in Germany and by Fascism in Italy, and to the constitutional agitation of the Labor Party in England. All these and many other topics demand notice in any survey of the history of Europe since the war and such notice cannot be unduly brief if it is to be really illuminating and explanatory. No succinct summary could possibly suffice to give a comprehensible picture.

I have, in general, brought the history of Europe down to the mid-summer of 1923, obviously no logical or fixed terminus, there being none such at this end of the historic process. Contemporary history has only one definite terminus, namely its point of departure, and that, after all, is itself not so very definite, its proper location being the subject of much dispute.

C. D. H.

New York
July 30, 1923

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

The purpose of this book is the presentation of the history of Europe since the downfall of Napoleon. Needless to say, only the broader lines of the evolution of so crowded a century can be traced in a single volume. I have, moreover, omitted many subjects, frequently described, in order to give a fuller treatment to those which, in my opinion, are more important. I have endeavored to explain the internal development of the various nations, and their external relations in so far as these have been vital or deeply formative. I have also attempted to preserve a reasonable balance between the different periods of the century and to avoid the danger of over-emphasis.

The great tendencies of the century, the transference of power from oligarchies to democracies, the building up of nations like Germany and Italy and the Balkan states which was the product of long trains of causes, of sharp, decisive events, and of the potent activity of commanding personalities, the gradual expansion of Europe and its insistent and growing pressure upon the world outside, shown in so many ways and so strikingly in this age of imperialism and world-politics, the increasing consciousness in our day of the urgency of economic and social problems, all these and other tendencies will, I trust, emerge from the following pages, with clearness and in just proportion.

The problem of arranging material covering so many different countries and presenting such varieties of circumstance and condition is one of the greatest difficulty. It arises from the fact that Europe is only a geographical expression. The author is not writing the history of a single people but of a dozen different peoples, which, having much in common, are nevertheless very dissimilar in character, in problems, in stages of development, and in mental outlook. If he adopts the chronological order (and events certainly occurred in chronological sequence), if he attempts to keep the histories of a dozen different countries moving along together as they did in fact, he must pass continually from one to the other and his narrative inevitably becomes jerky, spasmodic, and confused. If on the other hand he takes each nation in turn, recounting its history from starting

point to point of conclusion, he gains the great advantage of continuity, which begets understanding, but he writes a dozen histories, not one. He therefore compromises, perforce, with his intractable problem and works out a method of presentation of whose vulnerability he is probably quite as acutely conscious as any reader could be. My method has been to bring down more or less together the histories of those countries which have so intimately and significantly interacted upon each other, Austria, Prussia, France, and Italy, that the evolution of one cannot be, even approximately, understood apart from a knowledge of the current evolution of the others. I then return to my starting point, 1815, and trace the histories of England, Russia, Turkey and the lesser states separately, gaining the advantage of being able to show their continuous development. I hope that this method has at least the merit of rendering clearness of exposition possible.

My narrative is based to some extent upon an examination of the sources, although, considering the vast extent of the original material available, this has been necessarily comparatively limited. It is based chiefly, as probably any synthetic work covering so large a field must be, on the elaborate general histories of different periods or countries, on biographies, and on the special monographic literature. These are indicated in the bibliography at the end of the volume which I have attempted to make critical and descriptive rather than extensive. It has been impossible for me to employ footnotes freely and consequently I am restricted to a general recognition of my great and constant indebtedness to the authorities used, a recognition which I wish to make as explicit and as grateful as it must be brief and comprehensive.

C. D. H.

Northampton, Massachusetts,
December 31, 1909.

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EUROPE SINCE 1815

CHAPTER I

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

In March 1814, the enemies of Napoleon entered his capital and bivouacked in triumph in the streets. The long struggle was over which had forced the Emperor back step by step from the plains of Russia through Germany, and was now sweeping him from France. Slowly the states of Europe had come to see that Napoleonic domination could be ended only by a generous and unswerving co-operation. Reading this useful lesson in the defeats of many fields, they had built up the Great Coalition, and finally the political system, fashioned with such a varied display of talent by the Emperor of the French, had given way beneath the impact of a united and resolute Europe.

But the overthrow of Napoleon brought with it one of the most complicated and difficult problems ever presented to statesmen and diplomatists. As all the nations of Europe had been profoundly affected by his enterprises, so all were profoundly affected by his fall. For nearly a quarter of a century the Continent had been harried by war, involving, directly or indirectly, all the powers, great and small. During that period boundaries had been changed and changed again with bewildering rapidity, old states had been destroyed, or cut up, or re-fashioned arbitrarily, several historic dynasties had been swept from their thrones, new legal and social systems had been established, largely after French models, and now the power that had led in this vast transformation had been humbled, its sovereign forced to strike arms. The destruction of the Napoleonic régime must be followed by the reconstruction of Europe, and it is with this difficult work that this history begins. This reconstruction was foreshadowed more or less clearly in the treaties concluded with each other by the various states as they entered the Great Coalition. Particularly important, however, were the Treaties of Paris and Vienna, to the making of which the powers now directed their attention.

The first step, naturally, was to determine the future status of France. What should be done with this arch-enemy of Europe,

now that the decision no longer lay with her but with her conquerors? What should be her future government, how large her territory, how severe her punishment?

The question of the government was the first to arise, and had agitated the Allies for weeks before they entered Paris. There were several possible solutions. One was the continuance of Napoleon in power, but only after having given sufficient guarantees for good behavior. Such an outcome was possible up to the middle of March, when the conditions were presented him for the last time. After he rejected them the Allies determined to have done with him forever. There were the alternatives of a Regency for the little King of Rome, Napoleon's son, or of a successful French general as the new monarch, such as Bernadotte, now patronized by the Tsar. Some proposed to leave the whole matter to the French people, others to the determination of the legislative chambers sitting in Paris. But as the discussion went on it gradually became clearer and clearer that it must be either Napoleon or Louis XVIII, the founder of the new royal family or the representative of the old. Bernadotte upon the throne would mean an undue influence of Russia in the affairs of France; a Regency, an undue influence of Austria. An appeal to the French people, it was said, would let loose the Revolution once more, the very thing to which it was proposed to administer a definite and complete quietus. Gradually the cry of the French royalists in favor of Louis XVIII, "the legitimate king is there," to restore him is imperatively necessary, "all else is intrigue," carried all before it, and the first step in the reconstruction of Europe was taken by the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne from which they had been absent for twenty-two years.

On May 30, 1814, the Treaty of Paris was concluded between the Allies on the one hand, and France, under Louis XVIII, on the other. The boundaries of France were to be those of January 1, 1792, with slight additions toward the southeast in Savoy and in the north and northeast. On the other hand she was to relinquish all her conquests beyond that line, which meant the extensive territories of the Netherlands, Italy, and parts of Germany, containing in all a population of about thirty-two millions. The distribution of these territories was to be determined later, but it was already decided in principle, and so stated in the treaty, that the Netherlands should form a single state by the addition of the Belgian provinces to Holland, that Lombardy and Venetia should go to Austria, that the Republic

of Genoa should be incorporated in Sardinia, that the states of Germany should be united in a federation, that England should keep Malta and certain French colonies, returning others, that the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine, united to France since 1792, should be used for the enlargement of Holland, and as compensation to Prussia and other German states, and that Italy, outside those regions that were to go to Austria, should be " composed of sovereign states." The definite elaboration of these intentions of the Allies was to be the work of a general international congress to be held, later in the year, in Vienna.

The Congress of Vienna (September 1814–June 1815) was one of the most important diplomatic gatherings in the history of Europe, by reason of the number, variety, and gravity of the questions presented and settled. The worldly brilliancy of its membership was remarkable even for an age accustomed to the theatrical diplomacy of Napoleon. There had rarely been seen before such an assemblage as gathered in Vienna in the autumn of 1814. There were the emperors of Austria and Russia, the kings of Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Denmark, a multitude of lesser princes, and all the diplomats of Europe, of whom Metternich and Talleyrand were the most conspicuous. All the powers were represented except Turkey. So brilliant an array merited consideration, and partly because men needed relaxation after the tense and desperate years through which they had just passed, and partly to oil the wheels of diplomacy, the court of Austria was most profuse and ingenious in its entertainment. Gaiety was the order of the day. It has been estimated that this Congress cost Austria about sixteen million dollars, spent for pageantry and amusement, and this when the state was virtually bankrupt.

Slowly the work for which these men had come together was accomplished. The Congress of Vienna was not a congress in the ordinary meaning of the word. There was never any formal opening nor any general exchange of credentials. The representatives of the powers did not assemble day after day and deliberate upon the many problems pressing for solution. There were no general sessions of all the powers. A large number of treaties were made between the various states and these were brought together in their essential features in the so-called Final Act of June 9, 1815, a kind of codification of the work of the Congress. Everything was arranged outside in special committees, and in the intimate interviews of sovereigns and diplo-

mats. Particularly important were the agreements of the Great Powers with each other, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, the Allies who had conquered Napoleon, for their decisions were the main work of the Congress, and were forced upon the lesser states, which were simply expected to accept what they could not themselves arrange. The dramatic interest of the Congress lies in the fact that these Great Powers were not in harmony with each other, that their interests at times were so divergent, their ambitions so intense and conflicting, that at one moment war seemed likely to be the outcome of this meeting called to give peace to Europe.

By the first Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, France had renounced all rights of sovereignty and protection over thirty-two millions of people. The diplomats of Vienna reserved the right to distribute these millions as they saw fit. This was the main work of the Congress as it was also the one which occasioned the greatest discord. The division of the spoils was a troublesome affair. The territories which France had renounced were widely scattered. They included what are now Belgium, certain Swiss cantons, large parts of Italy, extensive regions of Germany on both sides of the Rhine, and the Duchy of Warsaw, a creation of Napoleon out of former Poland. In addition to these, Saxony, an independent kingdom, which had remained faithful to Napoleon when the other German states had turned against him, and the Kingdom of Naples, of which Napoleon's brother-in-law, Murat, was still sovereign, were also considered properly at the disposal of the powers, by reason of their connection with the fallen star.

Certain questions had been decided in principle in the first Treaty of Paris, and needed now but to be carried out. The King of Piedmont, a refugee in his island of Sardinia during Napoleon's reign, was restored to his throne, and Genoa was given him that thus the state which borders France on the southeast might be the stronger to resist French aggression. Belgium, hitherto an Austrian possession, was annexed to Holland and to the House of Orange, now restored, that this state might be a barrier in the north. It was understood that, in general, the doctrine of legitimacy should be followed in determining the re-arrangement of Europe, that is, the principle that princes deprived of their thrones and driven from their states by Napoleon should receive them back again at the hands of collective Europe, though this principle was ignored whenever it might suit the interest of the Great Powers. Thus many of

the German and Italian princes recovered their authority. But in the determination of the legitimacy of a government great elasticity prevailed. In general, those states which in Germany had been destroyed before 1803, and in Italy before 1798, were not restored. This alone meant that the map of Europe was far more simple than at the outbreak of the French Revolution.

The Allies who had, after immense effort and sacrifice, overthrown Napoleon, felt that they should have their reward. The most powerful monarch at Vienna was Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, who, ever since Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia, had loomed large as a liberator of Europe. He now demanded that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, whose government fell with Napoleon, be given to him. This state had been created out of Polish territories which Prussia and Austria had seized in the partitions of that country at the close of the eighteenth century. Alexander wished to unite them with a part of Poland that had fallen to Russia, thus largely to restore the old Polish kingdom and nationality to which he intended to give a parliament and a constitution. There was to be no incorporation of the restored kingdom in Russia, but the Russian emperor should be king of Poland. The union was to be merely personal.

Prussia was willing to give up her Polish provinces if only she could be indemnified elsewhere. She therefore fixed her attention upon the rich Kingdom of Saxony to the south, with the important cities of Dresden and Leipsic, as her compensation. To be sure there was a King of Saxony, and the doctrine of legitimacy would seem clearly to apply to him. But he had been faithful to his treaty obligations with Napoleon down to the battle of Leipsic, and thus, said Prussia, he had been a traitor to Germany, and his state was lawful prize. Prussia preferred to receive her increase of territory in Saxony rather than in the west along the Rhine, because Saxony was contiguous. She would thus consolidate and become more compact, whereas any possession she might acquire along the Rhine would be cut off from the rest of the kingdom by intervening states, and would only render more straggling and exposed her boundaries, already unsatisfactory. Moreover, she wished no common boundary with France, feeling that she would always be weak along the Rhine.

Russia and Prussia supported each other's claims, the one to the Duchy of Warsaw, the other to the Kingdom of Saxony. But Austria and England were opposed to the demands of the northern courts, Austria not only because she was reluctant to give up her own Polish territory, her own part of the Duchy of

Warsaw, but because she feared the power of Russia, and the growth of Prussia in northern and central Germany, England because she desired to prevent Russia from increasing in strength, and Prussia from threatening Hanover. The Polish and Saxon questions, thus closely connected with each other, formed the most thorny subject before the Congress, the very pivot on which everything turned. So heated did the discussion become that Talleyrand, utilizing the opposition of the Great Powers to each other, succeeded in forming a secret alliance between England, Austria and France, to resist these pretensions by arms if necessary (January 1815). The situation into which the powers had come over this Polish-Saxon question was manifestly so full of danger for all concerned that they began to recede from their extreme positions. This prepared the way for concessions, but the concessions were forced largely from Prussia. The opposition to Russia was much less vehement, owing to her great military power. With three hundred thousand men ready for action she spoke with emphasis, and moreover, in the general state of exhaustion, Europe had no desire to go to war on account of Poland. The final decision was that Russia should receive the lion's share of the Duchy of Warsaw, Prussia retaining only the province of Posen, and Cracow being erected into a free city; that the King of Saxony should be restored to his throne; that he should retain the important cities of Dresden and Leipsic, but should cede to Prussia about two-fifths of his kingdom; that, as further compensation, Prussia should receive extensive territories on both banks of the Rhine. Prussia also acquired Pomerania from Sweden, thus rounding out her coast line on the Baltic.

Russia emerged from the Congress with a goodly number of additions. She retained Finland, conquered from Sweden during the late wars, and Bessarabia, snatched from the Turks; also Turkish territories in the southeast. But, most important of all, she had now succeeded in gaining most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Russia now extended farther westward into Europe than ever, and could henceforth speak with greater weight in European affairs.

As Vienna was honored by being chosen the seat of the mighty Congress the House of Hapsburg profited greatly by the arrangements concluded there. Austria refused to take back her former possessions in southern Germany and Belgium, considering them too distant and too difficult to defend, and preferring to consolidate her power in southern and central Europe. She recovered her Polish possessions and received, as compensation

for the Netherlands, northern Italy, to be henceforth known as the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, comprising the larger and richer part of the Po valley. The Illyrian provinces along the eastern coast of the Adriatic were erected into a kingdom and given to her. This enlargement of her coast line increased her importance as a maritime power. She also extended westward into the Tyrol and Salzburg, planting herself firmly upon the Alps. Thus, after twenty years of war, almost uninterruptedly disastrous, she emerged with considerable accessions of strength, and with a population larger by four or five millions than she had possessed in 1792. She had obtained, in lieu of remote and unprofitable possessions, territories which augmented her power in central Europe, the immediate annexation of a part of Italy, and indirect control over the other Italian states. The policy followed by Austria in the negotiations was indicated by Metternich, who said, "We wished to establish our empire without there being any direct contact with France." This was accomplished.

England, the most persistent enemy of Napoleon, the builder of repeated coalitions, the pay-mistress of the Allies for many years, found her compensation in additions to her colonial empire. She retained much that she had conquered from France or from the allies or dependencies of France, particularly Holland. She occupied Heligoland in the North Sea, Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean; Cape Colony in South Africa; Ceylon, Isle of France, Demerara, St. Lucia, Tobago, and Trinidad. It was partially in view of her colonial losses that Holland was indemnified by the annexation of Belgium on the Continent, as already stated.

Another question of great importance, decided at Vienna, was the disposition of Italy. The general principle of action had already been laid down in the Treaty of Paris, that Austria should receive compensation here for the Netherlands, and that the old dynasties should be restored. Austrian interests determined the territorial arrangements. Austria took possession, as has been said, of the richest and, in a military sense, the strongest provinces, Lombardy and Venetia, from which position she could easily dominate the peninsula, especially as the Duchy of Parma was given to Marie Louise, wife of Napoleon, and as princes connected with the Austrian imperial family were restored to their thrones in Modena and Tuscany. The Papal States were also re-established. Austrian influence was henceforth substituted for French throughout the peninsula.

No union or federation of these states was effected, as in

Germany, largely because Austria feared that she would not be allowed the presidency of two confederations. It was Metternich's desire that Italy should simply be a collection of independent states, should be only a "geographical expression." The doctrine of legitimacy, appealed to for the restoration of dynasties, was ignored by this congress of princes in the case of republics. "Republics are no longer fashionable," said the Tsar to a Genoese deputation which came to protest against this arrangement. Genoa and Venice were handed over to others. Romilly mentioned in the English House of Commons that the Corinthian horses which Napoleon had brought from St. Mark's to Paris were restored to the Venetians, but that it was certainly a strange act of justice "to give them back their statues, but not to restore to them those far more valuable possessions, their territory and their republic," which had been wrested from them at the same time.

Other changes in the map of Europe, now made or ratified, were these: Norway was taken from Denmark and joined with Sweden: Switzerland was increased by the addition of three cantons which had recently been incorporated in France, thus making twenty-two cantons in all. The frontiers of Spain and Portugal were left untouched.

Such were the territorial re-adjustments decreed by the Congress of Vienna, and which were destined to endure, with slight changes, for nearly fifty years. It is impossible to discover in these negotiations the operation of any lofty principle. Self-interest is the key to this welter of bargains and agreements. Not that these titled brokers neglected to attempt to convince Europe of the nobility of their endeavors. Great phrases, such as "the reconstruction of the social order," "the regeneration of the political system of Europe," a "durable peace based upon a just division of power," were used by the diplomats of Vienna in order to reassure the peoples of Europe, and to lend an air of dignity and elevation to their august assembly, but the peoples were not deceived. They saw the unedifying scramble of the conquerors for the spoils of victory. No ignominy was spared the people of Germany. The diplomats quarreled over the question whether some of the subjects of certain princes, who were not to be restored, (the mediatized princes), subjects who paid small taxes, were to be reckoned as "whole souls," or "half souls." Germans were indignant as they saw themselves considered merely as numbers and articles of taxation. A German editor denounced this "heartless system of statistics,"

and glorious Blücher grimly compared this congress to the annual cattle fair. The doctrine of legitimacy was one of the rhetorical shibboleths, but, as already said, it was applied only capriciously as suited the Great Powers. Republics need not invoke it, and even kings were curtly excluded from its benefits. Gustavus IV, of Sweden, dethroned, claimed in vain his restoration. The King of Denmark was forced to acquiesce in the grievous dismemberment of his kingdom. For years the monarchs of Europe had denounced Napoleon for respecting neither the rights of princes nor those of peoples. They now paid him the flattery of hearty imitation. They ignored as cavalierly as he had done the prescriptive rights of rulers, whenever it seemed to them advantageous to do so. The principle of nationality which Napoleon had contemned to his own undoing, they treated with similar disdain. It was in defiance of this principle that Austria was given a commanding position in Italy, that Norway was handed from Denmark, whose language she spoke, to Sweden, as compensation for Finland, which the latter was forced to renounce to Russia, and for Pomerania, which she was forced to cede to Prussia, that the Belgians were united with the Dutch.

Europe generally acquiesced willingly in the work of this Congress, ardently desirous as it was, after the long, sickening wars, for peace at almost any price, and that work proved reasonably durable. Yet the settlement of Vienna had pronounced enemies from the start, anxious to overthrow it. Among the disaffected were the French, who saw what they regarded as their natural boundary taken from them. They alone, among the important nations, came forth from this international liquidation with no accessions of territory. Prussia, Russia, Austria, and England, all received additions and important ones. But not so France, and thus relatively to the others France was weakened. For Frenchmen these treaties of 1815 were "odious," and to be torn up when the propitious time should come. Multitudes, also, of Germans and Italians were embittered as they saw their hopes of unity and liberal government turn to ashes. The Belgians resented being handed about without even being consulted. They rose in revolt in 1830, and destroyed this artifice of 1815. The arrangements concerning Germany and Italy were demolished in the great decade of 1860 to 1870.

Though the division of territories and the determination of the map of Europe constituted the main work of the Congress of Vienna, other subjects were passed upon as well. Though it did not abolish the slave trade, it condemned it in a solemn utter-

ance "as contrary to the principles of civilization and human right." It was something to have the traffic thus officially branded. The Congress also established a federal form of government for Germany, which will be described in a succeeding chapter. It adopted certain articles concerning the future organization of Switzerland. The Final Act, codifying the work of the Congress during its many months of activity, was signed June 9, 1815, a few days only before the battle of Waterloo. All the governments of Europe accepted its provisions, except Spain and the Papacy, whose opposition was treated by the others with easy-going indifference.

While the Congress of Vienna was slowly elaborating the system that should succeed the Napoleonic on the basis of a certain balance of power, Napoleon escaped from Elba, made straight for Paris, seized the government of France from the hands of the fleeing Louis XVIII, and entered upon the reign of a "Hundred Days." The Allies once more forgot their wranglings, indignantly gathered themselves together to end this menace once for all, and Waterloo was their reward. This sudden flash had, however, proved the necessity of legislation supplementary to that of the Congress before peace could be considered secure. The first Treaty of Paris had not proved a solid basis for a reconstructed Europe. A restored Bourbon had not been able to keep his throne. Now France must give sufficient bonds that in the future she would not disturb the tranquillity of the Continent. The result was the second Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815), concluded, like the first, between Louis XVIII, restored once more, and the Allies, but, unlike the first, imposing heavy and humiliating burdens upon France. Her territory was reduced, involving a loss of about half a million inhabitants, though it was still larger than at the outbreak of the Revolution. She was forced to cede a number of strategic posts on her northern and eastern frontier. She was to pay a war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs and eighteen fortresses were to be occupied by 150,000 troops of the Allies for a maximum of five years, a minimum of three, these troops to be supported by the French. It has been estimated that the total cost of the "Hundred Days" to France, resulting from these stipulations and certain additional claims of the Allies, amounted in the end to 1,570,000,000 francs, the equivalent in purchasing power of about 6,000,000,000 francs, as the franc was valued before the great World War.

Before quitting Paris in the fall of this eventful year of 1815, the Allies signed two more documents of great significance in the

future history of Europe, that establishing the so-called Holy Alliance, and that establishing the Quadruple Alliance. The former proceeded from the initiative of Alexander I, of Russia, whose mood was now deeply religious under the influence of the tremendous events of recent years and the fall of Napoleon, which to his mind seemed the swift verdict of a higher power in human destinies. He himself had been freely praised as the White Angel, in contrast to the fallen Black Angel, and he had been called the Universal Saviour. He now submitted a document to his immediate allies, Prussia and Austria, which was famous for a generation, and which gave the popular name to the system of repression which was for many years followed by the powers that had conquered in the late campaign, a document unique in the history of diplomacy. Invoking the name of "the very holy and indivisible Trinity," these three monarchs, "in view of the great events which the last three years have brought to pass in Europe, and in view, especially, of the benefits which it has pleased Divine Providence to confer upon those states whose governments have placed their confidence and their hope in Him alone," having reached the profound conviction that the policy of the powers, in their mutual relations, ought to be guided by the "sublime truths taught by the eternal religion of God our Saviour" solemnly declare "their unchangeable determination to adopt no other rule of conduct, either in the government of their respective countries, or in their political relations with other governments than the precepts of that holy religion, the precepts of justice, charity, and peace"; solemnly declare, also, that those principles "far from being applicable exclusively to private life, ought on the contrary to control the resolutions of princes, and to guide their steps as the sole means of establishing human institutions, and of remedying their imperfections." Henceforth, accordingly, "comformably to the words of Holy Scripture" the three monarchs will consider themselves as brothers and fellow citizens, "united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity," and will lend "aid and assistance to each other on all occasions and in all places, regarding themselves, in their relations to their subjects and to their armies, as fathers of families." Hence, their "sole principle of conduct" shall be that "of rendering mutual service and testifying by unceasing good will the mutual affection with which they should be animated. Considering themselves all as members of one great Christian nation, the three allied princes look upon themselves as delegates of Providence called upon to govern three

branches of the same family," namely, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. "Their majesties recommend, therefore, to their peoples, as the sole means of enjoying that peace which springs from a good conscience and is alone enduring, to fortify themselves each day in the principles and practice of those duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to men." "All those powers who wish solemnly to make avowal" of these "sacred principles shall be received into this Holy Alliance with as much cordiality as affection." [1]

This document, born of the religious emotionalism of the Tsar, has no parallel. Written in the form of a treaty, it imposes none of the practical obligations of a treaty, but is rather a confession of faith and purpose. Diplomatists were amazed at its unworldly character. Ultimately, nearly all the powers of Europe signed it, more out of compliment to the Tsar than from any intellectual sympathy. Metternich pronounced it a "sonorous nothing," a "philanthropic aspiration clothed in a religious garb," an "overflow of the pietistic feelings of the Emperor Alexander"; Castlereagh, a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense"; Gentz, a bit of "stage decoration." Yet for a generation this Holy Alliance or "diplomatic apocalypse" stood in the mind of the world as the synonym for the régime of absolutism and repression which prevailed in Europe. But that régime was not the outcome of the treaty of the Holy Alliance, but rather that of the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance concluded in the same year. The former was a dead letter from the moment of issue, and did not influence the policy, either domestic or foreign, of any state. Its author, Alexander I, was, moreover, in 1815 a liberal in politics who had been largely instrumental in forcing the restored Bourbon, Louis XVIII, to grant a constitution to France, and who was himself about to grant one to Poland. He was certainly at this moment far from thinking of inaugurating a system of repression. But the latter, the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, became under the manipulation of Metternich a stern and forbidding reality, as we shall see. The liberal newspapers of the Continent confused the two treaties, naturally enough, as Russia, Austria, and Prussia were signatories of both, and they came to speak with hatred of the Holy Alliance. The name excepted, however, the Holy Alliance is much less important than the Quadruple Alliance concluded November 20, 1815.

[1] Univ. of Penn. *Translations, etc.* I, 3. Edit. by J. H. Robinson.

Napoleon had been overthrown only by collective Europe, bound together in a great coalition. The episode of the "Hundred Days," occurring while the Congress of Vienna was laying the foundations of the new Europe, proved the necessity of the prolongation of that union. Hence, there appeared the "Concert of Powers," which for the next few years is the central fact in the international affairs of Europe. In the eyes of the victorious monarchs there were two dangers menacing the system they were resolved to restore: France as a military power; and "French ideas," the ideas of the Revolution, of the rights of peoples and individuals which, operating upon the masses of the different states, might lead them to attempt to remold the different governments along French lines. Against the first danger ample precautions had been taken. France was now surrounded by a ring of states sufficiently strong in a military sense to hold her in check temporarily, and to prevent any such invasions of the French as had occurred during the previous years. Moreover, many of her frontier fortresses had been taken from her, leaving weak spots in her line of defense, particularly toward Germany. She had also been forced to consent to the occupation of her territory for several years by a large army under the command of the powers that had just humbled her. As if this were not enough, she was herself to pay for the support of those troops, and also to pay a large indemnity. It was believed that all this would be sufficient to compel her to keep the peace, that she would have domestic problems severe and exacting enough to absorb her entire attention.

The control or extinction of the so-called "French ideas" was a more baffling and subtle problem, but one which the Allies felt it necessary to attack. For this purpose they, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, signed a Treaty of Alliance on November 20, 1815, engaging to employ all their means to prevent the general tranquillity from being again disturbed, binding themselves "to maintain in full vigor, and should it be necessary, with the whole of their forces," the permanent exclusion of Napoleon and his family from the throne of France, promising to concert necessary measures "in case the same Revolutionary Principles, which upheld the last criminal usurpation," should again, "under other forms, convulse France." Expressing themselves as "uniformly disposed to adopt every salutary measure calculated to secure the tranquillity of Europe by maintaining the order of things re-established in France," they agreed, in order "to consolidate the connections, which at the present

moment so closely unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world," to renew their meetings " at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves or by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their interests, or for the consideration of the measures which, at each of these periods, shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe." [1]

This was virtually an assertion that the four Great Powers would henceforth control Europe in the interests of the ideas they represented. The Alliance whose object had been to overthrow Napoleon, was to be projected into the time of peace. There was thus started that series of congresses which, for the next eight years, exercised a rigid inquisition into the political movements of Europe, and a pitiless repression of such as appeared dangerous. This alliance was contracted with a view particularly to keeping France harmless. The important provision is that concerning future congresses, and it was the manipulation of these congresses in the interest of reaction, the conversion of this alliance into an engine of universal repression, largely by the adroit diplomacy of Metternich, that made the three powers which consistently co-operated, and had first signed the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, so odious to the Liberals of the Continent. In 1815 this Quadruple Alliance appeared as a warning only to France, but the first congress held under the agreement disclosed a compact union of the three eastern states against the spirit of reform everywhere. England's policy rapidly diverged, as we shall see, from that of her allies.

The fate of Europe in the period after 1815 was largely controlled by the powers that had thus proclaimed the principles of the Christian religion their favorite rule of conduct, yet the probable character of their policy could be more accurately foretold by a study of the character of their rulers rather than of the biblical principles to which they were amiably inclined to append their signatures. Each was an absolute monarch, recognizing no trammels upon his power, save such as he himself might be willing to concede. To each the fundamental idea of the Revolution, the sovereignty of the people, was incomprehensible and loathsome. Each had suffered repeatedly and grievously from that Revolution. Each was sure to be its enemy, should

[1] Quotations are from Treaty of Alliance and Friendship. Signed Paris, November 20, 1815. Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, I, 372–375.

it break forth again. Yet there were variations. The Emperor of Russia, Alexander I, appeared, in 1815, the most powerful monarch of Europe. Young, imaginative, impressionable, he had received in his early education a tincture of western liberalism which, in the years immediately after Waterloo, seemed likely to deepen. This at first made Metternich regard him as little less than a Jacobin, all the more dangerous because crowned. Yet he was known as changeable, as egoistic, as influenced by fear. Frederick William III, King of Prussia, slow, timid, conceiving government in a parental, patriarchal sense, was a weak ruler, but a ruler whose views were those of the eighteenth century, who did not see the change that had come over the world, who was disposed to plod along contentedly in the traditional path of the absolute Prussian monarchy, distrusting innovations, deferential toward Austria. The other member of the Holy Alliance was Francis I, of Austria, the most narrow-minded, illiberal of the three. He, too, had learned nothing from the suggestive vicissitudes of his career. His mind was commonplace, barren, even mean. The spirit of his rule is mirrored in certain well-known utterances: "The whole world is mad and wants new constitutions." "Keep yourselves," he said to a group of professors in 1821, "to what is old, for that is good; if our ancestors have proved it to be good why should not we do as they did? New ideas are now coming forward of which I do not nor ever shall approve. Mistrust these ideas and keep to the positive. I have no need of learned men. I want faithful subjects. Be such: that is your duty. He who would serve me must do what I command. He who cannot do this, or who comes full of new ideas, may go his way. If he does not I shall send him."

Though Francis I was a commonplace character he possessed in his chief minister, Prince Metternich, a man far out of the ordinary, a man who appeared to the generation that lived between 1815 and 1848 as the most commanding personality of Europe, whose importance is shown by the phrases, "era of Metternich," "system of Metternich." He was the central figure not only in Austrian and German politics, but in European diplomacy, dominating his age as Napoleon had dominated his, though by a very different process. Metternich was the most famous statesman Austria produced in the nineteenth century. A man of high rank, wealthy, polished, he was the prince of diplomatists "without a peer in his age or in his style," says a French historian and critic, "who deserved to govern Europe

as long as Europe deserved to be governed by diplomacy. In this respect everything about him is interesting. . . . Metternich remains by exterior grace, by the excellence of tone, the perfection of attitude, and the subtle knowledge of the proprieties, an incomparable master. The great comedy of the world, the high intriguing of the European stage, has never had so fertile an author, an actor so consummate." [1]

Metternich's reputation was based on his long and tortuous diplomatic duel with Napoleon. Claiming to have correctly read that bewildering personality from his earliest observation of him, and to have lured him slowly yet inevitably to his doom by playing skilfully upon his weaknesses, Metternich considered himself the conqueror of the conqueror. An achievement so notable imposed upon many, nor did Metternich do aught to dim the brilliancy of the exploit. His imperturbability, his prescience, his diplomatic dexterity were everywhere praised. He came to be considered the one great oracle, whose every word was full of meaning, if only you could get it. Diplomats bowed like acolytes before this master of their craft, and rulers also made their obeisance, though somewhat more slowly, as obviously befitted those who ruled by nothing less than divine right. A few years after 1815, Alexander I, of Russia, whose liberal vagaries had sorely tried this infallible high priest, made his penance. "You are not altered," he said. "I am. You have nothing to regret, but I have."

Metternich played this lofty rôle with becoming gravity and grandeur. His cynicism, so corroding for his contemporaries, never turned upon himself. Humility is hardly a proper weakness for a primate. No adulation could equal his own self-appreciation. He speaks of himself as being born "to prop up the decaying structure" of European society. He feels the world resting on his shoulders. "My position has this peculiarity," he says, "that all eyes, all expectations are directed to precisely that point where I happen to be." He asks the question: "Why, among so many million men, must I be the one to think when others do not think, to act when others do not act, and to write because others know not how." Traveling in Italy in 1817, he records: "My presence in Italy produces an incalculable effect." Traveling in Germany in 1818, he notes: "I came to Frankfort like the Messiah." Elsewhere he says: "Happy is he who can say of himself that he has never strayed

[1] Sorel, *Essais d'Histoire et de Critique*, 21–22.

from the path of eternal law. Such testimony, my conscience cannot refuse me." His assurance stood the test of all experience. Even in 1848, after the revolutions of Italy and Germany, the abdication of his emperor, and his own overthrow and flight to London, he said: "My mind has never entertained error."

As an historical figure Metternich's importance consists in his execration of the French Revolution. His life-long rôle was that of incessant, lynx-eyed opposition to everything comprehended in the word. He lavished upon it a wealth of metaphorical denunciation. It was "the disease which must be cured, the volcano which must be extinguished, the gangrene which must be burned out with the hot iron, the hydra with jaws open to swallow up the social order." He had a horror of parliaments and representative régimes. "France and England," he said, "may be considered as countries without a government." He defined himself as the man of the status quo. His was a doctrine of pure immobility. The new ideas ought never to have come into the world, but the past could not be helped. Prevention of their further spread was, he felt, the imperative requirement of European politics. He was the minister of European conservatism. His strength lay in the fact that repose was the passionate desire of the men of 1815. Nothing seemed more fearful to Europe than a recurrence of war. Only it was safe to say that a Europe, invigorated, electrified as this had been, however exhausted, however desirous of rest for the time being, would not be willing to be forever quiescent. The ideal of immobility as a permanent thing is the paralysis of thought. Metternich failed in the end, though for a while Europe was blinded by his success, because, while he could imprison revolutionists, he could not imprison ideas. He failed to understand the impalpable forces of his age.

Considering the work of the Congress of Vienna as largely his, his concrete task was, henceforth, to consolidate that work, to repel all attacks upon it. He saw only one side of the Revolution, the destructive. The constructive side he never understood. This, however, was for the future the more important. A comprehension of it was most essential for a statesman who felt the world resting on his shoulders.

How Metternich worked out his system will be seen in succeeding chapters. His lever was Austria. Austria's legal rights and commanding authority in Germany and Italy, and his own remarkable powers of persuasion, suggestion, and intimidation were the instruments used in the erection of the international fabric which took its name from him.

CHAPTER II

REACTION IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

Austria emerged from the Napoleonic wars stronger, larger, and more populous than ever. She had been repeatedly shattered, her boundaries repeatedly redefined during the last twenty years, yet the result was favorable. She had relinquished her possessions in the Netherlands (modern Belgium) and some of her southwest German lands, but had been indemnified by lands in Germany and Italy, which were contiguous and more advantageous. At the very moment that her great German rival, Prussia, was becoming more straggling and loosely extended, Austria was attaining a territorial compactness she had never known. Planted firmly upon the Alps and the Carpathians, and with an extensive coast line along the Adriatic, she was admirably situated for an assertive rôle in European politics.

The Austrian Empire, however, presented to the eye certain peculiarities, offered by no other state in Europe, a knowledge of which is essential to an understanding of her history in the nineteenth century. The empire was conspicuously lacking in unity, political, racial, or social. It was not a single nation like France but was composed of many nations. To the west were the Austrian duchies, chiefly German, the ancient possessions of the House of Hapsburg; to the north Bohemia, an ancient kingdom acquired by the Hapsburgs in 1526; to the east the Kingdom of Hungary, occupying the immense plain of the middle Danube; to the south the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, purely Italian. None of these even was a unit but each was composed of several parts. Bohemia included, beside Bohemia proper, Moravia and Silesia; Hungary included far to the east the principality of Transylvania, and to the southwest the kingdom of Croatia. Many of these constituent elements preserved special privileges, thus rendering the government confused and unequal.

More important still was the fact that this empire was inhabited by many peoples which differed greatly in origin, in language, in history, in customs and institutions. At best these racial and linguistic differences rendered difficult, if not impos-

sible, the growth of a national consciousness, a common patriotism; at the worst they might become mutually antagonistic and tend to disrupt the empire. The two leading races were the Germans, forming the body of the population in the Austrian duchies, and the Magyars, originally an Asiatic folk, encamped in the Danube valley since the ninth century, and forming the dominant people in Hungary. Yet also in the eastern part of Hungary were Roumanians, reputed descendants of early Roman colonists and speaking a language of Latin origin, and there were Slavic peoples north and south of the Germans and Magyars in both Austria and Hungary. In this medley of states, races, and languages there lay numberless possible causes of division and contention. They had almost nothing in common save allegiance to the emperor and, for most of them, to the Roman Catholic Church. If the desire for a separate national life should spring up among these various peoples, the Empire might be disrupted, would at any rate be transformed. In 1815, however, there was not the rivalry in nationality and language that later became so acute.

This empire was not a German empire, though it had the appearance of so being. The Germans were the most influential element, the ruling house was German, Vienna, the capital, was a German city, the German language was used for official intercourse. An attempt had been made in the eighteenth century, under Joseph II, thoroughly to Germanize the empire, but it had completely and quickly failed and it was not likely to be made again in the nineteenth century, as the balance between the German and the non-German elements had been altered since, considerably in favor of the latter. The Germans were in a decided numerical minority, but by reason of their greater wealth, intelligence, and general advancement they remained the leading element in the state. But the nineteenth century was to see their leadership contested and gradually weakened by the rise of strong national and race movements in Hungary and Bohemia. The Slavs formed the majority of the population of the entire empire, but they were not homogeneous, were geographically scattered, were in civilization inferior, and were for the time quiescent.

To rule so conglomerate a realm of twenty-eight or twenty-nine million people was a task of great difficulty. This was the first problem of Francis I (1792–1835) and Metternich. Their policy in the main was to keep things as they were. To innovate was to enter a lane that might know no turning. They made no attempt to reform the government. They allowed the

various parts of the political machine to continue, lacking as it was in symmetry and in efficiency. This machinery was both chaotic and unscientific. There was no central, coherent cabinet, or group of ministers. There were, of course, various departments, but some had jurisdiction over the whole empire, some only over parts. In any case the boundaries were not carefully defined. Government was exceedingly slow, cumbrous, disjointed, inefficient.

Austria was now the classic land of the old régime. Her boundaries had been repeatedly changed at the hands of Napoleon, but the internal structure of the state and of society had remained unaltered. The people were sharply divided into classes, each resting on a different legal basis. Of these the nobility occupied a highly privileged position. They enjoyed freedom from compulsory military service, large exemptions from taxation, a practical monopoly of the best offices in the state. They possessed a large part of the land, from which in many cases they drew enormous revenues. Upon their estates they exercised many of the same feudal rights as had their ancestors, such as those of the police power and of administering justice through their own courts. They exacted the *corvée* and other services from the peasants. The condition of the peasants, indeed, who formed the immense mass of the population, was deplorable. It has been stated that in Bohemia, for instance, they owed half of their time and two-thirds of their crops to the lords, and in certain parts it was not uncommon for human beings and cattle to be sheltered by the same roof. The peasants had indeed been refused the right to purchase release from their heaviest burdens. These were the two classes into which Austrian society was divided, for the bourgeoisie, or middle class, was only slightly developed and of little importance. Industry was in a backward state, hampered at every point by official regulations.

There were throughout the empire various local bodies called estates, which, however, constituted no real check upon the absolutism of the central government. They in no sense constituted local self-government. They were composed almost entirely of nobles, and their powers were slight. Their sessions were brief, perfunctory, and furnished no political training. Hungary occupied a somewhat special position. She had a central Diet or parliament and long-established county governments. They, however, were no great barrier to the working of the central government, which, indeed, for thirteen years, from 1812 to 1825, refused in spite of the law to call the Diet together. Moreover,

these Hungarian assemblies did not represent the Hungarian people but merely the privileged classes. Absolutism in government, feudalism in society, special privileges for the favored few, oppression and misery for the masses, such was the condition of Austria in 1815.

It was the fixed purpose of the Government to maintain things as they were and it succeeded largely for thirty-three years, during the reign of Francis I, till 1835, and of his successor, Ferdinand I (1835–48). During all this period Metternich was the chief minister, the accomplished and resourceful representative of the status quo. His system, at war with human nature, at war with the modern spirit, rested upon a meddlesome and ubiquitous police, upon elaborate espionage, upon a vigilant censorship of ideas. The head of this department boasted that he had "perfected" the system of Fouché, an achievement similar to that of painting the lily. Censorship was applied to theaters, newspapers, books. The frontiers were guarded that foreign books of a liberal character might not slip in to corrupt. Political science and history practically disappeared as serious studies. Spies were everywhere, in government offices, in places of amusement, in educational institutions. Particularly did this Government fear the universities, because it feared ideas. Professors and students were subjected to humiliating regulations. Spies attended lectures. The Government insisted on having a complete list of the books that each professor took out of the university library. Text-books were prescribed. Foreign scholars might not be appointed to professional positions, nor even become tutors in private families. Students might not study in foreign universities, nor might they have societies of their own. A clerical inquisition was added to that of the police. Students must attend church and go to confession at stated times. Confession papers were required at all examinations. Confession became a regular business for poor students, who sold their papers to comrades needing them on such occasions. As examination periods approached such papers rose and fell according to supply and demand, like stocks and bonds. Obviously, under a system where there was no freedom of teaching or of learning, science withered. It was accordingly perfectly appropriate for a friend of Metternich to congratulate him on the entire exclusion of the scientific spirit from the universities of Austria. Austrians might not travel to foreign countries without the permission of the Government, which was rarely given. Austria was sealed as nearly hermetically as possible against the liberal

thought of Europe. Intellectual stagnation was the price paid. A system like this needed careful bolstering at every moment and at every point. The best protection for the Austrian system was to extend it to other countries. Having firmly established it at home, Metternich labored with great skill and temporary success to apply it in surrounding countries, in Germany through the Diet and the state governments, in Italy through interventions and treaties, binding Italian states not to follow policies opposed to the Austrian, and in general by bringing about a close accord of the Great Powers on this illiberal basis.

We shall now trace the application of this conception of government in other countries. This will serve among other things to show the dominant position of the Danubian empire in Europe from 1815 to 1848. Vienna, the seat of rigid conservatism, was now the center of European affairs, as Paris, the home of revolution, had been for so long.

GERMANY

One of the most remarkable changes of the nineteenth century was the transformation of Germany, from a loose and inefficient federation into an imposing, powerful empire. Germany, like Italy, was long a geographical expression rather than a nation. The map of Germany was for centuries the wonder of the world. It was a tangle of lilliputian and irrational states, many of them "archeological curiosities." Since the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars these had disappeared in large numbers, greedily absorbed by their more powerful neighbors. Thus the knights of the empire, the ecclesiastical states, and nearly all the free cities, had disappeared, so that between 1798 and 1815 the number of German states had decreased to less than forty. This work of simplification had been largely furthered by the spirit of aggrandizement of the German princes themselves, who were anxious to increase their dominions, no matter by what means, and who eagerly co-operated with Napoleon, the purpose of whose manipulations was not the welfare of Germany. The German states of 1815 were of all shapes and sizes and of various denominations. There were free cities, electorates, margravates, duchies, grand duchies, and five kingdoms, Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, Würtemberg, and Bavaria. The last three had been raised to regal rank by the all-powerful Napoleon, and at his fall it was found impossible to reduce to duchies again what he had so greatly exalted.

Down to 1806 the German states had been bound together in

a loose union called the Holy Roman Empire, about which clustered the brilliant, but diaphanous, unsubstantial memories of centuries. That had been succeeded from 1806 to 1813 by the Confederation of the Rhine, a creation and instrument of Napoleon, which included ultimately nearly all Germany except the two great states, Prussia and Austria. This confederation fell with its creator, and the question of the future organization was one much discussed at the Congress of Vienna and settled there, not by the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire, which many advocated, but by the erection of the so-called German Confederation, composed of thirty-eight states.[1] The central organ of the government was to be a Diet, meeting at Frankfort. This was to consist not at all of representatives chosen by the people, but of delegates appointed by the different sovereigns and serving during their pleasure. They were to be not deputies empowered to decide questions, but simply diplomatic representatives, voting as their princes might direct. Austria was always to have the presidency of this body. The method of procedure within the Diet was complicated and exceedingly cumbrous. It sat sometimes as an Ordinary Assembly, sometimes as a General Assembly or Plenum. The difference was mainly in the character of the business transacted and in the method of voting. In the former only ordinary business was considered and matters were decided by a majority vote. Each of the eleven large states had one vote, while the remaining states were divided into six groups, called curiæ, each group having a single vote. There were thus seventeen votes in all. In the Plenum were considered all questions of greater importance. Here a two-thirds vote was necessary for a decision. The total number of votes was sixty-nine, divided among the different states. Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg, had four each, others three, two, and each state had at least one. The distribution was grossly unfair if it was intended to show the relative importance of the several states. Prussia and Austria, great European powers, had no more weight than Saxony, a small state, and only four times as much as Liechtenstein, a state of a few thousand inhabitants. Thus it came about that the seven larger states, having five-sixths of the population of Germany, could be outvoted decisively by the smaller states representing one-sixth.

[1] Made 39 by the admission of Hesse-Homburg in 1817, remaining such only until 1825, when the line of Saxe-Gotha died out. Reduced by subsequent extinction of other houses to 33 before its dissolution in 1866.

The Congress of Vienna, having thus created an assembly, did not proceed to define its powers. The jurisdiction of the Diet was left to be decided by the Diet itself. It was decided that the first business of the Diet should be the framing of the fundamental laws of the confederation and the establishment of the organic institutions. This might seem to be unduly elastic and to be giving to the assembly an opportunity to claim the largest powers for itself. But this was not to be feared, as in the adoption and in the change of any fundamental law, a unanimous vote was required, and all the delegates were dependent upon home governments which were averse to a strong union and which had now the absolute power to prevent the rise of one.

This Federal Act did not create a fatherland. There was no king or emperor of Germany. There was no German flag. No one was, properly speaking, a German citizen. He was a Prussian, or Austrian, or Bavarian citizen, as the case might be. The federal government had no diplomatic representatives in the other countries of Europe, but each state had, or could have, its own diplomatic corps. The German as German had no legal standing abroad, — only as a citizen of a separate state that might, but generally did not, command respect. Each state had the right to make alliances of every kind with the others or with non-German states. The only serious obligation they assumed toward each other was that they should enter into no engagement that should be directed against the safety of the Confederation or that of any individual state within the union; that they should not make war upon each other upon any pretext, but should submit their contentions to the Diet; that if the Confederation should declare war, all the states should support it, and that none should negotiate separately with the enemy or alone make peace.

Such was the constitution given to Germany by the Congress of Vienna. It created a government in which obstruction was easy, positive action very difficult. Each state possessed powers of delaying decisions of the Diet interminably, even, in many cases, of rendering them impossible. Moreover this government, weak as it was, was not even purely German. Three rulers of foreign states were members of it and could influence its deliberations, particularly in those cases where an individual veto would prove decisive, that is, in all the most fundamental and organic matters. The king of England was represented for Hanover, a possession of the English royal family; the king of

DISTRICTION OF RACES
IN
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
English Miles
Breslau
Chemnitz
Karlsbad
Prague
Pilsen
Nuremberg
Würzburg
Bayreuth
Regensburg
Augsburg
Munich
Linz
VIENNA
Salzburg
Innsbruck
Brixen
Trent
Verona
Padua
Venice
Gulf of Venice
Trieste
Görz
Laibach
Gratz
Klagenfurt
Villach
Brünn
Olmütz
Pressburg
Agram
Fiume
Zengg
Bologna
Florence
Pisa
Leghorn
Perugia
Lissa
Lesina
Curzola
Spalato
Bohemia
Moravia
Austria
Styria
Carinthia
Tyrol
Carniola
Croatia
Bavaria
Wurtemberg
Saxony
Thuringia
Hungary
Dalmatia
Bosnia
ADRIATIC SEA


Longitude East 20 from Greenwich
22
24
26
RUSSIA
Galicia
Cracow
Tarnow
Lemberg
Krempetec
Zips
Eperies
Kaschau
Rosenau
Shemnitz
Munkacz
Czernowitz
Bukovine
Sereth
Pruth
Dniester
Tokay
Erlau
Debreczen
Budapest
Grosswardein
Bistritz
Klausenburg
Keeskemet
Kalocsa
Szegedin
Arad
Maros Vásárhely
Szeklers
Transylvania
Mre Theresiopel
Temesvar
Hermannstadt
Fogaras
Kronstadt
Banat
Syrmia
Neusatz
Versecz
Mehadia
Orsova
Belgrade
Rimnicu
Ploesti
Bukharest
ROUMANIA
SERVIA
Rustchuk
Danube
Nish
Novipazar
MONTENEGRO
Cattaro
Antivari
Scutari
Drin
Prizren
TURKEY
Germans
Czechs
Slovaks
Poles
Ruthenians
Slovenes
Serbo-Croats
Italians & Ladines
Roumanians
Magyars
20
22
24
42
44
48
50

Denmark for Holstein, the king of the Netherlands for Luxemburg. Prussia and Austria too might be influenced to look upon the Confederation in the light of their international position and interests, Austria particularly, as only one-third of the Austrian Empire was within the bounds of the Confederation. The other two-thirds, mainly non-German, were not included, yet their interests might dictate the policy of the Austrian delegates. Thus Hungarians, Poles, and Italians might indirectly influence the determination of purely German questions in the German Diet. The international rather than national character of this Confederation was further manifested in the fact that the chief articles of the Federal Act establishing it were inserted in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and as such were under the collective guaranty of the powers and therefore presumably not to be altered without their consent.

It is clear that a Germany so organized was not a nation but only a loose confederation of states expressly declared to be independent and sovereign, a confederation designed simply for mutual protection, and poorly adapted even for that. "Judged by the requirements of a practical political organization," says von Sybel, "this German Act of Confederation, produced with so much effort, possessed about all the faults that can render a constitution utterly useless." He adds that it "was received by the German nation at large, partly with cold indifference, and partly with patriotic indignation."

This indignation was vehemently felt by the Liberals, who, under the influence of the tremendous struggles with Napoleon, had come passionately to demand a close and firm union of all Germans that thus they might realize in their institutions and in the face of all the world the greatness which they felt was in them. The exaltation of the final struggle with Napoleon had only heightened the demand of the more progressive spirits for national unity, that thus Germany might never henceforth be subjected to the humiliations of the past at the hands of foreigners. This longing for unity and strength, which in the patriotic atmosphere of the late wars had seemed so near realization, was now seen to be a hope deferred. German unity was, according to Metternich, an "infamous object," and the views of the diplomats at Vienna were more those of Metternich than of the Liberals. The latter were indignant at what they called the great deception of Vienna, and their bitterness was to be a factor in the later development of Germany.

That they were from the very force of circumstances, the

very nature of existing conditions, inevitably destined to disappointment we can see more clearly than did they, swept along as they were by the strong patriotic current of the hour, little appreciating the bewildering, baffling complexity of their problem. The object they aimed at was one of supreme difficulty. German unity was not simply a matter of sentiment, however fine and just, but was a hard, practical question only to be answered, if at all, by ripe political sense and wisdom. It involved the adjustment of many conflicting and perhaps irreconcilable interests. Traditions, centuries old, must be overcome. Mere inertia was a powerful obstacle. And another was the fact that the future of Germany was not left for the Germans to work out alone. It was a part of the work of the Congress of Vienna, of the general settlement of Europe. This brought it about that the Act of Federation was hastily framed and that, too, partially by powers careless of German interests or hostile to them. It was no desire of neighboring states to have a strong and united Germany. But the main obstacle lay in one of the oldest, most persistent facts of German political life and history, the strong states-rights or particularist feeling. No effective union could be established unless the various members would surrender some of their authority. Not one of the German princes was willing to pay the price. Austria, more non-German than German, could not for that very reason hope to be the supreme power in a really united Germany, therefore she favored a loose union wherein she might, by playing upon rival passions, enjoy a lesser leadership. Prussia could not be given the leadership in a new empire, as Austria would not consent and the lesser states would be alarmed. Obviously, none of the smaller states could hope to exercise a power they would not grant to either of the greater. Moreover, they believed that any sacrifice of sovereignty would only leave them exposed to the aggrandizing passions of the great. At first these lesser states, indeed, wished to be entirely independent, to have no union at all, even that of a loose confederation. The conclusive argument against this was that Germany must at least be strong enough so that no second series of events like that of the Napoleonic invasions and conquests should again occur.

Thus it is seen that the radical evil of the German situation was the particularism or excessive individualism of the states. This was nothing new, but had been for centuries the most powerful fact. This feeling was now even more pronounced than ever, for the reason that the lesser states had latterly

grown stronger by their absorption of their neighbors in the period just elapsed. National unity had been wrecked by it. It could only be restored, says Sybel, by the further extreme development of this spirit — till one state should become so large that it would overshadow all the rest and force them to recognize its ascendency — then the selfishness of one would end in the unity of all. Now the unity of England and France had been brought about in precisely this way, by the absorption by one state of all its rivals, but the outcome of German evolution had been peculiar, in that it had seen the rise of two great powers, not one, Prussia and Austria, neither able to conquer or push the other aside, and each most jealous of any increase of the other's power. Such was the play of ambition and interest, baffling the ingenuity and ability of those who desired a real and fruitful union of all Germans. A Prussian field-marshal, Clausewitz, wrote about this time: "Germany can achieve political unity only in one way, by the sword; by one of its states subjugating all the others," a thought put later into a more resounding phrase by Bismarck, and expressing approximately the method by which unity was finally achieved. But so hard a doctrine lay beyond the range of understanding of the early nineteenth century.

The Liberals of Germany, eager for national unity, thus suffered a severe defeat at Vienna. They were given a confederation, looser than that of the Holy Roman Empire, and with none of the glory and lustre of the latter, a union only nominal, inefficient, and prosaic, containing no vital force. The Liberals were also eager for reforms within the states, for constitutional government, for parliaments with real powers, for the end of absolutism. Here again they were disappointed. They had hoped to get a mandatory provision in the Federal Act establishing representative legislatures in each one of the states of Germany. In appealing to his people to rally around him in the war against Napoleon, the King of Prussia had very recently promised his people a constitution and had urged at the Congress of Vienna that the Federal Act should require every member of the Confederation to grant a representative constitution to his subjects within a year. Metternich, even more opposed to free political institutions than to a strong central government, succeeded in thwarting the reformers at this point also, by having this explict and mandatory declaration made vague and lifeless. Thus the famous Article XIII of the Federal Act was made to read: "A constitution based upon the system of estates will

be established in all the states of the union." The character of the new constitutions was not sketched; and the time limit was omitted. A journalist was justified in saying that all that was guaranteed to the German people was an "unlimited right of expectation." The future was to show the vanity even of expectation, the hollowness of even so mild a promise. The Liberals had desired something more substantial than hope. Austria and Prussia, the two leading states, governing the great mass of the German people, never executed this provision. Nor did many of the smaller states.

Germany, then, in 1815, consisted of thirty-eight loosely connected states. Some of these were very large, some exceedingly small. Prussia and Austria ranked with the greatest powers of Europe. Some of them were old, had their individual history, traditions, and prestige. Others were new, or had recently undergone such sweeping changes as to be practically new. Their future was highly problematical. Their boundaries were intertwined and complicated. Some were what are called enclaves, that is, were entirely surrounded by another state, having no egress to the outside world save through the neighbor's territory. Economic life could not flourish owing to the tariffs and change of coinage that met merchant and trader at every border, and owing also to the wretched means of communication and transportation. These states presented many varieties of governments. There were some where absolutism prevailed, where the prince was the law-giver, the executor, and the judge, ruling without the aid of any assembly, without outside restraints. Such were the two greatest, Austria and Prussia, and such were several of the smaller. There were others where the prince was assisted in his work by assemblies, bodies which the people had no right to claim, but which the ruler in his condescension saw fit to call about him, in no sense popular bodies, chosen by the people, but composed mainly of nobles. These exercised little control over the acts of the prince, but were at least in a position to present grievances. Most of the states of Germany, as Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Saxony, were of this kind. There were other states where the prince granted a written constitution, somewhat after the French model, providing for an elective assembly to which was given some power over the government's proposals for taxes and laws. Such an assembly was not to control the Government, as did the English Parliament, by forcing the ruler to choose his ministers from persons satisfactory to it. The prince was the government in every instance

but he preferred to ask the co-operation of his people up to a certain point, and he granted them rights, such as freedom of the press and of speech, which were coming to be more and more demanded by Europeans generally. Saxe-Weimar was the most prominent state of this class. Its prince received the sincere laudation of the Liberals and the sincere aversion of Metternich.

In none of these systems was the principle of popular sovereignty recognized. Germany was thoroughly monarchical. The only question was whether monarchy should undergo a change of nature more or less extensive, or should assert its old prerogatives in all their fulness. After the disappointments of the Vienna Congress the Liberals of Germany pinned their hope to the increase of states of the Saxe-Weimar class. It was clear that Germans were not to have unity. Might they not have political and civil liberty? There seemed some ground for optimism. Constitutions were granted in the states of southern Germany in the next few years, in Bavaria and Baden in 1818, in Würtemberg in 1819, and in Hesse-Darmstadt in 1820. It matters not whether the princes granted these for selfish reasons in order to gain popular support for a struggle which they felt was imminent with their more powerful colleagues, Prussia and Austria, for the advantage to their people remained the same.

But it soon became evident after 1815 that while there were signs of progress there were more signs of a menacing reaction. Austria having set her house in order, having put a Chinese wall about her empire, marked innovation in the neighboring lands for special hostility when the favorable moment should arrive. Metternich's programme was stated in one of his confidential reports to his Emperor: "We must lead Germany to adopt our principles without our appearing to impose those principles upon her." This could not be done abruptly and harshly. Two personages were too powerful to be treated summarily, Alexander I of Russia and Frederick William III of Prussia. The former was in 1815 nothing less than a "Jacobin" in Metternich's opinion, as he was himself granting a constitution to Poland and favoring constitutionalism in Germany and Italy and elsewhere. Reaction could not be successful unless he should come to see the error of his ways. The King of Prussia had promised a constitution to his country as explicitly as a man could. Metternich was pre-eminently a man who knew how to bide his time, and who knew how, when the proper moment arrived, to strike hard. His time was not long in coming. Frederick William III was both procrastinating and timid.

Moreover, the reactionary party shortly after 1815 won ascendency at his court. Two years went by before he appointed the special committee to undertake the preparation of the promised constitution. Its report after a long and slow investigation was unfavorable to the project, which was finally allowed to drop. The Prussian Government slipped back easily into the old familiar autocratic grooves. According to Metternich the king's chief mental trait was "the repressive," and this gradually reasserted itself. More important was the change in Alexander I, who by 1818, for reasons that are somewhat obscure, had gone over to conservatism. With the rulers of Russia and Prussia in this state of mind Metternich's course was made easy. He was able to use certain current events to render himself incontestably the dominant personality in Europe, and to secure the prevalence of the Austrian principles of government far beyond the confines of Austria itself.

The years immediately succeeding 1815 were years of restlessness and uncertainty. The German Liberals were, as we have seen, indignant at the "great deception" of Vienna. But they hoped that at least the various states of Germany might be reformed along constitutional lines. Article XIII of the Federal Act rendered this possible, though it did not, to their great regret, ensure it. Here again was hope deferred, for as the years went by the signs that little had been gained in the direction of larger liberty multiplied. Only a few states entered the new path. The large ones stood aloof, and in many of the small ones the old régime was restored in its entirety by the returning princes and with a lamentable lack of humor. The disappointment of Liberals was intense, their criticism trenchant. The chief seat of disaffection was found in the universities and in newspapers edited by university men. As the subjection of these centers of agitation was to be the main object of Metternich's German policy, it is well to describe their activity.

The students of Jena had during the Napoleonic wars founded a society called the Burschenschaft, whose purpose was the inculcation of an intense national patriotism, the constant exaltation of the ideal of a common fatherland. Societies were nothing new in German universities, but the previous ones, the Corps, had included in their membership only those coming from the same state or province. They thus preserved that sense of localism which was the bane of German life. The Burschenschaft was based on the opposite principle of membership derived from all the different states, thus ignoring local lines, and teaching

NORTH SEA
KGD. of DEN
Duchy Holstein
HAMBURG
KGD. OF HANOVER
KGD. OF THE NETHERLANDS
Westphalia
Limburg
Jülich
Kleve-Berg
D. WALDECK
HESSE
ELECTORATE OF HESSE
KGD. OF BELGIUM
GR.D. OF LUXEMBURG
GR.D. OF HESSE
Lower Rhine
NASSAU
Bav. Palatinate
KINGD. of BAVARIA
KINGD. of WÜRTTEMBERG
KGD. OF FRANCE
REPUBLIC 1848-1852
Empire since 1852
SWITZERLAND
Savoy
KGD. OF SARDINIA
To 1861
Lombardy
MILAN
Helgoland
Brit. since 1807
Sylt
Schleswig
Flensburg
Lübeck
Altona
Hamburg
Groningen
Emden
Oldenburg
Bremen
Hanover
Zuider Sea
Amsterdam
The Hague
Leyden
Utrecht
Rotterdam
Osnabrück
Minden
Münster
Arnhem
Deventer
Wesel
Dortmund
Essen
Aachen
Liège
Namur
Maubeuge
Valenciennes
Cambrai
Bruges
Antwerp
Ghent
Courtrai
Brussels
Mechelin
Waterloo
Lille
Douai
Nov. 1813
Coblenz
Cologne
Bonn
Trier
Mainz
Frankfurt
Wiesbaden
Darmst.
Old Lichtenberg
Landau
Nov. 1815
Karlsruhe
Baden
Heilbronn
Stuttgart
Tübingen
Ulm
Augsburg
Hohenzollern
Constance
Basel
Zurich
Lucerne
Bern
Geneva
Lausanne
Sitten
Bellinzona
Chur
Vorarlberg
S. Gall
Liechtenstein
Memmingen
Sigmaringen
Freiburg
Milhausen
Belfort
Besançon
Dijon
Nancy
Strassburg
Metz
Thionville
Sedan
Reims
Troyes
Colmar
Epinal
Neufchâtel
Soleure
Macon
Lyon
Vienne
St. Etienne
Grenoble
Valence
Annecy
Aosta
Ivrea
Novara
Mayenne
Monza
Bergamo
Brescia
Pavia
Cremona
Mantua
Turin
Alessandria
Verceil
Lodi
Peschiera
Sondrio
Innsbruck
Meran
Trento
Verona
Villafranca
Tyrol
Inn
Adda
Po
Rhine
Rhône
Loire
Saône
Doubs
Meuse
Moselle
Main
Neckar
Danube
Elbe
Weser
Ems
Lippe
Aller
Leine
Oder
Saale
Elster
Mulde
Werra
Fulda
Eder
Lahn
Sieg
Ruhr
Wupper
Nahe
Queich
Kocher
Jagst
Tauber
Iller
Lech
Isar
Inn
Salzach
Traun
Enns
Drave
Mur
Save
Kulpa
Unna
Ems
Weser
Aller
Leine
Oder
Saale
Elbe


THE
GERMAN CONFEDERATION
1815-1866.
English Miles.
Empire of Austria
Kingdom of Prussia
The States belonging to the German Confederation are coloured all over.
ABBREVIATIONS:
Cust.- Custozza
Brnsw.- Brunswick
H.H.- Hessen-Homburg
K.H.- Elect. Hessia
Old.- Oldenburg
Sch.- Schaumkalden
S.L.- Schaumburg-Lippe
Sp.- Speyer
BALTIC SEA
Memel
Königsberg
Danzig
East Prussia
West Prussia
Province of Prussia
Pomerania
Prussia
Posen
Kgd. of Poland
EMPIRE OF RUSSIA
WARSAW
Silesia
Breslau
Bohemia
Moravia
Austria
Lower Austria
VIENNA
Galicia
Hungary
Budae Pest
Carniola
Slavonia
Military Frontier
Croatia
Bornholm
Rügia
Stettin
Frankfurt
Dresden
Prague
Elbe
Brünn
Olmütz
Tabor
Leoben
Graz
Laibach
Agram
Fünfkirchen
Mohacs
Essek
Pozega
Fiume
Istria
Cracow
Lodz
Kalisch
Thorn
Marienwerder
Osterode
Johannisburg
Soldau
Ostrolenka
Plock
Włocławek
Praga
Radom
Lublin
Kielce
Sandomierz
Jaroslawitz
Ivangorod
Petrikau
Czenstochau
Oppeln
Ratibor
Troppau
Teschen
Neutmarkt
N. Sandez
Jaroslav
Tarnov
Hesmark
Eperies
Kashau
Erlau
Debrecain
Gr. Wardein
Presburg
Komorn
Gran
Raab
Papa
Stuhlweissenburg
Steinamanger
Neustadt
Odenburg
Wallzen
Pesth
Neusohl
Shemnitz
Fokaz
Grenczin
Iglau
Znaim
Nikolsbg
Krems
Melk
Linz
Steyr
Salzburg
Inspruck
Trieste
Udine
Milan
Verona
Mantua
Venice
Padua
Vicenza
Trent
Botzen
Brixen
Lemberg
Kolberg
Köslin
Lauenbg
Marienburg
Elbing
Insterburg
Gumbinnen
Ilsit
Tilsit
Memel
Kulm
Graudenz
Strasburg
Gollub
Rawa
Gnesen
Kustrin
Frankfurt
Oder
Neisse
Glatz
Königgrätz
Josephstadt
Reichenberg
Zittau
Gitschin
Schweidnitz
Kreibowitz
Liegnitz
Glogau
Sagan
Kutoschin
Ostrowo
Gosino
Xions
Warthe
Netze
Weichsel
Bug
Narew
Pilica
Nida
San
Dniester
Theiss
Maros
Drave
Save
Kulpa
Unna
Una
Sinai 1849
Militairy Frontier
Since 1849
Adelsberg
Carniola
Carlstadt
Warasdin
Cilli
Marburg
Kanizsa
Kaschau
Kaposvar
Mur
Drave
Danube
Theiss
Maros
Save
Kulpa
Unna
Una
Pesth
Budae
Hungary
Croatia
Slavonia
Military Frontier
Istria
Fiume
Carniola
Laibach
Cilli
Graz
Leoben

a larger duty, a larger devotion, a larger idea of association. Glowing patriotism was the characteristic of the new organization. It soon succeeded in establishing chapters in sixteen universities. It was decided to hold a meeting of representatives of all the chapters and to give it the character of a patriotic celebration. The place chosen was the Wartburg, a castle famous as the shelter of Luther after his outlawry at the Diet of Worms, and the date chosen was October 18, 1817, famous as being the fourth anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, and approximately the three hundredth of the posting of Luther's Theses. Several hundred students met. Their festival was religious as well as patriotic. They partook of the Lord's Supper together and listened to impassioned speeches commemorating the great moments in German history, the liberation from Rome and the liberation from Napoleon. In the evening they built a bonfire and threw into it various symbols of the hated reaction, notably an illiberal pamphlet of which the King of Prussia had expressed his approval. They then dispersed, but their deed lived after them. This student performance had unexpected consequences. What was apparently a harmless and exuberant jollification seemed to conservative rulers and statesmen evidence of an unhealthy and dangerous ferment of opinion, and the rumors that gained currency about this celebration made it famous. It enjoyed a reputation altogether out of proportion to its real importance, which was slight. Metternich described it to the German rulers as a portent of far greater dangers sure to come. Shortly an event much more alarming occurred which seemed to justify this prognostication, the murder of Kotzebue, a journalist and playwright, who was hated by the students as a spy of Russia in Germany. A divinity student, Karl Sand, went to his house in Mannheim and stabbed him in the heart, March 23, 1819. Later an attempt was made to assassinate an important official of the government of Nassau. These and other occurrences played perfectly into the hands of Metternich, who was seeking the means of establishing reaction in Germany as it had been established in Austria. They gave him what he most needed, a weapon whereby to dissuade Alexander I and Frederick William III from all further toying with liberalism and to convert the Holy Alliance, hitherto a mere trumpet for biblical phrases, into an engine of oppression. Were not all of these occurrences manifestations of the same anarchical spirit, the desire to overthrow monarchical institutions? All were indiscriminately ascribed to the Burschenschaft, whereas it had only been responsible for the

Wartburg festival. The steps now taken to combat liberalism, which was charged with such unequal misdeeds, form a landmark in German history.

Metternich, having previously had an interview with Frederick William III, in which he was assured of the latter's support in the policy to be outlined to silence the opposition, called the ministers of those German governments of which he felt sure to a series of conferences at Carlsbad. In these conferences was fashioned the triumph of reaction in Germany. By the decrees which were adopted Metternich became the conqueror of the Confederation. Only eight states were represented, those upon which Metternich could count. The decrees there drawn up were then submitted to the Diet at Frankfort, all the customary modes of procedure of that body were cast aside, and a vote with no preceding debate was forced, so that the representatives of the states who had not been at Carlsbad did not have time to ask instructions of their Governments. Thus the decrees, rushed by illegal and violent methods through the Diet, became the law of Germany, binding upon every state. They were the work of Austria, seconded by Prussia. The small states resented the indignity to which they had been subjected but could do nothing. Carlsbad signifies in German history the suppression of liberty for a generation. As these decrees really determined the political system of Germany until 1848, they merit a full description.

It was stated once for all that the famous Article XIII of the act establishing the German Confederation, namely, that "a constitution based upon the system of estates will be established in all the states of the union" should not be interpreted as meaning constitutions of a foreign pattern, but representation of estates such as had been customary in German states even earlier. It was the earnest desire of the Liberals to get away from such old and useless assemblies. The great forces active against the prevalence of Metternich's system were free parliaments, free speech, and a free press. It was hoped that the first of these was thus prevented.

It was next provided that there should be at every university in the land a special representative to watch both professors and students. The function of these agents should be "to see to the strictest enforcement of existing laws and disciplinary regulations; to observe carefully the spirit which is shown by the instructors in the university in their public lectures and regular courses, and, without directly interfering in scientific matters, or in the methods of teaching, to give a salutary direction to

the instruction, having in view the future attitude of the students." It was provided that all teachers who should "propagate harmful doctrines hostile to public order or subversive of existing governmental institutions," that is, all who should not hold absolutism, as Metternich understood it, to be the only legitimate form of government, should be removed from their positions, and that once so removed they should not be appointed to positions in any other educational institution in any state. Other provisions were directed against secret or unauthorized societies in the universities, particularly that "association established some years since under the name" of the Burschenschaft, "since the very conception of the society implies the utterly unallowable plan of permanent fellowship and constant communication between the various universities." Furthermore "no student, who shall be expelled from a university by a decision of the University Senate which was ratified or prompted by the agent of the government, or who shall have left the institution in order to escape such a decision, shall be received in any other university." [1]

By these provisions it was expected that the entire academic community, professors and students, would be reduced to silence. The universities had become the centers of political agitation. That agitation would now cease under compulsion. There was one other enemy, the press, and drastic provisions were adopted to smother its independence beneath a comprehensive censorship. Finally, a special commission was created to ferret out all secret revolutionary societies and conspiracies that might threaten the nation, and this commission was to have full powers to examine and arrest any German, no matter of what state he might be a citizen. It discovered very little, but it pursued for years a policy as vexatious as it was petty.

The Carlsbad Conference is an important turning point in the history of central Europe. It signalized the dominance of Metternich in Germany as well as in Austria. Its most important feature is the surrender of Prussia to Austrian leadership. Down to 1819 there was ground for hope that Prussia might be a leader, though a cautious one, in the liberalization of Germany. That hope now vanished. Reaction was henceforth the order of the day in this great state. Frederick William III shortly abandoned definitely all idea of granting the constitution which he had promised in 1815. In the period of national humiliation

[1] Quotations are from University of Pennsylvania *Translations and Reprints*, Vol. I, No. 3. Edited by J. H. Robinson.

from 1807 to 1813 a notably liberal spirit had characterized the actions of the Prussian Government. Many reforms had been effected at the instigation of such men as Stein. But the period was too brief and the reforms remained incomplete. It was expected that they would be perfected after 1815, but now it was clear that they would not. Indeed, in some respects, though fortunately not in all, the liberal achievements of those years were curtailed. But after 1819 the period of full reaction came in. In many respects this period was more odious in Prussia than in any other state. The persecution of "demagogues" was a sorry spectacle, as it was in reality largely a persecution of men who should have had all honor shown them as national heroes. Jahn, the founder of gymnastic societies, which had been most effective in nerving the young men of Prussia to heroic action, was for five years subjected to the inquisition of the police and to severe imprisonment, only to be discharged because nothing could be found against him meriting punishment. Arndt, whose impassioned poems had intensified the national patriotism in the wars against Napoleon, was shamefully treated. His house was searched, his papers were ransacked. The charges against him show the triviality of this petty police inquisition. One official discovered revolution in the expression "that lies beyond my sphere." Sphere meant a ball, a ball, a bullet. Was not that a summons to insurrection and murder? Arndt indignantly protested that he hated "all secret intrigues like snakes of hell." Nevertheless he was removed from his professorship and for twenty years was prevented from pursuing his vocation. Private letters were systematically opened by the police in the search for some trace of revolution. Even Gneisenau, despite his brilliant record as a soldier, had four years to experience this invasion of his private rights. Spies went to hear the sermons of the most popular preacher in Berlin, Schleiermacher, and reported it as a highly suspicious circumstance that he had said that we owe to Christ the liberation of all spiritual forces and that every true Christian must believe that the kingdom of truth will conquer the kingdom of darkness. A publisher was forbidden to bring out a new edition of Fichte's *Address to the German Nation*, which had so splendidly stirred the youth of Prussia in the years of Napoleon's supremacy.

This was, in the opinion of all Liberals, the great treason of Prussia, this abdication of independent judgment, this docile surrender to the leadership of Austria. "Prussia," said Metternich to the Russion ambassador, "has left us the place which many Germans wished to give to her."

The situation was much the same in the other German states. With Austria and Prussia hand in glove, there was little opportunity for the lesser states. The spirit of the Carlsbad Decrees hung heavily over all Germany. Made even stronger the following year by the Vienna Conference of 1820, this system remained in force until the decade beginning with 1840. The revolutions of 1830 brought forth additional decrees in 1832 and 1834 intensifying the persecution of the academic world and of politicians suspected of liberalism. Metternich had succeeded in extending his system over the German Confederation. We shall now see how other countries were affected by the same system, how its influence expanded still further.

CHAPTER III

REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND ITALY

SPAIN

The fundamental purpose of the rulers of Europe after 1815, as we have seen, was to prevent the "revolution," as they called it, from again breaking out; in other words, to prevent democratic and constitutional ideas from once more becoming dominant. The precautions taken by these conservatives passed in the political language of the time as the Metternich system. Sufficient precautions had been taken, as we have seen, in central Europe. France was powerless to disturb for a long while to come. England was stiffly loyal to her old régime. But just as order seemed solidly re-established events occurred in the two southern peninsulas of Europe, Spain and Italy, which showed that a system of repression to be successful must be Argus-eyed and omnipresent. It is necessary, therefore, at this point to trace briefly the history of southern Europe that we may understand the events of 1820, the first real challenge of the Metternich system.

In 1808 Napoleon had by an act of violence seized the crown of Spain, and until 1814 had kept the Spanish king, Ferdinand VII, virtually a prisoner in France, placing his own brother Joseph on the vacant throne. The Spaniards rose against the usurper and for years carried on a vigorous guerilla warfare, aided by the English, and ending finally in success. As their king was in the hands of the enemy they proceeded in his name to frame a government. Being liberally minded they drew up a constitution, the famous Constitution of 1812, a document thoroughly saturated with the principles of the French Constitution of 1791. It asserted the sovereignty of the people, vesting the executive power in the king, the legislative in the Cortes or Assembly, a body consisting of a single chamber and elected by indirect universal suffrage, the citizens of the colonies having the same right to vote as did those of the mother country. Some of the features of the French Constitution which had worked

badly were nevertheless adopted. Deputies were to be chosen for two years and to be ineligible for re-election. Ministers might not be members of the chamber. Henceforth the Cortes were to be the central organ of government, the king being very subordinate. He might not leave the country without their consent, nor marry, nor might he dissolve or prorogue the Assembly, and in the intervals between the sessions a committee of the Cortes was to watch over the execution of the Constitution and the laws. The Constitution proclaimed the principles of liberty and equality before the law, thus abolishing the old régime. The extreme liberality of this Constitution is explained by the fact that it was the work of deputies coming in the main from the coast provinces, which were more democratic than the others. The classes hitherto dominant in Spain, the nobility and the clergy, for the time being lost their supremacy. The Constitution was the work of a small minority, was never submitted to the people for ratification, and its durability was therefore problematical. Indeed, its doom was sealed by the reappearance in Spain, on the downfall of Napoleon, of the legitimate king, Ferdinand VII.

This prince, now restored to his throne, was ill-fitted for rule, both by temperament and training. Cruel, suspicious, deceitful, unscrupulous, his character was odious, his intellect lacked all distinction. His education had been woefully neglected, nor had experience taught him anything of statesmanship. He had not used his leisure as Napoleon's prisoner for reading or the study of political questions. But, instead, he had embroidered with his own hands a robe of white silk with ornaments of gold for the Madonna of the altar of the church at Valençay, a fact which was made known to the Spanish people by his confessor. Indeed, the pamphlet which contained this edifying announcement went through seven editions in a short time, — a fact that not only paints the King but his people as well.

There was every reason to expect that such a man would thrust aside the paper constitution which so greatly limited his power, if he felt able to do so. The boundlessly enthusiastic, even hysterical manner in which the Spaniards received him convinced him that he could go to any length. The Constitution of 1812 had the support of only a very small minority of the educated people. The nobility, the clergy, many of the leaders of the army, and the ignorant and fanatical populace wanted a king of the old type. The King, seeing the way made plain, promptly took action. Before he reached his capital he de-

clared the Constitution and the decrees of the Cortes null and void, "as if these things had never been done." By this stroke and the rapturous acquiescence of the people absolutism was restored. A furious reaction began, a wild hunt for everyone in any way connected with the recent history of Spain. Liberals and those who had adhered to Joseph, Napoleon's brother, were persecuted. The Inquisition was re-established; the Jesuits returned in triumph. The press was gagged once more. Liberal books were destroyed wherever found, and particularly all copies of the Constitution. Thousands of political prisoners were punished with varying severity. Ferdinand would probably have been forced into a reactionary policy by his own people and by the other powers of Europe, even had his personal inclinations not prompted him to it. But this reaction was much too furious, lasted too long, and in the end weakened the King's position.

The Government of Ferdinand, vigorous in punishing Liberals, was utterly incompetent and indolent in other matters. Spain, a country of about eleven million people, was wretchedly poor and ignorant. Agriculture was primitive. Commerce and industry were shackled by monopolies and unreasonable prohibitions upon exportation and importation. Industrial activity was further lessened by the large number of saints' days, which were carefully observed. What education there was was in the hands of ecclesiastics. The Government of Ferdinand made no attempt to improve these deplorable conditions. But in addition to all this it failed to discharge the most fundamental duty of any government, that is, to preserve the integrity of the empire. The vast transatlantic possessions of Spain had risen in revolt. The reasons for this revolt, which presaged the downfall of the proud Spanish Empire, were: the continued and varied misgovernment of the home country which regarded the colonies as simply sources of wealth to be ingeniously exploited for the benefit of the home government, the taste of relative freedom they had enjoyed between 1810 and 1815 when the home government was otherwise occupied, the example of the United States and its successful war of independence, and the encouragement of England, seeking wider markets. Ferdinand could probably have kept his empire intact had he been willing to make the concessions demanded by the Americans, larger commercial liberty and considerable political autonomy. This he would not do. He would rule his empire as it had always been ruled, his colonies as he ruled the mother country. The result was revolution from Mexico to the southern tip of South America. Ferdinand's task

was to reconquer this vast region by force. This force he did not have. He hoped for the support of the Holy Alliance, which, however, was not forthcoming. He, therefore, was thrown upon his own resources. By 1819 he had collected an army of over twenty thousand men at Cadiz. Suddenly the army rose in revolt against the Government, and the first of those revolutions of southern Europe against the restored monarchs occurred.

With singular lack of perspicacity, the restored Bourbons of Spain had neglected or insulted the army, the very weapon which reaction in the other countries of Europe had taken every means to conciliate and win. Many of the ablest officers had been degraded; poor rations, poor barracks, insufficient pay, in arrears at that, had created a feeling of deep irritation in the army, which became the breeding place of conspiracies, the real revolutionary element in the state. The navy, too, so essential for the preservation of a transoceanic colonial empire, had been allowed to fall into the most shameful decay until it consisted of but little else than the king's own pleasure yachts. The officers were utterly poor. The only relief the Government granted them was permission to support themselves by fishing.

Under such conditions military outbreaks were natural. Insurrections occurred repeatedly, in 1814, 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818 and 1819. The failure in each case only increased the severity with which the Government pursued all those suspected of liberalism. In 1820 the army rose again, driven to desperation by the stories of horror told by soldiers returning from America, and believing that they were about to be sent to certain death.

On January 1, 1820, Riego, a colonel in the army, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812 and led a few troops through the province of Andalusia, endeavoring to arouse the south of Spain. He was unsuccessful. His force gradually dwindled away, attracting no popular support. But it had served its purpose. As the revolution was dying out in the south it kindled in the opposite end of the peninsula, under the Pyrenees and along the Ebro. The Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed there and the flames spread eastward to the great cities of Saragossa and Barcelona. Shortly riots broke out in Madrid itself. The King, learning that he could not rely upon his soldiers even in his capital, and thoroughly frightened, yielded to the demands of the scattered and incoherent revolution, and on the evening of March 7, 1820, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, promised to maintain it, and declared that he would harry out of the country those who would not support it. "Let us advance

frankly," he said, "myself leading the way, along the constitutional path." The text of the Constitution was posted in every city, and parish priests were ordered to expound it to their congregations.

Thus revolution had triumphed again, and only five years after Waterloo. An absolute monarchy, based on divine right, had been changed into a constitutional monarchy based on the sovereignty of the people. Would the example be followed elsewhere? Would the Holy Alliance look on in silence? Had the revolutionary spirit been so carefully smothered in Austria, Germany, and France, only to blaze forth in outlying sections of Europe? Answers to these questions were quickly forthcoming.

ITALY

In the leisure of St. Helena, Napoleon I wrote, concerning Italy: "Italy is surrounded by the Alps and the sea. Her natural limits are defined with as much exactitude as if she were an island. Italy is only united to the continent by one hundred and fifty leagues of frontier and these one hundred and fifty leagues are fortified by the highest barrier that can be opposed to man. Italy, isolated between her natural limits, is destined to form a great and powerful nation. Italy is one nation; unity of language, customs and literature, must, within a period more or less distant, unite her inhabitants under one sole government. And Rome will, without the slightest doubt, be chosen by the Italians as their capital." [1]

Napoleon was now in a position where he was powerless to aid in this achievement, even had he been so disposed. But the time was very fresh in men's minds when they believed that the great commander was to use his talent and opportunity to give them unity and freedom. He had not done so. Yet in a very real sense modern Italy began under his empire. He took the country a long step forward toward its ideal.

Napoleon's activity in Italy had been most revolutionary. He had driven all the native princes from the peninsula. Only the kings of Naples and Piedmont still retained some semblance of authority, for each fortunately had an island to which he could flee, whence the French could not drive him, as the British controlled the sea. The former spent several years in Sicily, the latter in the island of Sardinia. Napoleon did not formally

1 Cesaresco, *The Liberation of Italy*, 3.

unite all Italy, but he annexed a part directly to the French Empire, a part he made into the Kingdom of Italy, with himself as King and his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, as Viceroy, and the remainder constituted the Kingdom of Naples, over which Murat, brother-in-law of Napoleon, ruled. Thus, though there was not unity, there were only three states where formerly there had been a dozen. Yet, in an important sense, there was unity, for it was the directing mind of the French Emperor that permeated and largely controlled the policy of all three. The French did much for the regeneration of Italy. They abolished feudalism, they gave uniform and enlightened laws, they opened careers to talent, they stimulated industry. New ideas, political and social, penetrated the peninsula with them. Italians henceforth would never be the same as they had been. Barriers, physical, material, intellectual, had been thrown down, and could never be permanently set up again. Of course there was the reverse. The burdens imposed in the place of those removed were heavy. Napoleon made the Italians a part of his general European system and forced them to give freely of their money and their men for purposes that concerned them only slightly, if at all. Sixty thousand Italians perished in his wars in Spain and Russia. His shameless robbery of their works of art gave deep offense. His treatment of the Pope wounded many in their religious sensibilities, and he ignored the national sentiment whenever he chose. Yet the later achievement of unity and liberty was made much easier because Napoleon had passed that way. He shook the country out of its century-old somnolence. Service in his armies increased the strenuousness of the Italians and taught them the art of war. The very fact that they had witnessed and participated in great events imparted an unknown energy to these easy-going sons of the south. Napoleon had exiled every one of the Italian princes. They might be restored, but their prestige was irrevocably gone. He had even driven the Pope from his states, and had abolished the temporal power. What had been done once might perhaps be done again. There had been for a few years a state bearing the name Kingdom of Italy. The memory of that fact could not be uprooted by all the monarchs of Christendom. It was an augury full of hope, a beacon pointing the sure and steadfast way.

Of all this the Allies, at their famous Congress of Vienna, took no note. They were playing the short politics of the hour. They paid no attention to the impalpable forces of the human spirit. They looked upon the future of Italy as a matter quite

at their disposal and they reconstructed the peninsula without asking its opinion or consent. A people numbering more than seventeen million had nothing to say about its own fate. The mighty men of Europe sitting in Vienna considered that their affair. And they arranged it by returning Italy to the state of a geographical expression. They did not give it even as much unity as they gave Germany, not even that of a loose confederation. They made short shrift of all such suggestions and restored most of the old states. There were henceforth ten of them: Piedmont, Lombardy-Venetia, Parma, Modena, Lucca, Tuscany, the Papal States, Naples, Monaco, and San Marino. Genoa and Venice, until recently independent republics, were not restored, as republics were not "fashionable." The one was given to Piedmont, the other to Austria.

These states were too small to be self-sufficient, and as a result Italy was for nearly fifty years the sport of foreign powers, dependent, henceforth, not upon France but upon Austria. This is the cardinal fact in the situation and is an evidence, as it is a partial cause, of the commanding position of the Austrian monarchy after the fall of Napoleon. Austria was given outright the richest part of the Po valley as a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. Austrian princes or princesses ruled over Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, and were easily brought into the Austrian system. Thus was Austria the master of northern Italy; master of southern Italy, too, for Ferdinand, King of Naples, concluded an offensive and defensive treaty with Austria, pledging himself to make no separate alliances and to grant no liberties to his subjects beyond those which obtained in Lombardy and Venetia. Naples was thus but a satellite in the great Austrian system. The King of Piedmont and the Pope were the only Italian princes at all likely to be intractable. And Austria's strength in comparison with theirs was that of a giant compared with that of a pigmy.

Thus the restoration was accomplished. Italy became again a collection of small states, largely under the dominance of Austria. Each of the restored princes was an absolute monarch. In none of the states was there a parliament. Italy had neither unity nor constitutional forms, nor any semblance of popular participation in the government. The use which the princes made of their unfettered liberty of action was significant.

Of these several states the four most important were: the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, the Kingdom of Sardinia or Piedmont, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples.

The first was ruled by a viceroy, who carried out orders received from Vienna. It paid into the Austrian treasury taxes far out of proportion to its population or its extent. Here French laws were largely abrogated, and an attempt was made to make the people forget that they were Italians, and to consider themselves Austrians. Children were taught in their textbooks of geography that Lombardy and Venetia were geographically a part of Austria. Industries were repressed in favor of Austrian manufacturers. Austrians were appointed to the university professorships, and they and their students, as well as other persons, were watched by numerous and proficient spies. It was even considered necessary to edit Dante that he might be read with safety.

The King of Piedmont, Victor Emmanuel I, had been for many years an exile in the island of Sardinia, and his states had been annexed by Napoleon to France. He returned to Turin enraged against the author of all his woes. Saying jokingly that he had slept fifteen years, he resolved that Piedmont should regard the interval as a dream. Most of the laws and institutions introduced by France were abolished by a stroke of the pen, almost the only ones retained being those which the Piedmontese would gladly have seen go, the heaviest taxes and the police system. Most of those connected with the government and the army during the French period were removed from their positions, thus constituting at the outset a disaffected class. Religious liberty was narrowly circumscribed; political liberty did not exist, nor did liberty of education. The universities were shortly placed under the control of the Jesuits, and professors and students were spied upon. Some of the deeds of reaction were so absurd as to become classical illustrations of the stupidity of the restored princes. Gas illumination of the Turin theater was abandoned because it had been introduced by the French. French plants in the Botanic Gardens of Turin were torn up, French furniture in the royal palaces destroyed, and a certain custom house official would let no merchandise be brought over the new Napoleonic road over the Mont Cenis pass, lest revolutionary ideas might thus be smuggled in. But, however unwise and retrogressive this government might be, it followed in foreign affairs a policy of independence of Austrian influence as far as this was possible. Piedmont was a military state, having an army altogether disproportionate to its size. Indeed, three-fourths of the revenues of the state went to the support of the army and navy.

The Papal States were peculiar among the governments of Europe. The Pope was their ruler. The Government was in the hands of the priests. Over each of the provinces and legations was a prelate. All the higher officials were of the clergy. The laity were admitted only to the lower positions. Taxes were high, yet papal finances were badly disorganized, and the Government had difficulty in meeting running expenses. An important source of income of this Christian, priestly state was the lottery, which was administered with religious ceremonies, and was even kept running Sundays. The Government could not even assure the personal safety of its citizens. Brigandage was rife, and the Pope was forced finally to make a formal treaty with the brigands, by which they were to give themselves up as prisoners for a year, after which they were to be pensioned. Though bigoted and corrupt, the Government had a keen scent for the evils of the French régime. It repealed most of the French laws, and even forbade vaccination and gas illumination, as odious reminders of that people. The police were numerous and vexatious, paying particular attention to what one of their documents characterized as "the class called thinkers." The Inquisition was restored and judicial torture revived. Education was controlled by the clergy. Even in the universities most of the professors were ecclesiastics and the curriculum was carefully purged of all that might be dangerous. This excluded, among other subjects, modern literature and political economy. Niebuhr, the German historian, thus recorded his impression of that state: "No land of Italy, perhaps of Europe, excepting Turkey, is ruled as is this ecclesiastical state." Rome was called "a city of ruins, both material and moral."

In the south, covering three-eighths of the peninsula, was the Kingdom of Naples, or the Two Sicilies. The king, Ferdinand I, was of the Spanish Bourbon line. He was incredibly ignorant, and in character detestable. Returning from Sicily, however, he did not imitate his contemporaries by abolishing everything French. "Civil institutions," says a recent historian, "had advanced four centuries in the nine years of French rule." [1] But while in theory much of the work of those years was allowed to remain, in practice the Government was hopelessly corrupt. The King's treatment of the army was such as to raise up in it many enemies to his power. Many who had served under Murat were cashiered. Whipping was restored, which angered the common

[1] King, *History of Italian Unity*, I, 87.

soldier. Thus there grew up rapidly a military faction ripe for revolt.

Obviously the policy of the various princes, as just described, made many enemies: all the progressive elements of the population who believed in freedom in education, in religion, in business, and who saw special privileges restored, obsolete commercial regulations revived, arbitrary and ignorant government substituted for the freer and more intelligent administration of the French; and all those thrown out of employment in the civil service or the army. The malcontents joined the Carbonari, a secret society which first rose in the Kingdom of Naples, spreading thence over Italy and to other European countries. Their weapons were conspiracy and insurrection. In a country where no parliaments, no political parties, no public agitation for political ends were permitted, such activity was necessarily driven into secret channels. The Carbonari had an elaborate but loose and ineffective organization. Their rules and forms were frequently childish and absurd. Their purposes were not clear or definite. They were a vast liberal organization much better adapted for spasmodic movements of destruction than for the construction of new institutions. Into this society poured the dissatisfied of every class. It was a revolutionary leaven working in Italian society, spreading abroad a hatred of the restored princes, a desire for change.

Among a people living under such depressing conditions the news of the successful and bloodless Spanish Revolution of 1820 spread quickly. It was the spark to the tinder. In Naples a military insurrection broke out, of such apparent strength that the king yielded at once. The revolutionists demanded the Spanish Constitution of 1812, not because they knew much about it save that it was very democratic but because it possessed the advantage of being ready-made. The King conceded the demand, saying that he would have been glad to have granted a constitution before had he only known there was a general desire for one. He was apparently as enthusiastic as were the revolutionists. He went out of his way to show this in a most extraordinary fashion. On July 13, 1820, having heard mass in the royal chapel, he approached the altar, took the oath, and then, fixing his eyes upon the cross, he added of his own accord, "Omnipotent God, who with infinite penetration lookest into the heart and into the future, if I lie, or if I should one day be faithless to my oath, do Thou at this instant annihilate me." It seemed as if the era of constitutional government had come for more than a third of Italy.

THE CONGRESSES

Thus in 1820 the Revolution, so hateful to the diplomats of 1815, had resumed the offensive. Spain and Naples had overthrown the régime that had been in force five years, and had adopted constitutions that were thoroughly saturated with the principles and mechanism of Revolutionary France. There had likewise been a revolution against the established régime in Portugal. There was shortly to be one in Piedmont.

A matter of greater importance than the attitude of these peoples toward their governments was that of the governments toward the peoples. The powers had united to put down Napoleon. They had then taken every precaution to check the activity of so-called French principles. They had been in the main successful, but now those principles were asserting themselves triumphantly in outlying parts of Europe. It had been thought that future trouble would come from France; but, instead, it was coming from Spain and Italy.

Metternich, the most influential personage in Europe, had very clear views of the requirements of the situation. "The malady," as he called it, the unrest of the times, was not local or peculiar to one part of Europe, to any single country. To suppress this malady the Great Coalition had been built up which, after endless suffering and sacrifice, had overcome it, though it had not extirpated it. What it had cost so much to check, must be kept in check. The vitality of these subversive revolutionary principles was evident to all. Energetic measures were necessary and, to be successful, they must be applied everywhere and at all times. If a monarch in one state yielded to revolution the effects were not limited to that state or that monarch, but the revolutionary parties everywhere were encouraged and the stability of every throne, of the established order everywhere, was threatened. This was conspicuously shown by the recent events. A revolution in Spain encourages a revolution in Naples. The movement may spread northward sympathetically, may reach the Italian possessions of Austria, may reach Austria itself, France, and the other countries, and the world, supposed to have been quieted at Vienna, will riot once more in anarchy. Metternich thus showed that no state can in the modern age lead an isolated life. The life of Europe henceforth must be collective and anything that threatens its peace is a very proper subject for the discussion of Europe, collected in congresses.

Metternich in this way developed the doctrine of the "right of intervention," a doctrine new in international law, yet one to which he succeeded in giving great vitality for many years. The doctrine was that, as modern Europe was based upon opposition to revolution, the powers had the right and were in duty bound to intervene to put down revolution not only in their own states respectively but in any state of Europe, against the will of the people of that state, even against the will of the sovereign of that state, in the interests of the established monarchical order. A change of government within a given state was not a domestic but an international affair.

This doctrine did not originate in 1820. The principle was clearly laid down in the treaty of Quadruple Alliance of 1815 as far as France was concerned. It had been elaborated at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. There the five Great Powers had declared their purpose to maintain the general peace which was "founded on a religious respect for the engagements contained in the Treaties, and for the whole of the rights resulting therefrom." The phrase was vague because the powers could not agree on anything more definite. How much did it mean or might it be made to mean? Would revolutionary movements in any country be considered as justifying intervention in the interests of the sacred treaties? The opportunity to test the matter had now arisen. Metternich, as usual, was quite equal to the occasion. A congress was called at Troppau to consider the affairs of the Kingdom of Naples. Austria, Russia, Prussia, France, and England were represented. Unanimity was lacking but there was a majority for the ominous principle. The three eastern powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, absolute monarchies, now formally accepted the principle of intervention as laid down by Metternich. They would refuse to recognize as legal changes brought about in any state by revolution, even if the king of that state himself consented. They asserted their right to intervene to overthrow any such changes, first by using conciliatory methods, then by using force. This probably meant an immediate armed intervention wherever and whenever revolution might break out. And the right so to intervene was held to be implicit in the treaties of 1815 on which the European system rested. From this view England dissented vigorously, declaring that in her opinion the powers by those treaties intended to guarantee to each other only their territorial possessions, not at all their form of government. That was a domestic concern. England and France, though not signing the

new declaration, remained, however, merely passive and the absolute monarchies had their way.

Having established the principle the Congress next decided to apply it to the Kingdom of Naples. They accordingly adjourned to Laibach, inviting the King of Naples to meet them there. The Neapolitan Parliament was opposed to letting him leave the kingdom and only finally consented after he had again sworn to the constitution, and had with facile duplicity declared that he wished to go solely to intercede for his people and "to obtain the sanction of the powers for the newly acquired liberties." Falsehoods with Ferdinand I were redundant and superfluous. "I declare to you," he said, "and to my nation that I will do everything to leave my people in the possession of a wise and free constitution." Parliament, deceived by the royal mendacity, permitted him to go. No sooner was he out of his realm than he retracted all his promises and oaths and appealed to the Allies to restore him to absolute power, which was precisely what they had already determined to do. Austria was commissioned to send an army into the kingdom. It did so. The opposition of the Neapolitans was ineffective and Ferdinand was restored to absolutism by foreigners in 1821. He broke his return journey at Florence in order to make the *amende honorable* to a probably outraged Deity by placing a votive lamp in the Church of the Annunciation.

The political results were for the Neapolitans most deplorable. The reaction that ensued was unrestrained. Hundreds were imprisoned, exiled, executed. Arbitrary government of the worst kind was henceforth meted out to this unfortunate kingdom.

Just as this Neapolitan revolution was being snuffed out an insurrection blazed forth at the opposite end of the peninsula, in Piedmont. The causes of this movement were discontent at the stupid reaction of the last five years, the desire for constitutional government, and dislike of Austria. The insurgents were led to believe that they would have the support of Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, head of a younger branch of the royal family and heir presumptive to the crown, as his relations with Liberals were known to be intimate. His political importance was considered great owing to his nearness to the throne. As the king, Victor Emmanuel I, had no son, the crown would upon his death pass to his brother, Charles Felix, and upon the latter's death, he, too, being without direct heir, Charles Albert would himself become king.

The Piedmontese revolution broke out in Alessandria on

March 10, 1821. The revolutionists demanded the Spanish Constitution and war against Austria as the great enemy of Piedmont and of Italy. The King wavered for several days. He did not wish a civil war, Piedmontese fighting Piedmontese, which would surely come if he should refuse the demands and attempt to put down the movement. On the other hand, he knew that if he should grant those demands, the powers would intervene to suppress constitutionalism here as they had done in Naples and his promises would have been in vain. Unable to decide between the cruel alternatives of civil war or foreign intervention and conquest, and discovering no other course to follow, he abdicated on March 13, in favor of his brother Charles Felix. As the latter was not in Piedmont at the time, Charles Albert was appointed regent, until his arrival. Charles Albert, therefore, exercised the royal power for the moment and in a manner favorable to the revolutionists. He allowed the Spanish Constitution to be proclaimed from the royal palace in Turin "with such modifications as His Majesty, in agreement with the national representation, shall consider advisable." The new King shortly disavowed these concessions. The whole imbroglio was cut short by the action of the powers. An Austrian army was already on the borders and a hundred thousand Russians were ordered forward from Galicia. The revolutionists clashed at Novara with an army composed of Austrians and Piedmontese loyal to the King. They were easily routed and the revolution was over. Charles Felix, an absolutist king, was upon the throne, and Austria had again showed her resolution and her power. Once more the demand for constitutional freedom had been suppressed, once more Metternich had triumphed.

Thus both the Italian movements for a freer political life had ended in disaster. The reasons for their failure are instructive and are important for an understanding of the Italian problem. The Neapolitan revolution failed because of the European coalition forbidding its success, because of the treachery of the King, because of the illiberal treatment of Sicily by the revolutionists. That of Piedmont failed because it was the work of a small clique, had no broad basis of appeal to the people, lacked leadership and definite aims, neglected details, and also because of the opposition of the powers.

Thus two revolutions had been overcome and the system of the Congress of Vienna preserved in Italy. There remained the more remote problem of Spain. The principle there, however, was the same and the Allies felt obliged to assert it. This was the

work of the Congress of Verona. The revolution in Spain was still triumphant. The King and the reactionary parties could not by their own strength regain their old position. They appealed to the allied monarchs and by 1822 the latter, thoroughly committed to the policy involved, decided at the Congress of Verona, that Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, should send to their ministers in Madrid identical notes demanding the immediate restoration of Ferdinand VII to the fulness of his powers. In the event of the expected refusal the ministers should quit Madrid and war should be declared. England opposed this policy with high indignation, but in vain. France, now a thoroughly reactionary country, was commissioned to carry out the work of restoring Ferdinand. The Spaniards refused to accede to the demand of the powers, and in April 1823 a French army of a hundred thousand under the Duke of Angoulême, heir presumptive to the French throne, crossed the Pyrenees. The Spanish Government had no army and no money and could not oppose the advance of the invaders with any vigor. The French spent six months in traversing the peninsula from north to south, meeting no serious resistance. The Cortes retired from Madrid to Cadiz before the invaders, taking the King with them. The siege of Cadiz was now begun. The war was soon over with the seizure of the fort of the Trocadero and Ferdinand was back upon his absolute throne, by act of France, supported by the Holy Alliance.

There now began a period of odious reaction. All the acts passed by the Cortes since 1820 were annulled. An organization called the "Society of the Exterminating Angel" began a mad hunt for Liberals, throwing them into prison, shooting them down. The war of revenge knew no bounds. "Juntas of Purification" helped it on. Thousands were driven from the country, hundreds were executed. The French Government, ashamed of its protégé, endeavored to stop the savagery, but with slight success. This is an odious chapter in the history of Spain.

The Holy Alliance by these triumphs in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain, showed itself the dominant force in European politics. The system, named after Metternich, because his diplomacy had built it up and because he stood in the very center of it, seemed firmly established as the European system. But it had achieved its last notable triumph. It was now to receive a series of checks which were to limit it forever. Against the decisions of the congresses we have passed in review, one power, England, had protested, though to no effect. England's prestige had steadily

declined since the Congress of Vienna. The three eastern powers simply filed her protests against their intentions in their archives, paying no further heed. England, which had driven the French out of Spain ten years before, now saw them coming in again, this time with ease and success. As England's influence abroad decreased the wrath of Englishmen grew, and with the advent of Canning to the cabinet England delivered some swift blows in retaliation, showing that she was still a power to be reckoned with. It was, of course, useless for her to think of opposing the three great military monarchies by arms. But the contest between her and them was now removed to a field where her authority would unquestionably prove decisive.

Having restored the King of Spain to absolute power, the next wish of the Holy Alliance was to restore to Spain, and thus to monarchy, the revolted Spanish-American colonies. England let it be known that she would oppose any steps having this end in view, save those of the Spaniards themselves, and, as she controlled the sea, her declaration virtually was that she would keep the Holy Alliance restricted to the continent of Europe and would prevent it from sending ships and troops to the scene of the revolt. She sought and received the co-operation of the United States in this purpose, though no alliance was formed and each power acted independently. The United States had approved the secession of the countries to the south of her, so plainly to her advantage and so evidently in imitation of her example. Her government had also in 1819 virtually forced Spain to cede Florida, hitherto a Spanish possession. And now, just after the close of the successful French invasion and the restoration of Ferdinand, the President of the United States, James Monroe, in a message to Congress destined to become one of the most famous documents ever written in the White House, gave emphatic notice to the Holy Alliance of the attitude this country would assume in case it should endeavor to win back her colonies for Spain, should Spain herself be unable to do so. We should consider any attempt on the part of these absolute monarchies of Europe "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing the South American states "or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." These suggestions from England and the United States were sufficient to prevent the summoning of any

new congress to consider the reconquest of America and thus to add new laurels to the Holy Alliance. The doctrine of intervention had reached its high water mark as applied to the interests of reaction, had received an emphatic defiance — a defiance made the more resounding by the recognition shortly by England and the United States of the independence of the South American republics. Austria, Russia, and Prussia protested against a course which "tended to encourage that revolutionary spirit it had been found so difficult to control in Europe." Canning proudly said, "We have called in the New World to redress the balance of the Old." On the other hand, Metternich's opinion of Canning was that he was a "malevolent meteor hurled by an angry Providence upon Europe."

The Metternich system, thus checked, was to receive before long a series of blows from which it never recovered, in the overthrow of the restored Bourbons in France, in the Belgian revolution of 1830, and, in a certain way, in the Greek war of independence.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

While the tremendous changes from the institutions of the old régime to those of the modern were being accomplished amid the turbulence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, other changes of vast though incalculable significance were being accomplished silently in the economic life of that country which was the one constant enemy of France and Napoleon, namely, England. Indeed England's ability to endure the strain of the long struggle with her enemy across the channel, and in the end to emerge victorious, was owing to this generally unnoticed but radical transformation in the conditions of English industry, in the methods used by Englishmen in earning their living, in creating wealth. These changes, first occurring in Great Britain and later on the Continent, began to be conspicuous in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and have been proceeding ever since. They constitute what has been generally called the Industrial Revolution.

The transformation of industry and commerce accomplished since George III came to the throne in 1760 is unique in the history of the world, a transformation so sweeping that in this respect the present age differs more from that of George III than did his from that of Rameses II. This transformation has been the result of a long series of discoveries and inventions. Among these one stands preëminent, the placing at the disposition of man of a new motive force of incomparable consequence, steam, rendered available by the perfection of an engine for the transmission of its power. Steam engines had been in existence since early in the eighteenth century, the invention of a mechanic named Newcomen. But they were poorly constructed, wasteful in their use of fuel. The device of Newcomen was studied and so greatly improved by James Watt (1736–1819) that the latter is generally considered the inventor of the steam engine. Watt made it a practical machine, and thereby inaugurated a new age, the age of steam.

Consider for an instant the significance of this new agency. Up to the advent of the age of steam, industry and commerce

were essentially what they had been for many centuries. Previously the only motive force had come from animal strength, and from wind and falling water, exploited by windmills and water-wheels. Mankind possessed very few machines, but manufacture was literally, as the word indicates, production by hand and was carried on in small shops generally connected with the home of the manufacturer. There, in the midst of a few workmen, the proprietor himself worked. The implements were few, the relation of master and journeyman and apprentice intimate and constant, the differences of their conditions comparatively slight. Industry was truly domestic. In general each town produced the commodities which it required. Production was on a small scale and was designed largely for the local market. Necessarily so, for the difficulty of communication restricted commerce. Down to the nineteenth century men traveled and goods were carried in the way with which the world had been familiar since time began. Only by horse or by boat could merchandise be conveyed. Roads were few in number, poor in quality, bridges were woefully infrequent, so that traveler and cart were stopped by rivers, over which they were carried slowly, and often with danger, by boats and ferries. Practically no great improvement had been made in locomotion since the earliest times, save in the betterment of roadbeds and the establishment of regular stage-routes. Napoleon, fleeing from Russia in 1812, and anxious to reach Paris as quickly as possible, left the army, and with a traveling and sleeping carriage and constant relays of fresh horses, succeeded, by extraordinary efforts day and night, in covering a thousand miles in five days, which was an average rate of eight or nine miles an hour, a remarkable ride for an age of horse conveyance. Where the Emperor of the French, commanding all the resources of his time, could do no better, of course the average traveler moved much more slowly and merchandise more slowly still.

The transmission of information could not be more rapid than the means of locomotion. The postal service was primitive, postage was high and very variable, and was paid by the receiver. In France, after 1793, there was a kind of aërial telegraph which, by means of signals, operated from the tops of poles, like those along the lines of modern railroads, could transmit intelligence from Paris to other cities rapidly. But this invention was monopolized by the State and moreover ceased to operate when darkness or rain came on.

Into this world of small industries and limited commerce came

the revolutionary steam engine, destined to effect an economic transformation unparalleled in the history of the race. It was applied to industry, then to commerce. First employed in mining, it was early adopted by the manufacturers of cotton and woolen goods to give the force for the inventions of Crompton and Arkwright and Hargreaves and Cartwright, inventions which succeeded each other rapidly after 1767, and which completely revolutionized one of the world's basic industries, the manufacture of textiles.

The making of cloth consists of two main processes, first the *spinning* of the thread out of the raw material, cotton, wool, or flax, then the *weaving* of the thread into a solid fabric, cloth. The art of spinning had been known for ages, but it had not greatly developed. With the distaff and spindle, or with the spinning wheel, a person could make a thread, but he could only make one thread at a time. In 1767 James Hargreaves, an English spinner, invented the so-called spinning jenny which enabled him to make eight or ten threads at once, thus doing the work of eight or ten men. In 1769 Richard Arkwright invented a "water frame" or a machine which spun a stronger and firmer thread and which, moreover, was immensely more productive as it was run by water power instead of by hand or foot. But Arkwright's machines were so heavy that they had to be installed in special buildings or factories. Later inventions resulted in machines spinning two hundred threads at the same time. At this rate spinning outdistanced weaving and improvements must be made in the processes of weaving or this enormous increase in the output of thread could not be utilized. The crying need produced the man to solve it. Dr. Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman, constructed a self-acting loom, run by water power, and increasing greatly the rapidity with which weaving could be done.

Since these revolutionary innovations of the eighteenth century in the arts of spinning and weaving other inventions too numerous to mention have been made, perfecting and facilitating every part of the general process of textile manufacture. A single machine now does the work which formerly required the labor of a hundred or two hundred men.

What was thus accomplished in the textile industries was later accomplished in others, particularly in the manufacture of iron. Wherever possible the machine was substituted for the human being. A single individual could tend many machines and thus several other individuals were released for other work. The productive power of the race was greatly, in some lines fabulously,

augmented. It was inevitable that these improved processes would be applied on a larger and larger scale and to more and more branches of activity and that the grand total of manufactured articles would exceed the wildest imaginations of men.

But no sooner did machines become common than it was seen that a new motive force was necessary to run them. They were usually too heavy to be operated by human strength, by the arm or by the foot. Moreover wind and water power were restricted in amount and were precarious. The wind might cease, the river might run dry. The new industry that was developing needed a new motive force, always procurable, inexhaustible in amount, and capable of easy regulation. This new force was, as already indicated, at hand, — steam, now rendered available for the new and enormous work by the inventions of James Watt. The steam engine became the center of the modern factory system of production, the throbbing heart of every industry. The machine superseded the hand of man as the chief element in production, increasing the output ultimately in certain lines a hundred, even a thousand-fold. Domestic industry waned and disappeared. Manufacturing became concentrated in large establishments employing hundreds of men, and ultimately thousands.

But there was a limit imposed upon the utility of the steam engine in industry. Production on the large scale involved necessarily two other factors — larger sources of supply from which to draw the raw materials, larger markets for the finished products. Right here the inadequate means of communication called halt. The necessity for improvement was imperative. A single illustration is sufficient evidence. The port of Liverpool and the great manufacturing city of Manchester were separated by only about thirty miles. Three canals connected them, yet traffic on them was so congested that it sometimes took a month for cotton to reach the factories from the sea. The new machine industry was in danger of strangulation.

The steam engine, applied to locomotion, came to the rescue of the steam engine applied to looms and spindles. And first to locomotion on water. Fulton's steamboat, the *Clermont*, leaving New York August 7, 1807, arrived at Albany, a hundred and fifty miles distant, in thirty-two hours. The practicability of steam navigation was thus, after much experimenting, definitely established. But steam navigation only slowly eclipsed navigation by sail. In 1814 there were only two steamers, with a tonnage of 426 tons, in the whole British Empire. In 1816

Liverpool, which now has the largest steam fleet in existence, did not have a single steamer. It is impossible here to trace the growth of this method of locomotion. Its expansion was reasonably rapid. It was at first thought impossible to construct ships large enough to carry sufficient coal for long voyages. It was not until 1838 that a ship relying solely upon steam propulsion crossed the Atlantic Ocean. The *Great Western*, a British vessel, sailed from Bristol to New York in fifteen days, to the discomfiture of those who were at that very moment showing the impossibility of such a feat. "It was proved by fluxionary calculus," wrote Carlyle, "that steamers could never get across from the farthest point of Ireland to the nearest of Newfoundland; impelling force, resisting force, maximum here, minimum there; by law of nature, and geometric demonstration; — what could be done? The *Great Western* could weigh anchor from Bristol Port; that could be done. The *Great Western*, bounding safe through the gullets of the Hudson, threw her cable out on the capstan of New York, and left our still moist paper demonstration to dry itself at leisure." The experimental stage was over. In 1840, Samuel Cunard, a native of Nova Scotia, living in England, founded the first regular transatlantic steamship line, thus raising his name out of obscurity forever. In 1847 the Hamburg-American, in 1857 the North German Lloyd, in 1862 the French lines began their notable careers, ultimately constituting veritable fleets and serving all parts of the globe.

But more important still was the application of steam to locomotion on land, the invention of the railroad. This, like most inventions, was a slow growth. In the mines and quarries of England carts had for some time been drawn on rails made at first of wood, later of iron. It was found that horses could thus draw much heavier loads, the friction of the wheel being reduced. The next step was to substitute the steam engine for the horse. Several men were studying this problem in the early nineteenth century. William Hedley, chief engineer of a colliery near Newcastle, constructed in 1813 a locomotive, *Puffing Billy*, which worked fairly well. The significance of George Stephenson lies in the fact that by his inventions and improvements, extending through many years, he made it "actually cheaper," to use his own words, "for the poor man to go by steam than to walk." His first locomotive, constructed in 1814, proved capable of hauling coal at the rate of three miles an hour, but at such a rate was not commercially valuable. He perfected his machine by increasing the power of the boiler so that the *Rocket*

was able to make thirty miles an hour at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester railway in 1830. The experimental stage was over. The railway was a proved success. Construction began forthwith and has continued ever since. The development of the new means of locomotion has proceeded with the development of chemistry, metallurgy, mechanics, engineering, electricity. Rails have been constantly improved, locomotives augumented in drawing power, bridges flung over rivers and ravines, tunnels cut through mountains. Navigation, too, has had its record of triumph. Steamships, plying regularly and in all directions, have become larger and larger, swifter and swifter, more and more numerous. Traveling and transportation have thus been revolutionized by methods entirely dissimilar from those in existence during all the previous history of mankind. They represent not a difference of degree, but of kind.

The Industrial Revolution, begun in the closing quarter of the eighteenth century, and resting on these inventions, has been in progress ever since. It had progressed far in England by the time of the overthrow of Napoleon and it had been one of the causes of England's final victory because of the great increase in wealth which it had brought her. This union of machinery with steam power multiplied tremendously the resources of mankind. Gradually the new methods, the new system of production, have been introduced into other countries, first into France, after 1815, and later into Germany. There were several important consequences of the new system, some of which have already been indicated.

The Industrial Revolution meant a change from home work to factory work. Previously spinning, weaving, and other industries had been carried on in homes or in small shops, and frequently all the members of the family, not only the men but the women and the children, had taken part in the process. The head of the group himself owned the tools outright, bought the raw materials, and marketed the produce. It was truly a "domestic system" of manufacture, offering in general no great rewards, but insuring on the whole, a sound and healthy life under conditions favorable for the development of mind and body. Under the new system, the workers must leave home for the day's labor, were gathered together in large numbers in factories which were at first poorly ventilated and poorly lighted, and were frequently exposed to conditions that endangered health. They no longer owned their own shops and tools, for the new factories were too large, the new machines too expensive, for any but the rich to own. Thus

the independent worker became a wage earner, selling his labor to another, and forced to sell it, if he would avoid starvation. Under the factory system women and children became competitors of the men, as they could tend the machines in most industries as well as the men, and would accept lower wages. This dislocation of the family from the home to the factory brought with it many evils and abuses, as did also the long hours of labor, and the frequent lack of employment, owing to causes which the worker could not control, such as bad management of the business or glutting of the market. An entirely new set of problems arose out of the factory system, problems which will appear frequently in the course of this narrative, some of which have been solved more or less satisfactorily. Others await solution.

Of course the great advantage of the factory system is that it has enabled men to produce in immensely greater quantities the necessities and comforts and even the luxuries of life. The application of machinery to production, in agriculture, in manufacture, in transportation, has increased vastly the quantity and reduced the price of most commodities. Many products which only the well-to-do could formerly enjoy are now within the reach of the millions. The plane of living has been distinctly raised, but the higher standard begets a desire for a standard higher still.

But while this was and is the great advantage of the new system of production, its disadvantages to all but a few were more apparent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. By differentiating more sharply than they had been differentiated before the two classes engaged in the process of production, namely the wage earners and the capitalists, the factory system raised a large number of difficult, contentious questions concerning the relations of capital and labor, questions which have preoccupied and perplexed the world for a full century and whose solution is not yet in sight. By collecting together in large factories hundreds and even thousands of men, women, and children, who had previously worked in small shops or at home, it created grave problems concerning the health and morals and mental development of the workers. By bringing the workers together it caused them to know each other better, to sympathize more with each other, and it inevitably led them to organize into unions for the protection and furtherance of their collective and individual interests. By bringing about a more and more minute subdivision of labor, eighty or a hundred persons, for instance, being employed in making the different parts of a shoe where formerly

under the old system of hand labor the shoemaker made the entire shoe, the factory system has greatly multiplied the output by increasing the dexterity of the individual laborer, who, however, repeating the same motions over and over again finds his work less interesting, more tedious — which is one of the reasons why he demands a shorter working day. But by increasing the output it has reduced prices and brought many commodities within the reach of the laboring man which previously were quite beyond it. By building up large factory towns, by encouraging emigration from the country to the city, the factory system has affected municipal life profoundly, introducing new factors into politics, both local and national. Many were the good features of the new industrial régime, many the evil. That régime has gone on steadily developing ever since it was introduced in the eighteenth century for the reason that it offered more to humanity than the system it displaced. But on the other hand the undeniable evils which it brought in its train have aroused a more and more determined and more and more widespread discontent and opposition, and a prolonged, varied, and increasingly successful campaign against those evils has been, as we shall see, one of the conspicuous features of modern history.

The description that has just been given of the nature and the progress of that industrial revolution which, within a century and a half, transformed the conditions of life in Europe and in America and, to some extent, in other continents, is too brief fully to explain the amazing phenomenon. So rapid a presentation of a complex subject has the merit, it is hoped, of bringing out in high relief, its more significant and characteristic features, of emphasizing, as it should be emphasized, the all-pervasive, epoch-making character of the change, but it errs necessarily in the direction of an undue simplication of multitudinous facts and of social and economic interrelations which are most intricate and sometimes more or less obscure. Obviously justice cannot be done within the space of a single chapter to a subject which would require a volume for its proper and adequate treatment. In the interest, therefore, of a fuller comprehension, of a more precise appreciation of one of the mighty movements in the annals of the race it is desirable to consider somewhat further a few of its more salient aspects.

In the first place the very term, Industrial Revolution, may be misleading. That term was first used by Blanqui, a French

socialist, in 1837, with the evident intention of indicating as complete a break with the past of mankind in the economic sphere as the French Revolution indicated in the realm of politics and law and government. French Revolution, Industrial Revolution, these in Blanqui's opinion, these and all that they connote are the two great facts of modern history, differentiating the nineteenth century sharply from all the centuries that had gone before, and creating a distinctly new civilization. The term was later adopted by Arnold Toynbee (1852–1883), an English social reformer and economist, as a title for a book, which was published after his death and which effectively described the momentous change in economic thought and method. The term has become popular and is definitely lodged in contemporary usage. Moreover, it possesses the merit, after all, of being substantially accurate. But the word revolution means in the minds of most people something sudden, violent, and quite swift, soon over. The Industrial Revolution does not at all conform to this conception. This movement might more properly be called Industrial Evolution. It was not sudden, only its most striking manifestations occurred within the brief span of a few decades. It had its beginnings over two centuries ago, its period of great acceleration in the reign of George III, and it ought properly to be understood as continuing throughout the whole of the nineteenth century. Each one of the inventors mentioned above had had many precursors and was to have innumerable successors, all of whom contributed, obscurely or conspicuously, to the new development. The Industrial Revolution was a long, slow process of change, beginning obscurely, we cannot say precisely when, and only ending recently, if indeed it has ended yet. However, having indicated the necessary corrective, we will not quarrel further with the accepted terminology.

Another fact to be constantly borne in mind is that this Industrial Revolution, this remarkable series of changes in industrial processes and organization, did not occur at the same time in all countries and in some it has not even yet occurred. It began in England, but it was forty years or more before it appeared in the United States and France, sixty years before it affected Germany and many more before it began the transformation of Japan. The rate of growth and the character of the growth have not been uniform throughout the world.

In considering this subject of the Industrial Revolution a preliminary question naturally arises. Why was it that this change occurred first in England? Because all the

factors favorable to change were present there, and did not exist, in the same combination, in any other country. During the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth centuries commerce, rather than agriculture or manufacturing, had been the outstanding feature of English economic life. Shipbuilding was the most famous English industry and, when Peter the Great visited England, it was that which most attracted his attention. Great were the international conflicts generated in that age by the rivalry for the carrying trade. England was a great importing and exporting country. Importing tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, cotton, rice and other commodities which she could not produce, she was forced to pay for them by exports, and her exports were chiefly woolen goods, and later cotton. English woolens had long been famous and formed a lucrative branch of the national economy. When Englishmen spoke of the staple trade, they meant the woolen trade. The Lord Chancellor of England sits upon a woolsack, said to have been placed in the House of Lords in the reign of Edward III as a symbol, lest the peers forget the importance to the nation of this particular industry.

But if the staple trade of England had long been this trade in wool, a usurper of this historic primacy was growing up, which was ultimately to become king — cotton. Cotton had from time immemorial been used in the Orient, in India, in China. Herodotus, who lived in the fifth century before Christ, informs us that "there are trees which grow wild there [in India] the fruit of which is a wool surpassing in beauty and excellence that of sheep." But while cotton was known in the earliest ages in Asia and in America, it did not become an article of clothing in Europe until the modern period. The Middle Ages dressed in silk or linen or wool. The English, according to a leading English historian, were the last people in Europe to introduce the manufacture of cotton goods into their own homes. Its progress was slow indeed, hampered at every step by the jealousy of established rivals, who had their influence in Parliament, the manufacturers of woolen, silk, and linen goods. Moreover, the so-called cotton cloths that came gradually to be made in England were not solely of cotton, but were a mixture of wool or linen and cotton, the reason being that no Englishman was able to produce a cotton thread strong enough to serve as the warp. "In the middle of the eighteenth century," says Walpole, "a piece of cotton cloth, in the true sense of the term, had never been made in England." A century later the manufacture of

cotton was England's leading industry. It is interesting to discover why.

Keeping in mind the fact that England had long been at home upon the ocean, that she had long had a thriving carrying trade, that she understood the art of navigation as did no other nation, that within her spacious and far-flung empire she had long been busy exchanging the products of her native industry for the products of the colonies, the reader should recall the tremendous expansion of the British Empire in the eighteenth century and should seek to grasp its vast significance. From 1701 to 1815 England was frequently at war, and, contrary to a more or less prevalent idea, war is sometimes highly profitable. In the middle of the eighteenth century England acquired India and Canada, and the harvest which she reaped from the Napoleonic wars was considerable and valuable. Vast new areas were opened to her traders; her mercantile marine, her carrying trade developed rapidly, and were susceptible of far greater development, if only her home industries should be equal to the increased demand. The new opportunities beckoning from every direction constituted the challenge to the domestic producers to improve their processes in order to enlarge their output and thus to assure the superiority which England enjoyed in the markets of the world. Here we have at least a partial explanation of that remarkable series of inventions described above which multiplied so many times England's industrial productivity. The inventive qualities of the human mind respond to stimulus as do the other qualities, and no stimulus could be greater than that which lay in the situation which confronted England, great riches within grasp if only the mechanical means could be provided that would enable her to grasp them. When men seek an end intently they frequently find the means to attain it, and the case of England in the eighteenth century was no exception to the rule. The ingenuity of John Hargreaves, who began life as a poor weaver, of Richard Arkwright, who began it as a barber's apprentice, of Samuel Crompton, who while yet a boy lost his father and was forced to contribute to the family resources by spinning yarn, of Edmund Cartwright, an obscure country clergyman, of James Watt, a mathematical instrument maker of Glasgow, and of many others who preceded and who followed them, each contributing something to the stupendous whole, enabled Great Britain to meet the unrivalled opportunity, by revolutionizing, by modernizing, by enormously enlarging and energizing her woolen and cotton and other industries, by fabulously increasing their output so

that the needs of an expanding empire, of a growing carrying trade, of a world-wide commerce could be as easily satisfied as local or national needs had been satisfied under the previous conditions.

But beside the ingenuity and enterprise of her people another reason why England was the predestined birthplace of the Industrial Revolution lay in her natural resources. If numerous and elaborate machines were henceforth to supplant the few and simple ones which had previously sufficed for industry, new materials were necessary and those materials proved to be coal and iron. Not that coal and iron had never been known, had never been used before, but their use had been limited and difficult. The steam engine demanded coal in quantity if it was to give the force necessary for the new industry and transportation. The steam engine also, and the new and heavy machines, demanded iron. These commodities England possessed in apparently inexhaustible quantities and in happy juxtaposition, so that the co-operation of the two could be effected under the most favorable, most economical conditions. The age of steam was destined to be an age of coal and iron. These two elements were to exert the most obvious and profound influence upon the development and the relations of nations all through the nineteenth century and after, an influence which we shall be at pains to point out as this narrative proceeds. The extent to which the various industries have been developed in different countries has been determined, in a very large degree, by the natural resources of those countries. And the primacy of coal and iron among those resources has been abundantly demonstrated. Any one living under the shadow of the memories of the World War must be vividly conscious of their significance in determining the fate of nations, in shaping the issues of history.

Suffice it to say here that in the north of England lay large deposits of coal and iron, comparatively untapped. Hitherto her southern counties had been the most populous and most industrious part of England. Now, as a result of the new type of industrialism, the path of empire was to take its way northward. Yorkshire, Lancashire, were to enter into their own, were to become the hives of industry, the busy haunts of men. The southern and eastern counties had been the manufacturing centers of the nation as long as iron had been smelted with wood and not with coal, because there were the great forests which, however, were becoming exhausted. But now that coal was substituted for wood the industries of the nation migrated to the

region where coal and iron were near neighbors. And, be it said in passing, the climate of south Lancashire made that region the home of the new cotton industry, because it furnished the moisture necessary to certain of its processes. The successful utilization of coal and the construction of the varied machines required for the new industry necessitated an enormous development of the science of metallurgy. The metal industries of modern England owe their predominance to the requirements of the new type of manufacture. Coal for the engines, iron for the engines and the tools, iron in increasingly finer, stronger forms, such as the steel made by the Bessemer process discovered in 1856, these have been the two basic factors of the present industrial system, of large-scale manufacturing. They have also tended to concentrate industry in those districts where the two factors co-exist, in Northern England, in Northern France, in Westphalia, along the river Ruhr, and in Silesia. Expanding markets resulting from an expanding empire, commercial changes, mechanical inventions, natural resources, all these factors favorable to change existed in the England of the closing eighteenth century and did not exist in a similar combination in any other country. Hence English leadership in the new industrial era.

Some of the consequences of the new industrial system began to show themselves quite early, while others were late in appearing. Because coal and iron lay side by side in Northern England, there was a shifting of population, as already stated, from the southern counties which had hitherto played the leading rôle in English history. With this shifting in population went a corresponding shifting of political power, as we shall see more clearly when we take up the great political struggles of the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Read Macaulay's famous third chapter if you wish to get a panoramic view of Old England before the changes occurred that created the New England of Macaulay's own time, which was the first sixty years of the nineteenth century and in which the seeds now being widely sown came to a rich and full fruition. And read that distinguished historian's parliamentary speeches in 1831 if you wish to see what changes a shifting and a growth of population rendered necessary, in the orator's opinion, in the time-honored institutions of the land. The cities of Northern England, which grew rapidly in size under the stimulus of the new industrial development, would not be content permanently to remain unrepresented in the English Parliament while decayed boroughs, whose

population had dwindled almost to the point of complete extinction, continued to send up each two members to the House of Commons. Political emancipation was to be one of the results of the Industrial Revolution.

A conspicuous feature of the new industrial system was the specialization it introduced into the processes of manufacturing. This specialization has tended steadily to become more and more pronounced. Under the old system labor was little divided or specialized. Now it is divided and sub-divided until scores of individuals are involved in the fabrication of a shoe or a watch, each worker making only a single and restricted contribution to the finished article. An English historian has summarized as follows some of the results: "Not only have most workers but one kind of work; that work becomes a smaller and smaller part of increasingly complex industrial processes; and concentration thereon makes it more and more difficult for the worker to turn to other labor, if his employment fails. The specialist's lack of all-round capacity is natural and notorious. Hence most serious results follow the slightest dislocation of national economy. This specialization has also important psychological effects. A farmer, with his varied outdoor occupations, feels little craving for relief and relaxation. The factory hand, with his attention riveted for hours at a stretch on the wearisome iteration of machinery, requires recreation and distraction; naturally he is a prey to unwholesome stimulants, such as drink, betting or the yellow press. The more educated and morally restrained, however, seek intellectual stimulus, and the modern popular demand for culture arises largely from the need of something to relieve the grey monotony of industrial labor." [1]

Not only do individuals specialize, but different regions of a nation specialize, and even nations themselves do the same. Specialization means interdependence. If England gives her main attention to manufacturing certain things for which she possesses particular advantages, then she must rely on other nations for the things she does not produce. Her prosperity depends upon the co-operation in exchange of other nations, and if that co-operation fails, or threatens to fail, her situation may become critical or desperate. As a matter of fact industrial England must sell her products to foreigners if she is to live and must also buy from them necessary raw materials and food

[1] Pollard, *History of England*, 197.

supplies. But whether the foreigners will either buy or sell is for the foreigners themselves to decide.

What is true of England is also true, in greater or less degree, of other nations which have experienced the transforming touch of the Industrial Revolution. It is obvious, therefore, that that revolution has brought with it certain acute problems in international relations from which the old system which it has displaced was relatively free.

The Industrial Revolution has had another consequence. It has led to the growth of cities, one of the striking features of the modern age. The convenience of having similar industries in close proximity caused this growth. From the social point of view this is perhaps the most important aspect of the Industrial Revolution, this extraordinary increase of urban population and consequent growing desertion of the country. In most of the leading nations today the majority or a large minority of the population is to be found in cities. In Great Britain more than two-thirds of the people now live in cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants. The rise of these big industrial centers has been accompanied by numerous evils, such as objectionable housing conditions, slums, bad sanitation, defective water supply, poor policing. The development of the factory system, the requirements of machine production on a large scale have made the modern city, but they have also revealed the fact that human beings cannot be crowded together in enormous aggregations without serious menace to body and soul. If the majority of men must live in cities they will not be content unless they can live there decently and with due regard to health. Now in the early decades of the nineteenth century the demoralization of municipal life was extreme. Great masses of men lived under conditions that were a disgrace to civilization. Huddled together in crowded and desolate habitations, with little knowledge of the most elementary principles of economics and hygiene, they were necessarily exposed to all the diseases and vices and dangerous influences that flourish in such environment. The old forms of municipal government were found totally inadequate to the situation. The capacity of men to produce commodities, their ability to exploit as never before the forces of nature had outrun their powers of social organization. Municipal reform was destined to be one of the insistent and perplexing problems of the nineteenth century, a challenge to its intelligence and good will. The attempts to eradicate these evils constitute a long and important chapter in social history.

Gradually a long series of laws has in certain respects transformed urban life, one of the characteristic products of the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution has contributed enormously to human progress but, as Lecky says, human progress rarely means more than a surplus of advantages over evils. Now the evils which accompanied the rapid growth of manufactures were very great and were, at the outset, more striking than the advantages. It is an unquestionable advantage that a large part of the difficult and dangerous work of the world is now done by machines which would otherwise have to be done by men. It is also an advantage that this relief can continue as long as science and its practical applications continue to develop. Modern industrialism shows increasingly its close dependence upon science and also increasingly contributes to the development of science. The Industrial Revolution has vastly augmented production and employment. Millions and millions of men have by it been enabled to live who otherwise could not possibly have subsisted with the more primitive tools at their disposal.

But there is another side to the story. That Revolution made sharper the division between capitalists and wage-earners; the former were few, the latter many. The conflict between labor and capital, of which we hear so much to-day, is certainly nothing new in the world and is not the product of the Industrial Revolution. That conflict can be observed at the very dawn of history. From time immemorial and in all lands the greatest differences have existed between individuals, in wealth, in social power, in happiness. The well-being of the working classes has, indeed, been demonstrably much improved by the inventions of the past two centuries and the new type of industry which those inventions have introduced into the world. But a period of transition from an old system of society to a new one is always painful and always exacts its tribute of human sacrifice. Many who are accustomed to the old system and who have been trained for it are not required by the new or cannot adapt themselves to it. Unemployment, discouragement, poverty, distress ensue. A machine almost by definition throws people out of work because a machine does the work of several men. In the end it creates employment on a greater scale than ever, but there is an intervening period when it does the contrary, and the evidence is overwhelming that the closing years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nineteenth centuries were very costly in human suffering.

These undoubted and grave evils have often been depicted by historians and should not be forgotten. But they have often been presented as forming a tragic contrast to the times that had gone before. The idealizing instinct of man is unconquerable, and the two things which he is prone to paint in more glowing colors than they deserve are the past and the future, to the lamentable disadvantage of the present. But it may reasonably be expected that at least the student of history shall keep himself free from this illusion. He should leave this particular infirmity to the reformer. Macaulay tells us that one of the characteristics of the seventeenth century was "the bitter cry of labor against capital," that in that century the employment of children in industry prevailed to an extent which, in proportion to the number of persons employed in manufacturing, would in the nineteenth century seem almost incredible, that the number of men, women and children receiving poor relief was greater in the former century than in the latter. The background against which the modern age is to be viewed was anything but fair and golden. The difference between the seventeenth century and the nineteenth is that what shocked the latter did not shock the former. "The more carefully we examine the history of the past," says Macaulay, "the more reason shall we find to dissent from those who imagine that our age has been fruitful of new social evils. The truth is that the evils are, with scarcely an exception, old. That which is new is the intelligence which discerns and the humanity which remedies them."

There is another fact that should be borne in mind in our effort to form a just and balanced judgment of the advantages and disadvantages of the new industrial system. Many writers have uncritically and undiscriminatingly ascribed to the industrial revolution evils whose causes should be sought elsewhere. Labor conditions were, in all conscience, bad enough in England in 1815, but they were worse in other countries in which no trace of the Industrial Revolution was to be seen. Writers on this subject frequently overlook the history of that period, examine the evils, apart from their setting, and thus leave a false impression. The truth is that the long Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars had destroyed much accumulated wealth and had impoverished Europe. The widespread misery of the working classes is largely to be ascribed to that. England, indeed, came through that quarter century of wars in better condition than her neighbors on the Continent, and she came through better largely because of the Industrial Revolution itself, which had

developed her manufactures to an unprecedented degree and had enabled her to replace the wastage of the wars with unusual rapidity.

With these reservations, however, with this caution against the tendency to idealize the economic system which existed before the rise of the factory system, it must be admitted that the new system spelled misery for multitudes. The gain in productive power was undoubted but the gravity of the new social problems was equally undoubted. Among those evils were widespread unemployment, low wages for those fortunate enough to get work, sordid and indecent conditions of living of people herded together promiscuously in mushroom cities and in habitations unworthy of the name, and particularly the employment under barbarous conditions of women and children. All these and an alarming prevalence of drunkenness and vice, were formidable and repellant blotches upon the picture. But evils generate a desire for their cure. "All the great sources of human suffering," says John Stuart Mill, who has been correctly characterized as a temperate optimist and a wise social reformer, "are in a great degree, many of them entirely, conquerable by human care and effort." Some of the efforts which have been made to harmonize the new industrial order with the requirements of the best social thought and feeling of an age progressively enlightened and exacting will be described in the pages that are to follow.

Renouncing any attempt to describe this great change in history which is summarized under the title of the Industrial Revolution and which has meant indisputably a larger and fuller life for the race we may close this chapter with the opinion of a distinguished French philosopher, M. Bergson:

"A century has elapsed since the invention of the steam engine and we are only just beginning to feel the depths of the shock it gave us. But the revolution it has effected in industry has nevertheless upset human relations altogether. New ideas are arising, new feelings are on the way to flower. In thousands of years, when, seen from the distance, only broad lines of the present age will be visible, our wars and our revolutions will count for little, but the steam engine and the procession of inventions which accompanied it, will perhaps be spoken of as we speak of the bronze or chipped stone of pre-historic times; it will serve to define an age."

CHAPTER V

FRANCE DURING THE RESTORATION

THE REIGN OF LOUIS XVIII

No country in Europe had undergone between 1789 and 1815 so sweeping and so vital a transformation as had France, the birthplace of that famous Revolution which takes its name from her. Institutions, feelings, aspirations, mental outlook of a kind quite new in Europe, had been adopted by millions of Frenchmen as a new evangel. Much had been irrevocably destroyed by that Revolution, much had been created, much had been merely sketched. It remained for the nineteenth century to fill in this outline. The old form of society to which France had been accustomed for centuries was gone and a type new to Europe, of immense proselytizing power, had been unfolded. The old had been one of privileged classes. The new was democratic. The three great institutions, agencies of the privileged few, which had long weighed down with paralyzing effect upon the mass of Frenchmen, the monarchy, the nobility, and the church, had been brought into subjection to the people, had been weakened immeasurably as controlling forces in the life of modern France. France had made a passionate effort to free herself from all forms of aristocracy, temporal and ecclesiastical. France in 1815 was by far the most democratic country in Europe, in her feelings, her thoughts, her customs, and her institutions.

These changes had, however, not been brought about by the unanimous consent of the French people. The old privileged classes were, from the very nature of the case, sworn enemies of the new order which had been erected at their expense, and it was precisely because men were not agreed as to the permanence of the principles and decisions of the Revolution that the contest between the adherents of the old and the supporters of the new was to be carried over into the new era, and indeed still continues. The war of opinions which began with the Revolution was not ended in 1795 or in 1815, nor has it entirely ended yet, for the reason that not all Frenchmen have at any time been ready to accept the present fact, the status quo, but have tried repeatedly to re-open the discussion, and to modify, if not to reverse, the

decision. This warfare is the warp and woof of French history in the nineteenth century.

One thing, however, was settled at the outset. The old régime was not to be restored. The Bourbons recovered the right to rule only on condition that their monarchy should be a constitutional one. The Allies who, as the phrase ran, had "brought back the Bourbons in their baggage," insisted on this, believing it the only means of assuring the continuance of their rule, and Louis XVIII, rather than have a constitution forced upon him by the representatives of the French people, granted one himself. This procedure had the manifest advantage for him that he did not appear to receive his throne from the people on conditions imposed by them, that he did not at all recognize the revolutionary principle of popular sovereignty, that he appeared to rule solely by right of birth, by divine right, as had his ancestors. In the plenitude of his powers he would graciously grant certain privileges to his people. The monarchical principle would remain unblemished. Consequently, on his first return to France in 1814, he issued the most famous document connected with his name, the Constitutional Charter, which, suspended later during the Hundred Days, was revived in 1815 and remained in force until 1848, under three kings, Louis XVIII (1815–1824), Charles X (1824–1830), and Louis Philippe (1830–1848), only altered in some details in 1830 as a result of the revolution of that year.

By this act the King decreed that his own person should be inviolable, that his ministers might be impeached by the chambers, that he alone should possess all executive power, that he should command the army and navy, declare war, make treaties, and appoint to all positions in the public services; that the legislative power should be exercised by himself and a legislature consisting of two houses, a Chamber of Peers and a Chamber of Deputies; that the king alone should propose all laws; that they then should be discussed by the chambers and accepted or rejected according to their desire, but not amended save with his consent. If he should not propose a law desired by the chambers they might petition him to do so and might suggest the provisions they would like to see it contain, but if the king should reject this petition it should not be again presented during the same session. No tax could be levied without the consent of the chambers.

The Chamber of Peers was to be appointed by the king for life, or for hereditary transmission, as he might see fit. Its

sessions were to be secret. The Chamber of Deputies was to consist of representatives chosen for a period of five years. The suffrage was carefully restricted by an age and property qualification. Only those who were at least thirty years of age and paid at least three hundred francs in direct taxes should have the right to vote for deputies, and only those were eligible to become deputies who were forty years of age or over and paid a direct tax of at least one thousand francs. These provisions were very favorable to the wealthy. Indeed, they made the chamber a plutocratic body. There were less than 100,000 voters in France out of a population of 29,000,000, and not more than 12,000 were eligible to become deputies.

The Charter proclaimed the equality of all Frenchmen, yet only a petty minority were given the right to participate in the government of the country. France was still in a political sense a land of privilege, only privilege was no longer based on birth but on fortune. Nevertheless, this was a more liberal form of government than she had ever had under Napoleon, and was the most liberal to be seen in Europe, outside of England. The number of voters and of those eligible as deputies increased with the increase of wealth. The influence of English example is apparent in many of the provisions of the Charter.

There was another set of provisions in this document of even greater importance than those determining the future form of government, namely, that in which the civil rights of Frenchmen were narrated. These provisions show how much of the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon the Bourbons were prepared to accept. They were intended to reassure the people of France, who feared to see in the Restoration a loss of liberties or rights which had become most precious to them. They were thus intended to win for the restored monarchy a popular support and a guarantee of permanence it thus far lacked. It was declared that all Frenchmen were equal before the law, whatever their titles or rank, and thus the cardinal principle of the Revolution was preserved; that all were equally eligible to civil and military positions, that thus no class should monopolize public service, as had largely been the case before the Revolution; that no one should be arrested or prosecuted save by due process of law, that thus the day of arbitrary imprisonment was not to return; that there should be complete religious freedom for all sects, though Roman Catholicism was declared to be the religion of the state; that the press should be free "while conforming to the laws which are necessary to restrain abuses of

that liberty" — a phrase suspiciously elastic. Those who had purchased the confiscated property of the crown, the church, and the nobles, during the Revolution were assured that their titles were inviolable. The Napoleonic nobility was placed on an equality with the old nobility of France, and the king might create new peers at will, but nobility was henceforth simply a social title carrying with it no privileges and no exemptions from taxation or the other burdens of the state.[1]

Such were the concessions that Louis XVIII was willing to make to the spirit of the times and the demands of the people. They constituted an open recognition of the fact that the France of 1815 was not to be a restoration of the France of 1789. Certain phrases of the Charter gave offense, but they were mainly those of the preamble in which the King labored to maintain the claim of the divine right of monarchy and to connect his act with medieval precedents. These phrases were far-fetched and curiously archaic, but the fact remained that with all its limitations the Charter granted France a larger portion of self-government than it had enjoyed before, except during a brief period in the Revolution. And it put the Bourbon monarchy on record as recognizing the principal results of the democratic evolution of society. The Restoration started out by accepting the centralized administrative system, the great law codes, the concordat, and the nobility of Napoleon, and the social organization created by the Revolution.

The political condition of France after 1815 was exceedingly troubled. The nation was divided into several parties whose animosity toward each other had only been embittered by the Hundred Days. Louis XVIII, restored for a second time by the victorious enemies of France, was eminently qualified to calm the seething passions of his countrymen and lead them in the necessary work of recuperation. He was naturally a man of moderate opinions. A thorough believer in the divine right of monarchs and asserting the belief with fervor, he was, however, too clear-sighted to think that monarchy of the type historic in France could be restored. He saw as clearly as any one in the realm the greatness of the changes that had latterly been effected in France, and that his very throne would be imperiled if he attempted to undo any of the important work of the Revolution. He willingly granted a constitution to his people,

[1] The Charter may be found in full in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 93, or in University of Pennsylvania *Translations and Reprints*, Vol. I, No. 3.

sharing with them the power which his ancestors had wielded alone. He preferred to rule as a constitutional king than not to rule at all. He had known the bitterness of the exile's life too well to desire to be compelled to "resume his travels" owing to any illiberal conduct on his part. The throne was for him only the "softest of chairs." Cold-blooded, sceptical, free from illusions, free from the passion of revenge, indolent by nature, he desired to avoid conflicts and to enjoy his power in peace. His policy, which from the beginning he attempted to carry out, was expressed by himself a few years later in these words: "The system which I have adopted . . . is based on the maxim that it will never do to be the king of two peoples, and to the ultimate fusion of these — for their distinction is only too real — all the efforts of my government are directed."

The personality of the King seemed, therefore, admirably adapted for the problem that confronted France in 1815. But there were difficulties in the situation that foreboded trouble. Louis XVIII had been restored by foreign armies. His presence on the throne was a constant reminder of the humiliation of France. Moreover, his strength lay not in himself but in the historic rôle of his house, in immemorial prescription, and the power of mere custom over the French mind had been greatly lessened during the past twenty-five years. But a more serious feature was his environment. The court was now composed of the nobles who had suffered greatly from the Revolution, who had been robbed of their property, driven from the country, who had seen many of their relatives executed by the guillotine. It was but natural that these men should have come back full of hatred for the authors of their woes, that they should detest the ideas of the Revolution and the persons who had been identified with it. These men were not free from passion, as was Louis XVIII. More eager to restore the former glory of the crown, the former rank of the nobility and the clergy, more bitter toward the new ideas than the King himself, they were the Ultra-royalists, or Ultras — men more royalist than the King, as they claimed. They saw in the Revolution only robbery and sacrilege and gross injustice to themselves. They bitterly assailed Louis XVIII for granting the Charter, a dangerous concession to the Revolution, and they secretly wished to abolish it, meanwhile desiring to nullify its liberal provisions as far as possible. They constituted the party of the Right. Their leader was the Count of Artois, brother of Louis XVIII, who, the King being childless, stood next in line of succession. These men, not very numerous, but

very clamorous, formed the natural entourage of the monarch. The matter of most pressing importance to France was what power of resistance the King would show to this resolute and revengeful band. Would he in the end give way to them or would he be able to control them?

The other parties in France in 1815 were shortly differentiated. There was the party of the Left. This was not so much a coherent group as a conglomeration of the disaffected. It included those who believed in a republic, who, however, were for some time so few as to be a negligible quantity. It also included the adherents of Napoleon. This class was numerous and composed chiefly of old soldiers who saw themselves, the glory of the Napoleonic state, now degraded, put on half-pay, thrown into the background. These radical and discontented elements were opposed to the very existence of the Bourbon monarchy. But they were hopelessly discredited by the abuses and the failures of both the Republic and the Empire.

There were two other parties, called the Right Center and the Left Center. They comprised the body of moderate men who stood between the two extremes and were opposed to both. They were united by one bond — common loyalty to the Charter which the King had granted. They were the convinced supporters of the constitutional régime, but they differed from each other in their interpretation of what the Charter should mean. The Right Center accepted it as a finality, to be carried out honestly and to the letter. The Left Center believed in its honest execution, but also believed that, while the Charter should be thus observed, men should work for its further expansion, that as the years went by larger constitutional liberty should be accorded to the people. The Charter was for them not a finality but a stepping-stone. But further progress should be attempted only slowly and after full reflection. Of these four parties, two were distinctly unconstitutional — the Ultras and the Radicals or Left. The former, professing a momentary lip service to the Charter, were resolved to alter it as soon as possible in fundamental and comprehensive ways. They were in principle opposed to a written constitution. They wished to restore the absolute authority of the king and the former privileged positions of clergy and nobility. The Charter stood bluntly in the way. Consequently, however much they might dissemble, they favored its ultimate abrogation. The Radicals favored its destruction for the opposite reason — that the Republic or the Empire might

be restored, the Revolution made triumphant once more. The two middle parties were the friends of the new régime.

The events of the first year seemed to show the great power of the Ultras. Reaction set in fast and furiously in 1815. There occurred a series of outrages that have come down in history as the White Terror, in contradistinction to the Red Terror of the Revolution. Immediately after the battle of Waterloo rioting broke out in Marseilles, led by Royalists, and resulting in much plundering and many murders. The movement spread to other departments in the south. Religious motives were added to the political, as the Protestants, particularly numerous in the south, had been strongly attached to the Revolution and to Napoleon and had welcomed the return of the latter from Elba. The white flag of the Bourbons was disgraced by these atrocities committed by Royalists. The Government was in no sense the cause of them, but it was criminally negligent in not trying to repress them.

With the meeting of the first legislative chambers this campaign of revenge and reaction became systematic and frenzied. The Chamber of Deputies was overwhelmingly Ultra-royalist, elected, as it had been, amid the terror and demoralization of the crashing Empire. It demanded satisfaction for the treachery of the Hundred Days. As a result Marshal Ney, "the bravest of the brave," and other distinguished French soldiers, were condemned to death and shot — an everlasting disgrace to the Bourbon monarchy. The Chamber demanded repressive measures of various kinds from the King and got them. It demanded still more violent ones which the King would not concede. The dissension between the Moderate Royalists, represented by the King, the ministry, and the Chamber of Peers, on the one hand, and the Ultras, represented by the Count of Artois and the Chamber of Deputies on the other, soon reached a climax. The King himself said bitterly, "If these gentlemen had full liberty, they would end by purging even me." The representatives of the foreign governments intervened to say that so unreasonable a reaction must cease, in the interest of the stability of the Bourbon monarchy and of the peace of Europe. They feared that the revolutionary elements of France would break out again, stung by such insane legislation. The Ultras even went so far as to reject the budget, a blazing indiscretion, as it offended all who were financially interested in France, foreigners and Frenchmen. The King now took a decisive step, prorogued the Chamber, and then dissolved it. He then appealed to the people to return

a moderate Chamber. The appeal was wholly successful and this mad reaction was speedily brought to a close. The Ultra majority was swept away and a large majority of Moderate Royalists was returned. France had weathered her first crisis in parliamentary government but the temper of the Ultras had been shown with the vividness of lightning. France had had emphatic warning of the danger that would lie in the triumph of that party.

From 1816 to 1820 the Government of France was able to advance along more liberal lines. The two chief ministers, Richelieu and Decazes, both convinced adherents of the Bourbon monarchy, were men who saw the utter folly of attempts at reaction such as those just witnessed and who believed that the pressing needs of France were very different from those of a faction bent on revenge. The two Centers now controlled Parliament, and for several years worked in harmony with the King.

They accomplished much for the rehabilitation of France. In 1815, it will be recalled, the Allies had imposed a large war indemnity on France, and had insisted that she support an army of occupation of 150,000 in eighteen fortresses of the northern and eastern departments for a minimum of three, a maximum of five, years. This was a great financial burden and a greater humiliation. The liberation of the soil of the foreign armies was a task which the King and the ministry had very much at heart. To effect this the people had to make great sacrifices, for before it could be accomplished the national credit must be re-established and to effect this Frenchmen must pay higher taxes. This they did, and France proceeded to pay off the immense war indemnity more rapidly than the powers that had imposed it had expected would be possible. By 1817 the Allies agreed to withdraw thirty thousand of their troops, and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 they agreed to withdraw the remainder before the close of that year. Thus the outward evidence of the appalling national humiliation was removed. "I can die at peace," said Louis XVIII, "since I shall see France free and the French flag floating over every city of France." France was, for the first time since 1815, mistress in her own house. The foreign ambassadors ceased their weekly meetings in Paris, designed for the drafting of advice to be given to the French Government. The foreign tutelage was over.

The reorganization of the army was undertaken at this time. The military power of France had been sadly shattered in the

general downfall of the Napoleonic system. The army was reduced to a few corps kept up by voluntary enlistment. Now that the foreign troops were to be withdrawn and France was to resume her full place in international affairs it was necessary to create an army that should command respect. There were, however, difficulties in the way. A large army could not be raised by volunteering. And yet forced military service had become, under Napoleon, so hateful a burden that it had been expressly forbidden in the Charter. A combination of the two methods lay at the basis of the new law. Voluntary enlistments were still to furnish the bulk of the army. If these should not be sufficient recourse should be had to compulsion to complete the corps. All young men of twenty years of age should draw lots. The "bad numbers" alone would be forced to serve for six years. Forty thousand might thus by these two processes be enrolled every year. Having served in the active army six years, they should pass into the reserve army for six years more. This reserve should be used only in defense of the soil of France, should not be ordered out of the country. It was estimated that thus there would be an army of 240,000 men on a peace footing. Promotion was to be for service and merit and was to be equally open to all. The bill was violently opposed by the Ultras for the reason that it destroyed all hope of the nobility monopolizing the positions in the army. Their chances were simply the same as those of other men. The bill became law in 1818. Thus the basis of the military institutions was firmly laid. The army as thus constituted lasted with some alterations of detail down to 1868, surviving many violent changes in French history.

On two other subjects this moderate ministry of Richelieu carried important legislation, the electoral system and the liberty of the press. Concerning both matters the Charter had merely laid down general principles, leaving the manner in which they should be applied to be determined by the legislature in special laws. A liberty so large enabled the legislature to determine the real character, the range, and effect of two fundamental privileges, and as the different parties soon saw that by framing the laws in this way, or in that, they could further their own interests, both matters became the subject of passionate contention in parliament all through the period of the Restoration, and laws very dissimilar in character and in effect were passed as first one party, then another, gained ascendency in the state. Moderates and Ultras differed on these questions as on others.

Concerning the electoral system, the ideas of the Moderates

was shown in the law of 1817, passed by the Richelieu-Decazes ministry. The Charter merely stated the qualifications required of voters and of deputies. The manner in which the voters should elect the deputies was not defined. The law of 1817 established the system of the so-called general ticket (*scrutin de liste*); that is, the voters of each department should meet in the chief town of the department, and there elect all the deputies to which the department was entitled. This system favored the Moderates and Liberals, who belonged generally to the bourgeoisie, to the industrial and trading classes, largely an urban population, whereas the country gentlemen, the landed proprietors and their tenants, living in the country, were chiefly Ultras, members or adherents of the aristocracy of the old régime. Many of these found it difficult or expensive or annoying to make the trip to the chief town of the department, where alone they could cast their votes. Thus the law, which remained in force from 1817 to 1820, favored the Moderates as each succeeding election showed.

There was passed in 1819 a press law, much more liberal than that of the Napoleonic period, which had, in the main, been carried over into the first years of the Restoration. The censorship was abolished, and press cases were henceforth to be tried before juries. But even under this system newspapers were a luxury, enjoyed only by the rich and well-to-do, as they were not sold by the single copy but only to subscribers at a high price, and in addition there was a stamp tax on each copy of two cents, and a postage duty of one cent. Moreover, while freedom in establishing newspapers was guaranteed, as a matter of fact only the well-to-do could establish them, owing to the large preliminary deposit required of their proprietors, which was to serve as a guaranty fund for the payment of fines that might be inflicted as a result of damage suits.

But this body of liberal legislation rested upon an insecure basis, the favor of the King, and the coherence of the great mass of moderate men, the Centers. The Ultras did not relinquish their activity and were alert to seize upon every incident that might discredit the party in power. Nor had they long to wait. Events shortly occurred that aroused misgivings among the most timid of the Moderates, tending to drive them over to the Ultras, events, too, that shook the firmness of the King. According to the Charter there was to be a partial renewal of the Chamber of Deputies each year, one-fifth of that body passing out, and their places being filled by new elections. These elections showed

a distinct trend in favor of the Radical party, or party of the Left. At the first renewal in 1817, twenty-five "independents" of the Left were returned; in 1818 the result was similar, the Left increasing to forty-five. Among them were Lafayette and Manuel, both prominent figures in the Revolution. Now the principles of the Left were not only liberal, but were largely anti-dynastic. While that wing acquiesced in the existence of the Bourbon monarchy, it might at any time become actively opposed to it.

The elections in 1819 added greatly to the growing Left — it numbering now ninety of a total of 258. But more damaging than the number was the character of some of the members chosen, particularly of Grégoire. Grégoire had played a prominent rôle in the Revolution, having been a member of the Constituent Assembly and of the Convention. He had aided in the overthrow of the Roman Catholic Church. He had shown himself a fervid republican. A remark of his that kings are in the moral world what monsters are in the physical had had an immense notoriety, and was not yet forgotten. He was not a regicide, as he was absent from Paris at the time of the trial of Louis XVI, but he was, owing to his utterances, commonly considered one. No man was more odious to the Ultras and his election to the Chamber outraged their deepest feelings. Some of them had themselves helped bring about his election, believing that the triumph of so notable a revolutionary would help them in upsetting the mild policy of the ministry and bring about the longed-for reaction. In this they were largely right, as this election aroused consternation in the ranks of those who had hitherto been moderate, and drove many into the camp of the Ultras. The chief minister, Decazes (Richelieu having previously resigned), was convinced that some change must be made in the policy of the Government. The Ultras raged against this "regicidal priest," declared that either he must yield to the dynasty or the dynasty to him, and in a stormy session and amid shouts of "Long live the King," voted his exclusion from the Chamber, to which he had been chosen. The freedom of elections was thus grossly violated, as well as the promise of the Charter that the past should be forgotten.

But an event far more damaging to the Moderates now occurred — the murder of the Duke of Berry. The Duke was the younger son of the Count of Artois, and as his elder brother, the Duke of Angoulême, had no heir, he was the hope of the dynasty. At about eleven o'clock on the evening of February 13,

1820, as he was helping his wife into a carriage at the door of the Opera, he was violently attacked by a man, named Louvel, who plunged a dagger into his breast. The Duke died in the opera house at five o'clock, surrounded by the royal family, and demanding pardon for the murderer. The murderer desired to cut off the Bourbon line, which he thought he could do as the Duke had no children. His act was his own; he had no accomplices. But the Royalists at once asserted that the Liberal party was responsible and that anarchy was the natural result of the policy of liberalism. Their opposition was directed against the ministry under Decazes, whom they succeeded in forcing to resign. At his resignation Louis XVIII is said to have remarked, "It is over with me," meaning that from that time on his policy of reconciliation was impossible, that the party headed by the Count of Artois would control. This was virtually to be the case. In 1820 began the great royalist reaction, started in 1815, suspended from 1816 to 1820, when the more moderate policies prevailed, and destined now to last with but a single slight interruption until 1830, when it culminated in a new revolution.

The Right, now in control, proceeded to undo much of the work of the preceding ministries. By the electoral law of 1820 that of 1817 was rescinded, and a new system brought into existence. The Chamber of Deputies was enlarged from 258 members to 430, an increase of 172. The electors of deputies were no longer to meet together in the chief town of the department and vote for all the deputies from that department, but were to be divided into as many groups or colleges as there were arrondissements or districts in the department. Each voter was therefore to vote for one deputy only, the one from his district. Thus the principle of single-member constituencies was adopted. This arrangement would be advantageous to the Ultras, as the country gentlemen and their tenants, supporters of that party, no longer having to make the journey to the chief town, but enabled to vote at places nearer home, would come to the polls in larger numbers. In this way 258 members were to be chosen. The other 172 were to be elected in a special manner. At the chief town of each department were to meet one-fourth of the voters, those who paid the heaviest taxes, and they were to choose the additional 172. This method, of course, greatly augmented the power of the rich. It thus happened that about twelve thousand voters had the right to vote twice, once in the district and once in the department college, and

similarly were twice represented — by the deputies chosen in both ways, in both of which elections they participated. Hence this electoral law of 1820 was called the law of the double vote. Moreover, the president of each electoral college was to be chosen by the central government and the voters must write out their ballots in his presence and hand them to him unfolded — an excellent device for enabling the Government to bring pressure upon them in favor of its candidates. This bill was hotly contested in the Chamber and outside. The debate was long and impassioned, participated in by over a hundred and twenty members. The principle of the law, the double vote, was adopted only by a majority of five. Hailed with enthusiasm by the Ultras it assured their ascendency. By 1824 the independents, or Radicals, numbered only seven.

The liberal press law of 1819 went the same way after a brief existence of ten months. It was rescinded. The censorship was restored. No journal could be founded without the Government's consent, no single issue could appear without the censor's permission, the Government might suspend its publication for six months, and even under certain conditions suppress it (1820). This control, which would appear sufficient, was strengthened two years later by an additional law which enabled the Government to suppress publication even for "tendencies" when no definite infraction of the law could be proved.

Armed with these powerful instruments for the control of elections and of the organs of opinion and agitation, the Ultras pushed confidently forward, and their future appeared assured by the birth of a posthumous son of the Duke of Berry. They forced the King to send an army into Spain to restore Ferdinand VII to an absolute throne in the interests of the Holy Alliance (1823). They thus hoped to throw military glamour over the restored House of Bourbon, to efface by dazzling exploits the uncomfortable memory of those performed by Napoleon. Flushed with an easy victory in Spain, the Ultras resumed the policy of political and religious reaction at home with great enthusiasm.

Thinking that a new election of the Chamber of Deputies held during the war fever would result overwhelmingly in its favor, the Villèle ministry (1822–1828) caused the existing Chamber to be dissolved and new elections to be ordered. They were held in February 1824, and resulted as desired in a sweeping triumph of the Ultras. Of the 430 deputies elected only fifteen were Liberals. This triumph had been achieved only by the grossest

abuse of power on the part of the Government, which stopped at nothing to gain its ends. It even went so far as to relieve many prominent Liberals of taxes, so that they could not meet the tax qualification for voters or for membership in the Chamber.

A law was now passed decreeing that the new Chamber should last seven years, to be entirely reconstructed at the end of that time. This was an arbitrary change in the Charter.

The reactionary party, now overwhelmingly in the majority in the Chamber, and declaring that that Chamber should not be altered for seven years, thus lengthening the term and suppressing the annual partial renewal, considered that it could safely advance to the realization of its most cherished plans, too long held in abeyance. Their project was helped by the death in 1824 of Louis XVIII, and the accession to power of his brother, the Count of Artois, who assumed the title of Charles X. Charles had virtually directed the policy of his brother for several years. His accession, however, would necessarily give it additional impetus. He needed only six years thoroughly to uproot the elder branch of the House of Bourbon.

THE REIGN OF CHARLES X

The characteristics of the new King were well known. He was the convinced leader of the reactionaries in France from 1814 to 1830. He had been the constant and bitter opponent of his brother's liberalism, and had finally seen that liberalism forced to yield to the growing strength of the party which he led. He was not likely to abandon lifelong principles at the age of sixty-seven, and at the moment when he seemed about to be able to put them into force. Louis XVIII had made an honest effort to reconcile the two social régimes and systems into which Frenchmen were divided — the old pre-revolutionary régime and the new régime, the product of the Revolution, the old nobility and the modern middle class with its principle of equality before the law. The nobility had returned from abroad unchanged, with ideas of feudal privileges, with the determination to restore as much as possible of the old power of the landed aristocracy and of the church, faithful support of the monarchy by divine right. The policy of reconciliation had been badly shattered during the closing years of Louis XVIII's reign. With the accession of Charles X it was entirely abandoned, and that of restoration vigorously attempted. Not that this was proclaimed from the housetops. Charles rather at first attempted to re-

assure the somewhat perturbed mind of the nation. He announced his firm intention to support the Charter, and declared that all Frenchmen were, in his eyes, equal. He liberated political prisoners and won great applause by abolishing the censorship of the press. But these halcyon days were limited to the inauguration of the new Government. At the coronation of the King, France was treated to a spectacle of medieval mummery that impressed most unpleasantly a people that had for a generation been living in the positive realities of the modern spirit. It seemed the most incredible height of absurdity to see the King anointed on seven parts of his person with sacred oil, miraculously preserved, it was asserted, and dating from the time of Clovis. Nor could France, in the modern scientific atmosphere, gravely believe, as it was asked to, in the power of the king's touch. Béranger's witty poem on Charles the Simple was on everybody's lips.

But the legislation now brought forward by the King, and largely enacted, showed the belated political and social ideas of this Government. It was first proposed to grant nine hundred and eighty-eight million francs to the nobility whose lands had been confiscated during the Revolution and sold as "national property" to private individuals. The Charter explicitly assured the purchasers of this land that they should not be molested in their possession. But the courtiers, despite this assurance, were demanding the restoration of their estates to themselves. The King expressed the belief that by this act the last wounds of the Revolution would be closed. The émigrés should not receive their lands, but they should receive a money indemnification.

The debates on this proposal were heated. Many of the Ultra-royalists criticised it, saying that the sum proposed was entirely insufficient. Many rejected the very idea of indemnification, but demanded that the "stolen goods" themselves be given back. That there was an article in the Charter preventing this they did not consider a legitimate obstacle.

The Opposition, however, did not lack arguments. Had the descendants of those whose property had been seized after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes ever been indemnified? Had the émigrés suffered so much more than others from the Revolution that they alone should be compensated for their losses? It might be right to compensate those who had had to flee from France to save their lives, but many of these émigrés who were now to help themselves out of the public treasury had fled voluntarily in order to bring about an invasion of France by

foreigners, and, when that invasion had occurred, had themselves joined it and borne arms against France. Confiscation of property was a very proper punishment for such persons. Again, those who had remained at home and defended the fatherland had suffered as much as those who had emigrated and then invaded it. Furthermore, this measure would aid only the landed proprietors, but many fortunes, based upon personal property, had likewise been destroyed by the Revolution.

The bill passed (1825) and became law, though the Opposition in the Chamber of Deputies was larger than had been expected. Charles called it "an act of justice." It was perhaps wise in the sense that all purchasers of national domains, who, despite the assurance of the Charter, were constantly threatened, were henceforth safe. The value of these properties immediately rose in the market. But while the act pleased the émigrés and satisfied the purchasers of their domains, it offended the great mass of Frenchmen.

The manner in which the transaction was to be carried into effect was as follows: the sum involved was estimated at about a billion francs; the financial condition of the state did not permit the outright payment of so immense a capital; it was decided, therefore, to pay not the capital but the interest each year. This, it was estimated, would increase the annual expenditures of the state by about thirty millions.[1] This sum was procured by the conversion of the existing debt of France from a five per cent. to a three per cent. basis, thus saving about 28,000,000 francs in interest charges. In this way the indemnification of the émigrés would be effected without an increase in taxes. But this new act offended the nation's bondholders, who saw their income arbitrarily reduced by two-fifths. Thus the monarchy made enemies of a powerful class of capitalists, particularly the bankers of Paris. Money was taken from Peter to pay Paul. The strength of this class, which felt itself outrageously defrauded, was to be shown in 1830 to the great discomfiture of the Bourbon monarchy.

Another law that cast discredit upon this reign, and helped undermine it with the great mass of Frenchmen, was the law against sacrilege. By this act burglaries committed in ecclesiastical buildings and the profanation of holy vessels were, under certain conditions, made punishable with death. This barbaric

[1] As a matter of fact, interest was paid not on a billion but on about 625,000,000 francs.

law was, as a matter of fact, never enforced, but it bore striking witness to the temper of the party in power, and has ever since been a mark of shame upon the Bourbon monarchy. It helped to weaken the hold of the Bourbons upon France. It created a feeling of intense bitterness among the middle and lower classes of society, which were still largely dominated by the rationalism of the eighteenth century. They began to fear the clerical reaction more even than the political and social. The renewed missionary zeal of the church, the denunciation by Catholic bishops of civil marriage as concubinage, the open and great activity of the Jesuits, a society that had been declared illegal in France, all indicated the growing influence of the clergy in the state, an impression not decreased when, in 1826, the Papal Jubilee was celebrated with great elaborateness, and Frenchmen saw the King himself, clad in the violet robe of a prelate and accompanied by the court, walking in a religious procession through the streets of Paris. The university was under the control of the local bishop, who kept watch over professors whose opinions were denounced as dangerous, and who suspended many of their courses, as, for instance, those of Cousin and Guizot. Was it the purpose of the dominant party to restore both the nobility and the church to the proud position they had occupied before the Revolution?

Criticism of the evident policy of the Government was becoming general and ominous. But the ministry proceeded with its plans with unusual fatuousness. It now attacked what was regarded as one of the most precious acquisitions of the Revolution, the right to an equal division of an inheritance among all the heirs. The ministry brought forward a proposal, quite modest in its scope, to re-establish the principle of primogeniture. The Civil Code provided that in case the deceased died without leaving a will, his real estate should be apportioned equally among his heirs; and this equal division was to be made of most of his property in land, even if he did leave a will. He was given liberty freely to dispose by will of only a portion larger or smaller, according to the number of children.

The proposal now made was that this disposable part, which a man might will to his eldest son if he chose, should go to him likewise, if there were no will, as a legal advantage over the other children. This was to be the law only for those who paid three hundred francs in direct taxes. As a matter of fact this law would affect probably not more than eighty thousand families out of six million. Furthermore, the father was in no way forced

to constitute this preference for his eldest son, since he was left full liberty of testamentary disposition. Yet the mere suggestion threw the country into commotion. The prevailing thought was expressed by the Duke of Broglie, who said: "This is no law. It is a manifesto against existing society. It is a forerunner of twenty other laws which, if your wisdom does not prevent it, will break in upon us and will leave no rest to the society of France, which has been the growth of the last forty years." The proposition was defeated in the Chamber of Peers. For several nights the streets of Paris were illuminated in gratitude for this escape from feudalism.

These measures and failures, which were costing the ministry much popularity, were crowned by an attempt to render the press law more stringent. Charles X had long since regretted his act in abolishing the censorship. A bill was now proposed which wound an amazing mesh around the printing presses of France. So sweeping was it in character, giving the Government a practically unlimited control of all publications, both periodical, like the daily papers, and non-periodical, that it aroused immediately a remarkable opposition. It was denounced as barbaric by Chateaubriand, the foremost man of letters in France. "Printing," said Casimir-Périer, "is suppressed in France to the advantage of Belgium." Those engaged in this business, as well as the prominent writers and members of the French Academy, protested with vigor. The bill passed the Chamber of Deputies, but in the Chamber of Peers an opposition so intense developed that the ministry deemed it wise to withdraw the measure before it came to a vote. Paris was illuminated in honor of this escape. The provinces imitated the capital. These outbursts of joy were occasioned not only by the withdrawal of the press law. The people were already celebrating the fall of the hated Villèle ministry, which was felt to be imminent.

The mistakes of this ministry, however, were not yet over. A few days after the withdrawal of this press bill the National Guard was reviewed by the King. The King was personally received with much warmth, but cries of "Long live the Charter," "Down with the Ministers, down with the Jesuits," were heard from the troops. Villèle at once demanded that these troops be disbanded. The King consented and it was done. This was a mistake for two reasons: because it offended the bourgeoisie of Paris, thus far opposed to the ministry but loyal to the King, and because the men were permitted to retain their arms, of which three years later they were to make effective use.

The ministry, conscious of rapidly waning power, did not propose to yield, but attempted to crush the opposition. It had been unable to get the press bill through Parliament. The chief resistance the ministry had encountered had come from the Chamber of Peers, which had favored a moderate policy. Villèle thought to overcome this by packing that chamber with men who would support the ministry through thick and thin. Consequently seventy-six new peers were created, enough, it was thought, to enable the ministry to control that body henceforth. But it was also clear that the opposition was growing in the Chamber of Deputies too. Although the ministry was able to get its measures through that chamber, its majority was gradually becoming smaller. Villèle therefore decided to dissolve the Chamber, although it had yet four years to run. He expected by manipulation of the election to get an assembly in its place overwhelmingly in favor of the ministry. Thus, with the press shackled, and the Chamber of Peers and Chamber of Deputies controlled, the ministry could retrieve the rebuffs it had recently experienced and carry out its policy in all its vigor.

Never did a minister make a greater mistake. The ministry was overwhelmingly defeated in the elections. Its supporters numbered only 170; the combined opposing elements counted 250. Villèle retired from office.

The Martignac ministry now came in, in January 1828. The difficulties in its way were numerous. It had neither the favor of the King, nor the hearty support of the Chambers. Charles X told the new ministers, "Villèle's policy was mine, and I hope you will endeavor to carry it out as best you can." Martignac, however, made no such attempt, but strove rather to carry out a liberal policy, somewhat like that of the years 1816–20. The professors, Guizot, Villemain, whose courses Villèle had stopped, were reinstated. A somewhat more liberal press law was carried, abolishing censorship and the offense of "tendency." An educational law was enacted directed against the Jesuits and intended to please the more liberal religious element. But Martignac's course suited neither the Right nor the Left, and he shortly resigned. This pleased Charles X, who resented the liberalism of the ministry. Charles believed that he had the right to choose the ministers to suit himself, whether they pleased the Chamber or not. "I would rather saw wood," he said, "than be a king of the English type."

With the fall of the Martignac ministry in 1829 fell also the last attempt made under the rule of the Bourbon Legitimists

to fuse old and new France, to reconcile monarchy and constitutional freedom. The announcement of the new ministers was received with great popular indignation. The chief minister was Polignac, son of the Countess of Polignac, the friend of Marie Antoinette. Polignac had been one of the leaders of the émigrés at the outbreak of the Revolution, had joined in the Cadoudal conspiracy against Napoleon, had been sentenced to death, but had escaped with simply imprisonment, owing to the intervention of Josephine. In 1815 he had protested against the Charter, and had long refused to take the oath to support it. He had for years been very closely identified with Charles X, and had favored the most extreme laws proposed by him. Other ministers were Bourmont in the War Office, a man who was commonly supposed to have been a traitor to Napoleon, consequently to France, in 1815, and Labourdonnaye, Minister of the Interior, connected in the popular mind with the White Terror of 1815. Even Metternich, who could ordinarily view a policy of reaction with fortitude, considered the advent of such a ministry a matter of considerable gravity. "The change in the ministry is of the first importance," he wrote. "All the new ministers are pure royalists. Everything about the episode means counter-revolution." The feeling, that the appointment of this ministry was virtually a declaration of war to the bitter end against the modern society of France, was widespread, and was shared by all parties. Journals whose loyalty to the Bourbon monarchy was unimpeachable attacked the new ministry at once and in the most vigorous fashion.

Liberals of every shade began to organize to meet the dangers which they felt were coming. Old societies, like the Carbonari, renewed their activity. Men began to say that the House of Bourbon and a constitution were two incompatible terms. A faction was organized to prepare the way to the throne of the Duke of Orleans. Men began to study those chapters of English history which told how one prince could be put aside for another more to the liking of the nation. The groups opposed to the new ministry differed widely from each other in belief and purpose, Orleanists, Bonapartists, Republicans; but they were temporarily united in a common opposition. Indignation at the appointment of such a ministry was both widespread and deep, and became all the more vehement when Polignac declared his object to be "to reorganize society, to restore to the clergy its former preponderance in the state, to create a powerful aristocracy and to surround it with privileges."

For the time being, however, the ministry remained inactive, apparently amazed and checked by the remarkable ebullition of hostile feeling its appointment had called forth with the meeting of the Chambers. Early in March 1830 began a conflict which, short and sharp, ended in the overthrow and exile of Charles X. The King opened the session with a speech which clearly revealed his irritation at the Opposition, and his emphatic intention to support the ministry. The Chamber of Deputies, not at all intimidated, replied by an Address to the King, passed by a vote of 221 to 181, which was virtually a demand for the dismissal of the unpopular ministry, that thus "constitutional harmony" might be restored. The King replied by declaring that "his decisions were unchangeable," and by dissolving the Chamber, hoping by means of new elections to secure one subservient to his will. But the people thought otherwise. The elections resulted in a crushing defeat for the King and his ministry. Of the 221 who had voted for the Address, 202 were returned; of the 181 who had voted against it only 99 were returned. The total Opposition was increased from 221 to 270. The ministry could count on less than 150 votes in the new Chamber. The voters had spoken decisively.

This Liberal majority was not opposed to the monarchy. Had the King been willing to make some concessions, had he dismissed the ministry, the majority of the Opposition would have been satisfied. Charles X was urged to take this course by the most absolute of rulers, the Emperor Nicholas I, and by the most absolute of ministers, Metternich. Polignac was willing to go. But Charles had so conspicuously identified himself with his minister that yielding on that point seemed to him like abdicating. His own brother, Louis XVI, had come to a tragic end, he said, because he had made concessions. The ministry remained.

Charles was unconquerably stubborn. Other methods of gaining his ends having failed, he now determined upon coercion. He resolved to issue a series of ordinances to meet the demands of the situation. The ordinances consequently appeared in the *Moniteur*, the official organ, July 26, 1830. They were four in number. The first suspended the liberty of the press. For the publication of any periodical a preliminary authorization of the Government was thenceforth to be required. This authorization must be renewed every three months and might be revoked at any moment. Thus the editors of France could not lawfully publish another issue without obtaining the permission

of the Government. This, it was supposed, would effectually silence the opposition press. The second ordinance dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, just elected and overwhelmingly against the ministry, before that Chamber had ever met. This was to sport with the voters' rights to choose the deputies whom they desired. The reason assigned for this step was that during the late elections methods had been used "to deceive and mislead the electors." To prevent the recurrence of such manœuvers a third ordinance was issued gravely altering the electoral system. The number of deputies was reduced again to 258, one-fifth renewable each year. The property qualification for the suffrage was so manipulated as practically to exclude the rich bourgeoisie, merchants, and manufacturers, liberals and partisans of the new régime born of the Revolution, and to lodge political power almost entirely in the hands of the class of great landed proprietors, chiefly members of the nobility of the old régime. The electorate was hereby reduced by about three-fourths. Instead of about 100,000 voters there were now to be about 25,000. The fourth ordinance ordered new elections and fixed the date for the meeting of the new Chamber of Deputies that would emerge from those elections.

The King had persuaded himself that in issuing these ordinances he was acting not against the Charter but in conformity with it. He based his right upon an interpretation of Article 14, which gave him the power to make "the necessary regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state." He held that the king alone had the right to interpret the Charter, as the king alone had granted it. His interpretation was monstrous and his application of it pure absolutism, since, if the ordinances were legal, the most carefully safeguarded clauses of the Charter could be made null and void by the monarch's act. Needless to say, the Charter did not give the king the right to alter or abolish the fundamental provisions of the Charter. If so the French people would enjoy their liberties simply at the humor of the monarch. Not to have opposed these ordinances would have been to acquiesce quietly in the transformation of the French government into the absolute monarchy of the time of Louis XIV. If the French cared for the liberties they enjoyed, they could not permit this action of the King to stand. They must repel the assault upon their political system to whatever extent might be necessary, for the first and third ordinances were plainly violations of the Charter.

Yet Charles X and his minister, Polignac, were confident that

there would be no trouble. The ordinances affected, they said, only a few people — newspaper men and those who had the right to vote — an exceedingly small minority. No right that the masses of the people enjoyed was infringed. The people, therefore, would have no motive or desire to rise to aid simply the privileged few. It was the belief of the ministry that the mass of the nation was indifferent to the electoral law and was satisfied with material prosperity. The Government, entertaining this view of the situation, took no serious precautions against trouble. The Minister of Police assured his colleagues that Paris would not stir. Charles X, having signed the fateful decrees, and feeling secure, went off to hunt at Rambouillet. On his return that evening everything was quiet and the Duchess of Berry congratulated him that at last he was king.

The constitutional party, in truth, was poorly organized for resistance and moved slowly. The ordinances were aimed at the newspapers and the Chamber. The Chamber had not yet met. Its members were scattered over France, although some were in Paris. The first step in resistance was taken by the liberal editors of Paris. Under the leadership of Thiers they published a protest. "The reign of law has been interrupted; that of force has begun. The Government has violated the law; we are absolved from obedience. We shall attempt to publish our papers without asking for the authorization which is imposed upon us. The Government has this day lost the character of legality which gives it the right to exact obedience. We shall resist it in that which concerns ourselves. It is for France to decide how far her own resistance shall extend." On the following day the liberal members of the Chamber of Deputies drew up a formal protest against the ordinances, but outlined no course of action. The Revolution of 1830, however, was not to be accomplished by the journalists or the deputies.

As the significance of the ordinances came to be more clearly seen, popular anger began to manifest itself. Crowds assembled in the streets shouting "Down with the Ministry!"; "Long live the Charter!" Fuel was added to the rising flame by the appointment of Marmont, odious as a traitor to France in 1814, to the command of the troops in Paris. The workmen of the printing establishments, thrown out of employment, began agitating, and other workmen joined them.

On Wednesday, July 28, civil war broke out. The insurgents were mainly old soldiers, Carbonari, and a group of republicans and workmen — men who hated the Bourbons, who followed

the tricolor flag as the true national emblem, rather than the white flag of the royal house. This war lasted three days. It was the July Revolution — the Glorious Three Days. It was a street war and was limited to Paris. The insurgents were not very numerous, probably not more than ten thousand. But the Government had itself probably not more than fourteen thousand troops in Paris. The insurrection was not difficult to organize. The streets of Paris were narrow and crooked. Through such tortuous lanes it was impossible for the Government to send artillery, a weapon which it alone possessed. The streets were paved with large stones. These could be torn up and piled in such a way as to make fortresses for the insurgents. In the night of the 27th-28th the streets were cut up by hundreds of barricades made in this manner of paving stones, of overturned wagons, of barrels and boxes, of furniture, of trees and objects of every description. Against such obstacles the soldiers could make but little progress. If they overthrew a barricade and passed on, it would immediately be built up again behind them more threatening than before because cutting their line of reinforcements and of possible retreat. Moreover, the soldiers had only the flint-lock gun, a weapon no better than that in the hands of insurgents. Again, the officers had no knowledge of street fighting, whereas the insurgents had an intimate knowledge of the city, of its streets and lanes. Moreover, the soldiers were reluctant to fight against the people. The fighting continued two days amid the fierce heat of July. About six hundred lives were lost. Finally Charles, seing his troops worsted and gradually driven back out of the city, determined to withdraw the ordinances. His messengers, who were bringing this news to the insurgents, were greeted with cries of "Too late, too late!" The insurgents were no longer content with the withdrawal of the odious measures that had precipitated the contest. They would have nothing more to do with Charles X. But the determination of the government to succeed his was a delicate matter. Those who had done the actual fighting undoubtedly wanted the republic. But the journalists and deputies and the majority of the Parisians were opposed to such a solution. They now took the aggressive and skilfully brought forward the candidacy of Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, representing a younger branch of the royal family, a man who had always sympathized with liberal opinions. On July 30 appeared a manifesto written by Thiers in the interest of this candidacy, running as follows: "Charles X may no longer return to Paris: he has caused the blood of the people

to flow. The Republic would expose us to frightful divisions; it would embroil us with Europe. The Duke of Orleans is a prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution. . . . The Duke of Orleans is a citizen king. The Duke of Orleans has borne the tricolors in the heat of battle. The Duke of Orleans alone can again bear them; we wish no others. The Duke of Orleans makes no announcement. He awaits our will. Let us proclaim that will and he will accept the Charter, as we have always understood it and desired it. From the French people will he hold his crown."

On the following day the deputies who were in Paris met and invited the Duke of Orleans "to exercise the functions of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom." In a proclamation announcing this fact to the people it was stated: "He will respect our rights, for he will hold his from us." The Duke of Orleans accepted the position until the opening of the Chambers which should determine upon the future form of government for France. He added, "The Charter shall henceforth be a reality." But the transition from the old to the new was not yet completed. The people, who, during these three hot July days, had done the actual fighting, desired a republic. They had their quarters at the Hôtel de Ville and must be reckoned with. The final decision between monarchy and republic lay in the hands of Lafayette, the real leader of the Republicans. It was of the highest importance to know his attitude.

On July 31 Louis Philippe rode to the Hôtel de Ville dressed in the uniform of a general and wearing the tricolor cockade. He appeared on the balcony. Lafayette appeared with him and embraced him. The effect of the little pantomime was instantaneous. The crowd shouted for Louis Philippe. This popular applause ended the brief hope of the Republicans. The crowd virtually gave another sovereign to France.

Charles X now accepted the revolution. He abdicated, as did his eldest son, the Duke of Angoulême, in favor of the posthumous son of the late Duke of Berry, the Duke of Bordeaux, later well known in the history of France as the Count of Chambord and as Henry V, the title he would have worn had he ever become king. The leaders of the movement had, however, other ideas concerning the future government of France. They wished to be entirely rid of this legitimate royal line. Their first step was directed against Charles X and his immediate family. Desiring no repetition of the experience of the former revolutionists of having a king as prisoner they sent troops

against him to frighten him out of the country. The method succeeded. Slowly the King and his family withdrew toward the coast, whence they embarked for England (August 14). For two years Charles X lived in Great Britain, keeping a melancholy court in Holyrood Palace, Edinburgh, of sombre memory in the life of Mary, Queen of Scots. Removing later to Austria, he died in 1836.

The Chamber of Deputies, whose dissolution by Charles X before it had ever come together, had been one of the causes of this revolution, organized itself August 3 and undertook a revision of the Charter. It then called Louis Philippe to the throne, ignoring the claims of the legitimate prince, the nine-year-old Duke of Bordeaux. The revolution was now considered over. It had had no such scope as had that of 1789. It grew out of no deep-seated abuses, out of no crying national distress. France was growing every day richer and more prosperous. It was an unexpected impromptu affair. Not dreamed of July 25th, it was over a week later. One king had been overthrown, another created, and the Charter slightly modified. Parliamentary government had been preserved; a return to autocracy prevented.

The essential weakness of the monarchy of the Restoration was shown by the ease with which it was terminated. It always labored under the odium of its origin, having been brought back, as the phrase went, "in the baggage of the Allies," the enemies and vanquishers of France. The very presence of Louis XVIII and Charles X in France was a reminder of the humiliations of that country, was a trophy of her enemies' victories. Moreover, it was an inevitable fatality of this monarchy that its natural representatives and counselors had been long in exile, did not understand the complete intellectual transformation of their countrymen, had themselves always lived in a world of ideas alien to modern France, viewed the country they had to rule through a distorting though inevitable medium of preconceptions, prejudices, and convictions. The Bourbon monarchy accomplished much that was salutary. It restored the sadly disordered finances of the nation. Its policy in foreign affairs, in Greece, in Algeria, even in Spain, gave general satisfaction. But its ideal in government was the old, aristocratic régime and it was impelled by its very nature to seek to approach that ideal. When it approached too near it suddenly found itself toppled over.

Thus ends the Restoration and the reign of Louis Philippe now begins. Those who brought about the final overthrow of the elder Bourbons received no adequate reward. They had

the tricolor flag once more, but the rich bourgeoisie had the government. The Republicans yielded, but without renouncing their principles or their hopes. Cavaignac, one of their leaders, when thanked for the abnegation of his party, replied, "You are wrong in thanking us; we have yielded because we are not yet strong enough. Later it will be different." The revolution, in fact, gave great impetus to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.

CHAPTER VI

REVOLUTIONS BEYOND FRANCE

The influence of the Revolution of 1830 was felt all over Europe — in Poland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, England, and the Netherlands. It was the signal and encouragement for widespread popular movements which for a short time seemed to threaten the whole structure erected in 1815 at Vienna. It created an immediate problem for the rulers of Europe. They had bound themselves in 1815 to guard against the outbreak of "revolution," to watch over and assure the "general tranquillity" of Europe. They had adopted and applied since then, as we have seen, the doctrine of intervention in the affairs of countries infected by revolutionary fever, as the great preservative of public order. Would this self-constituted international police acquiesce in the overthrow of the legitimate king of France by the mob of Paris? Now that revolution had again broken out in that restless country, would they "intervene" as they had done in Spain and Italy? At first they were disposed to do so. Metternich's immediate impulse was to organize a coalition against this "king of the barricades." But when the time came this was seen to be impracticable, for Russia was occupied with a revolution in Poland, Austria with revolutions in Italy, Prussia with similar movements in Germany, and England was engrossed in the most absorbing discussion of domestic problems she had faced in many decades. Moreover, England approved the revolution. All the powers, therefore, recognized Louis Philippe, though with varying indications of annoyance. In one particular, consequently, the settlement of 1815 was undone forever. The elder branch of the House of Bourbon, put upon the throne of France by the Allies of 1815, was now pushed from it, and the revolution, hated of the other powers, had done it.

THE RISE OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

Another part of the diplomatic structure of 1815 was now overthrown. The Congress of Vienna had created an essentially artificial state to the north of France, the Kingdom of the

Netherlands. It had done this explicitly for the purpose of having a barrier against France. The Belgian provinces, hitherto Austrian, were in 1815 annexed to Holland to strengthen that state in order that it might be in a position to resist attack until the other powers should come to its rescue. The Congress had also declared and guaranteed the neutrality of the new state as an additional protection against an aggressive France.

But it was easier to declare these two peoples formally united under one ruler than to make them in any real sense a single country. Though it might seem by a glance at the map that the peoples of this little corner of Europe must be essentially homogeneous, such was not at all the case. There were many more points of difference than of similarity between them. Their historic evolution had not been at all the same. Except under the overpowering rule of Napoleon they had not been under the same government since 1579. Holland had been a republic. The Belgian provinces had remained subject to Spain at the time that Holland had acquired her independence, and had later passed under Austrian rule. They were also divided by language. The Dutch spoke a Teutonic tongue, the Belgians either Flemish, a Teutonic speech, yet differing from the Dutch, or Walloon, allied to the French. They were divided by religion. The Dutch were Protestants and Calvinists; the Belgians devoted Catholics. They differed in their economic life and principles. The Dutch were an agricultural and commercial people and were inclined to free trade; the Belgians a manufacturing people and inclined toward protection. There was one form of union, however, under which such dissimilar peoples might have lived harmoniously together — that of a personal union. Each might have had the same monarch but have kept its own institutions and followed its own line of development. But at Vienna no thought was given to such an arrangement. It was decided that the union should be "close and complete."

This was the first disappointment for the Belgians. They had hoped that henceforth they would have a large measure of independence. They had never yet constituted a nation. For centuries they had been subject to the Spaniards and the Austrians. But the French Revolution had powerfully aroused the longing for a national existence. This desire for liberty and independence, thwarted in 1815, operated with growing force throughout the period of their connection with Holland. The Belgians saw themselves simply added to and subjected to another people inferior in numbers to themselves.

Friction began at once. The King, William I, had promised a constitution to his united kingdom and appointed a commission to draw it up. The commission consisted of an equal number of Dutch and Belgian members. There were discussions as to the capital. The Dutch desired Amsterdam; the Belgians, Brussels. No decision was possible, and it was decided consequently to make no mention of the subject in the Constitution. It was agreed that there should be a legislature consisting of two chambers, an Upper Chamber appointed by the king, a Lower elected by the provincial states. The latter was to be composed of 55 Dutch and 55 Belgian members. The Belgians objected to this equality, saying that they were a population of over three million, while Holland had less than two million. Holland replied that she had been a sovereign and independent state for over two centuries and that she would not admit Belgian predominance; also that wealth and general state of civilization must be taken into account; moreover, that if population were regarded as the sole basis of the state she had a right to count in her colonies. She insisted upon a representation at least equal to that of the newly incorporated territories. As neither would recognize the predominance of the other, equality of representation was the only possible outcome.

Equal rights were granted all forms of worship. This was denounced by the Belgian Catholics. The Constitution gave great power to the king. The legislative bodies could reject but not amend bills. The right of trial by jury was not guaranteed, a right the Belgians had enjoyed under the French rule. The Constitution was now submitted to assemblies of the two peoples for approval. The Dutch assembly accepted it but the Belgian rejected it. Nevertheless, by an arbitrary exercise of power the King declared it in force.

A union so inharmoniously begun was never satisfactory to the Belgians. Friction was constant. The Belgians objected with justice that the officials in the state and army were almost all Dutch. They objected to the King's attempts to force the Dutch language into a position of undue privilege. They objected to the system of taxation. Religious differences inflamed passions still further. Though the fact remains that during this period and largely because of this union the material prosperity of the Belgians advanced greatly, still the union never became popular. The evident desire of the King to fuse his two peoples into one was a constant irritation. The system was more and more disliked by the Belgians as the years went by.

Thus, long before the revolution in France, there was a strong movement in Belgium in favor of larger liberty, of self-government. Few as yet, however, dreamed of a disruption of the kingdom. There was a lively sense of grievances too long endured. The July Revolution now came as a spark in the midst of all this inflammable material. On August 25, 1830, rioting broke out in Brussels. It was not at first directed toward independence. The Belgians would have been satisfied if each country could have been given its own government under the same king. The King rejected this proposal to change a "real" into a "personal" union. His troops attempted to put down the insurrection. There were in September several days of fighting in Brussels as there had been in Paris, and of the same character. The royal troops were driven out, and on October 4 the Provisional Government that had arisen out of the turmoil declared Belgium independent and called a congress to determine the future form of government. The King now prepared to make concessions, but it was too late. The congress decided in favor of a monarchy as the form of government, adopted a liberal constitution, and at the suggestion of England and France elected as king Leopold of Coburg, who had just declined the new throne of Greece, but who accepted this.

The task of greatest difficulty was to get the new kingdom recognized by the Great Powers, which in 1815 had added Belgium to Holland. Would they consent to the undoing of their own work? The King, William I, was resolved not to give up Belgium and was preparing to reconquer it, which he probably could have done, as Belgium had no army. Everything, therefore, depended on the powers which had suppressed revolution in Spain and Italy ten years before. Would they do it again in the interest of the treaties of 1815? Now, however, they were divided, and in this division lay the salvation of the new state. The Tsar wished to intervene in order "to oppose an armed barrier to the progress of revolution." Prussia seemed similarly inclined, but Louis Philippe, knowing that his own throne would be overthrown by the Parisians if he supinely allowed these absolute monarchies to crush the new liberties of the Belgians, gave explicit warning that if they intervened France also would intervene against them "in order to hold the balance even" until the whole question should be settled by the powers, in congress assembled.

In November, 1830, an insurrection broke out in Poland, which effectually prevented Russia from acting in the Belgian

matter, caused Prussia to fix her attention upon her eastern boundaries, and filled Austria with apprehension. Thus the Holy Allies, hitherto so redoubtable as the opponents of revolutionary movements everywhere, were in no position to stamp out such a movement in Belgium. This part of the work of the Congress of Vienna had consequently been undone. A new state had arisen in Europe as a result of revolution. Its revolutionary origin, however, was covered up by the action of the powers in now consenting to it. Conferences of the powers, held in London at the close of 1830 and in 1831, accepted the separation of Belgium from Holland, guaranteed the neutrality of the new kingdom, and sanctioned the choice by the Belgians of Leopold as their ruler. The powers had the satisfaction of knowing that though the territorial arrangements of Vienna were altered, France, the arch-enemy, had gained nothing. Moreover, the monarchical principle was saved, as Belgium had been prevented from becoming a republic; but the new monarchy was constitutional, a fact pleasing to England and France, but odious to the three eastern powers.

The success of the Belgian revolution had to a considerable extent been rendered possible by a revolution in Poland, which ended in disastrous failure. Neither Russia, nor Prussia, nor Austria would have acquiesced so easily in the dismemberment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had they not feared that if they went to war with France concerning it, France would in turn aid the Poles, and the future of the Poles was of far greater immediate importance to them than the future of the Netherlanders. The French Revolution of 1830 was followed by the rise of the Kingdom of Belgium; but it was also followed by the disappearance of the Kingdom of Poland.

REVOLUTION IN POLAND

Poland had been, down to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, an independent state. During that quarter its independence had been destroyed and its territory seized by its three neighbors, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in the famous partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. But the Polish people's passionate love of country was not destroyed and their hope that Revolutionary and Napoleonic France would restore their independence was intense. It was, however, destined to disappointment. But with the fall of Napoleon hope sprang up in another quarter. Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, was in 1815 filled with

generous and romantic aspirations and was for a few years a patron of liberal ideas in various countries. Under the influence of these ideas he conceived the plan of restoring the old Kingdom of Poland. Poland should be a kingdom entirely separate from the Empire of Russia. He should be Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. The union of the two states would be simply personal.

Alexander had desired to restore Poland to the full extent of its possessions in the eighteenth century. To render this possible Prussia and Austria must relinquish the provinces they had acquired in the three partitions. This, as we have seen, was not accomplished at the Congress of Vienna. There were henceforth four Polands — Prussian Poland, Austrian Poland, Russian Poland, and a new small independent Poland, created by the Congress of Vienna, the Republic of Cracow. The new Polish kingdom, erected by Alexander I in 1815, was then simply a part of historic Poland, nor did it indeed include all of the Polish territories that Russia had acquired.

Of this new state Alexander was to be king. To it he granted toward the close of 1815 a constitution. There was to be a Diet meeting every two years. This was to consist of a Senate, nominated by the king, and of a Chamber of Nuncios, elected by the assemblies of the nobles and by the communes. The latter chamber was to be elected for six years, one-third renewable every two years. Roman Catholicism was recognized as the state religion; but a generous measure of toleration was given to other sects. Liberty of the press was guaranteed, subject to laws designed to prevent its abuse. The Polish language was made the official language. All positions in the government were to be filled by Poles, not by Russians. No people in central Europe possessed such liberal institutions as those with which the Poles were now invested. A prosperous career as a constitutional monarchy seemed about to begin. The Poles had never enjoyed so much civil freedom, and they were now receiving a considerable measure of home-rule.

But this régime, well-meant and full of promise, encountered obstacles from the start. The Russians were opposed to the idea of a restored Poland, and particularly to a constitutional Poland, when they themselves had no constitution. Why should their old enemy be so greatly favored when they, the real supporters of the Tsar, were not? The hatred of Russians and Poles, a fact centuries old, continued undiminished. Moreover, what the dominant class of Poles desired, far more than liberal

government, was independence. They could never forget the days of their prosperity. Unfortunately they had not the wisdom or self-control to use their present considerable liberties for the purpose of building up the social solidarity which Poland had always lacked by redressing the crying grievances of the serfs against the nobles, by making all Poles feel that they were a single people rather than two classes of oppressors and oppressed. They did not seek gradually to develop under the ægis of their constitution a true and vigorous nationality, which might some day be strong enough to win its independence, but they showed their dissatisfaction with the limited powers Alexander had granted and shortly became obstructive and censorious — conduct lacking in tact and judgment.

The Diet criticized certain acts of the Tsar's officials and the Tsar warned the Diet. Friction developed from time to time, and, moreover, as the years went by, Alexander's early liberalism faded away. His successor, Nicholas I, who came to the throne in 1825, was a thorough-going absolutist. The spirit of unrest was strong among the mass of the lesser Polish nobility, a class little accustomed to self-control and also strongly influenced by the democratic ideas of Western Europe. This party was now inflamed by the reports of the successful revolution in France; by the belief that the French would aid them if they strove to imitate their example. When, therefore, the Tsar summoned the Polish army to prepare for a campaign whose object was the suppression of the Belgian revolution, the determination of the Liberals was quickly made. They rose in insurrection on the 29th of November, 1830. The Russian Grand Duke Constantine was driven from Warsaw. The revolutionists first tried negotiation with the Tsar, hoping in this way to secure their demand for larger political liberty. The attempt failed, but consumed time which the revolutionists could have used to much better advantage in arousing and organizing the country. When the Tsar sent word that Poland had but two alternatives — unconditional submission or annihilation — then the more radical revolutionists seized control of the movement, declared that the House of Romanoff had ceased to rule in Poland, and prepared for a life and death struggle.

Russia's military resources, however, were so great that Poland could not hope alone to achieve her national independence. The Poles expected foreign intervention, but no intervention came. Enthusiasm for the Poles was widespread among the people in France, in England, and in Germany. But the gov-

ernments, none of which was controlled by public opinion, refused to move. Louis Philippe, feeling his new throne quite insecure, did not wish to hazard it in the vicissitudes of a war. The revolution from which he had himself profited was a halfway affair. Revolutionary flames feed each other. If France should aid Poland the restless elements at home would be encouraged to go further and insist upon a thorough change in France which would endanger his position. England was not disposed to injure Russia, which might somewhere else wreak vengeance upon her. Prussia and Austria felt that an independent Poland would be a menace to them, as it would seek to win their Polish possessions. Moreover, patrons of reaction as they were, ought they to become, for no reason better than a popular sentiment, patrons of revolution?

Thus Poland was left to fight alone with Russia and of the outcome there could be no doubt. The Poles fought with great bravery, but without good leadership, without careful organization, without a spirit of subordination to military authorities. The war went on from January 1831 until September of that year, when Warsaw fell before the Russians. The results of this ill-advised and ill-executed insurrection were deplorable in the extreme. Poland ceased to exist as a separate kingdom and became merely a province of the Russian Empire. Its Constitution was abolished and it was henceforth ruled with great severity and arbitrariness. The insurgents were savagely punished. Many were executed, many sent to Siberia. Thousands of Polish officers and soldiers escaped to the countries of western Europe and became a restless element in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, always ready to fight for liberty. Even the Polish language seemed doomed, so repressive was the policy now followed by Russia. The Poles' sole satisfaction was a highly altruistic one, that by their revolt they had contributed greatly to the success of the revolutions in France and Belgium.

REVOLUTION IN ITALY

Another country which felt the revolutionary wave of 1830 was Italy. The revolutions of 1820 and 1821 had occurred in northern and southern Italy. They had been easily crushed, largely by Austrian arms. During the next decade Austrian influence weighed ever more heavily upon the peninsula. Discontent with existing conditions was general. The various governments were despotic, reactionary, unenlightened. The Car-

bonari were constantly plotting new insurrections. In 1830 Prince Metternich declared Italy to be of all European lands the one which had the greatest tendency to revolution.

Metternich's diagnosis was destined to immediate vindication. Revolutions broke out in the states of central Italy in 1831. The Prince of Modena and the Duchess of Parma, Marie Louise, the former Empress, were forced to flee from their states. More serious was the rising in the Papal States against the government of the priests. In the Romagna, the northern part of the Papal States, Bologna, the center of the disturbance, declared the temporal power of the Papacy at an end. Nearly every town in the States except Rome joined the movement.

The revolutionists expected the inevitable hostility of Austria but hoped for the support of France as well as of the people in other Italian states. But France was a most uncertain reed. Louis Philippe desired peace above all things, not wishing to risk his newly acquired power in the chances of a war so far away and with so strong a state as Austria. His prime minister declared in a celebrated speech that "French blood belongs to France alone," a phrase odious to all Liberals as in it there was only egoism. Louis Philippe, too, was probably influenced by fear of the rise anew of Bonapartism out of an Italian war. The two sons of Louis Napoleon of Holland had offered their services to the Italian insurgents. Further, might not Austria, irritated, permit Napoleon's son, the Duke of Reichstadt, now a virtual prisoner at Vienna, to return to France, in which case Louis Philippe's power would probably founder quickly? Feeling his position strong, Metternich decided to intervene and suppress the insurrection. Austrian troops were sent southward. The exiled rulers were easily restored. The Pope recovered his provinces. But a conference of the five great powers at this juncture demanded that he carry out extensive reforms, mainly in the direction of putting the government into the hands of laymen. The Austrian forces were then withdrawn. But the papal promises, not being kept, insurrection broke out again in 1832. Again the Papal Government was powerless to maintain itself. The Austrians once more crossed the frontier, at the request of the Pope. But this time France intervened, not in the interest of the Italians, but, as she held, in the general interest of the European equilibrium which would be upset by the predominance of Austria in Italy. Asserting that she had as good a right to be in the Papal States as had Austria, she seized the fortress of Ancona, announcing that she proposed to stay there

as long as Austrian troops remained. All this was a mere episode in the game of the balance of power. The two powers watched each other on the Pope's domains until 1838, when, the Austrians having withdrawn their troops, France gave up Ancona. Absolutism was restored in the Papal States and in the duchies.

Thus another attempt of Italians to direct their own affairs had failed. The leaders were incapable, the odds too great. But there were certain results of importance. The absolute necessity of driving Austria out of the peninsula, if the peninsula was ever to have a career of its own, was proved once more; also the difficulty of driving her out. The hostility of the papacy to any such project was again shown. The temporal power of the Pope had by some of his own subjects been declared at an end — a suggestive precedent. The ambition of the leaders, too, had been to make Rome the capital of a new state of Italy. The revolutions of 1820 and 1821 had mainly been the work of military circles. The movements of 1831 and 1832 were joined by many merchants and laborers. Liberalism was appealing with increasing force to classes of the population hitherto passive or ignored. Liberalism was becoming more democratic. But for the time being reaction again held sway in Italy.

REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

Thus in 1830 revolution raged with varying vehemence all about Germany — in France, in Belgium, in Poland, and in Italy. The movement also affected Germany itself. In Brunswick, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and in two Saxon duchies revolutionary movements broke out with the result that several new constitutions were added to those already granted. The new ones were chiefly in North Germany, whereas the earlier ones had been mainly in South German states. But the two great states, Austria and Prussia, passed unscathed and set themselves to bring about a reaction, as soon as the more pressing dangers in Poland and Italy and France were over, and they themselves felt secure. Using certain popular demonstrations, essentially insignificant, with all the effect with which he had previously used the Wartburg festival, Metternich succeeded in carrying reaction further than he had been able to even in the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819. Those decrees were aimed chiefly at the universities and the press. New regulations were adopted in 1832 and 1834 by which he secured not only the renewal of these but the enactment of additional repressive measures.

In 1832 six new articles were adopted by the Diet of the Confederation, by which the suppression of liberalism was rendered more thorough than ever. By them every German sovereign was bound to refuse any petition of his local assembly that might impair his sovereignty; every assembly was forbidden to refuse its sovereign the taxes necessary to carry on the government or to use the taxing power to force concessions from the prince, or to pass any laws prejudicial to the objects of the Confederation. A committee was to be appointed by the Diet to watch over the legislation of the different states, and to report all measures that threatened the rights of the Diet or of the individual sovereigns. The Federal Diet was made a kind of Supreme Court with power to interpret the fundamental laws of the Confederation and to decide what state laws were inconsistent with them, that is, were unconstitutional.

The Diet also passed other repressive measures forbidding political societies, public meetings, and revolutionary badges, and promising aid to sovereigns in case of need. The decrees against the universities were enforced with renewed vigor. Thus not only universities, but chambers of deputies were now under the Metternich system. This was Metternich's crowning achievement in Germany. Again a persecution of professors, students, and journalists, surpassing previous ones, was instituted. Obstinate chambers of deputies were dissolved. Constitutional life in the few states where it existed was reduced to a minimum. The political history of Germany offers but little interest until the great mid-century uprising of 1848 shook this entire system of negation and repression to the ground.

CHAPTER VII

THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

Louis Philippe, the new monarch of the French, was already in his fifty-seventh year. He was the son of the notorious Philippe Egalité, who had intrigued during the Revolution for the throne occupied by his cousin, Louis XVI, had, as a member of the Convention, voted for the latter's execution, and had himself later perished miserably on the scaffold. In 1789 Louis Philippe was only sixteen years of age, too young on the whole to play a political rôle, though he became a member of the Jacobin Club. Later, when the war broke out, he joined the army of his country and fought valiantly at Valmy and Jemappes. Becoming suspected of treason he fled from France in 1793 and entered upon a life of exile that was to last twenty-one years. He went to Switzerland, where he lived for a while, teaching geography and mathematics in a school in Reichenau. Leaving there when his incognito was discovered he traveled as far north as the North Cape, and as far west as the United States. He finally settled in England and lived on a pension granted by the British Government. Returning to France on the fall of Napoleon he was able to recover a large part of the family property, which, though confiscated during the Revolution, had not been actually sold. During the Restoration he lived in the famous Palais Royal in the very heart of Paris, cultivating relations that might some day prove useful, particularly appealing to the solid, rich bourgeoisie by a display of liberal sentiments and by a good-humored, unconventional mode of life. He walked the streets of Paris alone, talked, and even drank with workmen with engaging *bonhomie,* and sent his sons to the public schools to associate with the sons of the bourgeoisie — a delicate compliment fully appreciated by the latter. His palace was the meeting place for the liberal, artistic, intellectual society of Paris. Here certainly was a prince as nearly republican as a prince could be. The rights won by the Revolution would surely not be endangered by a man who so easily adapted himself to the new ideas that had come into the world with the great upheaval. Frenchmen, who dreaded the idea of a republic, dis-

credited by the horrors of the Revolution, and who wished to do away with the old-style monarchy, revived by Charles X, might naturally be hopeful of combining the advantages of both and avoiding the evils of both by placing so amiable and enlightened a prince in power.

Thus the legend grew up, carefully fostered, that here was a prince who put patriotism above self-interest, who had fought and suffered for his country. It was not known then, or in 1830, that he had sought to fight against it during Napoleon's reign, nor was it known that under this exterior of ostentatious liberalism there lay a strong ambition for personal power, a nature essentially autocratic, thoroughly imbued with extreme monarchical principles. Louis Philippe had learned the arts of intrigue, of self-control, of silent, incessant exploitation of circumstances for his own advancement.

Such was the man who in 1830 became king, called upon to govern a country in a sea of troubles. His legal title to the throne was very weak, his actual position for many years most precarious. He had been invited to ascend the throne simply by the Chamber of Deputies — a chamber, moreover, which had been legally dissolved, which, furthermore, had never been authorized to choose a king, which was, therefore, giving away something it did not possess. Moreover, of that chamber of 430 members only 252 took part in the vote, 219 in favor of Louis Philippe, 33 opposed. The Chamber of Peers concurred, but its concurrence merely emphasized its nullity in the whole proceeding. The choice of the new king was never submitted to the people for ratification, was never even submitted to the voters, who numbered about a hundred thousand. Louis Philippe was virtually the elect of 219 deputies, who, in turn, had no legal standing. Though the people of France acquiesced in the new régime, they never formally sanctioned it. The new king, in order to show clearly the break with the past, assumed the name Louis Philippe, rather than Philip VII.

The Chamber of Deputies, before calling Louis Philippe to the throne, drew up a Constitution to which he took oath. The Constitution was really a revision of the Charter of 1814 in those articles which had occasioned trouble during the last fifteen years, or which seemed inconsistent with the new monarchy. The fatal Article 14 was modified to read, "The king issues the ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws but never has power to suspend the laws or prevent their execution." Another change was that the right of initiating

legislation should no longer belong simply to the king, but should be enjoyed by both chambers. The sessions of the Chamber of Peers were made public like those of the Chamber of Deputies.

Instead of the formula, "the Catholic religion is the religion of the state," a phrase that denoted a position of privilege, a new formula appeared to the effect that that religion was "professed by the majority of the French." It was explicitly provided that the censorship should never be re-established. Article 67 said, "France resumes its colors. For the future, no other cockade shall be worn than the tricolor cockade." Thus the flag of the Revolution, lustrous with victories on a hundred battlefields, replaced the white banner of the Bourbons. The preamble of the Charter of 1814 was suppressed because it sanctioned the theory of monarchy by divine right and because in it the king condescended to grant Frenchmen rights as an act of royal pleasure, which they considered belonged to them inherently. In most other respects the Charter of 1814 remained unaltered. The age qualification was reduced for deputies to thirty years, for voters to twenty-five. It was, however, stated in the revision that the electoral system should be determined by ordinary law, thus providing for a supersession of the existing method.[1]

A law was accordingly passed in 1831 establishing the system that was destined to remain in force until 1848. The law of the double vote was rescinded. The franchise, hitherto given only to those paying a direct property tax of 300 francs, was now extended to those paying one of 200 francs. The qualification was reduced to 100 francs in the case of certain professional classes, the "capacities," so-called, lawyers, physicians, judges, professors. Thus the electorate was doubled. But France was still far from democracy. At the beginning of the reign the voters numbered about two hundred thousand out of a population of about thirty millions. France was still governed by the propertied classes, by an aristocracy of wealth. Under the July Monarchy the bourgeoisie enjoyed a practical monopoly of power.

There was from the beginning a division of opinion as to the character of the new monarchy. Did Louis Philippe rule by divine right, or did he rule by the will of the people, expressed by their deputies? The very nature of the July Revolution showed that the former claim was untenable. That revolution

[1] The Constitution is given in full in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 105.

had been made by the people of Paris against the monarch who ruled by divine right. Even with Charles X out of the way his legitimate successor was not Louis Philippe but the little Duke of Bordeaux. But did the accession of this prince to the throne prove on the other hand that all sovereignty was vested in the people? Many claimed that such was the case, that the people of France had virtually elected Louis Philippe king, that they might with equal propriety have elected any one else, that having elected him they could dismiss him. The opponents of those who held this view declared that this was to make the July Monarchy virtually a republic, and the fact remained that the republic had been deliberately rejected. This party argued that the new monarchy was peculiar — that the basis of the new system was a kind of contract between the king and the nation; that neither was absolutely sovereign, but that each possessed a part of the sovereignty; that thus each was indispensable to the other, each incomplete without the other; that France did not recognize without qualification the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, or that of the sovereignty of the monarch; that the fusion of the two, inevitable, complete, was the basis of the state; that the true theory of the monarchy was that expressed in Louis Philippe's phrase that he was "king by the grace of God *and* the will of the nation."

Not only was the legal basis of the July Monarchy uncertain, but its practical hold on France was most precarious. It was forced to devote the first half of its life to the problem of getting solidly established. Improvised at the moment of revolution, cleverly set up in the midst of general confusion, it was singularly lacking in all the qualities that impose upon mankind, that command immediate respect, that indicate the possession of authority and power. There was nothing majestic about its origin. It had no roots. Devised by the rich bourgeoisie, it seemed the expression of purely business considerations. Whether it could captivate the sentiments of France, could throw about itself the glamour that usually hovers over a throne, remained to be seen. It certainly possessed no prestige at the moment of its inception. Metternich analyzed the situation with keenness. "Louis Philippe finds himself at his accession to the throne in an untenable position," wrote the Austrian Chancellor, "for the basis upon which his authority rests consists only of empty theories. His throne lacks the weight of the plébiscite which was behind all the forms of government from 1792 to 1801; lacks the tremendous support of historical right, which was be-

hind the Restoration; lacks the popular force of the republic, the military glory of the empire, the genius and the arm of Napoleon, the Bourbon support of a principle. Its durability will rest solely upon accidents."

Its durability, however, proved greater than had that of the Napoleonic Empire or of the Restoration. Yet it had first to pass through a long period of storm and stress. It had enemies without, who denied its very right to exist. And even the supporters of the new régime were divided into two parties who could not long co-operate, so different were their views of the policies that ought to be followed by the Government both at home and abroad. There was the so-called party of movement or progress, with Laffitte, a rich Parisian banker, and Lafayette, at its head. This party did not consider that the revolution was over as soon as Louis Philippe sat upon a throne. They wished at home to effect many reforms in a democratic sense, not with revolutionary haste but gradually; and abroad, they wished to aid those peoples which were revolting against misrule — as in Belgium, Poland, and Italy. Thus by making France more democratic and by supporting democratic movements elsewhere, France would resume in the world her position of leadership in liberalism, which she had held under the Revolution of 1789.

The other party was called the party of resistance, of conservatism. It believed that the Revolution of 1830 had terminated on August 9, when Louis Philippe accepted the revised constitution and became king. It held that the Revolution had simply substituted for a king who wished to overthrow the parliamentary system established in 1814, a king who wished to maintain that system; that the Revolution meant the preservation of existing institutions, did not at all mean the expansion of those institutions in a democratic direction; that it was a popular revolution designed to prevent a royal revolution. It believed that France ought immediately to recover her normal condition, that the revolutionary passions which disturb men's minds and injure business ought to be quieted at once. Abroad, as well as at home, it would pursue a policy of peace. Casimir-Périer, Guizot, and the Duke of Broglie were leaders of this group.

Louis Philippe's preferences were decidedly for the latter party. Yet he could not at first break openly with the former. For some time, therefore, he called members of both to the ministry. Such a ministry could not from the very nature of the case have a clear, coherent policy. Revolutionary passions still ran riot in Paris. Crowds demanded the execution of the min-

isters of Charles X, who had advised the autocratic actions of that monarch. Mobs attacked Legitimists in the streets of Paris. These outbreaks resulted in business stagnation. The working classes suffered. It is said that 150,000 of them left Paris in search of employment. Public credit sank rapidly. Government bonds fell. No one could foresee what would happen either at home or abroad. The bourgeoisie felt insecure and rallied to the party of resistance.

Finally, March 13, 1831, Casimir-Périer and the party of resistance came into power. That party was destined to remain in power, with some variations, more or less marked, during the rest of the reign of Louis Philippe. Its policy truly expressed the essential character of the July Monarchy, which fell after eighteen years because it had not accomplished the democratic reforms demanded by the party of progress.

Casimir-Périer was a man of great wealth, of imperious temper, of positive opinions, of incisive speech. The principles according to which he intended to administer the government were boldly and clearly stated in an address delivered in the Chamber of Deputies shortly after the formation of his ministry. His declarations formed virtually the programme of the party of resistance. He announced his intention to carry out without weakness and without exaggeration the principle of the July Revolution. Now that principle was not insurrection; it was resistance to executive aggression. "France was exasperated, she was defied; she defended herself, and her victory was the victory of law basely outraged. Respect for plighted faith, respect for law, that is the principle of the Revolution of July, the principle of the government founded by it. For that Revolution founded a government and did not inaugurate anarchy. It did not overthrow the form of society, it affected only the political system. It aimed at the establishment of a government that should be free but orderly. Thus violence must not be, either at home or abroad, the character of our government. At home every appeal to force, abroad every encouragement of popular insurrection, is a violation of its principle. Such is the thought, such the rule of our home and foreign policy. Order must be maintained, the laws must be executed, authority respected. Public security and tranquillity must be revived. The Revolution has not begun for France the reign of force. The blood of the French belongs to France alone. The first result of this Revolution has been to render monarchy more popular by reconciling it with liberty."

Casimir-Périer formulated for foreign affairs the principle of

non-intervention, promising not to intervene in favor of peoples in insurrection, but asserting that foreign powers had likewise no right to intervene beyond their own frontiers. This principle was absolutely opposed to that on which the Holy Alliance had been acting. Later Casimir-Périer did intervene in Italy and in Belgium in the name of the principle of non-intervention.

This policy of rigorous restoration of order was begun at once. Casimir-Périer died in 1832 after a service of only fourteen months, but the policy he outlined with such clearness and firmness, and put into force, was continued in large measure by his successors.

The Government needed whatever strength it could get from a concentration of all its forces for the preservation of its existence, for the parties that desired the overthrow of the Orleanist Monarchy were active and daring. These parties, the Legitimists and the Republicans, it finally succeeded in silencing, though not until after much shedding of blood.

For the Legitimists, those who defended the rights of Charles X and his descendants, Louis Philippe was a usurper, a thief who had treacherously stolen the crown of the Duke of Bordeaux, the legitimate king. This party was numerically small, but it had in the Duchess of Berry a dauntless and resolute, if imprudent leader. A woman of unusual personal charm, attracting people to her and her plans despite their better judgment, she now, an exile in England, conceived the idea of winning a throne for her son, the Duke of Bordeaux. That the accomplishment of this would be the very climax of adventure did not sober her romantic, passionate nature. She believed that foreign monarchs would aid in asserting the principle of legitimacy, which lay at the basis of their own power. The magic of Napoleon's return from Elba was fresh in the mind of Europe. Might not a beautiful woman, representative of the House of Bourbon, succeed where the audacious soldier had succeeded? The Duchess won the reluctant consent of Charles X. She counted for success upon the favorable situation of the European powers, upon the supposed strength of the Bourbon party in France, upon the co-operation of the clergy and the nobility, and upon the support of the Vendée, considered the home of chivalric devotion to the white flag of the Bourbons. She felt so sure of success that she had already prepared a new constitution. She was warned in vain by prominent Legitimists of the total lack of effective preparations for so desperate an undertaking. Crossing the continent from England to Italy, she landed in France April 28, 1832, and, con-

cealed in a hut, waited for the promised rising of Marseilles. Even the news that this had failed and that the leaders were prisoners did not daunt her. She had told the faithful to be ready for her in Vendée on the first of May. She must keep the promise. Eluding the spies who were upon her heels, after great hardship, constant danger, and numerous adventures, she succeeded in reaching her destination. But the Government knew of the plan and the few hundred defenders of the legitimate monarchy were put down after a brave resistance. The Duchess escaped, reached Nantes after great exertions, and eluded the police for several months. She was betrayed by a person whom she had employed on several errands, was arrested, and was imprisoned until it was thought that she was dishonored and rendered politically impotent by the birth of a daughter and the avowal of a secret marriage.

At the very time this royalist insurrection was being put down in the west, a republican insurrection burst out in Paris. Lafayette had won the acquiescence of the Republicans in the erection of the July Monarchy, but only by assuring them that it would be the "best of republics." But this did not prove to be the case. By 1832 it seemed clear to them that they had been duped, and that the July Monarchy promised no growth in liberty for France. They then became its bitter enemies.

An insurrection broke out in Paris in June 1832 on the occasion of the funeral of General Lamarque, a prominent Republican. It was not sanctioned by the prominent men of the Republican party. The generals, known to be Republicans, remained inactive. The insurgents, therefore, were obscure, and their number was small, yet they fought with desperation for two days in the streets of the capital. They were defeated because they were unable to gain the cooperation of any considerable body of men. The workmen of Paris did not rise. The leaders refused to lead. Yet an insurrection so ill-timed and so ill-directed occasioned considerable loss to the Government. It was important as being the first frankly republican insurrection since 1815, and it was the strongest opposition the Government of July had thus far had to overcome. The Republicans were not discouraged by this failure, but went on preparing for the future. The Government favored a law aimed at breaking up the secret societies which were spreading republican principles, by restricting the right of association. Henceforth, any association, whatever might be its nature and whatever the number of its members, must submit its constitu-

tion and by-laws to the Government, and might not exist without its consent. Hardly had the new law been passed than new insurrections burst forth in several cities. Particularly important was that in Lyons in April 1834, which grew out of labor troubles but quickly took on a political character. For five days the riot raged in that city, finally, after great exertions, being put down by the Government. Insurrections also occurred in several other cities.

The Government was successful in suppressing these republican upheavals. It made no attempt to conciliate the discontented. It did not study the labor problem, which was one of the causes of the prevalent unrest, but determined to crush this annoying faction once for all. Republicanism must be stamped out. To this end the press must be controlled. The revised Charter of 1830 had provided for freedom of the press, and had declared the censorship abolished forever; yet the July Monarchy from the very moment of its inception had vigorously prosecuted republican journals, instinctively recognizing in them its most dangerous enemy. From July 1830 to September 1834 it had instituted over five hundred trials of journalists alone, had imposed heavy fines and long terms of imprisonment upon editors. The *Tribune*, the most aggressive republican sheet, had been prosecuted 111 times and had been forced to pay 157,000 francs in fines. Such prosecutions were more frequent than ever after the futile insurrections of April 1834. In addition to press prosecutions the Government determined to prosecute some of those who had been arrested in the recent riots. It instituted a monster trial of 164 accused, not before the jury courts, distrustful of the results in that case, but before the Chamber of Peers. Over four thousand witnesses were called. The defendants refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Peers, or to defend themselves. The case dragged on for months, from March 1835 to January 1836, creating much bitterness of feeling. Finally the accused were condemned to various terms of imprisonment or to deportation. But the decision was not enforced. A general amnesty, proclaimed a little later on the occasion of the marriage of the King's eldest son, liberated them. By these vigorous methods, however, the Republican party were effectually silenced for many years. Its impotence was increased still further by divisions among the members themselves.

Not only were attacks made upon the Government during these stormy years, but attempts upon the life of the King were frequent. These were ascribed to the Republicans and served

to discredit them still further. They were not the acts of the party but of isolated individuals. From 1835 to 1846 six different attempts to assassinate the monarch were made and numerous other plots were discovered before they could be put into operation. The most horrible of these was that of Fieschi in 1835. An infernal machine composed of many gun-barrels was discharged by a Corsican, Fieschi, at the King as he was passing with his three sons and many members of the court and army through the streets of Paris, July 28, 1835. Eighteen persons were killed on the spot, many more were injured. The King and his sons escaped as by a miracle.

The Government, encouraged by the widespread execration of this fiendish crime, determined to strike hard at all opponents. It secured the passage in September 1835 of new laws concerning the assize courts, the jury system, and the press. The Minister of Justice was empowered to establish as many of these assizes or special courts as might be necessary to judge summarily all those attacking the security of the state. The accused might be judged even though absent. In jury trials the decision might henceforth be given by a mere majority, seven, instead of the two-thirds vote, eight, previously required. The third and most important law concerned the press. It was designed to protect the king, the constitution, and the fundamental principles of society from attack. Heavy fines, as high as 50,000 francs, were imposed for various offenses — for a summons to insurrection, even if the insurrection should not occur; for attacks upon the king, even allusions to his person, or caricatures; for publication of jury lists; for the collection of subscriptions to aid newspapers to pay their fines. The law went even further and forbade Frenchmen under heavy fines the right to defend other forms of government than the existing one; to declare themselves adherents of any fallen royal house; to question the principle of private property. The censorship was re-established for drawings, caricatures and plays. The preliminary deposit required of newspapers was raised to 100,000 francs.

These September Laws gave great offense to all liberal and moderate men. After five years of freedom of the press to return to so far-reaching a suppression of that freedom seemed unjustifiable. The most careful defense of the king and the constitution was certainly desirable, but did it require any such drastic measures at this time? Would not the very multiplicity of crimes tend to encourage crime?

These laws greatly weakened the July Monarchy. Men felt

that individual liberty was only an empty word. The press law was aimed particularly at the Legitimists and the Republicans. The papers of the former party, well supplied with capital, survived the persecution to which they were now subjected. The republican organs, lacking this resource, largely disappeared. The press in France was in as deplorable a condition as in the worst days of the Restoration.

The Government might now feel secure against the attempts of the Legitimists and the Republicans. The only other party that was an inevitable opponent of the July Monarchy was the Bonapartist. But of this Louis Philippe entertained no fear. Indeed, with what proved to be singular fatuity, he distinctly promoted by his actions the growth of a sentiment that in the end was to prove very costly both to himself and to France. With the evident intention of showing that the July Monarchy, unlike that of the Restoration, was truly national, that it had no desire to eliminate all reminders of the Napoleonic era, but rather regarded them as among the priceless glories of France, he completed the Arc de Triomphe, begun by Napoleon, named streets and bridges after Napoleon's battles, and caused the Napoleonic history to be portrayed on the walls of the palace at Versailles, side by side with that of Louis XIV. Literature was already busy creating the Napoleonic legend, which, ignoring the evils and the frightful cost to France of the great Emperor's rule, was immortalizing his achievements and mourning his tragic end. It was singular policy, indeed, for a descendant of Capetian kings to foster the reviving interest in the career of the illustrious founder of a rival family. But that no danger lay that way seemed to be proved by two attempts on the part of the heir to the Napoleonic throne to overthrow the July Monarchy, which was showing itself so complaisant to the Napoleonic sentiment, attempts which resulted in ridiculous failures.

Napoleon I had died in 1821, and his son, the King of Rome, known after 1818 as the Duke of Reichstadt, had died in 1832. The headship of the family thus passed to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the son of Louis Napoleon, formerly King of Holland, and of Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of the Empress Josephine. Napoleon had indicated that the succession should be in this line in case he should leave no direct descendant. Prince Louis, born in the Tuileries in 1808, had been educated in Germany, and had gone to Italy, where, in 1831, he had participated on the popular side in the revolutionary movements described above. He was now living in Switzerland, brooding

over his fortune, taking seriously his rôle of pretender, publishing his political views. Suddenly he appeared before the garrison of the fortress of Strasbourg in 1836, wearing the familiar Napoleonic coat and hoping to win the support of the soldiers by the very magic of his name. Thus having a lever he could perhaps topple Louis Philippe from his throne. He failed miserably, and was brought to Paris a prisoner. The Government thinking it wise to treat this episode as a childish folly did not prosecute him but allowed him to sail to the United States. But Louis returned next year to Switzerland. He removed to England upon the threat of Louis Philippe, taking part there in fashionable or semi-fashionable life, elaborating his political theories and planning for his political future. His undertaking had failed but he had at least announced himself to France as the heir of the Great Napoleon. He believed firmly in his star and felt that he would some day be called to finish the interrupted work of his uncle.

The Government of Louis Philippe proceeded to inject still further vitality into the growing Napoleonic legend. It secured the consent of the English Government to the removal of the remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to Paris, where they might repose, according to the wish which the Emperor had himself expressed in his last testament, on the banks of the Seine, "in the midst of the French people whom I have loved so well," and in December 1840 they were deposited beneath the dome of the Invalides with elaborate funeral pomp and amidst evidences of extraordinary popular excitement. A minister of Louis Philippe said in the Chamber of Deputies, "He was Emperor and King, the legitimate sovereign of this land; as such he might rest in Saint-Denis. But he is entitled to more than the usual burial place of kings." The question put by Lamartine was pertinent. What was the Government thinking of "to allow the French heart and imagination to be so fired?"

Meanwhile, Louis Bonaparte, pretender to the throne, had resolved to take advantage of this renewed interest in Napoleon. Declaring that the ashes of the Emperor ought to rest only in an Imperial France, he made another attempt to overturn the Government of Louis Philippe. On August 6, 1840, he landed with about sixty companions near Boulogne, hoping to win over the garrison of that town and then to enact another "return from Elba," an event whose fascination for adventurers was lively, but an achievement difficult to repeat. He brought

with him proclamations declaring the House of Orleans dethroned. The failure of this attempt was more humiliating than that of Strasbourg, four years earlier. The little group was scattered by the appearance of troops. They fled toward the beach, where most of them surrendered. But a few, among them the Prince, plunged into the water in order to get to a boat nearby, which capsized as they were attempting to scramble into it. They were seized by the authorities. But the Prince, brought before the Chamber of Peers for trial, had a chance to make a speech. "For the first time in my life," he said, "I am at last able to make my voice heard in France and to speak freely to Frenchmen. . . . The cruel and undeserved proscription which for twenty-five years has dragged my life from the steps of a throne to the prison which I have just left has not been able to impair the courage of my heart. . . . I represent before you a principle, a cause, a defeat. The principle is the sovereignty of the people: the cause is that of the Empire: the defeat is Waterloo." His eloquence, however, was unavailing. He was condemned to imprisonment for life in the fortress of Ham. He escaped, however, six years later disguised as a mason, named Badinguet. Two years after that he was the most important figure in France.

The parliamentary history of France during the ten years from 1830 to 1840 was marked by instability. There were ten ministries within ten years. Yet there was a fairly continuous policy. Ministries might disappear and new ones come on the scene, but all after the fall of Laffitte, 1831, were composed of men of the party of resistance, such as Casimir-Périer, Broglie, Thiers, and Guizot. The chief work was to consolidate the July Monarchy, to put down its enemies, and to keep the peace with foreign countries. When, however, the members of this party had finally triumphed over their adversaries, they divided against each other. The personal rivalry of two men, Thiers and Guizot, was largely the cause of this. Each desired the leading place in the Government. Out of this rivalry arose two parties, one called the Left Center, with Thiers as leader, the other called the Right Center, under Guizot. The division, however, was not based simply upon the personal ambitions of the two men. Each had its theory of the constitution. Thiers held that the king reigns but does not govern; in other words, the king must always choose his ministers from the party that is in the majority in the Chamber and must then let them govern without intervening personally in affairs. Guizot, on the other hand, held that the

king should have the greatest consideration for the opinions of the majority but that he was not bound strictly to follow that majority. "The throne," he said, "is not an empty chair."

Louis Philippe had no desire to be simply an ornamental head of the state, as he was according to Thiers' view. He desired to be the real ruler, to govern as well as to reign. He insisted upon conducting foreign affairs himself, and he endeavored to exercise a controlling influence in other ways through his ministers. But for several years after his accession to the throne he was careful to guard himself from all appearance of assuming personal power. But now that his enemies were overthrown and crushed, now that these street insurrections were stamped out, he began to reveal his real purpose more clearly, which was to be ruler in fact as well as in theory. Taking advantage of the party divisions just alluded to, he forced Thiers, the chief minister and a man too independent to be a mere spokesman of the King, to resign in 1836, and called to the ministry Molé, a man who, as he correctly supposed, would, because of his political convictions, be very willing to be the representative of the King's personal views. Men began at once to talk of "personal government," of the interference of the monarch in the realm that properly, they held, belonged to parliament. References to Charles X became frequent. A vigorous opposition to this "court policy" and "court ministry" finally brought about its fall in 1839. Thereupon Soult became chief minister, but was looked upon as as much the representative of the King as Molé had been. His brief ministry was notable for a direct rebuff administered through him to the monarch. Louis Philippe asked for an appropriation for his son, the Duke of Nemours. The Chamber rejected the request by a vote of 226 to 220. The Soult ministry then retired and at last the King, appearing to renounce his personal ambition, called Thiers to the ministry.

The chief feature of the short Thiers ministry was its treatment of the Eastern Question, which, in a new phase, had been for several years before Europe again. The existence of the Turkish Empire was once more threatened, this time by a powerful vassal of the Sultan. After the Greek war of independence, in which the viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, had greatly aided the Sultan, the former was dissatisfied with his reward. He began to extend his possessions by arms. He conquered all of Syria (1832). He pushed forward into Asia Minor, defeating the Turkish generals sent against him. He prepared to go still further, to Constantinople. At once the Euro-

pean powers began to take sides. Russia offered her aid and succeeded in making a treaty with the frightened Sultan, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 1833, whereby, for certain obligations she was to assume, she acquired an almost complete control of the Turkish government. England, hostile as ever to Russian influence in Turkey and also wishing to maintain her own commercial prestige in the East, came to the aid of Turkey. Russia and England, therefore, declared their intention of maintaining the integrity of the Sultan's dominions, though their motives were contradictory. Prussia and Austria took the same side, asserting that the rights of legitimate monarchs must be maintained. On the other hand, France supported Mehemet Ali. The French had been attracted toward Egypt ever since Napoleon's expedition. The Egyptian army was organized and drilled by Frenchmen. France had just conquered Algiers. A close connection between Mehemet Ali and France would probably offer considerable commercial and political advantage in the Mediterranean. Thus France became the patron of Mehemet. But she stood alone. Her isolation was shown to all the world when the powers met in conference in London in 1840 and, ignoring her, because they knew that she was hostile, made a treaty with Turkey, pledging themselves to force Mehemet Ali to terms. The publication of this treaty aroused a warlike feeling in France, as it seemed to exclude her from the concert of powers, as in 1815. Thiers urged the adoption of warlike measures, but the King vigorously opposed such proposals, which would involve France and the July Monarchy in the greatest danger. Thiers resigned and Guizot now became chief minister. France adopted a policy of peace and the danger of a war passed. Thus the King rather than the ministry had determined the policy of the Government. Incidentally, Louis Philippe found himself relieved of the minister who believed that the king should reign but should not govern, and he gained in Guizot, who now became the leading minister and who remained in power until 1848, an instrument through which he was enabled to carry out with great skill his personal policy during the remainder of his reign.

With the elevation of Guizot to the leading position in the Government, France attained ministerial stability. The administration of which he was the real head remained in power from 1840 to 1848. Guizot was now fifty-three years of age. He had been a Liberal at the time of the Empire and the Restoration. Eminent as a professor, an historian, and an orator, he was a man of strong and rigid mind, holding certain political prin-

ciples with the tenacity of a mathematician. In a world of change he remained immutable. He refused to recognize that France needed any alteration in her political institutions. He believed in the Charter of 1814, as revised in 1830. Any further reform was unnecessary and would be dangerous. To preserve order within and peace without, that the wealth of France might increase, was his programme. His policy was, as he said in his opening speech in the Chamber, the "maintenance of peace everywhere and always."

These were also the views of Louis Philippe. The King could in no sense use Guizot as a pliant tool. Guizot was a man of far too great independence of thought, of far too vigorous and original character, to be the tool of any man. But this harmony of opinions was so complete that the King could complacently watch his minister carry out the royal programme, and Louis Philippe was always far more concerned with the reality than with the appearance of power.

Moreover, the Government was scrupulous in its adherence to parliamentary forms, in which Guizot was a strict believer. This ministry always had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. That majority, indeed, increased at each election. There was no attempt to defy the Chamber and exalt the royal prerogative. The King could not be accused of aspiring to play a personal rôle as in the days of Molé, for the ministry directed the Government and the ministry constantly had a majority of the Deputies to approve its actions. What France witnessed was a policy of stiff conservatism, of immobility, constantly supported by the Chamber.

The attention of the country consequently became riveted on that majority. How was it obtained? It was clear that it did not represent public opinion, did not at all express the convictions of France as a whole. It became evident on examination that that majority, the never failing support of the ministry, was obtained by an elaborate system of corruption. Louis Philippe and Guizot took no account of public opinion. They fixed their attention solely upon what was called the *pays légal*, that is, upon the body which possessed political rights under the constitution, namely, the voters and the deputies whom the voters chose. Now the number of voters was about 200,000, the number of deputies 430. Bodies so small could be manipulated and the manipulation was the supreme task of Guizot, the very foundation of his system. It was accomplished without difficulty. France was a highly centralized state, with local

government largely controlled by the central power. Consequently, the ministry had at its disposal an immense number of offices and it could do numberless favors to individuals and to communities. The electoral colleges, which chose the deputies, were small bodies frequently consisting of not more than two hundred members, many of whom were office-holders. The office-holders did as they were told by the Government, and other members were bribed in various ways by appeals to their self-interest. If they elected the candidate desired by the minister they might be rewarded by seeing a railway built in their district, for this was the period of railway building; or they might obtain tobacco licenses or university scholarships or petty offices for their friends. Many were the attractions held out to the self-interest of the voters, the *pays légal*. This was plainly corruption of the electorate, but it worked well in the opinion of the ministry. It insured the election to the Chamber of a large number of deputies pleasing to the ministry. Within the Chamber the same methods were used. About two hundred deputies, nearly half the assembly, were at the same time office-holders. The Government controlled them, as all promotions or increases of salary were dependent upon its favor. The ministry only needed to gain a few more votes to have a majority, and this was easily accomplished by a tactful distribution of its favors among those who had an eye to the main chance. There were plums enough for the purpose, offices to be bestowed, railroad franchises to be granted, lucrative contracts for government supplies to be awarded. "What is the Chamber?" said a deputy in 1841. "A great bazaar, where every one barters his conscience, or what passes for his conscience, in exchange for a place or an office."

Such a system was a mockery. The forms of the constitution were observed but its spirit was nullified. Self-interest was exalted above the interests of the nation. The ministry commanded a servile parliament. It is one of the ironies of history that Guizot, a man of most scrupulous honesty in private life, should have been the master mechanician of so corrupt and demoralizing a political machine.

Opposition to this system was, of course, inevitable, and is the main feature of the domestic politics of France from 1841 to 1848, when Louis Philippe and Guizot and the entire régime were violently overthrown. Reformers demanded that there be a change in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies and in the manner of electing it, parliamentary reform and electoral reform. Electoral reform should be effected by increasing the

body of voters, by lowering the property qualification, and by adding certain classes which could safely be intrusted with the suffrage, even if they could not meet the property qualification. Thus with an increased body of voters corruption would be more difficult. The ministry absolutely refused to consider this proposition. According to Guizot there were voters enough; moreover, the number was increasing with the increase of wealth. He even rejected a proposition that would have added only fifteen thousand voters to the existing electorate. It was demanded that the reform of the Chamber itself should be effected by forbidding deputies to hold office. Against this also the ministry set itself. Both plans, therefore, were rejected and the policy of immobility complacently continued. Year after year the two demands were brought forward in the Chamber; year after year they were voted down by the pliant majority. Reformers appeared to be hopelessly checkmated by the smooth operation of the machine they were denouncing. Well might Lamartine exclaim to Guizot, "According to you, the genius of the politician consists of only one thing — placing yourself in a position created by chance or by a revolution, and there remaining immobile, inert, implacable to all improvement. If in truth that were all the merit of a statesman directing a government, there would be no more need of statesmen: a post would do as well." This inertia ultimately disgusted some of the conservatives themselves. One of the members who had hitherto followed the ministry, summing up its work in 1847, said, "What have they done for the past seven years? Nothing, nothing, nothing." "France is bored," said Lamartine.

Yet this July Monarchy with its negative policy of resistance in season and out of season, resistance to lawlessness in the streets, to attacks of Legitimists and Republicans, to demands for an active foreign policy favorable to liberty, to demands for constitutional reform at home, was living in a world fermenting with ideas, apparently oblivious of the fact. Not only did its policy alienate many former supporters by its rigid and peremptory refusal of all concessions, and augment and sharpen more and more the antagonism of the Republicans, but its complete indifference to a new set of demands in the economic sphere, demands for social reform, was creating bitter enmities in another quarter and preparing a troublous future. There was growing up in France a party more radical than the republican, a party that looked forward not only to a change in the political form of the government but to a sweeping alteration in the form of

society, in the relation of the great mass of the population who were wage-earners to the privileged few, the capitalists and employers. The July Monarchy was a government of the bourgeoisie, of the well-to-do, of the capitalists. They alone possessed the suffrage. Consequently, the remainder of the population was in a political sense of no importance. The legislation enacted during these eighteen years was class legislation, which favored the bourgeoisie and which made no attempt to meet the needs of the masses. Yet the distress of the masses was widespread and deep and should have appeared clear and ominous to the Government. Under the Restoration, but chiefly under Louis Philippe, France was passing from the old industrial system of small domestic manufacture to the new factory system, the application of machinery to industry on a large scale, the employment of the new motive force, steam. This transition was in every country painful, involving as it did a dislocation and clumsy maladjustment of forces, and giving rise to most vexatious labor questions. Capitalists who could give or withhold the chance of employment had the upper hand and knew it. Grossly excessive hours of labor were required, and women and children who could tend machines were sacrificed to the new system in a manner that had never been possible under the old. The strange new conditions, the manifest evils dangerous to mind and body, required new laws for the protection of the weaker class. But legislation lagged far behind. Employers were intent on exploiting their factories, their machines, their workmen to the fullest possible extent, and many were amassing large fortunes. They were not interested in lessening the misery which the new order provisionally caused. And the law of France forbade the workmen themselves to combine for purposes of improving their condition. Ignorant, poor, lacking leadership, without political power, smarting under a sense of oppression and injustice, they were the inevitable enemies of a régime that passed them by, giving them no heed. In 1831 the silk-weavers of Lyons, earning the pitiful wage of eighteen sous a day for a day of eighteen hours, had risen in insurrection under the despairing banner, "We will live by working or die fighting."

Such conditions provoked discussion and many writers began to preach new doctrines concerning the organization of industry and the crucial question of the relations of capital and labor, doctrines henceforth called socialistic, and appealing with increasing force to the millions of laborers who believed that society weighed with unjustifiable severity upon them, that their

labor did not by any means receive its proportionate reward. Saint-Simon was the first to announce a socialistic scheme for the reorganization of society in the interest of the most numerous class. He believed that the state should own the means of production and should organize industry on the principle of "Labor according to capacity and reward according to services." Saint-Simon was a speculative thinker, not a practical man of affairs. His doctrine gained in direct importance when it was adopted by a man who was a politician, able to recruit and lead a party, and to make a programme definite enough to appeal to the masses. Such a man was Louis Blanc, who was destined to play a great part in the overthrow of the July Monarchy and in the Republic that succeeded. In his writings he tried to convince the laborers of France of the evils of the prevailing economic conditions, a task which was not difficult. He denounced in vehement terms the government of the bourgeoisie as government of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich. It must be swept away and the state must be organized on a thoroughly democratic basis. This was the condition precedent to all success. Only then and with the full power of the state at their disposal could the laboring classes work out their own salvation. The state, organized as a democratic republic, should then create so-called national or social workshops, advancing the necessary capital. These would be controlled by the workers who would share the proceeds. They would gradually supersede the existing workshops or factories, controlled and directed by the private individuals who had supplied the capital and who appropriated the profits. Private competition would give way to co-operative production. The individual producers would disappear. Louis Blanc's theories, propounded in a style at once clear and vivid, were largely adopted by workingmen. A socialist party was thus created. This party threatened the existence of the monarchy; it also threatened the industrial and commercial system in vogue. It believed in a republic as the only government that the democracy could hope to control; but it differed from the other republicans in that, while they desired simply a change in the form of government, it desired a far more sweeping change in society. As early as 1842 a German named Stein wrote: "The time for purely political movements in France is past: the next revolution must inevitably be a *social* revolution."

Thus it is evident that the amount of discontent with the government of France was great and growing. From nearly every quarter enemies arose. These enemies differed from each

other — they might not be able to co-operate in constructive work, but they could co-operate in destroying the existing system. There were the moderate Orleanists, convinced friends of monarchy, who were repelled by the prevalent corruption of parliament and wished to end it; there were the convinced Republicans, silenced but not suppressed; there were the Socialists, democratic, republican. The volume of discontent was increased by the unpopular character of the foreign policy of the ministry, which appeared humiliatingly submissive to England on certain occasions, too desirous of pleasing the absolute and reactionary monarchs of central Europe on others, too cold towards Liberals everywhere, too pettily personal, also, in that one of its aims was the advancement of the dynastic ambitions of Louis Philippe, who sought to promote by marriage alliances the fortunes of his family, even at the expense of the interests of the nation which he ruled.

These various groups, exceedingly dissatisfied with the existing order, converged in 1848, though unintentionally and unsympathetically, toward the most violent and reckless upheaval France had known since 1789 — a movement initiated by the moderate Monarchists, rapidly furthered by the Republicans, and in the end partly dominated by the Socialists. Each of these parties was by conviction and by temperament violently opposed to the other. The immediate occasion for their co-operation was furnished by the continued demand for electoral and parliamentary reform.

The electoral and parliamentary corruption of the July Monarchy has been described. Year after year the ministry had proved itself stronger and had defiantly resisted all proposals. The King was fatuously opposed to reform in itself. Guizot, believing in growth, nevertheless held that the time had not yet come for any alteration in the prevailing system. Beating against this wall, which seemed to grow higher and more solid each year, the Opposition came to see that there was no hope of overthrowing the obstructionist ministry by ordinary parliamentary methods.

Guizot constantly asserted that the demand for reform was simply brought forward for political purposes, that it was the work of a few, that the people as a whole were entirely indifferent. To prove the falsity of this assertion the Opposition instituted in 1847 a series of " reform banquets," which were to be attended by the people and addressed by the reformers. Petitions for reform were to be circulated on these occasions. Thus popular

pressure would be brought to bear on Parliament and King. These banquets were instituted by those loyal to the monarchy, but hostile to its policy. They simply wished to change the latter. Similar meetings, however, were instituted by the Republicans, who were opposed to the very existence of the monarchy. On the 18th of July, 1847, Lamartine, now rapidly advancing as a popular leader, prophesied a coming revolution. "If the monarchy," said he, "is unfaithful to the hopes that the wisdom of the country reposed in 1830, less in its nature than in its name, if it surrounds itself with an electoral aristocracy rather than unites the entire nation, if it allows us to descend into the abyss of corruption, rest assured that the monarchy will fall, not in its own blood as did that of 1789, but in the trap it itself has set. And after having experienced revolutions of liberty and counter-revolutions of glory, you will have a revolution of the public conscience and a revolution of contempt."

Great enthusiasm was aroused by these informal plébiscites all over the country during the summer and fall of 1847. It was conclusively shown that the people were behind this demand for reform. But the monarchy remained unaffected — still gave its systematic refusal. The King denounced in his speech from the throne this agitation "fomented by hostile or blind passions." He denied the legal right of the people to hold such meetings. To test this right before the courts of law the Opposition arranged a great banquet for February 22, 1848, in Paris. Eighty-seven prominent deputies promised to attend. All were to meet in front of the church of the Madeleine and march to the banquet hall. In the night of February 21–22 the Government posted orders forbidding this procession and all similar meetings. Rather than force the issue the deputies who had agreed to attend yielded, though under protest. But a vast crowd congregated, of students, workingmen, and others. They had no leader, no definite purpose. The crowd committed slight acts of lawlessness, but nothing serious happened that day. But in the night barricades arose in the workingmen's quarters of the city. Some shots were fired. The Government called out the National Guard. It refused to march against the insurgents. Some of its members even began to shout, "Long live Reform!" "Down with Guizot!" The King, frightened at this alarming aspect, was willing to grant reform. Guizot would not consent and consequently withdrew from office. This news was greeted with enthusiasm by the crowds and, in the evening of February

23d, Paris was illuminated and the trouble seemed ended. The contest thus far had been simply between Royalists, those who supported the Guizot ministry, and the reformers, and the fall of Guizot was the triumph of the latter. But the movement no longer remained thus circumscribed. The Republicans now entered aggressively upon the scene, resolved to arouse the excited people against Louis Philippe himself and against the monarchy. They marched through the boulevards and made a hostile demonstration before Guizot's residence. Some unknown person fired a shot at the guards. The guards instantly replied, fifty persons fell, more than twenty dead. This was the doom of the monarchy. The Republicans seized the occasion to inflame the people further. Several of the corpses were put upon a cart which was lighted by a torch. The cart was then drawn through the streets. The ghastly spectacle aroused everywhere the angriest passions; cries of "Vengeance!" followed it along its course. From the towers the tocsin sounded its wild and sinister appeal.

Thus began a riot which grew in vehemence hourly, and which swept all before it. The cries of "Long live Reform!" heard the day before, now gave way to the more ominous cries of "Long live the Republic!" Finally, on February 24th, the King abdicated in favor of his grandson, the little Count of Paris, who should be King Louis Philippe II, and whose mother, the Duchess of Orleans, should be regent. The royal family left the Tuileries and escaped from Paris in safety. Another French king took the road to England and entered upon a life of exile, which was to end only with death in 1850.

The government of France had been swallowed up by another revolution. The King and the minister were overthrown. Who would succeed them? The King had abdicated in favor of his grandson. But would the revolutionists recognize him? The Duchess of Orleans with great bravery went directly to the Chamber of Deputies with her two sons, nine and seven years old. A painful scene followed. The majority of the deputies hailed her as regent and her son as king, but soon the mob, consisting of the students, the Republicans, and Socialists who had forced the abdication, invaded the Chamber. The president declared the session closed. The mob continued in the hall, reenforced by new armed bands, which denounced the idea of a regency, denounced the Chamber and the deputies, and cried "No more Bourbons; a Provisional Government and after that the Republic." Out of this wild turmoil by no legal method arose

a new system. The republican deputies finally declared the House of Orleans deposed and proclaimed a Provisional Government and Lamartine read a list of seven names of those who should compose it. All were deputies. This list had been previously drawn up at the office of the *National*, the leading liberal newspaper. The crowd in the hall shouted its approval. This assembly did not proclaim the Republic.

While this government was arising in the Chamber, another movement was in progress, in another part of the city. The republican Socialists, meeting in the office of the *Reform*, their organ, had drawn up a list which had included the names on the list of the *National*, but had added to them three of their own number, among whom was Louis Blanc. These established themselves in the Hôtel de Ville and proclaimed the Republic. Thus there were two governments as a result of the insurrection. The members chosen in the Chamber traversed the streets of Paris to the Hôtel de Ville. There the two groups were fused. Positions were found in the new government for the members of both. The Republic was immediately proclaimed, subject to ratification by the people.

CHAPTER VIII

CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS

PRUSSIA

The French Revolution of 1848 was the signal for the most wide-reaching disturbance of the century. Revolutions broke out from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from France to the Russian frontier. The whole system of reaction, which had succeeded Waterloo and which had come to be personified in the imperturbable Metternich, crashed in unutterable confusion. But in order to understand the swiftness and completeness of this collapse, one must know something of the evolution of central Europe between 1830 and 1848, for the revolutions of 1848 were no sudden and accidental improvisations, but were simply the decisive and dramatic culmination of movements everywhere making for change. The Revolution of 1848 was a signal and an encouragement to other peoples to attempt similar things; it was not a cause. Particularly necessary is it to trace the inner evolution of Germany, Austria, and Italy during this period, which was not at all one of stagnation, but one characterized by a great and fruitful fermentation of ideas.

The interest of German history between 1830 and 1848 does not lie in the evolution of political liberty, for political repression and absolutism were the order of the day. It lies rather in growth along economic lines, in intellectual achievements outside the domain of politics, and in those movements of opinion and of racial aspiration which rendered so notable and far-reaching the vast turmoil of 1848.

For German history the all-important matter is the evolution during those years of a remarkable situation in both Prussia and Austria, which was highly favorable to revolutions in the fulness of time. The Confederation as a whole had no evolution, but was a sleeping, hollow mockery. The evolution of the lesser states, important no doubt, must be neglected in a study of this scope. The ideas, personalities, tendencies, and situations that were to prove determinant for central Europe, came not from them but from the two first-class powers already named, which stood confronting each other in the Confederation and in

Europe as a whole, rendering unity impossible, and both opposed to liberty.

And first of the evolution of Prussia during these years. Political liberty, as we have seen, was denied. No constitution was granted, no parliament created, but it would not be reasonable to emphasize that fact unduly. Their absence was not acutely felt save by a small enlightened minority. Such liberties Prussians had never known, and there were few serious practical grievances. The state was well administered. The king, Frederick William III (1797–1840), was honest and beloved, the administration hard-working and economical, the policies enlightened. The period between 1815 and 1848, though politically unimportant, was immensely significant in other ways. While university professors and students suspected of dabbling in politics were shamefully persecuted, the régime was not opposed to intellectual progress. Under it great advances were made in all branches of education from the lowest to the highest. Intellectual activity, forbidden to enter the political field, overflowed into others. It was a period of great and durable conquests in the domain of science, rich in leaders who held high the best traditions of scholarship and widened the bounds of human knowledge.

The great political achievements of the period lay in the administrative and economic questions met and solved by Prussian statesmen. Prussia had to undergo the most thorough reorganization. Before German unity could be achieved Prussian unity must be secured. The treaties of 1815 had transformed Prussia by almost doubling her territory and her population. Out of ten million inhabitants five million were new subjects, difficult to assimilate: the inhabitants of the Rhenish provinces had been for twenty years a part of the French Empire and were strongly attached to French ideas; the Poles still bitterly regretted the loss of their former independence; the Saxons resented their annexation to Prussia. These peoples did not feel themselves Prussians, though fate had put them under a Prussian king. The task of building anew the Prussian state out of such varied elements, of making a thoroughly homogeneous kingdom, was rendered all the more difficult from the fact that Prussia was divided into two separate, unconnected parts, an eastern and a western, separated by Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse-Cassel. Her boundaries were not those of a healthy state. These were the problems whose solution would require time. Meanwhile certain definite reforms were undertaken.

The financial question was the most urgent, and this was faced heroically. The burden of the Napoleonic wars had been tremendous. The Prussian debt was large; deficits were usual. By revising her system of taxation, and by rigid economy, order was finally brought about, there were surpluses instead of deficits, and in 1828 government bonds stood at par.

The great interest of the Prussian Government in the material development and prosperity of the country was best shown in its tariff policy. Prussia, as has been said, was divided into two unequal and unconnected parts. The boundaries were very extensive, increased still further by the fact that entirely within her territory lay states or fragments of other states independent of her. Moreover, the economic conditions in the eastern part of the realm were essentially different from those in the western; the one agricultural, the other industrial. There was nothing like freedom of trade between the different parts. Indeed, there were in old Prussia alone sixty-seven different tariff systems in operation, separating district from district. Cities were shut off from the surrounding country districts by tariff walls, and province from province. All this meant that commerce could not flourish, hampered on every side, and that industries, the support of commerce, could not expand, owing to narrow and uncertain markets. Under these conditions one industry thrived — smuggling. The smugglers' trade was easy, owing to the fact that the frontiers to be guarded were over 4,000 miles long, a line that could only be guarded by a very large number of customs officials, which would involve great expense. All this was changed in 1818, under the influence of a great financial reformer, Maassen. All internal customs were abolished and free trade was established throughout all Prussia. Then a tariff, very simple and covering few commodities, was established against the rest of the world. This tariff was put low enough to make smuggling unprofitable. Products that would be brought over sea were taxed higher, as they must enter by the few ports, which could be easily guarded. Having established a common tariff for her own kingdom, Prussia sought to induce other German states to enter into union with her, to adopt the same tariff against other nations and free trade with each other. She offered to share the total revenues collected pro rata according to population. The other states protested vehemently at first against what they considered the high-handed measures of the larger state, but they finally saw the advantage of union. The first to join were those which were entirely inclosed or

which had parts entirely inclosed by Prussia; whose commerce with the outside world must be through Prussian territory. Between 1819 and 1828 the little Thuringian duchies entered this Zollverein, or Tariff Union. The southern and central states of Germany held aloof and even formed rival tariff unions of their own. These, however, did not prosper. One by one the other states joined the Prussian Union, led thereto by the apparent advantages of free trade with each other and by Prussia's liberal terms. By 1842 all, save the Hanseatic towns and Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Austria, had joined. The treaties between the co-operating states upon which the union rested were made for brief periods, but were constantly renewed.

The advantages of the Zollverein were both economic and political. Industry grew rapidly by the application of the principle of free trade to the states of Germany. It created a real national unity in economic matters, at a time when Germany was politically only the semblance of a union; it accustomed German states to co-operate without Austria, and it taught them the advantages of Prussian leadership. Men began to see that a Germany could exist without Austria. The Zollverein is generally considered in a very real sense to have been the beginning of German unity.

As long as Frederick William III lived it was recognized that no changes would be made in the political institutions of Prussia. It was tacitly understood that his declining years should not be disturbed, that the demands for reforms should not be pressed. But when he died in 1840, says von Treitschke, "all the long pent-up grievances and hopes of Prussia overflowed irresistibly, gushing and foaming like molten metal when the spigot is knocked out." All eyes were now turned upon his son and successor, Frederick William IV.

The new King, forty-five years of age, was already well known as a man of unusual intellectual gifts — quick, mobile, enthusiastic, imaginative, an eloquent conversationalist and public speaker. He was a patron of learning, surrounding himself with scholars, artists, and writers. Goethe had said of him that "so great a talent must awaken new talents in others." From his general intellectual restlessness and liberality much was hoped, as it was also known that he had latterly not approved the policy of his father. This impression he confirmed by his acts at the opening of his reign. He issued an amnesty pardoning political prisoners. He restored Arndt to his professorship at Bonn. He released Jahn. In a series of impassioned utterances

he spoke glowingly of Prussia's destiny. It seemed that a new and liberal era was dawning.

But disillusionment soon began. The people wanted reforms and expected them from the new King. His predecessor had consented to the creation of local diets for local concerns in each of the provinces into which Prussia was divided. He had promised a central parliament but had not kept the promise. The demand now was for this. Would Frederick William IV grant it? This question was asked him by the estates of the Province of Prussia. His answer was kindly and vague. A little later a real answer came in the form of an ordinance which somewhat increased the powers of the provincial estates and provided that delegations from each should unite in Berlin. This was not at all what was wanted. Several of the provincial estates demanded the fulfilment of the promises of 1815. Books appeared discussing constitutional questions. The press took the matter up vehemently, the censorship having been somewhat slackened. The King apparently made no effort to win back the favor of his people. His policy was evidently purely reactionary. Popular meetings were forbidden in certain provinces; the press, too free for his satisfaction, was shackled again. Even the independence of the judiciary was threatened.

Year after year went by and the people became impatient because no parliament was created. The King, meanwhile wavering between the most exalted notions of the divine origin and nature of his position and his desire to live in harmony with his age, sketched plan after plan of an assembly which should not be representative, which should co-operate with him, and which should quiet the insistent clamor of his people. Finally, on February 3, 1847, he issued a Letter Patent which marks the beginning of the constitutional history of Prussia. By this Patent it was announced that the king would summon all the provincial assemblies to meet in one general assembly or United Landtag whenever the needs of the state should demand new loans, the levying of new taxes, or the augmentation of those already existing. The United Landtag was to have the right of petition, and the king might consult it in regard to new legislation. There were to be two chambers, meeting apart, except when considering financial questions, the former a chamber of lords, the other of the three estates. At first enthusiastic, the people were shortly chagrined at the outcome of all their efforts. The Landtag was not to meet at definite periods but only when the king should summon it. It was to resemble a medieval diet

more than a modern parliament. Even its power in financial matters was greatly limited. All discussion involving the tariff was reserved for the Zollverein. Provincial and local taxes remained to be determined absolutely by the crown. In case of war the Government might increase the existing taxes, being merely obliged to bring the matter to the attention of the next Landtag. Even the right of petition was carefully restricted. The king would receive petitions only when two-thirds of both houses had agreed upon them.

This was not the constitution the people had been so long demanding. By it the king was not required ever to call the United Landtag together. Moreover, he retained the complete law-making power and an almost unrestricted power over the nation's purse. The new parliament was to represent, not the people, but social classes.

Moreover, in the speech from the throne, with which Frederick William IV opened this assembly in the following April, he took particular pains to state that this Patent was no constitution creating a parliament representing the people of Prussia. "Never will I allow," he said, "a sheet of written paper to come, like a second Providence, between our Lord God in Heaven and this land, to govern us by its paragraphs. The crown cannot and ought not to depend upon the will of majorities. I should never have called you together if I had the least idea that you could dream of playing the part of so-called representatives of the people."

A conflict began at once between the King and the United Landtag, which developed into a deadlock. The Landtag demanded a real parliament. The King demanded loans. Neither yielded to the other, and in June 1847 the Landtag was dissolved. Nothing had been accomplished. A grave constitutional crisis had been created. The monarch stood in direct opposition to the Liberals. Such was the dangerously overheated state of the public mind when news of the revolution in Paris reached Berlin.

AUSTRIA

The history of Austria between 1815 and 1848 resembles in some respects that of the German Confederation in that it was not the evolution of a single homogeneous state. Movements proceeded from several local centers. For purposes of simplification it is well to examine each in turn. In the provinces of Austria proper, in the western part of the empire, the movement

took the form of a demand for the diminution of the autocratic system. There, as elsewhere in Europe, after 1840 a popular feeling that the time had come for larger liberty was distinctly perceptible. Yet there the difficulty of its achievement was at its maximum. For as long as Francis I lived there was no hope of sympathy from the throne. His successor, Ferdinand I (1835–48), was a man of less ability and was, moreover, mentally incapacitated for rule. This meant that Metternich and his colleagues exercised nearly uncontrolled power.

During this period little change occurred in the conditions of the Austrian provinces. Liberal opinions could not be freely published owing to the severity of the censorship; yet there were a few journalists and lawyers who managed to express a desire for some measure of political freedom and for a constitution. One significant feature of the time was the transition from the old to the new in the economic sphere. The introduction of machinery, bringing with it the factory system, was now accomplished, and was accompanied by the terrible evils which had marked this transition in England and France. Many laborers were thrown out of work, wandered about the country, demoralized, starving, and drifted to the cities, particularly to Vienna, forming a desperate element, easily incited to deeds of violence, as the issue was to show. An industrial crisis preceded the political crisis of 1848 and profoundly influenced its course.

The period preceding 1848, politically of slight interest, was rendered notable by the development of the spirit of nationality among several of the varied peoples who had hitherto been quiescent under the House of Hapsburg. This was the most significant phenomenon of these years, as it was to be the most permanent in its effects. This feeling of separate individuality, this assertion of the rights of nationality, which was one of the principal features of the history of the nineteenth century everywhere, had come to be the most salient characteristic of Austrian evolution in particular. Under the ægis of the House of Hapsburg several nations were arising and were struggling for a larger and more independent place in the collective state. This spirit was particularly pronounced in Bohemia and Hungary.

Bohemia had been united with Austria since 1526. Its population consisted of a German minority and of a branch of the Slavic race called Czechs. The Germans had for more than two centuries been preponderant. Their language was that of the government, of educated people, the language of literature and

science, the Czechish being regarded as fit only for peasants. But after 1815 the popular consciousness gradually awoke. The idea that the Czechish nationality could be revived took strong hold of a few educated men, who believed that Bohemia should be torn from German control and that the native Czechish element should be put in its place. The movement was at first confined to university men, was literary and scientific. A group of historians arose, of whom Palacky was the leader, who by their histories of Bohemia when she had been an independent kingdom, inculcated the wish that she might again be one. Pride was enlisted, too, by reviving a knowledge of the ancient native literature. Henceforth every Czech should cease to use German and speak his own native tongue. This movement grew, passing from university circles to the mass of the people. It was directed against the German office-holders in Bohemia and against the use of German in the government and in education. While during the period from 1815 to 1848 it accomplished no practical reform, it created a public opinion and a vehement aspiration for national independence that constituted an important factor in the general situation of that year.

A more pronounced national and racial movement within the empire was going on at the same time in Hungary, a country peopled by several different races speaking different languages and possessing different institutions. The leading races were the Magyars; the Slavs, broken up into several branches, north and south of the Magyars; the Germans or Saxons; and the Roumanians. The Magyars, though numerically a minority of the whole people, were more numerous than any other race, were the most developed politically, and had, ever since they had come into the country in the ninth century, regarded it as their own and had paid scant attention to the other races. Two sections of Hungary, Croatia, peopled almost entirely by Slavs, and Transylvania, the majority of whose inhabitants were Roumanians, were somewhat differentiated from Hungary proper, where the Magyars predominated, in that, though annexed countries and subject to the king of Hungary, they enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy. Croatia, for instance, had a viceroy or ban and a Diet of its own. Transylvania had its Estates, infrequently convoked.

Hungary had a constitution dating in part from the thirteenth century. It was in 1222 that the Golden Bull of Andreas II was issued, nearly contemporary with Magna Charta. There was a Diet or Parliament meeting in Presburg in two chambers,

or Tables, as they were called; a Table of Magnates, composed of the highest nobility, of certain of the higher clergy and office-holders; and a Table of Deputies, chosen by the congregations or county assemblies, and by the free cities. Hungary was divided into more than fifty counties, each one of which had its local assembly or congregation.

The nobility alone possessed political power. Only nobles sat in the national Diet, and only nobles were members of the county assemblies. The nobility was itself divided into two sections, the very wealthy, the Magnates, about five hundred in number, and the petty nobility, numbering perhaps seven hundred thousand, poor, in many cases uneducated and hardly to be distinguished from the peasants among whom they lived, save by their privileges. Everywhere feudalism flourished in its most flagrant form and perhaps as nowhere else in Europe. The aristocracy not only constituted all the assemblies, national and local, but they filled all the offices. They enjoyed old feudal dues and paid no taxes themselves. The very tax intended to defray the expense of the local administration, which they monopolized, was laid upon the class beneath. Their lands could be alienated only to members of their own order. Their palaces in the cities were not subject to municipal jurisdiction. The entire class of the bourgeoisie had only one vote in the Diet. Neither bourgeoisie nor the laboring class possessed any power. The immense mass of the population, the peasantry, were subject to a most oppressive serfdom.

It is evident that though Hungary had a constitution it was not of the modern type but of the medieval. To take a place among the progressive lands of Europe, Hungary needed to be brought within the region of modern ideas. One of those who saw this and whose whole activity was to contribute powerfully to this modernization, was Count Stephen Széchenyi, a great Hungarian Magnate who, himself an aristocrat, boldly told his fellow-aristocrats that the time for reform had come, that they must reform themselves, and must change radically the conditions of their country. He was rather a social than a political reformer, interested chiefly in the encouragement of material prosperity, which necessitated the removal of many abuses from which the aristocracy profited. He devoted his time, his money, and his immense prestige to social and economic improvement, to the draining of marshes, the building of roads and tunnels and bridges, the clearing of the Danube for navigation. His aim was to make Hungary a busy, prosperous, modern industrial

state instead of an illustration of belated medievalism. He encouraged the foundation of learned societies, the use of the national language, the establishment of a national theater. His work was mainly outside the Diet and consisted chiefly of his vigorous writings and his example. He was not a political revolutionist, not an enemy of Austria. The spirit in which he worked was shown by his admonition to his countrymen: "Do not constantly trouble yourselves with the vanished glories of the past, but rather let your determined patriotism bring about the prosperity of the beloved fatherland. Many there are who think that *Hungary has been*, but I for my part like to think that *Hungary shall be*."

Meanwhile the Diet, controlled in both houses by the Magyar aristocracy, accomplished little in the direction of reform. It was not willing to curtail its own privileges. But, on the other hand, it was willing to assert itself against the Austrian Government, to attempt to gain a larger independence for Hungary in the collective state. One gain it made — that concerning the Magyar language.

Latin was the language used in the Hungarian Diet. It was the language of the Roman Catholic Church and had formerly been the language of diplomacy. In a country where so many tongues were spoken its use seemed a felicitous arrangement, favoring no one race. It was neutral. But the Magyars, now alive with the spirit of self-assertion, sought to depose Latin and to place Magyar in its stead as the official language. This they finally achieved in 1844. The Croatian deputies, on the other hand, wished still to speak Latin, but were not permitted to. The Magyars showed that their desire was not the freedom of the several peoples of which Hungary was composed, but only their own freedom, indeed, the freedom to impose their will upon others. Their object was the complete Magyarization of all who lived in Hungary, were they Croatians, Serbians, Roumanians, or what else. In this struggle over language lay the germ of a conflict of races which was later to be most disastrous to the Magyars themselves. They were not willing to grant to others the rights which they had demanded for themselves.

While the Hungarian Diet was zealous in asserting the claims of Hungary against Austrian domination, and was eager to air Hungarian grievances against the Imperial Government, it refused to undertake any large measure of internal reform. The Magnates, intent upon the preservation of their unrivaled position, blocked the way of even those changes which the other

chamber, representative of the numerous lower nobility, was disposed to grant. Gradually there grew up as a result a party much more radical, nourished in the ideas of western Europe, democratic, and believing that the existing medieval institutions, the Diet and the county assemblies, must be thoroughly reorganized or swept away before the new ideas could be worked out. This Liberal party was led by Louis Kossuth, one of Hungary's greatest heroes, and Francis Deák, whose personality is less striking, but whose services to his country were to be more solid and enduring. Kossuth had first come into notice as the editor of a paper which described in vivid and liberal vein the debates in the Diet. When it was forbidden to print these reports he had them lithographed. When this was forbidden he had them written out by hand by a corps of amanuenses and distributed by servants. Finally he was arrested and sentenced to prison. During his imprisonment of three years Kossuth applied himself to serious studies, particularly to that of the English language, with such success that he was able later to address large audiences in England and the United States with remarkable effect. In 1840 he was released and obtained permission to edit a daily paper.

After 1840 the mass of the nation turned away from Széchenyi and toward Kossuth and Deák. Széchenyi, a Magnate, wished the gradual reform of his country from above, and had no sympathy with democratic movements. Kossuth, on the other hand, was the very incarnation of the great democratic ideas of the age. Sharing fully Széchenyi's desire to place Hungary in the front rank of modern nations, to develop its material prosperity, its civilization, he did not believe it possible to accomplish this by the methods hitherto followed, and without a thoroughly modern constitutional government. He believed that free political institutions contribute directly to material well-being and to civilization.

Kossuth, now as a brilliant editor and as an even more brilliant orator, conducted an agitation that had little in common with the reform movement of the Liberals up to this time. He did not believe that the necessary reforms could ever be brought about by existing agencies — either by the Diet or by the powerful county assemblies, both controlled by the nobility. He wished to erase all distinctions between noble and non-noble, to fuse all into one common whole. He demanded democratic reforms in every department of the national life; abolition of the privileges of the nobility and of their exemption from taxa-

tion; equal rights and equal burdens for all citizens; trial by jury; reform of the criminal code. Kossuth's impassioned appeals were made directly to the people. He sought to create, and did create, a powerful public opinion clamorous for change. This vigorous liberal opposition to the established order, an opposition ably led and full of fire, grew rapidly. In 1847 it published its programme, drawn up by Deák. This demanded the taxation of the nobles, the control by the Diet of all national expenditures, larger liberty for the press, and a complete right of public meeting and association; it demanded also that Hungary should not be subordinate to Austrian policy, and to the Austrian provinces. Such was the situation when the great reform wave of 1848 began to sweep over Europe.

ITALY

The Italian revolutions of 1820 and 1821, and of 1831 and 1832 had had no depth of root, no powers of endurance and had been easily crushed out by a few thousand Austrian bayonets. The humiliation of liberal-minded Italians was great indeed. It was clear to all that the methods hitherto employed would be inadequate to the end. The next fifteen years were devoted to a deeper study of the problem, to the elaboration of several plans for its solution, to the long and patient processes of preparing for an independent national existence a people sorely lacking the most essential elements characteristic of such a state. During this period a group of writers figure with unusual prominence. The previous revolutions had failed, partly at least, because of the narrow basis on which they rested. Disaffected army circles and members of a loosely organized, incompetently directed secret society, the Carbonari, had attempted these insurrections. The basis was narrow at best; moreover, the Italians had not yet learned the fundamental necessity of solidarity. Insurrections were pitifully local; Italians of different states rendered each other no assistance, or only the slightest, in movements that would have a common advantage for all and that to succeed must have the support of all. It was imperative that a universal mental state be created, that a common aspiration characterize the liberal elements everywhere, that an Italy of the imagination and affection should exist, even if the Italy of reality was only an expression of geography. All Italians must hold a common set of political ideas, whether they be Piedmontese, Sicilians, Venetians, or subjects of the Pope. To bring this about was

6
8
St. Gothard Pass
10
Longitude East
SWITZERLAND
Lausanne
Geneva
Rhône R.
Simplon
R. Saône
Lago Maggiore
L. of Como
Trent
Como
Bergamo
Brescia
Lombardy
AUSTRIA
Milan
Pescheria
Solferino
Villafranca
Verona
Mantua
R. Po
Pavia
Piacenza
Alessandria
Parma
Reggio
Modena
Ferrara
Bologna
Romagna
Aosta
Biella
Novara
Chambery
Mt. Cenis
Susa
Turin
Piedmont
Vercelli
Casale
R. Isère
Grenoble
Rhône R.
FRANCE
KINGDOM OF SARDINIA
Saluzzo
Cuneo
Genoa
Arignon
Gulf of
Spezia
Massa
Lucca
Pistoja
Florence
Pisa
Arno R.
Leghorn
Arezzo
Tuscany
Siena
Cortona
Nice
Monaco
Genoa
Marseilles
Toulon
C. Corso
Elba
Orbetello
Corsica
Civitavecchia
Ajaccio
TYRRH
Caprera
Gulf Terranova
Sassari
Sardinia
ITALY
1815-1859
Scale of English Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100
Austrian Empire
K'g'd of Sardinia
Parma
Modena
Lucca
Tuscany
States of the Church
K'g'd of the Two Sicilies
Cagliari
Tunis
46
44
42
40
38

14
16
18
20
46
44
42
40
38
Laibach
Carniola
Triest
Agram
Drave R.
Save R.
Brod
Belgrade
Fiume
Istria
Pola
Croatia
Zara
Dalmatia
Bosna Serai
Ancona
Castel Fidardo
Sebenico
Spalato
Lissa
Ascoli
Fermo
Teramo
Pescara
Ragusa
Montenegro
Cetigne
Cattaro
Budua
Scutari
Abruzzi
Sora
Molise
Foggia
Durazzo
Bari
Pontecorvo
Gaeta
Capua
Caserta
Benevento
R. Volturno
NAPLES
Nola
Ischia
Vesuvius
Eboli
Brindisi
Taranto
Avlona
Capri
Salerno
Basilicata
Padula
Otranto
Castrovillari
Corfu
Paola
Cosenza
Calabria
Monteleone
Lipari Ids.
Nicotera
Messina
Milazzo
Gerace
Aspromonte
PALERMO
Bagheria
Termini
Cefalu
Reggio
Cefalonia
Etna
Taormina
Catania
Syracuse
Noto
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
Adriatic Sea
Ionian Sea

the work of several gifted men, working mainly through the channel of literature.

Foremost among these was Joseph Mazzini. Mazzini was the spiritual force of the Italian resurrection, the prophet of a state that was not yet but was to be, destined from youth to feel with extraordinary intensity a holy mission imposed upon him. He was born in 1805 in Genoa, his father being a physician and a professor in the university. Even in his boyhood he was morbidly impressed with the unhappiness and misery of his country. "In the midst of the noisy, tumultuous life of the students around me I was," he says, in his interesting though fragmentary autobiography, "somber and absorbed and appeared like one suddenly grown old. I childishly determined to dress always in black, fancying myself in mourning for my country." It was after the failure of 1821 that Mazzini first became conscious of the mission of his life. While walking one Sunday with his mother and a friend in the streets of Genoa, they were addressed, he says, "by a tall, dark-bearded man with a severe, energetic countenance and a fiery glance that I have never since forgotten. He held out a white handkerchief towards us, merely saying, 'For the refugees of Italy.'" The incident, simple as it was, made a profound impression upon Mazzini's ardent nature. "The idea of an existing wrong in my country against which it was a duty to struggle, and the thought that I, too, must bear my part in that struggle, flashed before my mind on that day, for the first time, never again to leave me. The remembrance of those refugees, many of whom became my friends in after life, pursued me wherever I went by day and mingled with my dreams by night. I would have given, I know not what, to follow them. I began collecting names and facts, and studied as best I might the records of that heroic struggle, seeking to fathom the causes of its failure."

As Mazzini grew up all his inclinations were toward a literary life. "A thousand visions of historical dramas and romances floated before my mental eye." But this dream he abandoned, "my first great sacrifice," for political agitation. He joined the Carbonari, not because he approved even then of their methods, but because at least they were a revolutionary organization. As a member of it, he was arrested in 1830. The governor of Genoa told Mazzini's father that his son was "gifted with some talent," but was "too fond of walking by himself at night absorbed in thought. What on earth has he at his age to think about? We don't like young people thinking without

our knowing the subject of their thoughts." Mazzini was imprisoned in the fortress of Savona. Here he could only see the sky and the sea, "the two grandest things in Nature, except the Alps," he said. After six months he was released, but was forced to leave his country. For nearly all of forty years he was to lead the bitter life of an exile in France, in Switzerland, but chiefly in England, which became his second home.

After his release from prison Mazzini founded in 1831 a society, "Young Italy," destined to be an important factor in making the new Italy. The Carbonari had led two revolutions and had failed. Moreover, he disliked that organization as being merely destructive in its aim, having no definite plan of reconstruction. "Revolutions," he said, "must be made by the people and for the people." His own society must be a secret organization; otherwise it would be stamped out. But it must not be merely a body of conspirators; it must be educative, proselyting, seeking to win Italians by its moral and intellectual fervor to an idealistic view of life, a self-sacrificing sense of duty. Only those under forty were to be admitted to membership, because his appeal was particularly to the young. "Place youth at the head of the insurgent multitude," he said, "you know not the secret of the power hidden in these youthful hearts, nor the magic influence exercised on the masses by the voice of youth. You will find among the young a host of apostles of the new religion." With Mazzini the liberation and unification of Italy was indeed a new religion, appealing to the loftiest emotions, entailing complete self-sacrifice, complete absorption in the ideal, and the young were to be its apostles. Theirs was to be a missionary life. He told them to travel, to bear from land to land, from village to village, the torch of liberty, to expound its advantages to the people, to establish and consecrate the cult. He told them to "climb the mountains and share the humble food of the laborer; to visit the workshops and the artisans; to speak to them of their rights, of the memories of their past, of their past glories, of their former commerce; to recount to them the endless oppression of which they were ignorant, because no one took it upon himself to reveal it." Let them not quail before the horrors of torture and imprisonment that might await them in the holy cause. "Ideas grow quickly when watered with the blood of martyrs." Never did a cause have a more dauntless leader, a man of purity of life, a man of imagination, of poetry, of audacity, gifted, moreover, with a marvelous command of persuasive language. The response was

overwhelming. By 1833 the society reckoned 60,000 members. Branches were founded everywhere. Garibaldi, whose name men were later to conjure with, joined it on the shores of the Black Sea. This is the romantic proselyting movement of the nineteenth century, all the more remarkable from the fact that its members were unknown men, bringing to their work no advantage of wealth or social position. But, as their leader wrote later, "All great national movements begin with the unknown men of the people, without influence except for the faith and will that counts not time or difficulties."

The programme of this society was clear and emphatic. First, Austria must be driven out. This was the condition precedent to all success. War must come — the sooner the better. Let not Italians rely on the aid of foreign governments, upon diplomacy, but upon their own unaided strength. Austria could not stand against a nation of twenty millions fighting for their rights.

At a time when the obstacles seemed insuperable, when but few Italians dreamed of unity even as an ultimate ideal, Mazzini declared that it was a practicable ideal, that the seemingly impossible was easily possible if only Italians would dare to show their power; and his great significance in Italian history is that he succeeded in imparting his burning faith to multitudes of others. "The one thing wanting to twenty millions of Italians, desirous of emancipating themselves, is not power, but *faith*," he said. His life was one long apostolate, devoted to the preaching of the true gospel. His writings thrilled with confidence and hope. "Young Italy must be neither a sect nor a party, but a faith and an apostolate." But if Italy were united what should be its form of government? Mazzini believed that it should be a republic, because sovereignty resides essentially in the people, and can only completely express itself in that form. Moreover, "our great memories are republican," and "there are no monarchical elements in Italy," no dynasty rendered illustrious by glory or by important services to Italy, "no powerful and respected aristocracy to take the intermediate place between the throne and the people." That a solution of the Italian problem lay in combining the existing states into a federation, Mazzini did not for a moment believe. Every argument for federation was a stronger argument for unity. "Never rise in any other name than that of Italy and of all Italy."

Mazzini's work, when it passed from the realms of exhortation, of ideas, to practice, proved ineffective. Young Italy

attempted several insurrections which were less important and less successful than those conducted by the Carbonari. He himself lacked some of the qualities of practical leadership. He was dogmatic, intolerant. He underestimated the strength of the opposition. As a man of action he was not successful. Nevertheless is he one of the chief of the makers of Italy. He and the society which he founded constituted a leavening, quickening force in the realm of ideas. Around them grew up a patriotism for a country that existed as yet only in the imagination. Their influence even reached the king of Piedmont, who had driven Mazzini into exile and who kept him there. "Ah, Ricci," said Charles Albert, "the form of governments is not eternal; we shall march with the times."

But to many serious students of the Italian problem Mazzini seemed far too radical; seemed a mystic and a rhetorician full of resounding and thrilling phrases, but with little practical sense. Men of conservative temperament could not follow him. Repelled by the needless waste of life in small and pitifully weak insurrections, alienated by the sweeping character of his demands, these moderate reformers thought that the problem was of a different nature and ought to receive a different solution. They began about 1840 to express their views in books which were widely read and much discussed and which exerted a considerable influence.

One of these was "The Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians," a book by a Piedmontese priest, Gioberti, forced, like Mazzini, to live abroad in exile many years because of his radicalism. Gioberti believed that as Italy had been the fatherland of Dante and Napoleon, so it must always be the "home of creative genius." If so, it must occupy no less a position in the world than independence. He believed in independence as fervidly as did Mazzini, but he did not believe in the possibility of Italian unity, for Italy had been too long divided. The divisions were deep-seated, historic, insuperable. Unity could never be brought about by peaceful methods, and ought never to be attempted by force. Gioberti believed in a federation of the states of Italy under the presidency or leadership of the Pope. Thus Italy would be secure from foreign aggression or control and a free field would be opened for all kinds of internal improvement. He held that the genius of Italy was monarchical and aristocratic, whereas Mazzini had declared it to be republican and democratic. He believed that the futility of conspiracies and secret societies and insurrections had been proved, that they

did not further but hindered the cause. He concurred with Mazzini in believing in independence.

But to many who did not agree with Mazzini, Gioberti's idea that hope lay in the Pope seemed preposterous. This attitude was expressed by D'Azeglio in his "Recent Events in Romagna" (1846), a scathing commentary on the wretched misgovernment of the Pope within his own dominions, a vivid portrayal of the evils under which his subjects groaned. D'Azeglio also denounced the republican attempts at insurrection. Hope lay, in his opinion, in the king of Piedmont.

Still another point of view was represented by Cesare Balbo in his "Hopes of Italy" (1844). He too was a Piedmontese. He did not believe in unity; that was a madman's dream. Like Gioberti, he believed in federation, but federation could not be accomplished as long as Austria remained an Italian power. "Without national independence other good things are as nought." Austria, therefore, must be eliminated, but how could this be done? Not by a war against her of the Italian people or of the Italian princes, nor yet by foreign aid, but by the disruption of the Turkish Empire, which Balbo felt to be near at hand. Might not Austria expand eastward at the expense of the Sultan, and might she not then "make Italy a present of her independence?" Certainly a fanciful idea. Balbo pointed out the defects of the Italian character, and urged his countrymen to cast off their indolence, to cease to be "the land of the olive and the orange," and to develop strength and earnestness of character.

Out of this fermentation of ideas grew a more vigorous spirit of unrest, of dissatisfaction, of aspiration. This is the beginning of what is called in Italian the Risorgimento — the resurrection. Although ideas of how that resurrection should be brought about were at variance with each other, every utterance urged it forward. No political party was organized, but a general state of mind was created which held that Italy must become independent, which meant that Austrian influence must be eliminated, and that the Italians could do this themselves, if they only would. The watchword was given by Charles Albert, King of Piedmont. When asked how this great work could be accomplished, he said, "Italia farà da sè," Italy will do it alone.

Events in the realm of politics only intensified the effect of these books, seeming to open wide the door of hope. In 1846 a new Pope was elected, Pius IX. It was considered auspicious

that he was chosen by the anti-Austrian members of the conclave. He was known to have read Gioberti. His first acts were liberal. He pardoned political offenders, thus condemning his predecessor's policy. He appointed a commission to consider the question of railways, whose introduction had been opposed by his predecessor, one reason having been, it was said, his belief that they would "work harm to religion." He protested against the Austrian occupation of Ferrara. Metternich viewed this tendency with alarm. He had previously said that a liberal Pope was an impossibility. Now that there appeared to be one, he declared it the greatest misfortune of the age. The Pope's statement "that he was resolved to preserve all his authority" passed unheeded in the momentary enthusiasm. "Be a believer," wrote Mazzini to him, "and unite Italy."

Reforms were speedily granted in Tuscany and in Piedmont by the princes, stimulated by the spectacle of a reforming Pope. A citizens' guard was established in the former, that is, the people were given arms. This they believed would henceforth make despotism impossible. Charles Albert of Piedmont, hitherto called the "Hesitating King," because of his constant vacillation between absolutism and liberalism, now veered toward the latter, influenced by the action of the Pope and by the consensus of ideas represented in the Risorgimento. In October 1847 he issued a decree granting many reforms in local government, the organization of the police, and the censorship of the press. Shortly afterward he proclaimed the civil emancipation of Protestants. These reforms were received with great enthusiasm, an enthusiasm vastly augmented by a letter which he sent at this time to a scientific congress in which he said: "If Providence sends us a war of Italian independence I will mount my horse with my sons. I will place myself at the head of an army. . . . What a glorious day it will be in which we can raise the cry of a war for the independence of Italy!"

In January 1848 a revolution broke out in the Kingdom of Naples, the first of that year of revolutions. The king, Ferdinand II, was forced to yield to the demand for a constitution.

Such was the condition of Italy at the opening of 1848. The demand for reform was universal, but now news arrived which caused Italians speedily to pass on from this to a far greater undertaking, the ending of foreign domination. The news was that the monarchy of Louis Philippe was overthrown; that the Second Republic was declared; that Germany had risen; that

Austria was in the throes of dismemberment; that Metternich's system had collapsed, and that he himself had been driven into exile whither he had previously driven so many. The hour for Italy seemed to have struck in the hour of the distress of Austria. For the year 1848 was to be one of revolution the like of which Europe had not known since the Napoleonic period. Events were to succeed each other of a most sensational character, and the reaction of these events upon each other, of nation upon nation, of parts of nations upon other parts, was to be the most distinguishing as well as the most confusing characteristic of the time.

CHAPTER IX

CENTRAL EUROPE IN REVOLT

Central Europe at the opening of 1848 was then in a restless, disturbed, expectant state. Everywhere men were wearied with the old order and demanding change. A revolutionary spirit was at work, the public mind in Germany, Italy, and Austria was excited. Into a society so perturbed and so active came the news of the fall of Louis Philippe. It was the spark that set the world in conflagration. The news was received with joy by the discontented everywhere, who by it were themselves nerved to resistless energy. Revolution succeeded revolution in the various countries with startling rapidity. The whole political system of conservatism seemed about to founder utterly. The great mid-century uprising of the peoples had begun.

The storm-center of this general convulsion proved to be Vienna, hitherto the proud bulwark of the established order. Here in the Austrian Empire one of the most confused chapters in European history began. A wild welter of disintegrating forces threatened for a while the very submersion of the Danubian state. The movement was so complicated and intricate that to give a clear account of it is exceedingly difficult. The immediate impulse came from Hungary. There the Diet had been in session since 1847, engaged in working out moderate reforms for the kingdom. The effect of the news of the fall of Louis Philippe was electrifying. The passion of the hour was expressed in a flaming speech by Kossuth, who proved himself a consummate spokesman for a people in revolt. Of impressive presence, and endowed with a wonderful voice, he was revolutionary oratory incarnate. In a speech in the Diet, March 3, 1848, he voiced the feelings of the time, and seized the leadership from more moderate men. With bitter execration he fulminated against the Austrian Government as a charnel house whence issued suffocating vapors and pestilential winds benumbing the senses, deadening the national spirit. Only with a free constitution could the various races of Austria have a happy future and live together in brotherhood. The effect of this speech in Hungary and throughout the Austrian states was immediate and profound.

Translated into German, and published in Vienna, it inflamed the passions of the people. Ten days later a riot broke out in Vienna itself, organized largely by students and workingmen. The soldiers fired and bloodshed resulted. Barricades were erected and the people and soldiers fought hand to hand. The crowd surged about and into the imperial palace, and invaded the hall in which the Diet was sitting, crying "Down with Metternich!" Metternich, who for thirty-nine years had stood at the head of the Austrian states, who was the very source and fount of reaction, imperturbable, pitiless, masterful, was now forced to resign, to flee in disguise from Austria to England, to witness his whole system crash completely beneath the onslaught of the very forces for which he had for a generation shown contempt.

The effect produced by the announcement of Metternich's fall was prodigious. It was the most astounding piece of news Europe had received since Waterloo. His fall was correctly heralded as the fall of a system hitherto impregnable.

As Hungary, under the spell of Kossuth's oratory, had exerted an influence upon Vienna, so now the actions of the Viennese reacted upon Hungary. The Hungarian Diet, dominated by the reform and national enthusiasm just unchained and constantly fanned by Kossuth, passed on March 15th and the days succeeding the famous March Laws, by which the process of reforming and modernizing Hungary, which had been going on for some years, was given the finishing touch. These celebrated laws represented the demands of the Hungarian national party led by Kossuth. They concerned two great subjects, the internal reorganization of Hungary and the future relations of that kingdom to the empire as a whole. They swept away the old aristocratic political machinery and substituted a modern democratic constitution. Henceforth there was to be a Diet meeting annually, not at Presburg, a town near Austria, but at Budapest, in the very heart of the kingdom, a Diet, moreover, to be elected, not by the privileged nobility but by every Hungarian owning property to the value of about one hundred and fifty dollars. The feudal services owed the nobility by the peasants were abolished, and nothing was said of compensation, save that it was a "debt of honor," presumably to be discharged by the nation later. Religious freedom, liberty of the press, trial by jury, a national guard were all proclaimed. And as regards the relations of Hungary to the empire, it was declared that Hungary should henceforth have its own ministry, not only for

domestic business, but also for war, finance, and foreign affairs. These latter departments had hitherto belonged to the central government. The March Laws made Hungary practically an independent nation. The only connection with Austria was in the person of the monarch, who could act in Hungary, however, only through this Hungarian ministry. The consent of the Vienna Government was all that was now needed to complete this virtual separation, and this consent was shortly given under the compulsion of dire necessity (March 31). Thus, with remarkable swiftness and without bloodshed Hungary had practically won her independence. Henceforth she would be mistress of her own destinies. That she so understood the matter was shown by her creation of a national army with a national flag, and by the appointment of Hungarian ambassadors to foreign countries.

The example of Hungary was speedily followed by Bohemia. Here there were two races: the Germans, wealthy, educated, but a minority, and Czechs, poorer, but a majority, ambitious to make Bohemia a separate state, subject only to the Emperor. The movement for the revival of Czechish nationality had been growing since 1830, expressed particularly by the revival of the Czechish language as a mark of distinction from the German, as a method of spiritual unification. This had been accompanied, as we have seen, by a revival of interest in Czechish and Slavic history. The Bohemians now sent a deputation to Vienna March 19th, to ask for the complete equality of Czechs and Germans, for the familiar liberal reforms relating to the Diet, the press, taxation, and religion, and for local autonomy. The Emperor a few days later conceded most of these demands.

Meanwhile, recognizing the opportunity, the liberals of Vienna and the Austrian provinces snatched at advantages for themselves. They demanded a constitution for the whole empire, and larger local self-government for the Austrian provinces. These demands, too, were granted, of course because of the helplessness of the Government. That helplessness was due chiefly to the critical situation in Italy. In Hungary, Bohemia, and the Austrian provinces extensive rights in the direction of self-government, of constitutional reform, of personal freedom, had been won. But there had in no case been a repudiation of the empire. The emperor's legitimate headship was not questioned. But in Italy it was just this that was denied. There, Austria possessed the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. The leading city of Lombardy was Milan, of Venetia, Venice. These

states had long resented Austrian rule. Moreover, the other states of Italy had, since 1815, been practically dominated by Austria. In the peninsula the desire to expel the foreigner completely, and to achieve unity, was strong and growing. This is an important chapter of Italian history, which, however, can only be briefly treated here. The Italian reformers saw their opportunity in the disturbances of 1848. Milan rose in insurrection, and expelled the Austrian troops, which were unprepared. Venice, under the inspiring leadership of Daniel Manin, threw off the Austrian allegiance and declared itself a republic once more. Piedmont, an independent state, threw in its lot with these rebels, and sent its army into Lombardy. The other Italian states, Tuscany, the Papacy, and Naples, being compelled thereto by the popular demand, sent troops forward to northern Italy to co-operate. The moment seemed to have arrived for the liberation of the peninsula from Austrian control. The peoples and governments appeared to be unanimous in their determination to drive out the Austrians once for all. Italy had practically declared its independence. Here, then, was the critical point that must be defended at all costs. Fortunately for Austria she had in northern Italy a commander equal to the task, Radetzky, a man who had served with credit in every Austrian war for sixty years, and who now at the age of eighty-two was to increase his reputation. Radetzky, forced out of Milan, retired to the famous Quadrilateral, the fortresses on the Adige and the Mincio, Legnago, Peschiera, Verona and Mantua, one of the strongest military positions in Europe. Temporarily on the defensive, he believed he could win in the end if properly supported. He succeeded in convincing the Austrian Government that the crucial point was Italy, that here the fate of the empire would be decided.

Meanwhile, there were March Days in Germany, too. Austria's distress was Germany's opportunity as it was Italy's. As we have seen, the personality and system of Metternich had imposed themselves upon the German Confederation, and through it upon the states of which it was composed. The news of his fall had immediate and resounding effect, and particularly in Prussia, for months kept fevered by its struggle with Frederick William IV for a real parliament. On March 15th barricades were erected in Berlin and for a week the capital was the scene of great turbulence and some bloodshed. The King, who had begun to waver even before the outbreak, issued on the 18th a proclamation in which he summoned the United Landtag to co-

operate in framing a constitution for the realm, guaranteeing the political and civil liberties that had been demanded for years. He also promised to lead in the attempt to achieve unity for Germany.

For the moment seemed to have come when this, also, might be wrung out of the chaos of the times, when the loose confederation erected by the Congress of Vienna might be transformed into a strong and vigorous union. The Liberals had always desired this, and had recently become unusually active in outlining plans and preparing for the future. The revolution in France gave them encouragement. The fact that Austria, interested in the preservation of the old Confederation, was now impotent, that the princes everywhere in Germany were powerless to oppose, greatly advanced the cause. A self-constituted committee of Liberals met at Heidelberg early in March and decided to call a preliminary assembly to consider the whole question. This preliminary assembly, or *Vorparlament*, met from March 31st to April 4th and arranged for the election, directly by the people, of an assembly that should draw up the constitution for a united Germany. The princes of the different states were forced to sanction this proceeding, as was also the Diet. In April and May the elections were held, and on May 18th the first German National Assembly or Parliament of Frankfort met amid the high hopes of the people.

Thus by the end of March 1848 revolution, universal in its range, was everywhere successful. The famous March Days had demolished the system of government that had held sway in Europe for a generation. Throughout the Austrian Empire, in Germany and in Italy the revolution was triumphant. Hungary and Bohemia had obtained sweeping concessions; a constitution had been promised the Austrian provinces; several Italian states had obtained constitutions; the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom had declared itself independent of Austria, and the rest of Italy was moving to support the rebels; a constitution had been promised Prussia, and a convention was about to meet to give liberty and unity to Germany.

But the period of triumph was brief. At the moment of greatest humiliation Austria began to show remarkable powers of recovery. In the rivalries of her races and in her army lay her salvation. The Government won its first victory, not in Italy, which was the critical point, but in Bohemia. There, in March, the Germans and the Czechs had worked together for the acquisition of the reforms described above. But shortly serious

differences drove the two races apart. The Germans wished to have Bohemia represented in the Frankfort Parliament, and included within the new Germany that was expected to issue from the deliberations of that body. To this the Czechs, however, were strongly opposed, fearing that this would only mean the complete submersion of their own nationality in that of Germany, the Germans being overwhelmingly predominant. What they aspired to was ultimately a Czechish or Slavic kingdom of their own. Fearing this very thing the Germans in Bohemia redoubled their efforts to make the connection between Bohemia and Germany close. Racial animosities were thus vigorously fanned. The result was street disturbances in Prague between the Germans and Czechs, culminating in an insurrection June 12. Windischgrätz, commander of the troops in Prague, proclaimed the city in a state of siege. Unable to restore quiet by negotiation he bombarded the city on the 17th, soon subdued it and was dictator. The army had won its first victory, and that, too, by taking advantage of the bitter racial antagonisms in which the Austrian Empire so abounded.

In Italy also the army was victorious. Radetzky had correctly foreseen the future. The Italians, after the first flush of enthusiasm, began to be torn by jealousies and dissensions. The Papal, Neapolitan, and Tuscan troops were recalled and northern Italy was left to itself. The rulers of those states had sent their armies forward to join Piedmont in the war with Austria, not because they had wished to, but because of popular pressure which they now felt able to defy. Charles Albert was no match for Radetzky, and was defeated badly at Custozza, July 25th. Austria recovered Lombardy and could even have invaded Piedmont had it not been for the opposition of France and Great Britain. Hostilities were brought to a close by an armistice August 9th. By the middle of the summer of 1848 the Austrian Government was again in the saddle in Bohemia, and had partially recovered its power in Italy. But in Vienna itself and in Hungary its position was still most precarious.

Hungary, as we have seen, had won by the March Laws of 1848 a position of practical independence of Austria. It possessed its own ministry, which constituted the real government. The rôle of the Emperor was most circumscribed, yet he was forced to endure this humiliation for the present. But the Austrian ministry was only biding its time to humble this arrogant Magyar Government. The opportunity came with the outbreak of civil dissension within Hungary itself. There racial and

national rivalries rose to the highest pitch. The Magyars, though a minority of the whole people, had always been dominant and the victory of March had been their victory. But the national feeling was strong and growing with Serbs, Croatians, and Roumanians. These, in the summer of 1848, demanded of the Hungarian Diet much the same privileges which the Magyars had won for themselves from the Vienna Government. They wished local self-government and the recognition of their own languages and peculiar customs. To this the Magyars would not for a moment consent. They intended that there should be but one nationality in Hungary — that of the Magyars. Individual civil equality should be guaranteed to all the inhabitants of the kingdom of whatever race, but no separate or partly separate nations, and no other official language than their own. They, therefore, refused these demands point-blank. As a consequence, the bitterest race hatreds broke out in this Hungarian state, whose power had been so recently established, and was so lightly grounded. The Magyars insisted that the Magyar language should be taught in the schools in Croatia and should be used in all official communications between that province and the central government in Budapest. The Croatians resented this uncompromising and ungenerous policy and their resentment rapidly became rebellion. The Austrian Government appointed Jellachich, a Croatian colonel and a bitter opponent of the Magyars, as governor or ban of Croatia. This the Hungarians felt to be an insult, and their relations with the Vienna Government became very much strained. Jellachich labored from the outset to fan the flames of this hatred of Croat and Magyar. Would the Austrian Government sanction these acts of one of its subjects against Hungary? That Government had approved the March Laws which gave large powers to Hungary, and Hungary included Croatia, Slavonia, and other Slavic areas. The Hungarian Government was entirely within its rights when it demanded that Jellachich be dismissed and that the agreement of March be loyally applied. But Austria had made those concessions only from compulsion. It saw now in Jellachich a means of recalling them. But its own position was still too insecure to permit it to proceed openly and aboveboard to that direct end. The policy that it followed was most tortuous, — now apparently conceding the Hungarian demands, at the same time not discrediting Jellachich. It would be impossible in our space to trace these manœuvers in detail. Suffice it to say that conduct so uncandid increased daily the tension between Hungary and

Austria, considered by Hungary responsible for the actions of Jellachich. A change consequently occurred in the inner politics of Hungary, which was resolved to maintain itself against the rebellious Slavs and, if Austria supported them, against Austria itself. The Hungarian ministry since March had been a moderate one, in favor of maintaining peace. It included all the more important Magyar statesmen. But the perilous position into which the Magyars were drifting naturally favored the more warlike and revolutionary leaders who embodied the passionate hatred of the Slavs and the Austrians. Peaceful negotiation between the various parties to the conflict failed, and in September 1848 matters were precipitated by Jellachich, who began a civil war by leading an army of Croatians and Serbs against the Magyars. The effect of this action was to arouse the Magyars to a fever heat, and to play directly into the hands of the aggressive war party. Kossuth and the extreme radicals now came into power. Those who stood for peaceful relations with Austria, like Deák, gave up in despair. The Austrian Government finally assumed the aggressive. On October 3d the Emperor declared the Hungarian Diet dissolved. At the same time Jellachich, so odious to all Magyars, was given the command of all the imperial troops in Hungary. The immediate effect, however, of this action was not what had been intended, but was rather another outbreak in Vienna itself. There the revolutionists, sympathizing with the Magyars, rose and actually controlled the city for several weeks. The Emperor fled to Olmütz. But now the army appeared upon the scene. Windischgrätz, recalled from Prague, besieged Vienna for five days, finally forcing its surrender October 31, 1848. Austria had won her third victory; for in Bohemia, in Italy, and now in Vienna the army had intervened with decisive effect and had either crushed or checked the revolutionary parties, and had won back for the Government some of the ground lost in March.

The reactionary party in Austria now became stronger and more determined to finish with this ubiquitous revolution. It forced the Emperor Ferdinand to abdicate. He was succeeded December 2, 1848, by his nephew, Francis Joseph I, a lad of eighteen, destined to one of the longest reigns known to history, a reign that was to end only with his death in 1916. The purpose of this manœuver was to permit by a show of legality the abrogation of the March Laws in Hungary. Promises made by Ferdinand, it was held, were not binding upon his successor, and the promises of March were henceforth to be repudiated.

Schwarzenberg, one of the most reckless, daring, and autocratic ministers of the nineteenth century, now became the real leader of the Government. The Austrian ministry, at last confident of its power, retracted the March Laws and prepared to subdue Hungary as it had subdued Bohemia and Vienna. Hungary stiffened for the coming conflict. She declared Francis Joseph a usurper. Only that person was King of Hungary who had been crowned in Hungary with the crown of St. Stephen. She therefore refused to recognize the new ruler until he should be crowned and take the oath to the constitution, and she held that Ferdinand was still King, and prepared to fight in his defense and that of the March Laws which he had sanctioned.

Thus it came about that the year 1849 saw a great war in Hungary. Austrian armies were sent into that country from various directions. The ungenerous conduct of the Magyars toward the other races in Hungary was now given its reward. Not only did the Hungarian armies have to face Austrian troops, flushed with victory, but in the south the Serbs were in full revolt, in the east the Roumanian peasantry favored the Austrians, in the south and southwest the Croatians and Slavonians under Jellachich were eager for revenge. The result was that the Hungarian armies in the period from January to March 1849 were in the main unsuccessful. In April, however, they gained several victories and drove back the Austrians. Then, in a frenzy of excitement, the Hungarian radicals, led by Kossuth, induced the Diet to take the momentous step of declaring that the House of Hapsburg, as false and perjured, had ceased to rule, and that Hungary was an independent nation. Kossuth was appointed President of the indivisible state of Hungary. While the word republic was not uttered, such would probably be the future form of government if the Hungarians succeeded in achieving their independence. The Hungarian victories still continued for a while, but the action of the Diet in declaring independence altered the situation disastrously. The matter became international. Foreign intervention brought this turbulent chapter abruptly to a close. The young Francis Joseph I made an appeal for aid to the Tsar of Russia. Nicholas I showed the greatest alacrity in responding. The reasons that determined him were various. He was both by temperament and conviction predisposed to aid his fellow-sovereigns against revolutionary movements, if asked. He was an autocrat and interested in the preservation of autocracy wherever it existed. Also he had no desire to see a great republic on his very borders.

Furthermore, a successful Hungary might make a restless Poland. Many Poles were fighting in the Hungarian armies.

Russian troops, variously estimated at from 100,000 to 200,000 now poured into Hungary from the east and north. The Austrians again advanced from the west. The Hungarians fought brilliantly and recklessly, urged on by the eloquence of Kossuth. They sought the aid of the Turks but did not receive it. They even appealed to the Slavs, promising them in adversity the rights they had refused in prosperity, but in vain. The overwhelming numbers of their opponents rendered the struggle hopeless. Kossuth resigned in favor of Görgei, a leading general. The latter was forced to capitulate at Világos, August 13, 1849. The war of Hungarian Independence was over. Kossuth and others fled to Turkey, where they were given refuge. Nicholas proudly handed over to Francis Joseph his troublesome Hungary, which Austria, if left to her own resources, would probably have been unable to conquer. The punishment meted out to the Hungarians had no quality of mercy in it. Many generals and civilians were hanged. The constitutional privileges were entirely abolished. Hungary became a mere province of Austria, and was crushed beneath the iron heel. The catastrophe of 1849 seemed the complete annihilation of that country.

Meanwhile Italy also had been reconquered by the revived military power of Austria. The armistice concluded in August 1848 between Austria and Piedmont, after the battle of Custozza, lasted seven months, during which time diplomacy was vainly attempting to effect a peace. Austria crushed Lombardy as never before beneath a harsh military rule. Charles Albert considered himself now so deeply pledged to deliver Italy that he resolved to reopen the war and did so in the spring of 1849. But his chances were much poorer than in 1848. During those months absolutism in its severest form had been restored in Naples, and Naples consequently would send no aid; also the Pope had fled from Rome, his prime minister, Rossi, having been murdered, and had gone to Naples as the guest of Ferdinand. Rome had been declared a republic, with Mazzini as one of the Triumvirs, as the executive was called. Tuscany, also, had been declared a republic, the Grand Duke having likewise taken refuge with Ferdinand of Naples. Tuscany and Rome were consequently involved in such internal complications that they could not be counted on in a renewal of the war. Moreover, there was little sympathy between the republicans of these states and the monarchists of Piedmont, for one of the causes here, as everywhere,

of Austrian success lay in the fact that the revolutionists were divided among themselves. When Charles Albert took the field, therefore in 1849 he took it alone. No help came from the states to the south. The result was not long doubtful. At Novara, March 23, 1849, the Sardinian army was utterly overthrown. The King himself sought death on the battlefield, but in vain. "Even death has cast me off," he said. Believing that better terms could be made for his country if another sovereign were on the throne, he abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, whose reign, begun in the darkest adversity, was destined to be glorious. Passing into exile, Charles Albert died a few months later. He had rendered, however, a great service to his house and to Italy, for he had shown that there was one Italian prince who was willing to risk everything for the national cause. He had enlisted the interest and the faith of the Italians in the Government of Piedmont, in the House of Savoy. He was looked upon as a martyr to the national cause.

The battle of Novara was followed shortly by the overthrow of the Florentine Republic and the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. But the restoration of the Pope and the extinction of the Roman Republic was a more difficult task. That republic, under the leadership of Mazzini, was becoming popular with the former subjects of the Pope, and would no doubt have lived had foreign powers been willing to let it alone. But they were not. France, believing that Austria would intervene if she did not, and wishing to assert something like a balance of power in the peninsula, decided to send an expedition to restore the Pope, but at the same time to preserve the free institutions that had recently been won by the Romans. The president of the republic, Louis Bonaparte, favored this for personal reasons. He wished to win the favor of the Catholics and conservatives of France. And thus France, pledged by its very constitution "never to employ its forces against the liberties of another people," went to work to destroy a sister republic. It should be said that the true Republicans in France strove to prevent the Government from embarking upon this policy, but in vain. At first the French were repulsed, but then, reinforced and far superior to the Romans, they began a siege of the city which lasted about three weeks, ending in its capture June 30, 1849.

With the fall of Venice before the Austrians in August 1849 this chapter of Italian history closes. The hopes of 1848 had withered fast. A cruel reaction now held sway throughout most of the peninsula. The power of Austria was restored, greater

apparently than ever. Piedmont alone preserved a real independence, but Piedmont was for the time being crushed beneath the burdens of a disastrous war and a humiliating peace.

Meanwhile the victories of the Liberals in Germany were being succeeded by defeats. Their hope had centered in the deliberations of the Parliament of Frankfort, consisting of nearly six hundred representatives, elected by universal suffrage. The assembly was composed of many able men, but it possessed only a moral authority. Though its existence had not been prevented by the rulers of the various states, because they had not dared to oppose what the people so plainly desired, still those rulers gave it no positive support and played a waiting game, hoping to be able to prevent the execution of any decisions unfavorable to themselves. The assembly aspired to give unity and a constitution to Germany. But having no draft ready to discuss, much time was lost. Debates on rather abstract questions, too, which might better have been postponed, consumed many weeks, during which the old order was beginning to win back its old position, particularly in Austria. Gradually, however, the constitution was elaborated. It reduced considerably the powers of the several rulers and created a fairly strong federal state. Two most thorny questions long baffled the assembly: what territory should be included in the new Germany, and who should be its head? The difficulties were extreme in either case. They lay in the fact that there were two great powers, Austria and Prussia, the fundamental fact, as we have seen, of the historical evolution of Germany. Any decision of either question would probably offend one or the other. Austria was the chief problem. Should she be admitted into the new union? If so, wholly or only in part? If wholly, that would mean that millions of Italians, Croatians, Hungarians, Poles, Roumanians would come in, would participate in the making of the laws. It would mean, too, that the new central parliament would have to legislate for a most motley aggregation of peoples. Moreover, the empire thus created would be no *Germany*, but a nondescript. Austria, largely non-German, had a population of 38,000,000. The rest of Germany would number only about 32,000,000. Austria would, therefore, have an absolute majority in the parliament, and the actions of that majority might be determined by the desires of Hungarians and Slavs. Obviously such an unity would be a mockery. Moreover, to permit such dissimilar elements to live together the loosest confederation would be necessary, and Germans were tired of loose confederations. On the

other hand, to admit only the German provinces of Austria would be to break up the unity of Austria, and to this the Austrian Government objected. It was finally decided, however, to include those provinces only. The boundaries of the new union were to be the same as those of the German Confederation.

The other most important question was what should be the form of the new government, and who should be the executive? Should there be an emperor or a president or a board, and, if an emperor, should his office be hereditary, or for life, or for a term of years? Should he be the ruler of Prussia or of Austria, or should first one and then the other rule? The final decision was that Germany should be an hereditary empire, and on March 28, 1849, the King of Prussia was chosen to be its head. Austria announced curtly that it "would neither let itself be expelled from the German Confederation, nor let its German provinces be separated from the indivisible monarchy."

The center of interest now shifted to Berlin, whither a delegation went to offer to Frederick William IV the imperial crown of a united Germany. Would he accept it? If he should, the new scheme to which twenty-eight minor states had already assented would go into force, though it might involve a war with Austria, by this time largely recovered from her various troubles. Frederick William had declared in 1847 that he was willing to settle the German question, "with Austria, without Austria, yes, if need be, against Austria." Now, however, he was in a very different mood. He declined the offer of the Frankfort Parliament. The reasons were varied. Austria protested that she would never accept a subordinate position, and this protest alarmed him. And he disliked the idea of receiving a crown from a revolutionary assembly; rather, in his opinion, ought such a gift to come from his equals, the princes of Germany.

Thus the two great German powers, Austria and Prussia, rejected the work of the Frankfort Parliament. Rebuffed in such high quarters, that body was unable to impose its work upon Germany, and it finally ended its existence wretchedly. In session for over a year it accomplished nothing. But the responsibility for the failure of Germans to achieve a real unity in 1848 and 1849 rests primarily not with it, but with Prussia and Austria. Its failure, however, and its mistakes probably made it easier for the next generation to solve the problem.

The King of Prussia now attempted to form a union along his own royal lines, an attempt which he soon abandoned, on peremptory orders from Vienna. This was the famous

"humiliation of Olmütz." Austria then demanded that the old German Confederation, which had been suspended in 1848, be revived with its Diet at Frankfort. This was done in 1851.

The permanent results of this mid-century uprising of central Europe were very slight. Everywhere the old governments slipped back into the old grooves and resumed the old traditions. Two states, however, emerged with constitutions which they kept, Sardinia, whose Constitutional Statute, granted by Charles Albert on March 4, 1848, established a real constitutional and parliamentary government, the only one in Italy; and Prussia, whose Constitution issued by the King in its final form in 1850 was far less liberal, yet sufficed to range Prussia among the constitutional states of Europe. By it the old absolutism of the state was changed, at least in form. There was henceforth a parliament consisting of two chambers. In one respect this document was a bitter disappointment to all Liberals. In the March Days of 1848 the King had promised universal suffrage, but the Constitution as finally promulgated rendered it illusory. It established a system unique in the world. Universal suffrage was not withdrawn, but was marvelously manipulated. The voters were divided in each electoral district throughout Prussia into three classes, according to wealth. The amount of taxes paid by the district was divided into three equal parts. Those voters who paid the first third were grouped into one class, those, more numerous, who paid the second third into another class, those who paid the remainder into still another class. The result was that a few very rich men were set apart by themselves, the less rich by themselves, and the poor by themselves. Each of these three groups, voting separately, elected an equal number of delegates to a convention, which convention chose the delegates of that constituency to the lower house of the Prussian Parliament. Thus in every electoral convention two-thirds of the members belonged to the wealthy class. There was no chance in such a system for the poor, for the masses. This system, established by the Constitution of 1850, continued to exist in Prussia down to the revolution brought about by the World War. It gave an enormous preponderance of political power to the rich. The first class consisted of very few men, in some districts of only one; the second class was sometimes twenty times as numerous; the third sometimes a hundred, or even a thousand times. Thus though every man twenty-five years of age possessed the suffrage, the vote of a single rich man might have as great weight as the votes of a thousand workingmen.

CHAPTER X

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

THE SECOND REPUBLIC

The Revolution of 1848 in France was extraordinarily swift, entirely unexpected, and extremely radical. "Though the February Revolution," says de Tocqueville, "was of all our revolutions the shortest and the least sanguinary, yet far more than any other it filled the minds and hearts of men with the idea and feeling of its omnipotence." Beginning as a moderate demand for a larger electorate, it soon passed far beyond this into the realm of the new and the uncertain. A revolution of three days, it was made without premeditation, without definite plan or accredited leaders. The day of the 24th of February was made memorable by events crowding upon each other with irresistible pressure. On the morning of that day there was no public demand for a republic; by sunset a republic, the second in the history of France, had been proclaimed. This spectacular outcome was the one least imagined, as it had seemed for the past few years that the republican party which had so troubled Louis Philippe's early years as king was now moribund. Suddenly under the pressure of circumstances it awoke, and, though the party of a small Parisian minority, it won the triumphs of the day and established its régime.

The Second Republic lasted nominally nearly five years, from February 24, 1848, to December 2, 1852, when the Second Empire was proclaimed. Practically, however, as we shall see, it came to an end one year earlier, December 2, 1851. During this period the state was administered successively by the Provisional Government, chosen on February 24th, and remaining in power for about ten weeks, then for about a year by the National Constituent Assembly, which framed the Constitution of the Republic, and then by the President and Legislative Assembly, created by this constitution. The history of the Republic was to be a very troubled one.

The Provisional Government was from the first composed of two elements. The larger number, led by Lamartine, were simply Republicans, desirous of a republican form of government in place of the monarchical. "I regard the republican government," says Lamartine, "that is to say, the government of peoples by their own reason and their own will, as the sole aim and the sole end of the great civilizations, as the sole means of realizing the great general truths that a people desires to inaugurate in its laws. Other forms of government are states of tutelage, confessions of the eternal minority of peoples, imperfections in the sight of philosophy, humiliations in the sight of history." The other element of the Provisional Government was represented by Louis Blanc, Flocon, Albert, men who believed in a republic, but as a means to an end, and that end a social, economic revolution; men who wished primarily to improve the condition of the laboring classes, to work out in actual laws and institutions the socialistic theories propounded with such effectiveness during the later years of the reign of Louis Philippe, and particularly the principles represented in Louis Blanc's famous phrase, "the right to labor." What these men most desired was not a mere political change, but a thoroughgoing reconstruction of society in the interest of the largest and weakest class, the poor, the wage-earners. Blanc's conception of the republic he thus expressed: "It has always been my opinion that the republican form of government is not the sole object to be aimed at, even by politicians of the republican school, if their love for the commonwealth be sincere and disinterested. I believed then, as I do now, that the chief end to be kept in view is to make him that works enjoy the fruits of his work; to restore to the dignity of human nature those whom the excess of poverty degrades; to enlighten those whose intelligence, from want of education, is but a dim, vacillating lamp in the midst of darkness; in one word, to enfranchise the people, by endeavoring to abolish this double slavery, ignorance and misery." [1]

Blanc was a convinced Socialist, intelligent and thoughtful. The interests of the working classes constituted, in his opinion, the supreme problem of government. He wished to replace private property by public property in the interest of the greater number. He would do this by co-operative societies. Production should not be carried on by capitalists, employing laborers

[1] Quotations are from Dickinson, *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France*, pp. 176, 178.

for wages and retaining profits for themselves. The laborers should manage the various industries themselves, reaping whatever rewards there were. To start these co-operative societies the aid of the state, furnishing capital, would be necessary. But in the end, gradually and without violence, the whole process of production would be transferred from the control of the few to that of the many.

A scheme so novel and so opposed to the habits and institutions of the ages was bound to be misconceived and misrepresented. Believers in the existing order would denounce every economic change as robbery; believers in change would be more dominated by passion, by hatred of the rich, by a desire for a division of property, than by moderate or equitable plans of economic reform.

The Provisional Government, divided as it was into Socialists and Anti-Socialists, ran the risk of all coalitions, that of being reduced to impotence by internal dissensions, as was to be immediately shown. Certain great reforms were, however, carried with practical unanimity. The death penalty for political offenses was abolished. Universal suffrage was proclaimed, and thus political power passed suddenly from the hands of about two hundred thousand privileged wealthy persons to over nine million electors. Negro slavery throughout the French colonies was abolished, as it had been in the first French Revolution. The freedom of the press was established, as were the freedom of public meeting and association and the right of all citizens to become members of the National Guard. The results were almost instantaneous and completely changed the character of political life in Paris. Newspapers and party pamphlets, sold cheaply, appeared in profusion, expressing the most varied and in many cases most radical ideas, and influencing far greater numbers than the French press had previously done. Political clubs, similar to those of the Revolution, were opened and formed additional clearing-houses for opinion and debate, and the National Guard rose in a few weeks from 50,000 to about 200,000. In other words, the masses of Parisian workmen now had weapons in the hand, as members of the Guard, and means of self-expression and propaganda in clubs and newspapers.

Conflicts between the two great currents of opinion began on the very day of the proclamation of the Republic. Armed workmen came in immense numbers to the Hôtel de Ville and demanded that henceforth the banner of France should be the red flag, emblem of Socialism. Lamartine repelled this demand

in a brilliant speech. "You desire," he said, "to replace a revolution marked by unanimity and fraternity with one of revenge and suffering. You demand that the Government raise as a sign of peace the standard of war to the bitter end among citizens of the same country. Never will I sign such a decree. I will repel to the last moment of my life this bloody flag, and you ought to reject it more than I, for the red flag has never been borne elsewhere than around the Champ-de-Mars, imbrued with the blood of the people in 1791 and 1793, while the tricolor has made the circuit of the world with the name, the glory, and the liberty of France." Lamartine's eloquence was overwhelming. The workmen themselves stamped upon the red flag.

But the Government, achieving an oratorical victory, saw itself forced to yield to the Socialist party in two important respects. On motion of Louis Blanc, it recognized the so-called "right to labor." It promised work to all citizens, and as a means to this end it established, against its own real wishes, the famous National Workshops. Blanc demanded that a Ministry of Progress be established, to organize co-operative associations of the kind which he had advocated. But, instead, the Government established a Labor Commission, with Blanc at its head and with its place of meeting the Luxembourg Palace. This was a mere debating society, a body to investigate economic questions and report to the Government. It had no power of action, or of putting its opinions into execution. Moreover, by removing Louis Blanc from the Hôtel de Ville to another part of Paris, the Government really reduced his influence and that of his party. Yet this Labor Commission, thus lamed at the start, set loyally to work. It was composed of delegates of workingmen representing different crafts, of political economists, and even of employers. Declaring that "manual labor too prolonged ruins the health of the laborer, and by preventing the cultivation of his mind, undermines the dignity of man," it demanded the reduction of the working day from eleven to ten hours in Paris, and from twelve to eleven throughout the country. The Provisional Government then decreed this change, but the decree remained a dead letter, as employers ignored it. The Commission persuaded the Government to abolish the "sweating" system. It also acted as a court of arbitration in certain labor disputes with some measure of success. But as time wore on it became irritated over its general lack of achievement, which contrasted so lamentably with the endless hopes it had aroused. The irritation constantly deepened, and the Commission became

in the end a center of much inflammatory talk. Looked to for leadership by tens of thousands of workmen, it was a source of danger to the Government. Deprived of all modes of legal action, it might become the seat of conspiracies and illegal proceedings.

The National Workshops, too, were a source of ultimate disappointment to those who had looked to them to solve the complex labor problems of the modern industrial system. Conceded by the Provisional Government against its will, and to gain time, that Government did not intend that they should succeed. Their creation was intrusted to the Minister of Commerce, Marie, a personal enemy of Louis Blanc, who, according to his own admission, was willing to make this experiment in order to render the latter unpopular and to show workingmen the fallacy of his theories of production, and the dangers of such theories for themselves. The scheme was represented as Louis Blanc's, though it was denounced by him, was established especially to discredit him, and was a veritable travesty of his ideas. Blanc wished to have every man practise his own trade in real factories, started by state aid. They should be engaged in productive enterprises; moreover, only men of good character should be permitted to join these associations. Instead of this, the Government simply set men of the most varied sorts — cobblers, carpenters, metal workers, masons, to labor upon unproductive tasks, such as making excavations for public works. They were organized in a military fashion, and the wages were uniform, two francs a day.

It was properly no system of production that was being tried, but a system of relief for the unemployed, who were very numerous owing to the fact that many factories had had to close because of the generally disturbed state of affairs. The number of men flocking to these National Workshops increased alarmingly: 25,000 in the middle of March; 66,000 in the middle of April; over 100,000 in May. As there was not work enough for all, the number of working days was reduced for each man to two a week, and his total wage for the week fixed at eight francs. The result was that large numbers of men were kept idle most of the time, were given wretched wages, and had plenty of time to discuss their grievances. They furnished excellent material for socialist agitators. This experiment wasted the public money, accomplished nothing useful, and led to a street war of the most appalling kind.

The Provisional Government was, as the name signified, only

a temporary organization whose duty was to administer the state until an assembly should be elected by the new universal suffrage, which assembly should then frame a Constitution. The elections were held April 23d, and the National Constituent Assembly met on May 4, 1848. The assembly consisted of nine hundred men, about eight hundred of them moderate Republicans. The Socialists had almost disappeared.

The Assembly showed at once that it was bitterly opposed to the opinions of the Socialists of Paris. The Provisional Government now laid down its powers, and the Assembly chose five of its members, all Anti-Socialists, with Lamartine as the head, as the new executive until the Constitution should be drawn up. All these men had been opposed to Louis Blanc. The Assembly also refused to create the Ministry of Labor demanded by the latter. The workingmen of Paris, irritated at this refusal and at the outcome of the elections, and seeing that they had nothing to hope for from this Assembly, rose in insurrection, endeavoring to accomplish a new revolution which should bring in the socialistic state as that of February had brought in the republican democratic. On May 15th they invaded the Chamber, drove out the representatives, and declared the Assembly dissolved and proclaimed a new Provisional Government of their own. But their victory was short-lived. The National Guard came to the rescue of the Assembly, and some of the leaders of the insurgents were made prisoners.

The Assembly, irritated in turn by the humiliation to which it had been subjected, resolved to root out the great source of danger, the National Workshops. The Government announced their immediate abolition, giving the workmen the alternative of enrolling in the army or going into the country to labor on public works. If they did not leave voluntarily, they would be forced to leave. The laborers, goaded to desperation, prepared to resist and to overthrow this Government which they had helped bring into existence, and which had proved so unsympathetic. Organized as a semi-military force, angered at the hostility of the bourgeois to all helpful social reform that could make their lives easier, they began a bitter fight. The Assembly saw the terrible nature of the conflict impending. General Cavaignac was given dictatorial powers by the Assembly, the Executive Commission of five resigning. During four June days (June 23–26, 1848) the most fearful street fighting Paris had ever known went on behind a baffling network of barricades. The issue was long doubtful, but finally the insurgents were put down.

The cost was terrible. Ten thousand were killed or wounded. Eleven thousand prisoners were taken, and their deportation was immediately decreed by the Assembly. The June Days left among the poor an enduring legacy of hatred toward the bourgeoisie.

The republic of order had definitely triumphed over the socialistic agitation. But so narrow had been its escape, so fearful was it with anxiety for the future that the dictatorship of Cavaignac was continued until the end of October. Thus the Second Republic, proclaimed in February 1848, after ten troubled weeks under a Provisional Government, passed under military leadership for the next four months. One-man power was rapidly emerging.

The results of this socialist agitation and of the sanguinary days of June were lamentable and far-reaching. They greatly contributed to the overthrow of the Republic. Many of the bourgeois had during these months experienced the most acute financial distress. Many manufacturers and merchants were ruined by the economic crisis created by the disturbed state of affairs. Bonds depreciated in two months from 116 francs to 50, with the result that fortunes invested in these securities were suddenly cut in two. Their holders became enemies to the Republic, because they wished above everything a government of order, under which alone business could flourish and property be secure. This class was very influential.

The peasants also turned against the Republic. They were told that the Socialists were going to take their lands from them and divide them. They were as strongly attached to the principles of private property as were the rich, and for the same reason desired a government of order. But more important, because alienating the peasants from the Republic, was the action of the Provisional Government in levying a new tax.

The financial situation of France at the close of the July Monarchy was unsatisfactory, and was rendered worse by the Revolution, which caused widespread business uncertainty, undermined credit, and made the collection of taxes difficult. Bankruptcy was not to be thought of, as the Government did not wish to have the Second Republic mean, in the opinion of mankind, the repudiation of debts, as had the First. On the other hand, no new loan could be raised. The Government, therefore, did the only thing it could do; it increased the direct taxes by almost one-half (forty-five centimes supplementary to each franc hitherto paid). This fell not only upon the middle class,

but also upon the peasants. Nothing could have been more disastrous for the Republic, which thus lost its popularity with the most numerous class. If the Republic meant increased taxes, it was, in their opinion, inferior to monarchy. The effect of this tax was shown more clearly later. It had had but a small influence upon the elections for the Constituent Assembly, not being widely known.

After the suppression of the Socialists in June the Assembly proceeded to frame the Constitution, for which task it had been chosen. It proclaimed the Republic as the definitive government of France. It declared universal suffrage. It provided that there should be a legislature consisting of a single chamber. A second chamber seemed aristocratic, and, moreover, likely to be a check upon the first, that is, upon the people seeking to legislate, and therefore was rejected. The Assembly was to consist of 750 members, chosen for three years, to be renewed in full at the end of that period.

The executive was to be a President of the Republic elected for four years and ineligible for re-election save after a four years' interval. He was given very considerable powers. It was felt that the danger in giving him these would he neutralized by the shortness of his term and by his inability to be immediately re-elected. He was given the right to propose legislation to the Assembly, to "dispose of the armed force," to negotiate and ratify treaties, though these should become binding only when sanctioned by the Assembly, to appoint and dismiss ministers and other officials, civil and military. The President therefore was to be a person of power. How he should be chosen was the most important question before the Constituent Assembly, and was long debated. The Assembly, dominated by its fundamental dogma of universal suffrage and popular sovereignty, was disposed to have the President chosen by all the voters. The danger in this procedure lay in the lack of political experience of the French electorate, and the probability that they would be blinded by some distinguished or famous name in making their choice, not guided by an intelligent analysis of character and of fitness for the high office. Moreover, if the people should choose both the legislature and the President, they would create two co-ordinate authorities, likely to disagree, and in that case with the chance of victory resting with the President, a single individual, knowing his own mind, acting directly and swiftly, rather than with the legislature divided into parties, and necessarily acting slowly. This likelihood that the President, wielding the

military and civil power, might overturn the Republic and make himself a despot, was distinctly foreseen by some members, who explicitly warned the Assembly against it, notably by Jules Grévy, later a President of the Third Republic, who urged that the President be chosen by the legislature and that he be removable at any time by it. Thus Parliament would be the supreme body in the state, not simply a co-ordinate and rival power, and presidential usurpation would be impossible. "Are you quite sure," said Grévy, "that in that series of men who are to succeed each other every four years to the presidential throne, there will be only devoted republicans anxious to descend from it? Are you sure that there will never be any one sufficiently ambitious to try to perpetuate his power? . . . And if this man is a member of one of those families which have ruled over France, if he has never expressly renounced what he calls his rights, if commerce is languishing, if the people are suffering, if they are passing through one of those crises in which misery and deception deliver them over to those who conceal by promises their projects against liberty, will you guarantee that this man of ambition will not succeed in overthrowing the Republic?" Events were shortly to prove Grévy's clear right to the title of prophet, but his proposition was now voted down overwhelmingly. "Something must be left to Providence," answered Lamartine. Another amendment was suggested that at least no member of any of the families which had ruled France should ever be chosen President. This, too, for doctrinaire reasons, and because it seemed to limit the national sovereignty, was voted down, and it was definitely decided that the people should choose the President and should be entirely untrammeled in their choice. Thus in the very act of drawing up a Constitution for the Second Republic, the Assembly rendered easy, if not inevitable, its overthrow.

Though the Republicans of 1848 committed many grave errors, owing partially to their inexperience, partially to their indisposition to abate any of their traditional political principles in the face of the extraordinary exigencies of a tumultuous and turbulent year, yet their work had certain consequences destined to survive. For fifty years the Republic had been associated in the minds of multitudes of Frenchmen with the Reign of Terror, had signified violence, disorder, and confiscation of property. It now became evident that it might mean something very different, for here was a Republic which suppressed insurrection and restored order with a resolution and thorough-

ness that the monarchy had not shown under Charles X or Louis Philippe, one, moreover, which preferred unpopularity to bankruptcy. The June Days and the tax of the forty-five centimes were direct causes of its downfall. Yet by them the Republic as an ideal of government ultimately gained strength, though the present experiment proved ephemeral and weak.

For, in leaving the choice of the President to universal suffrage, this republican assembly was playing directly into the hands of a pretender to a throne, of a man who believed he had the right to rule France by reason of his birth, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the Great Napoleon and legitimate heir to his pretensions. At the time of the February Revolution this man was practically without influence or significance, but so swiftly did events move and opinion shift in that year 1848 that by the time the mode of choosing the President was decided upon, he was already known to be a leading candidate, a fact that stamped that decision as all the more foolhardy.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had become chief of the house of Bonaparte in 1832 at the age of twenty-four. He conceived his position with utmost seriousness. He believed that he had a right to rule over France, and that the day would come when he would. He adhered to this belief for sixteen years, though those years brought him no practical encouragement, but only the reverse. Gathering about him a few adventurers, he attempted in 1836, at Strasbourg, and in 1840 at Boulogne, to seize power. Both attempts, already described, were puerile in their conception, and were bunglingly executed. Both ended in fiasco. He had gained the name of being ridiculous, a thing exceedingly difficult for Frenchmen to forgive or forget. As a result of the former attempt he had been exiled to the United States, from which he shortly returned. As a result of the latter, he was imprisoned in the fortress of Ham in northern France, from which he escaped in 1846, disguised as an ordinary mason, named Badinguet. He then went to England and in 1848, at the time of the Chartist risings, he was a special constable stationed in Trafalgar Square. This was certainly no record of achievement. But the stars in their courses were fighting for him. The Revolution of 1848 created his opportunity, as that of 1789 had created that of the First Napoleon. Like his great prototype, whom he constantly sought to imitate, he offered his services to the Republic. He was elected a member of the Constituent Assembly, where the impression he created was that of a mediocre man, with few ideas of his own, who could probably be controlled

by others. His name, however, was a name to conjure with. This was his only capital, but it was sufficient. The word Napoleon was seen to be a marvelous vote-winner with the peasants, who, now that universal suffrage was the law of the land, formed the great majority. "How should I not vote for this gentleman," said a peasant to Montalembert, "I whose nose was frozen at Moscow?" Louis Napoleon was an avowed candidate for the presidency, and, as the most colorless, was the strongest. Cavaignac was the candidate of the democratic Republicans, who had governed France since February, but he was not popular, and, moreover, he was hated by the workingmen for his part in the June Days. Ledru-Rollin was the candidate of the Socialists, an aggressive party, but made odious to law-abiding citizens by the events of the year, and always in the great minority. Lamartine was also a candidate. His sun had mounted swiftly to full meridian splendor in February, but was as swiftly paling. Moreover, the parties opposed to the very idea of a republic now rallied about Louis Napoleon — the Legitimists and the Orleanists, as they preferred even an Empire to a Republic, an unknown man who seemed pliable to a man known for firmness, rigidity, and strenuous republicanism, as was Cavaignac. Moreover, the enigmatic candidate was most profuse in pleasing promises to various groups. There were other causes for Louis Napoleon's overwhelming triumph. The Republic had been proclaimed by a faction in Paris, though later ratified by the Constituent Assembly. It was associated in the minds of men with grave uncertainty as to rights of property, rights to which the French have always held tenaciously. Louis Napoleon, by his professions and his family traditions, seemed to stand for order and stability. Again, for many years a series of brilliant writers had been portraying in history and in poetry the wonders of the Napoleonic era. Men's actual knowledge of the evils and oppressions of that era was growing less as the older generation, which could have told the true tale, was disappearing, and a new Napoleonic legend, fair, thrilling, and altogether admirable had grown up. It mattered little that this legend was vitiated through and through by mendacity and distortion of history.

For these reasons, when the presidential election of December 1848 occurred, Louis Napoleon was found to be overwhelmingly the elect of the people. He had over 5,400,000 votes, while Cavaignac, his nearest competitor, had less than 1,500,000, Ledru-Rollin 370,000, and Lamartine less than 18,000. The new President entered upon his duties December 20, 1848. On

that day before the Assembly he swore "to remain faithful to the democratic republic," and said: "My duty is clear. I will fulfil it as a man of honor. I shall regard as enemies of the country all those who endeavor to change by illegal means that which France has established."

The French had thus selected a Prince as President, an innovation in the art of government. In the following May they did an equally astonishing thing in the election of a Legislative Assembly. This Assembly of 750 members contained about 500 Monarchists, who were divided into Legitimists, Orleanists, and a few Bonapartists; about 70 moderate Republicans of the kind that had thus far controlled the Republic, and about 180 Socialists. Thus the first legislature elected under the new Constitution of the Republic was overwhelmingly monarchical. Only 70 could be held to be sincerely attached to the present form of government. The explanation of this remarkable result lies in the fact that the Days of June were still very vivid in men's minds. The mass of Frenchmen voted for monarchical candidates because they believed that the Republic was dangerous to order and property.

Thus both the President and the majority of the Assembly were, by reason of their very being, enemies of the Constitution under which they were elected. The situation was one that could not permanently endure. The three years that elapsed between the inauguration of the President and the coup d'état of 1851, which virtually ushered in the Empire, though it was not formally proclaimed until a year later, were a period not of legislative and social reform, but of adroit and tortuous factional politics, played not for the advancement of France, but for the advantage of party. Not particularly instructive, a brief treatment of them will suffice.

At first the President and the monarchical majority cooperated against the republican party, which each felt to be the real enemy. Opportunities for doing this were not slow in presenting themselves. Some of the Republicans unwisely attempted an insurrection against the Government, June 13, 1849. This was easily put down. Following up their victory, the authorities proceeded to cripple the Opposition severely. Thirty-three of their representatives were arrested and deprived of their seats in the Legislative Assembly. Their journals were suppressed. Public meetings were forbidden for a year, an order renewed several times later. As school-teachers had been effective friends of the Republic all over France, education was largely reorgan-

ized with a view of bringing it more closely under the control of the clergy, friends of monarchy. Paris was declared under martial law, which gave greater actual power than ever to the President.

This removal of the republican leaders rendered easy the passage of further repressive legislation. The Assembly next enacted the Franchise Law of 1850. This provided that to be a voter one must have resided in a given commune for three years, and that that fact must be proved by the presence of one's name on the tax list. This law virtually abolished universal suffrage and re-established in a round-about way a property qualification. It deprived over three million workingmen, one-third of the electorate, of the suffrage, either because they paid no taxes or because to get work they had frequently to change their residence and could not, therefore, meet the three-year residence qualification. Those thus disfranchised, of course, bitterly hated the Assembly. Another law was then passed restricting the freedom of the press by re-establishing the requirement of a preliminary deposit of 50,000 francs from all editors. This stamped out of existence most of the cheap newspapers of the Republicans and Socialists, as they could not meet the qualification.

Having silenced the Republicans, the victors, President and Assembly, fell to warring with each other. This conflict, showing itself in many minor matters, became most pronounced and bitter over the question of a revision of the Constitution. The Constitution forbade the re-election of the President at the end of his four-year term. Louis Napoleon had no desire to retire to private life. He believed that if only this article were stricken out the immense majority of Frenchmen would re-elect him. He demanded that this clause be revised by the Assembly. The Assembly refused. The President was balked in his ambition of continuing in power by peaceful means. He now showed that he was ready to resort to any means to that end. He planned and carried out with extraordinary precision and success a remarkable coup d'état. In order to discredit the Assembly with the people, he demanded that the law limiting the suffrage, which he himself had strongly urged, be repealed. This was refused, the Assembly not wishing to stultify itself so conspicuously. The President, with audacious duplicity, then posed as the guardian of the Constitution, as the representative of the principle of universal suffrage. He believed that the workmen would not intervene in behalf of the Assembly if he should attack it.

For a successful coup d'état secrecy was the absolute pre-

requisite, and never was secrecy better guarded. Possessing the power of appointment to civil and military positions, the President filled the more important ones with creatures of his own, who had everything to gain and little to lose from the overthrow of the existing system. Such were the Minister of War, who controlled the army; the Minister of the Interior, who controlled the officials in the departments; and the Prefect of Police, who controlled the police of Paris.

The 2d of December, 1851, anniversary of the coronation of Napoleon I and of the battle of Austerlitz, was chosen as the fateful day. During the early morning hours many of the military and civil leaders of France, Republican and Monarchist, were arrested in bed and taken to prison. A battalion of infantry was sent to occupy the Legislative Chamber. Placards were posted on all the walls of Paris, pretending to explain the President's purposes. The Assembly was pronounced dissolved, universal suffrage was declared re-established, the people were convoked in their primary assemblies. The President explained that he must save the Republic from its enemies, the Monarchists and the Anarchists, who put "in jeopardy the repose of France," that he made the people of France arbiter between the Assembly and himself, "by invoking the solemn judgment of the only sovereign that I recognize in France, the people." To accomplish the security the nation sorely needed after so much turmoil, he proposed the following changes in the constitution: the President should hold office for ten years; ministers should be solely dependent upon him; there should be a council of state to prepare the laws and to discuss them before the legislative body; a legislative body to discuss and vote the laws, elected by universal suffrage; another assembly, "composed of all the illustrious persons of the country," to be the "guardian of the fundamental compact," and of the public liberties. "This system, created by the First Consul at the beginning of the century, has already given to France repose and prosperity; it will guarantee them to her again." The people were called upon to approve or disapprove these suggestions.

The significance of all this was at first not apparent to those who read the placards. But signs of opposition began to show themselves as their meaning became clearer. Some of the deputies, going to their hall of meeting, found entrance prevented by the military. Withdrawing to another place, and proceeding to impeach the President, they were attacked by the troops, who arrested a large number, and took them off to

prison. Thus the leaders of France, civil and military, were in custody, and the President saw no organized authority erect before him. This was the work of the 2d. Would the people resent the high-handed acts of this usurper?

The President had not neglected to make unprecedented preparations for this contingency. His police controlled all the printing establishments, whence usually in periods of crisis emerged flaming appeals to revolt; also all the bell towers, whence in revolutionary times the tocsin was accustomed to ring out the appeal to insurrection. Nevertheless, on the 3d, barricades were raised. On the 4th occurred the famous "massacre of the boulevards." Over 150 were killed and a large number wounded. Paris was cowed. The coup d'état was crowned with success. To prevent any possible rising of the provinces martial law was proclaimed in thirty-two departments, thousands of arbitrary arrests were made, and the work on which the Prince President entered on the night of December 2d was thoroughly carried out. Probably a hundred thousand arrests were made throughout France. All who appeared dangerous to Louis Napoleon were either transported, exiled, or imprisoned. This vigorous policy was aimed particularly at the Republicans, who were for years completely silenced.

Having thus abolished all opposing leadership, Louis Napoleon appealed to the people for their opinion as to intrusting him with power to remodel the Constitution along the lines indicated in his proclamation. On December 20, according to the official statement, 7,439,216 voted in favor of so doing, and only 646,737 voted in the negative. While the election was in no sense fair, while the issue presented was neither clear nor simple, while force and intimidation were resorted to, yet it was evident that a large majority of Frenchmen were willing to try again the experiment of a Napoleon.

The Republic, though officially continuing another year, was now dead. Louis Napoleon, though still nominally President, was in fact an absolute sovereign. It was a mere detail when a year later (November 21, 1852) the people of France were permitted to vote on the question of re-establishing the imperial dignity, and of proclaiming Louis Napoleon Bonaparte emperor, under the name of Napoleon III. 7,824,189 Frenchmen voted yes; 253,145 voted no. On the anniversary of the coup d'état, December 2d, a day so fortunate for Bonapartes, Napoleon III was proclaimed Emperor of the French, and the Second Empire was established.

THE SECOND EMPIRE

The President, who, by the endless witchery of a name, by a profitable absence of scruples, and by favorable circumstances, had known how to become an Emperor, was no mere vulgar adventurer, but was a man of ideas as well as audacity, of generosity as well as egoism, of humanitarian aspirations for the betterment of the world, as well as of a vivid perception of the pleasures of personal advancement. His ideas, expounded gracefully in writings and in speeches, were largely derived from a study of the life of the Great Napoleon. Long before he became President of the Republic he published a book called "Napoleonic Ideas," an appraisal of the historic significance of the First Emperor. It appears from this that Napoleon I had two purposes in life. One was the preservation of all that was valuable in the Revolution, the foundation of the state and of society upon a solid enduring basis — which could only be accomplished by the exercise of absolute power on the part of the ruler — and the other was that this great end having been attained, the preliminary probationary period of despotism would give way, and the edifice would then be "crowned with liberty," which it were unsafe earlier to bestow — that through the training received from an active and intelligent despot France would be fitted to enter upon the life of freedom, which appears to be the goal as well as the dream of modern times.

That the latter part of Napoleon's plans, the bestowal of free institutions upon France, had not been achieved, was, in his nephew's opinion, no fault of his, but of those ignorant and reactionary nations which had waged war upon him, had defeated him at Waterloo, and had thus cut right athwart his beneficent activity. However inaccurate a judgment this may have been, it was of importance, as it furnished the new ruler with a programme. He declared his desire to finish the work his uncle had been forced to leave unfinished, to restore order, so sadly compromised by the unstable, feverish régimes since 1815 — and this he could only do, he held, by exercising autocratic power — and then to cap the structure with liberty in all its plenitude. The history of the Second Empire falls into these two divisions — autocracy unlimited from 1852 to 1860, and a growing liberalism from 1860 to 1870, when the Empire collapsed, its programme woefully unrealized.

The political institutions of the early Empire merit descrip-

tion. They were adopted largely from the Consulate. The machinery was elaborate, and mainly valuable for purposes of deception. The principle of universal suffrage, proclaimed by the Republic of 1848, was preserved, was indeed in theory made the basis of the whole imperial régime, but was ingeniously rendered quite innocuous to the autocrat. There was a Legislative Body of 251 members elected every six years by universal suffrage. But most modest was to be the rôle of this assembly. It was to be no real parliament, such as had existed under Louis XVIII, Charles X, Louis Philippe, and the late Republic. It could not even elect its own president, who was appointed, as were the vice-presidents, by the Emperor. It could not propose legislation. All bills were laid before it by the Emperor. It could not question the ministers, or by adverse votes overthrow them, as they were appointed by the Emperor and were responsible to him alone. Its sessions were public, but might be made secret upon the request of five members. Thus when discussion became exciting it could be prevented from becoming noised abroad that there was dissension within the state; indeed, no reports of these debates might be published by the newspapers, save an official minute, dry, analytical, concise, drawn up by the presiding officer, himself, as has been said, an appointee of the Emperor. Political eloquence was the evil spirit carefully to be exorcised. No more speeches of a Lamartine, inflaming and shaping outside opinion. Parliament was absolutely insulated from the public. Even the subjects of legislation on which it might express approval or disapproval were carefully limited, a large legislative power belonging to the Emperor alone. It did not even control taxation. Though it voted the budget each year, the Emperor had the right during its recesses to contract extraordinary loans, which, of course, meant that he virtually possessed the vital power of taxation. This was really the old régime back again.

There was also a Senate, composed of the Emperor's appointees — marshals, admirals, cardinals, and others, irremovable, serving for life. This body had no legislative power, no executive power, no judicial power. It was declared "the guardian of the fundamental law"; that is, the Constitution. All laws must be submitted to it, not for discussion and possible amendment, but that it might oppose their promulgation if it found them opposed to the Constitution. It was to interpret doubtful or obscure phrases of the Constitution; it might propose amendments, *senatus consulta*, which would become definite when

sanctioned by the Emperor. Its powers were nominally extensive, purposely vague, and might easily become entirely inoperative. The Senate, as a matter of fact, was the mere tool of the Emperor.

There was also a Council of State, appointed by the Emperor and removable by him, with power to frame laws to be submitted by the ministers to the Legislative Body, but with no power of legislating.

In the midst of these numerous wheels stood the master mechanician, the Emperor, Napoleon III. His attributes were real and sweeping in their range. He had the command of the army and the navy, decided upon war and peace, could alone conclude treaties of peace, of commerce, of political alliance. He was the fountain of justice, possessing the full power of pardon. He appointed to all important offices. The ministers were absolutely dependent on him. He appointed the Council of State, the Senate, the High Court, and, as we have seen, could largely manipulate the Legislative Body, which, moreover, he alone could convene, adjourn, and dissolve. He alone had the right to propose laws; the Council of State worked them out in detail, and the Legislative Body approved; after that he, as if his power were not already sufficient, could sanction and promulgate them. Having dissolved the legislature, he need not call another for six months.

In short, the Emperor was the state. All this machinery did not disguise, but rather accentuated his autocracy. The important fact for several years was not the activity of these various bodies, but of the one man. Parliamentary institutions, until 1860, were little else than a sounding-board for the wishes of the monarch.

It is true that France had a Legislative Body, which was, however, thoroughly bottled up, as we have seen. This body was elected by universal suffrage, but the elections were controlled in various ways by the Government. It proposed in every district an official candidate, whom it forced all office-holders to support actively. It hampered in numerous and ingenious ways independent candidates. All meetings for campaign purposes were prohibited as "prejudicial to the free exercise of the suffrage." The press, so essential an aid in any free political life, was thoroughly shackled, so that practically only those newspapers favorable to the Government could flourish. No new journal might be established without the preliminary permission of the Government. Every change of editor or manager must likewise

be officially approved. Also, as a guarantee for good behavior, a deposit must be made, proportioned to the importance of the place of publication, which might be as high as 50,000 francs for Paris, as high as 15,000 for the departments. A system of warnings was developed, whereby, after two warnings that articles had appeared disagreeable to the Government, the publication might be indefinitely suspended. New press misdemeanors were created. To describe the sessions of the Legislative Body other than by the publication of the official minutes was one of these. To publish false news another. Press cases were taken from juries, which showed a tendency to be just, and handed over to special courts which had the right to act summarily.

Under this system political life was completely stamped out, intellectual independence well-nigh extinguished. Repression was all-powerful and endlessly pervasive. France was no longer a land of freedom. For several years she breathed a mephitic atmosphere of intellectual humiliation and effacement.

In return for all this Napoleon sought to entertain and divert and enrich France. His government was "both repressive and progressive — repressive of whatever imperiled his power, progressive in devotion to whatever might adorn and strengthen it."[1] Marrying at this time a young Spanish woman of twenty-six years, of remarkable beauty and of noble birth, Mlle. Eugénie de Montijo, "a marriage of love," as he told the French people, the Tuileries immediately became the center of a court life probably the most brilliant and luxurious of the nineteenth century. Fête followed fête in swift succession. Life could not be more lavish or more gay. Sumptuous and showy, the balls, dinners, military parades, illuminations, were, it was given out, not mere self-indulgence for the favored few, but were of advantage to all France. Did they not encourage business and trade? A shower of gold wherever it fell was considered highly fructifying. Some criticized, asking if it was worth while to overthrow parliament in order to put an orchestra in its place, but, in the main, joy was unconfined; and bourgeois society paid court society the genuine compliment of imitation.

But pleasure did not engross the attention of the new sovereign. His reign was distinguished by a spirit of great enterprise, kindly feeling for the masses, good works of benefit to the different classes of society. The Emperor was no incorrigible conservative like Metternich, but a very modern man, anxious that his reign should be memorable for works of utility, of improvement.

[1] Gorce, *Histoire du Second Empire,* II, 3.

He had a genuine love for humanity, a sincere desire to help those who were heavy laden. He founded hospitals and asylums freely, and relief societies of various kinds for the poor. The free distribution of medicines was provided for. In 1864 laborers were given for the first time in French history the right to strike, which has proved a most important weapon in their hands for the betterment of their conditions. Banks were organized from which landed proprietors, both great and small, might obtain loans on easy terms to enable them to carry on improvements in agriculture. The railways, denounced by Thiers as "the costly luxury of the rich," "toys for the Parisians," were extended in a few years from a mileage of 2,000 to one of 6,000. Steamboat lines were established to enlarge the markets of France by transatlantic commerce. Canals were begun. For the Emperor was distinctly a man of his age, responsive to new ideas, and sincerely enthusiastic in promoting all the progress in the arts and trades which the marvelous discoveries of modern science rendered possible. No class of the population was ignored in these schemes. In Napoleon's opinion, preceding governments had failed precisely because they had considered only a class — the Legitimist monarchy only the aristocracy, the Orleanist monarchy only the rich bourgeoisie. The Empire, he said, stood for no class, but for the nation in all its entirety. A great international exposition was held in Paris in 1855, bringing thousands of visitors to Paris, and giving a distinct impulsion to material progress by its impressive revelation of the wealth of the tools at man's disposal.

A grandiose scheme for the modernization and beautification of Paris was projected, which, carried out by Baron Haussmann, made it the most attractive and comfortable capital in Europe. This transformation of the capital, indeed, was one of the principal undertakings of the Second Empire, an undertaking in process of execution during the entire course of the reign.

All these enterprises greatly stimulated commerce. An era of unwonted speculation now set in. The Stock Exchange reflected vividly the buoyancy and daring of the period. Fortunes were made quickly, and of a size hitherto unknown in France. Thus, in an air of general prosperity, of economic expansion, of multifarious activity, men forgot their loss of liberty, and even the great famines, great floods, and important business failures which occurred during this period did not produce the usual unrest. They were regarded as merely the reverse of what was, in the main, a most attractive picture.

In 1856 Napoleon III was at the zenith of his power. The Empire had been recognized by all the other states of Europe. The Emperor had, with England and Piedmont as allies, waged a successful war against Russia in the Crimea.[1] He was supposed to have the best army in Europe, and he was honored in the face of all the world by having Paris chosen as the seat of the congress which drew up the treaties at the end of that war. And now an heir was born to him, the Prince Imperial, as interesting to his day and as ill-fated as the King of Rome had been in his. Fortune seemed to have emptied her full horn of plenty upon the author of the coup d'état.

But the Empire had already reached its apogee, though this was not evident for some time. The Emperor's policy had thus far been dominated by a very clear perception of self-interest. Now it was to change, become less precise, bolder, and more uncertain, calculated to arouse criticism and to create a lack of confidence, a general sense of insecurity. In preparing France for the Empire while yet he was the dictatorial President of 1852, Napoleon had taken special care to reassure her on one point. As the First Empire had been a period of unexampled war, would not the Second be the same? In a speech at Bordeaux, which became famous, Napoleon had with great deliberation treated this subject. "Nevertheless," said he, "there is a fear to which I ought to reply. In a spirit of distrust certain people say: the Empire is war. But I say: the Empire is peace. I confess, however, that I, like the Emperor, have many conquests to make. I wish, like him, to win and to reconcile the hostile parties," and to achieve economic and moral victories of various kinds. . . . "Such are the conquests that I contemplate, and all of you who surround me, who desire, like myself, the welfare of the fatherland, you are my soldiers." To the latter sort of conquests the Emperor gave himself, as we have seen, with energy and success. But the other part of his promise he did not adhere to. Wars were frequent in his reign, wars not forced upon him but created by him, wars disastrous to himself and to his dynasty, as the more famous ones of the First Empire had been to the First Napoleon.

The policy of the Empire at home after 1860 was determined by the policy abroad. This was determined by the Emperor, who had uncontrolled rights of making war, which rights he unwisely used. The beginning of his serious troubles was his participation in the Italian war of 1859.

[1] See Chapter XXXI.

To understand the course of the Second Empire from 1860 to 1870 one must study the part played by Napoleon III in the making of modern Italy, the consequences of which were to be for him so unexpected, so far-reaching, and in the end so disastrous. And correctly to appraise that policy we must first trace the history of the rise of the Kingdom of Italy.

CHAPTER XI

CAVOUR AND THE CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III

With the failure of the revolutions of 1848–9 Italy returned to her former condition, of division into small states, arbitrary government, and domination by Austria. The punishment of Liberals was general, and at times savage, particularly in Lombardy-Venetia and in Naples. In the latter case the proceedings were so iniquitous that Gladstone, in a flaming pamphlet, denounced the Neapolitan government as the very negation of God erected into a system. After the Pope's return to Rome, his government was guilty of such misdeeds that its supporter, Louis Napoleon, protested, though in vain. In Tuscany the government was characterized by severity, in Lombardy and Venetia by long-continued persecutions. Constitutions that had been granted were generally revoked. One state in the peninsula formed a brilliant exception to this sorry system of reaction — Piedmont. Though badly defeated on the battlefield at Custozza in 1848, and at Novara in 1849, it had gained an important moral victory. An Italian prince had risked his throne twice for the cause of Italian independence, conduct which for multitudes of Italians marked the House of Savoy as the leader of the future. Moreover, the king who had done this, Charles Albert, had also granted his people a constitution. He had abdicated after the battle of Novara, and his son, Victor Emmanuel II, then twenty-nine years of age, had come to the throne.

Austria offered Victor Emmanuel easy terms of peace if he would abrogate this constitution, and prospects of aggrandizement were dangled before him. He absolutely refused. This was a turning point in his career, in the history of Piedmont, and in that of Italy. It won him the popular title of the Honest King. It made Piedmont the one hope of Italian Liberals. She was national and constitutional. Henceforth her leadership was assured. For the next ten years her history is the history of the making of the Kingdom of Italy. Thither Liberals who were

driven out of the other states took refuge, and their number was large.

Victor Emmanuel was a brave soldier, a man, not of brilliant mind, but of sound and independent judgment, of absolute loyalty to his word, of intense patriotism. And he had from 1850 on, in his leading minister, Count Camillo di Cavour, one of the greatest statesmen and diplomatists of the nineteenth century.

Cavour was born in 1810. His family belonged to the nobility of Piedmont. He received a military education and joined the army as an engineer. But by his liberal opinions, freely expressed, he incurred the hostility of his superiors and was kept for a time in semi-imprisonment. He resigned his commission in 1831, and for the next fifteen years lived the life of a country gentleman, developing his estates. By studying the new scientific processes of agriculture, by introducing and inducing others to introduce machinery, by experimenting with canal irrigation and artificial fertilizers, he was largely instrumental in revolutionizing farming in Piedmont. During these years, to vary the monotony of existence, he visited France and England repeatedly, interested particularly in political and economic questions. He was anxious to play a part in politics himself, though he saw no chance in a country as yet without representative institutions. "Oh! if I were an Englishman," he said, "by this time I should be something, and my name would not be wholly unknown." Meanwhile, he studied abroad the institutions he desired for his own country, particularly the English parliamentary system. Night after night he sat in the gallery of the House of Commons, seeking to make himself thoroughly familar with its modes of procedure. Cavour's mind was the opposite of Mazzini's, practical, positive, not poetical and speculative. He wrote on social and economic questions. Particularly did he advocate the building of railroads as tending effectively to promote the moral unity of Italy, which must precede political unity. They would sweep away local jealousies and bind the Italians of different sections together commercially. Rome ought to be the center of the system, which should unite the whole peninsula. In all these plans for the material enrichment of Piedmont and of Italy, he was dominated by the patriotic consideration that they would contribute to the achievement of independence and unity. In 1847, when the censorship of the press was abolished in Piedmont, Cavour saw that his opportunity had come, left his retirement, and founded a liberal newspaper called *Il Risorgimento*. Its aims were "independence, union between the princes

and people, and reforms." He welcomed with enthusiasm the creation in 1848 of a parliament for Piedmont and of a constitution, which he had, indeed, been one of the boldest to demand. "Italy," he said, "must make herself by means of liberty, or we must give up trying to make her." This belief in parliamentary institutions Cavour held tenaciously all through his life, even when at times they seemed to be a hindrance to his policies. He believed that in the end, sooner or later, the people reach the truth of a matter. He was elected to the first Piedmontese Parliament, was taken into the cabinet in 1850, and became prime minister in 1852. He held this position for the remainder of his life, with the exception of a few months, proving himself a great statesman and an incomparable diplomat.

Cavour had said in 1850, with an optimism and a courage not daunted by the disastrous defeats of Custozza and Novara, that if Piedmont would "gather to itself all the living forces in Italy it would be in a position to lead our mother country to those high destinies whereunto she is called." To accomplish this, he now said, "Piedmont must begin by raising herself, by re-establishing in Europe as well as in Italy a position and a credit equal to her ambition." He threw himself with enthusiasm and intelligence into his preliminary work of making Piedmont, a small and poor country, strong, vigorous, modern, of calling the attention of the great powers to this little state beneath the Alps. To accomplish this the army must be reorganized and strengthened, the fleet built up, fortifications erected. This would involve immense expenditure. But Piedmont's debt had been greatly increased by the late war. The interest on it had mounted from about two million lire in 1847 to thirty million in 1852. There were large annual deficits; bankruptcy appeared imminent. Economy rather than expenditure seemed imperative. Not so thought Cavour. He believed in spending freely on improvements, because they were necessary, and because in the end larger revenues would result. He urged large appropriations not only for the army, but for public works. He encouraged agriculture, completed the railway system of Piedmont, stimulated commerce and industry by treaties of commerce with other states, secularized some of the monastic lands, levied new taxes, all this, of course, by securing the necessary laws from Parliament. The result of all this activity was that Piedmont entered upon a period of rapid growth in material prosperity, and the new burdens were as easily borne as the old had been. Cavour was thus able to create a large and well-equipped army of ninety

thousand men, remarkable for a state whose population was only five million. And this facilitated his next object, which was to secure for Piedmont an ally among the great powers, for this he considered absolutely necessary if she were to accomplish her high mission. Cavour believed, as did all true patriots, that Austria must be driven out of Italy before any Italian regeneration could be achieved. But he did not believe with Mazzini and others that the Italians could accomplish this feat alone. In his opinion the history of the last forty years had shown that plots and insurrections would not avail. It was essential to win the aid of a great military power comparable in strength and discipline to Austria. This explains why he urged that Piedmont participate in the Crimean War.

The Crimean War was fought in 1854 and 1855 by France and England against Russia, to prevent the latter power from dismembering the Turkish Empire. There seemed to be no reason for a small and struggling state like Piedmont to interfere. It had no serious quarrel with Russia. The preservation or dismemberment of Turkey was for it a matter of only remote concern. Yet Cavour, looking beyond the immediate question, believed that Piedmont's and Italy's interests would be subserved by an alliance offensive and defensive with the two western powers against Russia. For he believed that thus Piedmont would win the good will of her two allies, and might take her place as an equal at the council board of European diplomacy. Such a position this state, petty and poor, in comparison with France and England and Austria and Russia, with barely five millions of people, had hitherto not held. Among the "powers" she was practically unrecognized. For reasons, then, quite remote from the real question at issue, and reasons, therefore, which Cavour could not publicly give, he wished to use this opportunity. His plan was bitterly denounced and generally condemned. It was said that the quarrel was none of Piedmont's, that by sending her army to the Crimea she would be exposing her own frontiers, that her finances would be ruined by this additional strain, that she should husband her money and her men for her own struggle, which must ultimately come with Austria. Her resources would be none too great at best. Cavour himself called the risks of the venture "enormous."

But he succeeded in carrying it through. Seventeen thousand Sardinians were sent to the Crimea, where they proved excellent soldiers and won distinction. But Cavour was not aiming primarily at military glory, but at moral and diplomatic

victories. Piedmont had entered the alliance unconditionally. She was not promised that, participating in the war, she would be permitted to participate in the making of the peace, and when the Congress of Paris was called in 1856 Cavour started out not knowing whether he would be admitted to it owing to Austria's opposition. He was going to Paris, he said, in order "to sniff the air." But a few days after his arrival he was informed that he would be received. The two great powers could not well consent to the ignoring of their ally. Cavour had won the interest of Napoleon III, who in 1855 had asked him, "What can be done for Italy?" Cavour had replied by a memorandum. Now in Paris, after the treaty had been made, Napoleon caused the question of Italy — a question foreign to the purpose of the Congress — to be brought before it. This was Cavour's chance. The Italian situation was to be discussed in a congress in which Austria sat. Clarendon, representing England, indignantly denounced the Papal Government as a "disgrace to Europe," and Ferdinand's misrule in Naples as crying for the intervention of the civilized world. This speech created an extraordinary sensation. Moreover, by bringing the Italian question forward, it furnished Cavour an opportunity to speak. His speech was brief, cautious, and bold. The main cause of the evils from which Italy suffered was Austria, he declared. "Austria is the arch-enemy of Italian independence; the permanent danger to the only free nation in Italy, the nation which I have the honor to represent."

Cavour returned from Paris with no material advantage gained, but his moral victory was complete. Piedmont had participated in a council of the great powers. Austria had been indicted publicly in a great international congress. So had the Pope, and so had the King of Naples. Piedmont had again shown that she was the champion of all Italy. Many who, influenced by Mazzini, had hitherto believed that Italy's salvation lay in a republic, began to change their opinion, and to entertain an increasing confidence in the patriotism and statesmanship and military power of the Piedmontese monarchy. Cavour had gained for himself a great reputation as a diplomatist. Prince Metternich, now in retirement, and a connoisseur in such matters, is said to have remarked: "There is only one diplomatist in Europe, but unfortunately he is against us; it is M. de Cavour." Cavour was now one of the commanding personalities of Europe. His position in his own country was more solid than ever.

After the Congress of Paris Piedmont proceeded still further to make herself the model state of Italy. Laws were passed strengthening the army. Industry expanded under wise legislation. Education was stimulated, and the National Society was organized to encourage the growth in the other states of Italy of a sentiment in favor of Piedmont. The motto of this society was: "Independence and Unity; out with the Austrians and the Pope." The subjects of other states were to be won from their loyalty to their own princes to loyalty to Piedmont. A revolution in opinion and sentiment was to be effected that later a political revolution might be easier. This society was successful. Many, like Manin, who had hitherto been Republicans, renounced their republicanism and declared themselves willing under certain conditions to follow Piedmont. "Make Italy," wrote Manin, "and we are with you; if not, not." The National Society spread rapidly throughout the other states. By it Liberals everywhere were drawn together under the banner of the House of Savoy, and a state of mind was created favorable to the overthrow of the petty princes and the exaltation of Piedmont.

Cavour had returned from Paris hoping that France might shortly be induced to aid Piedmont. The Emperor had in 1855 asked what he could do for Italy, and Cavour had responded with all explicitness. Suddenly all hope of this consummation seemed dashed to the ground by a murderous attempt upon the life of Napoleon by certain Italians, led by Orsini (January 14, 1858). This, however, did not deflect Napoleon from the alliance with Sardinia toward which he had been tending for some time. The motives that influenced him to take the step momentous for himself as well as for Italy were numerous. The principle of nationality which he held tenaciously, and which largely determined the foreign policy of his entire reign, prompted him in this direction — the principle, namely, that peoples of the same race and language had the right to be united politically. He sought, as we shall see, to further this principle in several cases, with results very disastrous to himself and to France.

Further, Napoleon had long been interested in Italy. He had himself taken part in the revolutionary movements there in 1831, and had probably been a member of the Carbonari. Moreover, it was one of his ambitions to tear up the treaties of 1815, treaties that sealed the humiliation of the Napoleonic dynasty. These treaties still formed the basis of the Italian political system in 1858. Again, he was probably lured on by a desire to win glory for his throne, and there was always

the chance, too, of gaining territory. Fear, also, may have influenced him. Orsini had not been the first Italian who had tried to assassinate the Emperor; he might not be the last, if he should do nothing for Italy.

At any rate, the Emperor decided to draw closer to Piedmont. Hardly six months after Orsini's attempt, he invited Cavour to meet him at Plombières, a watering place in the Vosges mountains. The meeting, which occurred July 21, 1858, was shrouded in utmost mystery. Only four persons in Piedmont knew of it, including Victor Emmanuel and La Marmora. The ministers of Napoleon were kept in ignorance of it. The Emperor, always a dreamer and conspirator, was now closeted with a conspirator far more skilful than himself. The interview of Plombières is one of the most famous in the history of the century. There were long conversations, a memorable description of which was contained in a letter which Cavour immediately sent to Victor Emmanuel and which constitutes our chief source of information concerning the intrigues of two unscrupulous men conspiring for different reasons to bring about a war.[1] No written agreement or treaty of alliance was made, but it was agreed verbally that France and Piedmont should go to war with Austria, but only upon some pretext which could be justified before Europe, and which would make it appear that the two powers were not bent upon revolution, but that they were merely repelling Austrian aggression. A rising in Massa and Carrara was to serve as the pretext. If Austria should begin war against Piedmont, France would come to the latter's assistance, and if the allies were victorious Italy should be reconstituted as follows: Lombardy and Venetia should be added to Piedmont, as should also the duchies and parts of the Papal States, the Romagna and the Legations. Austria would thus be completely expelled from the peninsula, and Victor Emmanuel would rule over a kingdom of Northern Italy. The rest of the Papal States, with the exception of Rome and a region round about, should be added to Tuscany, which would thus form a kingdom of Central Italy. These two kingdoms and that of Naples and the Papal States should then be united into an Italian Confederation under the presidency of the Pope who might consequently feel compensated for the loss of most of his possessions. In return for her aid France was to receive Savoy and possibly Nice. The Emperor urged a marriage between his cousin Prince Napoleon and the daughter of Victor Emmanuel. No definite agreement was then

[1] Chiala, *Lettere edite ed inedite di Camillo Cavour*, II, 568 *seq.* 2nd edit.

made. Prince Napoleon was a debauchee of forty-three. Princess Clotilde was a young girl of sixteen. Ultimately this sacrifice was made — so revolting to Victor Emmanuel and the Piedmontese. Early in December 1858 these verbal agreements were put into writing, though not, it would seem, although the matter is most obscure, into a binding treaty.

Though Cavour had apparently achieved the dream of his life, an alliance with a great military power, his position during the next few months, between the meeting at Plombières, July 1858, and the final declaration of war, April 1859, was one of extraordinary difficulty. He had invoked a powerful spirit. Could he control it, or would he become the mere sport of it? Might not Napoleon, notably of a changeable mind, change it now at the critical time, leaving Piedmont high and dry, at the mercy of her powerful neighbor, Austria, leaving Cavour and all his policy a wreck? Might not the other powers, getting wind of the conspiracy, step in to prevent war, the necessity of which was the very basis of Cavour's policy for the creation of modern Italy, as it was of Bismarck's policy later for the creation of modern Germany? If the war should come and Napoleon should be faithful to his engagements, might not the greatest danger lie right there? Might not a victorious Napoleon in Italy do what a victorious Napoleon had done in Italy before, use his opportunity for his own advantage and not for that of the Italians, whom he ostensibly came to succor? Cavour did not wish to play a game for Napoleon. The risk at any rate must be run.

It had been stipulated by Napoleon that he would support Piedmont in a war with Austria if Austria appeared as the aggressor. Cavour's policy therefore for the next months was to provoke Austria to this end. It was a period of great tension for the Piedmontese minister, in which he displayed extraordinary resourcefulness, coolness, craft, unscrupulousness. He wove ceaselessly a marvelous web of tortuous intrigue. Now Napoleon seemed about to withdraw; now a congress of the powers to cut clean through the projects of these conspirators. Into the interesting details of these machinations we cannot go. In the end they were successful, and Austria was goaded by Cavour's conduct to take the fatal step. She demanded that Piedmont disarm within three days, otherwise war would be declared. War was precisely the thing Cavour wanted, and for which he had for months been ceaselessly working. He had contrived to make Austria appear the aggressor and now the case had arisen for

which Napoleon had promised his aid. Piedmont refused the Austrian ultimatum, and at the end of April 1859 war began. The public opinion of other nations blamed Austria and exonerated Piedmont, most unjustly, for this war was Cavour's, desired by him and brought about by him with extraordinary skill. That he had succeeded in throwing the whole responsibility for it on his enemy was only further evidence of the cunning of his fine Italian hand.

The Austro-Sardinian War lasted only about two months. The Austrian armies were large but incompetently led. They wasted the time before the arrival of the French troops when Piedmont was at their mercy. When the French arrived, the Emperor at their head, active fighting began. The theater of war was limited to Lombardy. The battles of Magenta (June 4) and of Solferino (June 24) were victories for the Allies. The latter was one of the greatest battles of the nineteenth century. It lasted eleven hours, more than 260,000 men were engaged, nearly 800 cannon. The Allies lost over 17,000 men, the Austrians about 22,000. All Lombardy was conquered, and Milan was occupied. It seemed that Venetia could be easily overrun and the termination of Austrian rule in Italy effected, and Napoleon's statement that he would free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" accomplished. Suddenly Napoleon halted in the full tide of success, sought an interview with the Emperor of Austria at Villafranca, and there on July 11th, without consulting the wishes of his ally, concluded a famous armistice. The terms agreed upon by the two Emperors were: (1) The creation of an Italian Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope. (2) The cession to France, and the transfer by France to Sardinia, of the province of Lombardy. (3) The inclusion of Venetia in the Italian Confederation, as a province, however, under the Crown of Austria. (4) The restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena to their respective states, whence they had just been driven by popular uprisings.

The considerations that determined Napoleon to stop in the middle of a successful campaign, and before he had attained the object for which he had come into Italy, were many and serious. While victorious on five battlefields he had no reason to feel elated. Magenta and Solferino had been victories, but he saw that they might easily have been defeats. He had conquered Lombardy, but Austria had 150,000 men in Venetia, and 100,000 more were advancing to join them. Austria's troops would then

outnumber his. Moreover Austria would now plant herself firmly in the famous Quadrilateral, whose fortressses could only be taken, if at all, after long and difficult sieges. Furthermore, the control of events was plainly slipping from him. The effect of the Piedmontese propaganda in the other states of Italy was already becoming apparent. During the war the Romagna had thrown off its allegiance to the Pope, the authority of the rulers of Modena and Parma had been renounced by their rebellious subjects, and all three — the Romagna, the two duchies, and Tuscany also, were clamoring for annexation to Piedmont. If the war should continue the other Italians might show the same determination and Napoleon might find that, instead of an enlarged kingdom of Piedmont, a kingdom of all Italy had been created, and many of the leading men in France were denouncing as very dangerous to France this possible creation of a powerful state on her southeastern border. The French Catholics were opposed to the continuation of a war so full of menace to the Pope. Moreover, Prussia was mobilizing her troops on the Rhine and was contemplating intervention, and France was in no condition to fight Austria and Prussia combined. Also, the Emperor had been touched by the horrors of the battlefield. "The poor people, the poor people, what a horrible thing is war," he was heard to say more than once at Solferino.

Austria was eager for peace. Her army was badly led. She was involved in trouble with Hungary. She did not relish being saved by Prussia, for Prussia might then seize her leadership in Germany. Francis Joseph, too, like Napoleon, was horrified by war. "Better lose a province," he said after Solferino, "than be present again at so awful a spectacle." Thus both rulers were willing to come to terms.

The news of the armistice came as a cruel disappointment to the Italians, dashing their hopes just as they were apparently about to be realized. The Government of Victor Emmanuel had not even been consulted. In intense indignation at the faithlessness of Napoleon, overwrought by the excessive strain under which he had long been laboring, Cavour completely lost his self-control, urged desperate measures upon the King, and, when they were declined, in a fit of rage, threw up his office. The King by overruling Cavour showed himself wiser than his gifted minister. As disappointed as the latter, he saw more clearly than did Cavour that though Piedmont had not gained all that she had hoped to, yet she had gained much. It was wiser to take what one could get and bide the future than to imperil all

by some mad course. Here was one of the great moments where the independence and common sense of Victor Emmanuel were of great and enduring service to his country.

Napoleon had not done all that he had planned for Italy, yet he had rendered a very important service. He had secured Lombardy for Piedmont. It should also be noted that he himself acknowledged that the failure to carry out the whole programme had cancelled any claim he had upon the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France.

ANNEXATIONS AFTER VILLAFRANCA

Thus by the preliminaries of Villafranca, embodied later in the Peace of Zurich, November 10, 1859, the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Austria put an end to the process of Italian unification shortly after it had begun. Piedmont had grown by the addition of Lombardy and that was all. Austria was still an Italian power, and by the terms agreed upon was to be a member of the projected Italian Confederation. That she could use that position to continue her leadership in Italy was proved by her success in using the German Confederation for purposes of leadership in Germany. The Pope was still a temporal ruler and his power indeed was to be augmented by the presidency of the Confederation. Thus the Austrian Emperor and the Pope stood in the way of Italian aspirations as before. No wonder that Cavour said, though incorrectly, that all the efforts Piedmont had made during the past ten years had gone for nought. But the Peace of Zurich was destined never to be carried out save in the one respect that Lombardy was added to Piedmont. Victor Emmanuel saw what Cavour failed to see, that the chapter was not closed but that it might be carried further, that central Italy at least might be drawn into the enlarged kingdom of Piedmont.

The situation in central Italy was this: during the war the rulers of Modena, Parma, Tuscany, had been overthrown, and the Pope's authority in Romagna, the northern part of his dominions, had been destroyed. Assemblies called in those states by revolutionary leaders voted, in August 1859, in favor of annexation to Piedmont. Thus the provinces of central Italy hurled defiance at the two Emperors who had decided at Villafranca that the rulers of those countries should be restored. Piedmont declined their offer at the time, knowing the opposition of Napoleon, and fearing to offend him, lest he might then

withdraw from Italy entirely, thereby leaving Piedmont alone and exposed to Austrian attack. But unofficially Piedmont gave them encouragement to hold out for annexation.

The Italians of the central states stood firm. It was evident that the former rulers could only be restored by force and Napoleon promised that force should not be used, either French or Austrian, to accomplish their restoration. For months this anomalous situation continued, harassing to every one. The central states, under the leadership of Piedmontese statesmen who had gone to them to assume direction, revised and rendered uniform their laws, and created a common military force that they might in the end bring about fusion with Piedmont. Diplomacy suggested a congress which was never convened, and for some time things drifted. Slowly the whole confused situation began to clarify. Napoleon came to see that if the peoples were left to themselves they would never restore their rulers but would insist upon union with Piedmont; that, moreover, the federation under the presidency of the Pope could never be brought about except by force. He saw also that the restoration of the rulers to their duchies would be an advantage to Austria but not at all to France. He had no desire that Austria should be again predominant in the peninsula. Other events co-operated to hasten a solution. In England, in June 1859, a new election had occurred and a ministry had come into office which was very friendly to the cause of Italian unity, and which particularly wished the Italians to be strong enough to be independent of the French. The English Government protested against the employment of French or Austrian forces to repress the clearly expressed will of the people of central Italy and to restore the princes. This was England's great service to the Italians. "The people of the duchies have as much right to change their sovereigns," said Lord Palmerston, "as the English people or the French, or the Belgian or the Swedish. The annexation of the duchies to Piedmont will be an unfathomable good to Italy."

Another event tending toward the solution of the question was the return of Cavour to power in January 1860, after an absence of six months. Cavour saw that the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont could be effected only with Napoleon's consent, which, therefore, must be secured. But Napoleon would not yet give it. It was clear that a bargain must be made. Piedmont could have the annexations for a price and that price was the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, which Napoleon

had not claimed before as he had not carried out the agreement of Plombières, but which he now demanded as compensation for the creation of an important state on the southeastern border of France, and because he wished, by enlarging the national boundaries, to allay the sharp criticism which his Italian policy had aroused at home. It was finally agreed that plébiscites should be taken in the states of central Italy to see if they wished annexation to Piedmont, and in Savoy and Nice to see if they wished annexation to France. Thus, in theory, the principle would be upheld that peoples have a right to dispose of themselves.

These plébiscites in Italy resulted as was expected. (March 11–12, 1860.) The vote was almost unanimous in favor of annexation.

Modena, Parma, Tuscany and the Romagna were thus added to the Kingdom of Piedmont, which had already received Lombardy. The Pope issued the major excommunication against the authors of this spoliation of his dominions (Romagna), but Victor Emmanuel accepted the sovereignty thus offered him, and on April 2, 1860, the first parliament of the enlarged kingdom met in Turin. A small state of less than 5,000,000 had grown to one of 11,000,000 within a year. This was the most important change in the political system of Europe since 1815. As far as Italy was concerned it made waste paper of the treaties of 1815. It constituted the most damaging breach made thus far in the work of the Congress of Vienna. What that congress had decided was to be a mere "geographical expression" was now a nation in formation. And this was being accomplished by the triumphant assertion of two principles utterly odious to the monarchs of 1815, the right of revolution and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies for themselves, for these annexations were the result of war and of plébiscites.

But Piedmont's triumph was not without an element of bitterness for it had been bought with a price, and that price was the cession of Savoy and Nice, with a population of about 700,000, to France. Savoy was the cradle of the ruling house and its abandonment was a great humiliation, but it was, in Cavour's opinion, inevitable. Because of it Garibaldi, a citizen of Nice, attacked him in Parliament with remarkable vehemence: "You have made me," he said, "a stranger in the land of my birth." "The act," replied Cavour with impressive dignity, "that has made this gulf between us, was the most painful duty of my life. By what I have felt myself I know what Garibaldi must have

felt. If he refuses me his forgiveness I cannot reproach him for it." Parliament supported Cavour, ratifying the cession by a majority of 229, more than four-fifths of the entire chamber. The plébiscites in Savoy and Nice took place a few days later and resulted in an almost unanimous vote for annexation to France. One result of this annexation of Savoy and Nice was to prove very important for France. It alienated England from Napoleon completely. England did not wish to see her powerful neighbor grow larger. The depth and unfortunate effect of this estrangement Napoleon was to feel fully before many months had passed. Moreover, might not this acceptance of Italian territory involve him in further Italian complications? Was he not morally compromised? That Cavour appreciated the advantage of the situation was shown by his reported remark to the French ambassador, "Now you are our accomplices." What had Cavour in mind for accomplices to do? He did not explain the cryptic utterance, but every one knew that he was still far from his cherished goal. Napoleon III would still be very useful. Sophisticated Guizot, then living in retirement, made at about this time an observation: "There are," he said, "two men upon whom the eyes of Europe are fixed, the Emperor Napoleon and M. de Cavour. The game is being played. I back M. de Cavour."

THE CONQUEST OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES

Much had been achieved in the eventful year just described, but much remained to be achieved before the unification of Italy should be complete. Venetia, the larger part of the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples still stood outside. In the last, however, events now occurred which carried the process a long step forward. Early in 1860 the Sicilians rose in revolt against the despotism of their new king, Francis II. This insurrection created an opportunity for a man already famous but destined to a wonderful exploit and to a memorable service to his country, Giuseppe Garibaldi, already the most famous military leader in Italy, and invested with a half mythical character of invincibility and daring, the result of a very spectacular, romantic career.

Garibaldi was born at Nice in 1807. He was therefore two years younger than Mazzini and three years older than Cavour. Destined by his parents for the priesthood he preferred the sea, and for many years he lived a roving and adventurous sailor's life. He early joined "Young Italy." His military experience was chiefly in irregular, guerilla fighting. He took part in the

unsuccessful insurrection, organized by Mazzini in Savoy in 1834, and as a result was condemned to death. He managed to escape to South America where, for the next fourteen years, he was an exile. He participated in the abundant wars of the South American states with the famous "Italian Legion," which he organized and commanded. Learning of the uprising of 1848 he returned to Italy, though still under the penalty of death, and immediately thousands flocked to the standard of the "Hero of Montevideo" to fight under him against the Austrians. After the failure of that campaign he went, in 1849, to Rome to assume military defense of the republic. When the city was about to fall he escaped with four thousand troops, intending to attack the Austrian power in Venetia. French and Austrian armies pursued him. He succeeded in evading them, but his army dwindled away rapidly and the chase became so hot that he was forced to escape to the Adriatic. When he landed later, his enemies were immediately in full cry again, hunting him through forests and over mountains as if he were some dangerous game. It was a wonderful exploit, rendered tragic by the death, in a farm-house near Ravenna, of his wife Anita, who was his companion in the camp as in the home, and who was as high-spirited, as daring, as courageous as he. Garibaldi finally escaped to America and began once more the life of an exile. But his story, shot through and through with heroism and chivalry and romance, moved the Italian people to unwonted depths of enthusiasm and admiration.

For several years Garibaldi was a wanderer, sailing the seas, commander of a Peruvian bark. For some months, indeed, he was a candle maker on Staten Island, but in 1854 he returned to Italy and settled down as a farmer on the little island of Caprera. But the events of 1859 once more brought him out of his retirement. Again, as a leader of volunteers, he plunged into the war against Austria and immensely increased his reputation. He had become the idol of soldiers and adventurous spirits from one end of Italy to the other. Multitudes were ready to follow in blind confidence wherever he might lead. His name was one to conjure with. There now occurred, in 1860, the most brilliant episode of his career, the Sicilian expedition and the campaign against the Kingdom of Naples. For Garibaldi, the most redoubtable warrior of Italy, whose very name was worth an army, now decided on his own account to go to the aid of the Sicilians who had risen in revolt against their king, Francis II of Naples.

His determination created a serious problem for Cavour. The Government of Piedmont could not sanction an attack upon the Kingdom of Naples, with which it was at peace, without seeming a ruthless aggressor upon an unoffending state, and without running the risk of a European intervention which might undo all the work thus far accomplished. In Cavour's opinion the newly enlarged kingdom needed time for consolidation before undertaking any further task. On the other hand, if Garibaldi determined to go it would be dangerous to try to prevent him, and yet the result of a successful campaign might make him a rival of Cavour and might be used to checkmate Piedmont. It was imperative that Piedmont should still direct the evolution of Italy toward her future destiny. Cavour could not approve the expedition, and he was not prepared to condemn it. He therefore adopted the plan of secretly conniving at the preparations, at the same time holding Piedmont officially aloof from all connection with it. Thus he could assure the powers that Piedmont had nothing to do with it. If it should fail, he could not be reproached, whereas if successful, he might profit by it. He had need of all his customary wariness in this juncture.

On May 5, 1860, the expedition of "The Thousand," the "Red Shirts," embarked from Genoa in two steamers. These were the volunteers, nearly 1,150 men, whom Garibaldi's fame had caused to rush into the new adventure, an adventure that seemed at the moment one of utter folly. The King of Naples had 24,000 troops in Sicily and 100,000 more on the mainland. The odds against success seemed overwhelming. But fortune favored the brave. After a campaign of a few weeks, in which he was several times in great danger, and was only saved by the most reckless fighting, Garibaldi stood master of the island, helped by the Sicilian insurgents, by volunteers who had flocked from the mainland, and by the incompetency of the commanders of the Neapolitan troops. Audacity had won the victory. He assumed the position of Dictator in Sicily in the name of Victor Emmanuel II (August 5, 1860).

Garibaldi now crossed the straits to the mainland determined to conquer the entire Kingdom of Naples (August 19, 1860). The King still had an army of 100,000 men, but it had not even the strength of a frail reed. There was practically no bloodshed. The Neapolitan Kingdom was not overthrown; it collapsed. Treachery, desertion, corruption did the work. On September 6th, Francis II left Naples for Gaeta, and the next day Garibaldi entered it by rail with only a few attendants, and drove through

the streets amid a pandemonium of enthusiasm. In less than five months he had conquered a kingdom of 11,000,000 people, an achievement unique in modern history.

Garibaldi now began to talk of pushing on to Rome. To Cavour the situation seemed full of danger. Rome was occupied by a French garrison. An attack upon it would almost necessarily mean an attack upon France. A clash between Garibaldi's followers and the French troops which were maintaining the Pope's power in Rome would probably bring an intervention of Napoleon, this time against the Italians. There must, therefore, be no attack upon Rome. But while Rome itself and its immediate neighborhood must be preserved inviolate for the Pope, Cavour did not think that the two eastern provinces of the Papal States, Umbria and the Marches, need be. They desired annexation to Piedmont and were only kept down by an army of volunteers, drawn from Ireland, Austria, France and other Catholic countries. Ought people who wished to be free from the Pope's rule to be kept in subjection by an army of mercenaries?

Cavour felt that Victor Emmanuel must act. It would not do to leave Garibaldi to act as he wished, for that would mean an attack upon Rome and probably upon Venetia, and that would range Italy against, not only France, but Austria, two great empires, and everything that had been so painfully accomplished would be imperiled. To prevent Garibaldi's advance, which, once under way, would be beyond control, Victor Emmanuel must take charge of the revolution in southern Italy. Yet if Victor Emmanuel's troops entered the Papal States all the Catholic countries of Europe, outraged at the despoiling of the Pope, might intervene and undo what had been already done. Cavour believed that if he left the Pope unmolested in Rome, Napoleon would have no objection to the rest of the Papal States going into the new kingdom, if the population so desired. In this estimate he was correct. Understanding finally that Napoleon approved, if only the thing were done quickly, Victor Emmanuel's army crossed into the Papal States and defeated the Papal troops at Castelfidardo (September 18, 1860). They then entered the territory of Naples. The climax to all this unification movement was now at hand. On October 11, 1860, Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of the annexation of all the provinces in central and southern Italy whose people should declare in favor of it by plébiscite. The plébiscite took place in the Kingdom of Naples on October 21–22, 1860, and was overwhelmingly in favor of annexation. On the mainland ap-

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE
THE UNIFICATION OF
ITALY
Scale of English Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100
REFERENCE
I Aquired by Sardinia, by Treaty of Zurich, Nov. 10th 1859.
II Annexation to Sardinia, voted by Plebiscites, Mar. 11, & 12, 1860.
III Annexation to Sardinia, voted by Plebiscites, Nov. 4, & 5, 1860.
IV Annexation to Sardinia, voted by Plebiscites, Oct. 21st, 1860.
V Annexation to Kingdom of Italy; Voted by Plebiscites, Oct. 21, & 22, 1866.
VI Annexation to Kingdom of Italy; Voted by Plebiscite, Oct. 2, 1870.
VII Ceded to France, March, 1860.
VIII Ceded to France, March, 1860.
SWITZERLAND
FRANCE
KINGDOM OF SARDINIA
Lombardy
Savoy
Piedmont
Genoa
Gulf of Genoa
Tuscany
Corsica
Sardinia
Tyrrhenian Sea
Lausanne
Geneva
Rhône R.
Simplon
St. Gothard Pass
Longitude East
Lago Maggiore
L. of Lugano
L. of Como
Trent
Aosta
Chambery
Magenta
Novara
Ticino R.
MILAN
Bergamo
Brescia
Verona
Mantua
Padua
Venice
Ferrara
Parma
Reggio
Modena
Bologna
Romagna
Alessandria
Piacenza
Pavia
Casale
Turin
Susa
Mt. Cenis
R. Isère
Grenoble
Durance R.
Cuneo
Nice
Monaco
Avignon
Marseilles
Toulon
Spezia
Massa
Lucca
Pisa
Arno R.
Florence
Leghorn
Arezzo
Siena
Cortona
C. Corso
Elba
Orbetello
Civitavecchia
Ajaccio
Caprera
G. of Terranova
Sassari
Cagliari
Tunis
46
44
42
40
38
6
8
10

Laibach
Carniola
Agram
Drave R.
Triest
Fiume
Save R.
Brod
Belgrade
Pola
Zara
Bosna Serai
Sebenico
Ancona
Castelfidardo
Spalato
Lissa
Montenegro
Celigne
Ragusa
Cattaro
Budua
Scutari
Pescara
Abruzzi
Molise
Foggia
Durazzo
Pontecorvo
Gaeta
Bari
Capua
Caserta
Benevento
Volturno
NAPLES
Nola
Vesuvius
Ischia
Capri
Salerno
Tarento
Brindisi
Avlona
Basilicata
Otranto
Castrovillari
Corfu
Paola
Cosenza
Lipari Is.
Nicotera
Monteleone
Messina
Milazzo
PALERMO
Aspromonte
Termini
Reggio
Corleone
Etna
Taormina
Catania
Syracuse
Noto
Adriatic Sea
Ionian Sea
Tyrrhenian Sea
TURKEY
DALMATIA
CROATIA
TWO SICILIES
KINGDOM OF
14
16
18
20
46
44
42
40
38

proximately 1,300,000 voted yes, 10,000 no; in Sicily 432,000 yes, 600 no. A few days later the Pope's former subjects in the Marches voted for annexation by 133,000 to 1,200; and in Umbria by 97,000 to 380. Majorities so staggering showed how unanimous was the desire for unification.

After having conquered the Papal army at Castelfidardo, Victor Emmanuel had advanced with his army into the Kingdom of Naples for the double purpose of defeating the army still under Francis II at Capua and Gaeta, which Garibaldi had not been able to conquer, and of taking the direction of affairs of state out of the hands of Garibaldi, who, successful in war, was eminently lacking in political sagacity. It was imperative that Victor Emmanuel's authority should be supreme in Naples, that he might control the evolution of events. Both purposes were now achieved. The troops of Francis II were defeated at Capua on the first and second of November, and the siege of Gaeta, where Francis took his last stand, began.

Garibaldi had demanded the resignation of Cavour from Victor Emmanuel, and seemed disposed to insist upon certain conditions before handing over his conquest to him. The King's attitude was firm. He declined to consider the dismissal of Cavour. Moreover, now that Victor Emmanuel was himself in the Kingdom of Naples with a large army, and was backed by the vote of the Parliament and the plébiscites favoring annexation, Garibaldi yielded. On November 7, Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi drove together through the streets of Naples. The latter refused all rewards and honors and with only a little money and a bag of seed beans for his farm he sailed away to Caprera. Gaeta fell on February 13, 1861, and the King fled to Rome, entering upon a life of exile which was to end only with his death in 1894.

On the 18th of February, 1861, a new Parliament, representing all Italy except Venetia and Rome, met in Turin. The Kingdom of Sardinia now gave way to the Kingdom of Italy, proclaimed March 17th. Victor Emmanuel II was declared "by the grace of God and the will of the nation, King of Italy."

A new kingdom, comprising a population of about twenty-two millions, had arisen during a period of eighteen months, and now took its place among the powers of Europe. The Pope refused to recognize this "creation of revolution," and excommunicated the criminal invaders of his states. Victor Emmanuel he denounced as "forgetful of every religious principle, despising every right, trampling upon every law." Against his assumption

of the title of King of Italy, with which he has sought to seal his "sacrilegious usurpations," Pius IX formally protested.[1]

But the Kingdom of Italy was still incomplete. Venetia was still Austrian and the Patrimony of St. Peter was still subject to the Pope. This was a strip along the western coast, between Tuscany and Naples, twenty or thirty miles wide, and included the incomparable city of Rome. The Pope's power rested on the French garrison. The new Kingdom, however, was not strong enough to take Venetia from Austria, nor disposed to defy the Emperor Napoleon by an attack upon Rome.

There were, indeed, some Italian nationalists who were willing to forego permanently the possession of Rome as the capital. D'Azeglio called the desire for it simply "a classical fantasticality." Moreover, it was "a malarial town fit only for a museum." Not so thought Cavour, who believed that "without Rome there was no Italy." He declared that now that national independence had been secured the great object must be "to make the Eternal City, on which rest twenty-five centuries of glory, the splendid capital of the Italian Kingdom." The position of the capital was not to be determined by the character of the climate or topography, but by moral reasons, and the moral primacy of Rome among all Italian cities was unquestionable. They must have Rome, but on two conditions, that France should consent and that the Catholic world should have no just ground to believe that it meant the subjection of the Pope. Cavour hoped that the Pope would be willing to give up his temporal power on the guarantee that his spiritual authority should be carefully guarded and even extended. The principle of "a free church in a free state" absorbed his thought at this time. At his request Parliament voted the principle that Rome should be the capital of Italy, a solemn official declaration from which there could be no retreat. This was Cavour's last great act, for he now fell ill. Overwork, the extraordinary pressure under which he had for months been laboring, brought on insomnia; finally fever developed and he died on the morning of June 6, 1861, in the very prime of life, for he was only fifty-one years of age.

"Cavour," said Lord Palmerston, in the British House of Commons, "left a name 'to point a moral and adorn a tale.' The moral was, that a man of transcendent talent, indomitable industry, inextinguishable patriotism, could overcome difficulties which seemed insurmountable, and confer the greatest, the most

[1] Robinson and Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, II, 130.

inestimable benefits on his country. The tale with which his memory would be associated was the most extraordinary, the most romantic, in the annals of the world. A people who had seemed dead had arisen to new and vigorous life, breaking the spell which bound it, and showing itself worthy of a new and splendid destiny." [1]

Throughout his life Cavour remained faithful to his fundamental political principle, government by parliament and by constitutional forms. Urged at various times to assume a dictatorship he said he had no confidence in dictatorships. "I always feel strongest," he said, "when Parliament is sitting." "I cannot betray my origin, deny the principles of all my life," he wrote in a private letter not intended for the public. "I am the son of liberty and to her I owe all that I am. If a veil is to be placed on her statue, it is not for me to do it."

[1] Quoted by Cesaresco: *Cavour,* 216.

CHAPTER XII

BISMARCK AND GERMAN UNITY

In 1848 and 1849 the reformers of Germany, as of other countries, had made a vigorous effort to effect profound alterations in the political and social institutions of their country. Momentarily successful, their day of power proved brief, and by 1850 the old authorities were once more solidly established in their old positions. A practical absolutism reigned again throughout most of central Europe. In place of the German unity so long desired and for which the Frankfort Parliament had struggled with such earnest futility, the old Diet of 1815, slow, cumbrous, impotent save for repression, quietly slipped back into the familiar, well-worn grooves, resuming its sessions in May 1851, and devoting its attention to the removal of the débris left by the revolutionary hurricane which had just swept by. A period of reaction began again, even more far-reaching in its scope than that which had followed the Congress of Vienna of 1815. This period may be considered to have lasted from the diplomatic defeat of Prussia at Olmütz in 1850 to 1858, when William I assumed the regency of Prussia, and to 1859 when Austria, now as formerly the strong tower of ultra-conservatism, suffered an important diminution of power and prestige in the military defeats in Italy which have been described above.

During this period the work of 1848 and 1849 was undone wherever possible, and a persecution of Liberals carried out so thoroughly that tens of thousands left the country. This inspired some alarm at first, but consolation was found in the thought that the removal of these disturbers of the public mind would only leave the fatherland politically in peace. This was the beginning of the large German emigration to the United States, which later attained such impressive proportions and was attended by such important consequences. Austria and Prussia took the lead in the familiar work of repression.

The King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, had, as we have seen, granted a Constitution and created a Parliament during the recent convulsion, but it quickly became evident that he had

no intention of establishing the parliamentary system as it had been developed in England. He did not for a moment propose to weaken the royal power by dividing it with any assembly, even with one which, like this, represented only the rich. No new taxes or laws might be passed without the consent of the new chamber, but old ones might be continued without that consent. The Chamber had no control whatever over the ministry. With machinery like this Parliament could not have prevented reaction even had it so desired; but constituted as it was, it became itself one of the instruments of reaction.

That reaction began at once. The King was urged to abolish the Constitution outright, but this, mindful of his oath, he never did. However, a method of "interpreting" it virtually achieved the same end. The ministers gained great skill in the art of ruling with the Constitution against the Constitution. Laws which they disapproved were simply not executed or their contents were by "interpretation" molded to the heart's desire. The Constitution had proclaimed the right of association and public meeting, but as a matter of fact this right was permitted only to those favorable to the Government. Public meetings were watched by agents of the Government, who, on the least pretext, might dissolve them. Everywhere the police were active and unscrupulous. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment were frequent. A Berlin police regulation in 1851 permitted the application to prisoners of torture, deprivation of light, the straitjacket, and corporal punishment up to forty strokes. Men who were supposed to be democrats were hounded in every way. "No lawyer would give me work," wrote one of them; "no business man had the courage to seek the aid of my legal knowledge; no editor would consent to publish a book of mine." With great difficulty he succeeded in bringing out three novels. At once the Government forbade their introduction into public libraries, forbade their sale. Certain physicians were denied the certificates necessary to the practice of their profession because, as democrats, their "morality" could not be guaranteed. Abuses of power succeeded each other rapidly. "God in Heaven," wrote Bunsen, "what a frightful situation for Germany!" The mails were not respected. Postmen were ordered not to deliver letters to Liberals. Even reactionaries themselves felt the pinch at times. "I cannot write you much about politics," Bismarck informed his wife, "for all letters are opened." And again, "Do not forget, when you write me, that your letters are not read simply by myself but are also read

at the post office, by spies of every feather; be, without exception, prudent in your remarks."

The censorship abolished by the Constitution was not restored, but the same end was otherwise achieved. Methods were followed in this respect, as in many others, which were copied from Napoleon III, who was applying them successfully in France. Much ingenious reasoning was displayed at times by government officials. In one case the police announced that the law permitted the publication of newspapers but not their sale, and thus one Liberal paper was suppressed. By such means virtual absolutism was restored in Prussia after the liberal awakening of 1848 and 1849. No relief was found in the Chamber, for the Government secured large and dependent majorities there, by the same methods which Napoleon III used in France, by official candidacies and by various forms of bribery and intimidation. The system was thoroughly established. Prussia, with a Constitution, was really ruled with very little regard for its provisions.

The governing forces were the King and the landed nobility. These were the "Junkers," whom Bismarck later called the "pariahs of modern civilization," hide-bound conservatives, completely dominated by the ideas of old-time feudalism. The House of Lords was now one of their seats of power. Its members, indignant at the former freeing of their serfs, labored with much success to regain old rights, such as the police power on their estates, and hunting privileges. They had a monopoly of the higher grades in the army. All these measures irritated various classes of society and unrest, not peace, was the ominous result. No wonder that Bernhardi exclaimed, "The Constitution is nothing but a name," and that another who lived through it all wrote a little later, "The period from 1849 to 1858 was the most shameful in the history of Prussia."

But signs were not lacking of the dawning of a new day. The economic evolution of the country was proceeding on the whole unimpeded and quietly, and that evolution tended directly toward liberty, for it meant the transformation of Germany from an agricultural, feudal, and patriarchal into a great industrial nation. Even the Government itself facilitated this transformation which was in the end to be so prejudicial to its system, imitating in this, as in so many other respects, the example of Napoleon III, who thought that the best way to make people forget their loss of liberty was to enable them to get rich. But in the main this transformation was effected, not by governmental

measures, but by the unseen, unconscious operation of the ordinary laws of business.

This economic transformation is the most important feature of German history in the decade from 1850 to 1860, for it began the creation of that industrial Germany which was to be so tremendous a fact in the contemporary world. This transformation was apparent in many ways. Rich deposits of gold had been discovered in California, in 1848, and in Australia in 1851. It has been estimated that the world's production of the precious metal was about four times as great in 1856 as in 1847. The increase in the quantity of the medium of exchange had, among other important results for Germany this, the sudden creation of a large number of banks and business corporations. In Bavaria, for instance, only six stock companies with a capital of five millions had been founded between 1839 and 1848; but from 1849 to 1858 forty-four were established with a capital of one hundred and seventy millions. The capital of the banks created in Germany from 1853 to 1857 aggregated about 750 millions. All this meant an immense increase in the resources available for industry.

Germany had for various reasons remained industrially far behind neighboring countries, particularly France and England. Her population was largely rural, two-thirds of her inhabitants were agriculturalists. Whatever industries existed were small. There were few large cities. Berlin, the capital of Prussia, had a population of about 450,000, and in the entire Confederation there were only six or seven cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Both exports and imports were few. Germany sold little but raw materials. All this was now rapidly changed. Capital being easily procured, hundreds of new enterprises were started. Particularly was the exploitation of the immense mineral resources of the country, thus far largely neglected, undertaken with great energy. Coal mines were opened up, factories and foundries arose on all sides. Alfred Krupp made the steel foundry, begun by his father in 1810, one of the most famous establishments of the kind in the world. Workmen, attracted by higher wages than could be procured in agriculture, flocked to the cities, which increased rapidly. Economists state that the period of speculation succeeding the revolution of 1848 was the most remarkable Germany has ever seen. The Germans took naturally to modern business, showing their usual qualities of patience, order, adaptability, and an abounding faith in the advantages to be derived from the application to economic life

of the discoveries of science and from the use of scientific methods. The mileage of railroads rapidly increased, in Prussia alone in a few years from 114 miles to over 800, and the number of travelers increased fourfold.

All this had important political and intellectual consequences. It meant the rise of a modern capitalist class, a rich bourgeoisie, which would insist and which would have the power to insist that the state should no longer be run along medieval lines for the benefit of a feudal monarchy, and a feudal nobility of landlords. And the result of this economic revolution was to broaden men's horizon, and to weaken the local states-rights feeling. Manufacturers and merchants were anxious for the widest markets, and impatient of laws and institutions that hindered business. They saw the inconveniences that flowed from the existing political organization of Germany, the petty state animosities and the powerlessness of the Confederation abroad. They wished a reorganization of the country so that Germany should have the weight in international affairs that was necessary for the development of her wealth. That they might compete in the world markets they must have the support of the Government. The Government of the Confederation was impotent. This growing class therefore would hail with enthusiasm any attempt to strengthen it. Thus business was undermining the established order in politics. The requirements of modern industrialism were potent factors in the ultimate creation of German unity.

At the same time a similar trend was unmistakable in the intellectual evolution of Germany, and was shown in the various fields of theology, science, history and literature. From the romantic, the metaphysical, the speculative people they had been, Germans were becoming practical, positive, realist. The boldest innovations in the economic life were matched by the boldest discoveries in science. A new heaven and a new earth were taking the place of the old. The German intellect was showing its enterprise, its daring in every line, and was heaping up great riches. An intellectual environment was being created in which the great realist of the century in Germany could breathe and work successfully. It would be difficult to show all this except at length, and this would be impossible in the present treatise. But the fact remains that Schopenhauer in philosophy, and Helmholtz and Virchow in science, were laying intellectual foundations for the unification of Germany and the hegemony of Prussia.[1] The historians of the period, Sybel, Treitschke,

[1] Denis, *La Fondation de l'Empire Allemand,* Chap. III.

Droysen, Freytag, produced histories in abundance which were really great patriotic pamphlets, therefore less valuable as histories than as organs for shaping public opinion toward great and decisive action in the field of politics. They were vigorously patriotic, nationalistic in tone, Prussian in sympathy. Even Mommsen and Curtius, who wrote in the field of ancient history, distinctly revealed the current preconceptions and aspirations of the day.[1]

Opinion in Germany was greatly stimulated by the events in Italy. The Italian war of 1859, and the formation of the Italian Kingdom exerted a remarkable influence upon events outside of the peninsula. Here was a successful application of the doctrine of nationalities. Might not the precedent receive wider application? Poland, Denmark, Germany felt a powerful impulsion from beyond the Alps. This influence was shown in the very month of Villafranca. For July 1859 saw the genesis in Hanover of a new patriotic society, called the National Union, whose purpose was to create a national party for the purpose of "achieving the unity of the fatherland and the development of its liberties." The society soon spread throughout Germany. Unity and liberty were its watchwords. Did not the Italian campaign prove the necessity of the former? If Napoleon III could invade Italy, might he not with equal ease invade Germany? There must be a thorough military reorganization so that Germany should be safe from possible aggression, and to accomplish this the Confederation, as a whole, must first be reorganized. Cavour was, in the opinion of the members of the National Union, the model whom German statesmen should imitate. Prussia ought to do for Germany what Piedmont had done for Italy. Let her become frankly liberal, then Liberals everywhere would support her, and she could make the fatherland. This was not the method followed, as we shall see. Germany was made by an autocratic not by a liberal government. And the reason was that the conservative class was stronger in Germany than in Italy, and happened to find two able leaders, William I and Bismarck, as the Liberals in Italy had found two of their kind, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. Though the National Liberals in Germany influenced public opinion extensively and thus facilitated in the end the rise of German unity, they clashed with those who actually carried out the work, and were themselves defeated. The achievement of German unity was to be no imitation of an Italian example.

[1] Guilland, *L'Allemagne Nouvelle et Ses Historiens.*

The full import of all these changes in the economic life and in the intellectual outlook, this fermentation of ideas, was shortly to be shown in the reign, destined to prove most illustrious, of William I of Prussia. The preliminary stage was over, the period of action was about to begin.

In 1857, Frederick William IV became, by reason of mental disease, incapable of administering the Government. As the King had no son, his brother, William I, became his representative. The following year William became Regent, which gave him complete independence of action. It was recognized that the King would never recover. He died in January 1861, and William became sovereign. The accession of the new prince was hailed with great enthusiasm, so deep and general had been the disappointment in Prussia over the timidity, the reactionary character, and the fruitlessness of his predecessor's rule. The new ruler was intellectually the very antipodes of his brother, slow, solid, persistent, firm, rather than brilliant and imaginative. Common sense was his strongest quality as versatility had been that of his brother. William was the son of the famous Queen Louise, was born in 1797, and had served in the campaign against Napoleon in 1814. He was now over sixty years of age. His entire lifetime had been spent in the army, which he loved passionately. In military matters his thorough knowledge and competence were recognized. He had resented deeply the action of his brother at Olmütz, action dictated by the military weakness of Prussia. William believed that Prussia's destiny depended upon her army. The army was necessary for his purpose, which was to put Prussia at the head of Germany. "Now," he had written in 1849, "whoever wishes to rule Germany must conquer it; and that cannot be done with phrases." The mobilization of the Prussian troops in 1859 convinced him more than ever that the army needed strengthening. He now brought forward a definite military programme.

Prussia had been the first state, and was thus far the only one, to adopt the principle that all male citizens must be soldiers. By the law of 1814 universal compulsory three years' service in the active army was established. The soldier then passed into the reserve for two years, which meant that he would be summoned to military exercise for several weeks each year; he then passed into the *landwehr* for several years (from the ages of twenty-six to thirty-nine), receiving some little training intermittently. Then he passed into the *landsturm*, where he re-

mained until the age of fifty, to be called out only in the case of direst necessity. This system had been in existence for forty-six years, with only slight modification. But the system had not, in practice, been thoroughly carried out. No account had been taken of the increase of population. In 1820 the population of Prussia was about 12,000,000. The number of yearly recruits had been fixed at 40,000 and regiments for that number had been established. But in 1860 the population was about 18,000,000, and if all able-bodied men of military age were recruited, as by law they should be, there would be 63,000. As a matter of fact, however, the number of recruits had been kept at 40,000, which meant that many thousand young men, by law required to serve three years under the colors, had been excused in practice from service, and that others had been required to serve only two years. This kept the army down to about 130,000 active soldiers on a peace footing, 215,000 in time of war.

William I believed such a condition full of danger for Prussia. Considering himself primarily a soldier, the first soldier of Prussia, and responsible for her defense, he resolved to carry through certain reforms. In 1859 he appointed Albrecht von Roon Minister of War, in politics a convinced reactionary, in military matters a man of great knowledge and ability. In 1860 a plan for the reform of the army was submitted to the Prussian Parliament. Henceforth the law requiring universal military service was to be rigorously enforced.

This would mean 63,000 recruits each year instead of 40,000, and would give an army of 190,000 in time of peace, 450,000 in time of war, the service in the reserve being lengthened from two to four years. Thus the military forces of Prussia would be doubled. To do this necessitated the creation of new regiments with their officers and colors. This would involve an increase in the budget, which could only be sanctioned by Parliament. But the Chamber of Deputies was from the beginning opposed to this change, though it voted appropriations once on the understanding that they were provisional only. The Government acted as if they were permanent. In 1862 the Chamber refused the moneys entirely. This meant that the new regiments must be disbanded, their officers dismissed, that what had been done must be undone, that the royal plan of army reform must be abandoned, although it had been put into force at least provisionally, that the Government must, in a most conspicuous matter, retrace its steps. Over this question a bitter and prolonged controversy arose between the Crown and the Chamber of

Deputies, each side growing stiffer as the contest proceeded. The King was absolutely resolved not to abate one jot from his demands. He believed that the organization of the army, and the system of national defense belonged exclusively to himself, as they had undoubtedly to previous Prussian kings; that the fact that in 1850 a Constitution had come into existence creating a Parliament in no respect altered the situation; that indeed the right had been expressly confirmed by that Constitution; that Parliament was in duty bound to vote all appropriations necessary for him to discharge his duties as supreme executive and commander-in-chief. Parliament, on the other hand, held that by the Constitution all grants must be voted by it, that if it were bound to vote them on the mere demand of the King its discretion and power would simply disappear entirely. Parliament must, in the interests of the people, insist upon the preservation intact of its delegated powers, and the control of the purse was the chief of these. A deadlock ensued. The King was urged to abolish Parliament altogether. This he would not do because he had sworn to support the Constitution which established it. He thought of abdicating. He never thought of abandoning the reform. He had written out his abdication and signed it, and it was lying upon his desk when he at last consented to call to the ministry as a final experiment a new man, known for his boldness, his independence, his devotion to the monarchy, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck was appointed President of the Ministry September 23, 1862: on that very day the Chamber rejected anew the credits asked for by the King for the new regiments. The conflict entered upon its most acute phrase and a new era began for Prussia and for the world.

In this interview Bismarck told the King frankly that he was willing to carry out his policy whether the Parliament agreed to it or not. "I will rather perish with the King," he said, "than forsake your Majesty in the contest with parliamentary government." His boldness determined the King to tear up the paper containing his abdication and to continue the struggle with the Chamber of Deputies.

The man who now entered upon the stage of European politics was one of the most original and salient characters of his century. Born in 1815, he came of a noble family in Brandenburg, and as a young man seemed completely imbued with all the narrowness of his order, its vigorous insistence upon the preservation of existing institutions, its tenacious adherence to forms of belief that had long been undermined in Europe. Re-

ceiving a university education, he entered the civil service of Prussia only shortly to turn from its monotonous routine with invincible disgust. He then settled upon his father's estate as a country squire. For years he gave himself up to the problem of retrieving the family fortune, and with ultimate success. In 1847 he emerged from his country life and began his political career as a member of the United Diet. He now had an opportunity to expound his political views, which he did with emphasis. No compromise with the Revolution was his watchword. More royalist than the King he resented the King's act of granting a Constitution to Prussia but, once granted, he would abide by it. But he had no notion that the Constitution should transform Prussia into a state like England, the model which Liberals were constantly urging other people to follow. "The references to England are our misfortune," he said. If Prussians were only Englishmen, and possessed all the institutions and qualities of Englishmen, then "you might govern us in the English fashion." Bismarck's political ideas centered in his ardent belief in the Prussian monarchy. It had been the Prussian kings, not the Prussian people, who had made Prussia great. This, the great historic fact, must be preserved. What Prussian kings had done, they still would do. The reduction of royal power would only be damaging to the state. "The Prussian Crown must not allow itself," he said, "to be thrust into the powerless position of the English Crown, which seems more like a smartly decorative cupola on the state edifice, than its central pillar of support, as I consider ours." When the democrats declared that England had been made great by democracy he flatly contradicted them. England had grown great under an aristocratic constitution. "It remains to be seen whether this reformed constitution (1832) will maintain itself for centuries as did the earlier rule of the English aristocracy." He defended vehemently the Prussian nobility, a class at that time bitterly attacked. By them, and by their blood, the Prussian state had been built up. Bismarck was the uncompromising foe of the attempts made in 1848 to achieve German unity, because he believed those attempts involved a diminution in the importance of Prussia, and he was above all a Prussian. "The Frankfort crown may be very brilliant," he said, "but the gold which would give truth to its brilliancy can only be gained by melting down the Prussian crown," something he could not contemplate without horror. "The scheme for a union annihilates the integrity of the Prussian kingdom . . . Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain." His attitude

toward the assembly, of which he was a member, is shown by the words, "I know that what I have said to you will have no influence on your votes, but I am equally convinced that your votes will be as completely without influence on the course of events." No European state had suffered a more complete humiliation than Prussia at Olmütz, yet Bismarck vigorously defended the action of the Government. "Prussia ought to unite with Austria in order to crush the common enemy, the Revolution." "I regard Austria as the representative and inheritor of an ancient German power which has often gloriously wielded the German sword." The reason for this defense of Olmütz is highly significant. "The only sound principle of action for a great state is political egoism, and not romanticism, and it is unworthy of such a state to strive for anything which does not directly concern it."[1] A war with Austria in 1850 would have meant the ruin of Prussia. Therefore egoism, the sole legitimate motive force in politics, justified the convention of Olmütz. "According to my conviction," he said in a speech which he incorporated in part more than forty years later in his *Reminiscences*, "Prussian honor does not consist in Prussia's playing the Don Quixote all over Germany for the benefit of mortified parliament celebrities who consider their local constitution in danger. I look for Prussian honor in Prussia's abstinence before all things from every shameful union with democracy; in Prussia's refusal to allow, in the present and all other questions, anything to happen in Germany without her consent; and in the joint execution by the two protecting powers of Germany, with equal authority, of whatsoever they, Prussia and Austria, after joint independent deliberation, consider reasonable and politically justifiable."

By such utterances, poorly delivered, for he was no orator, Bismarck made himself immensely disliked by all Liberals. On the other hand, such downright and uncompromising flouting of all the popular phrases of the day, such unqualified and defiant adherence to monarchy and aristocracy commended him to the King, who appointed him, in 1851, Prussian delegate to the Diet at Frankfort. Bismarck's career now broadened, and during the next eight years he studied and practised the art of diplomacy, in which he was later to win many sweeping vic-

[1] Bismarck's political principles may be best studied in the speeches which he delivered during the years 1847–1851, and which may be found in Kohl, *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck*, Vol. I. Particularly interesting are the speeches of September 24, 1849, and December 3, 1850.

tories. He made the acquaintance of all the important statesmen and politicians of Germany and studied their characters and ambitions.

He had not been long in Frankfort before his views in regard to Austria changed. He came to regard her as the constant and determined enemy of Prussia, and to believe that her policy was to reduce Prussia to the position of a mere satellite, and Bismarck had no notion that a nation of 17,000,000 should occupy that position. At once this jingo Prussian bent all his energies to convince his superiors in Berlin of this fact. He soon saw that, though bound together in the same federation, the harmony of the two great German powers had been destroyed by the events of 1848. As early as 1853 he said in a report to Berlin that there was not room in Germany for the two powers — that one or the other must bend. Three years later he expressed his opinion even more clearly, "I only desire to express my conviction that ere long we shall have to fight Austria for our very existence; it is not in our power to avert that eventuality, for the course of events in Germany can lead to no other result."[1] In 1859, as he was leaving the Diet for the mission to St. Petersburg, he summed up the situation, "I see in our federal alliance that Prussia has an infirmity which sooner or later we shall have to heal *ferro et igni*, unless we begin in good time to seek a remedy for it." "Bismarck," wrote the Austrian delegate at the Diet, "believes that Prussia forms the center of the world." He did so regard it, and his activity largely made it so for others.

Such was the man, who in 1862 at the age of forty-seven, accepted the position of President of the Prussian Ministry at a time when King and Parliament confronted each other in angry deadlock, and when no other politician would accept the leadership. For four years, from 1862 to 1866, the conflict continued. The Constitution was not abolished, Parliament was called repeatedly, the Lower House voted year after year against the budget, supported in this by the voters, the Upper House voted for it, and the King acted as if this made it legal. The period was one of virtual dictatorship and real suspension of parliamentary life. The King continued to collect the taxes, the army was thoroughly reorganized and absolutely controlled by the authorities, and the Lower House had no mode of opposition save the verbal one, which was entirely ineffective.

Thus the increase in the army was secured. But an army is a mere means to an end. The particular end that Bismarck had

[1] Quoted by Murdock, *The Reconstruction of Europe*, 190.

in view was the creation of German unity by means of Prussia and for the advantage of Prussia. There must be no absorption of Prussia in Germany, as there had been of Piedmont in Italy, Piedmont as a separate state entirely disappearing. And in Bismarck's opinion this unity could only be achieved by war.

He boldly denied in Parliament the favorite theory of the Liberals, that Prussia was to be made great by a liberal, free, parliamentary government, by setting an example of progressiveness, as Piedmont had done, which would rally Germans in other states about her, rather than about their own governments. In what was destined to be the most famous speech of his life he declared in 1863 that what Germans cared about was not the liberalism of Prussia but her power. Prussia must concentrate her forces and hold herself ready for the favorable moment. The boundaries of the kingdom, as determined by the Congress of Vienna, were not favorable to a sound political life. "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided — that was the great blunder of 1848 and 1849 — but by blood and iron."

This "blood and iron" policy was bitterly denounced by Liberals, but Bismarck ignored their criticisms and shortly found a chance to begin its application. Displaying remarkable diplomatic astuteness and subtlety, unfolding surprising resourcefulness in using the exceedingly complicated international relations of his day in such a way as to further his Prussian and German plans, he proceeded to reshape Europe in most important particulars. He was favored in this by the jealousies of the powers and the general incompetence of their ministers. It was fortunate for Prussia that at a time when it was directed by one of the geniuses of the century, other countries were directed by mediocrities. His own ability, great as it was, would not alone have sufficed to accomplish the work of the next few years.

The German Empire is the result of the policy of blood and iron as carried out by Prussia in three wars which were crowded into the brief period of six years, the war with Denmark in 1864, with Austria in 1866, and with France in 1870, the last two of which were largely the result of Bismarck's will and diplomatic ingenuity and unscrupulousness, and the first of which he exploited consummately for the advantage of Prussia.

The first of these grew out of one of the most complicated questions that have ever perplexed diplomatists and statesmen, the future of Schleswig and Holstein. These were two duchies in the Danish peninsula, which is itself simply an extension of

the great plain of northern Germany. Holstein was inhabited by a population of about 600,000, entirely German; Schleswig by a population of from 250,000 to 300,000 Germans and 150,000 Danes. These two duchies had for centuries been united with Denmark, but they did not form an integral part of the Danish kingdom. Their relation to Denmark was personal, arising from the fact that a Duke of Schleswig and Holstein had become King of Denmark, just as an Elector of Hanover had become a King of England. The King of Denmark was, in the duchies, simply duke. The Danes naturally wished to make this union a real one, to incorporate entirely the duchies with the kingdom. But there were plain obstacles in the way. Holstein (not Schleswig) was a part of the German Confederation; the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein was represented in the Diet of Frankfort, as were the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria. Now the Germans in Schleswig wished to have that duchy also a part of the German Confederation, and were warmly supported in this desire by the public opinion of Germans everywhere. On the other hand, the Danes of Schleswig wished to have the duchy annexed to Denmark, and were naturally supported in this by the Danes of that kingdom.

The question had long been before Europe, but in 1863 it became acute, when on November 13, 1863, the Danish Parliament adopted a new Constitution, which incorporated Schleswig with Denmark. Two days later the King, Frederick VII, died, but his successor, Christian IX, signed the Constitution. What would Germany do? Would it allow Germans to be annexed to a foreign country outright? The Diet at once protested, and ordered an army sent into the duchies to prevent this consummation, and in doing this it had the enthusiastic support of public opinion throughout Germany. Bismarck, however, declined to join in this policy. He saw in the situation a chance for the eventual aggrandizement of Prussia, and for a possible future quarrel with Austria. He, therefore, wished Prussia to follow an independent line. He urged Austria to join with Prussia in upholding the London Protocol of 1852, which both powers had signed, as had the other powers of Europe, a treaty which regulated the succession to the duchies, under certain conditions, the main condition being that Christian might be King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig, but that the duchy should preserve its separateness from Denmark. Bismarck's position was that Austria and Prussia had a right to demand the observance of the treaty which they had signed, and that

they would support Christian if he would live up to the conditions. He induced Austria to join him in supporting this Treaty of London, claiming that they were simply upholding the sacredness of international agreements. The two powers proclaimed their intention to adhere to that treaty, but demanded that the Danes withdraw the recent Constitution, which they declared was in defiance of it. The duplicity of Bismarck's policy lay in the fact that he had assured himself that the Danes would not make this concession, which, moreover, he did not wish them to make, as his whole purpose was to pick a quarrel from which Prussia might profit. To make assurance doubly sure, the ultimatum presented to Denmark demanded the withdrawal within forty-eight hours of the Constitution incorporating Schleswig. This, as a matter of fact, was impossible, even if the Danes had unanimously desired it. The King could not do this of his own prerogative: he must have the assent of his Parliament. His Parliament had been dissolved and a new one had not been elected. Naturally, this could not be done in two days. At the expiration of that time Prussia and Austria declared war against Denmark in the name of the Treaty of London of 1852. But Bismarck knew that a war between two countries abrogates existing treaties between them, a fact which he was prepared to utilize to Prussia's advantage in time. In the name of the Treaty of 1852 he made war against Denmark for the real purpose of breaking that very treaty.

A war between one small state and two large ones could not be doubtful. Sixty thousand Prussians and Austrians invaded Denmark in February 1864, and, though their campaign was not brilliant, they easily won. The only danger was in a European intervention. A conference was held in London for the purpose of arranging a settlement by diplomacy. But nothing was accomplished. Russia was grateful for Prussian aid in the recent Polish insurrection; France and England were full of reproaches for each other. In such troubled waters Bismarck could fish successfully. He was able to block the proposed intervention. The war was successful for Prussia and Austria, and Denmark on October 30, 1864, signed the Treaty of Vienna, whereby she renounced all rights to Schleswig, Holstein, and the little duchy of Lauenburg, contiguous to the latter, in favor of Austria and Prussia, and agreed to recognize any disposition they should make concerning them. Bismarck later regarded his handling of the Schleswig-Holstein matter as the diplomatic masterpiece of his career.

The question now was what should be the future of the duchies? Their inhabitants wished to form a separate state under the Duke of Augustenburg and be admitted as such to the German Confederation. The people of Germany were overwhelmingly in favor of this arrangement, and Austria favored it. But Bismarck's ideas were very different. He did not care for another German state. There were too many already, and this one would only be another enemy of Prussia and ally of Austria. Moreover, Bismarck wished to annex the duchies wholly or in part to Prussia. He desired aggrandizement in general, but this particular addition would be especially advantageous, as it would lengthen the coast line of Prussia, would bring with it several good harbors, notably Kiel, and would enable Prussia to expand commercially. Thus the two powers were at variance over the disposition of their spoils. Bismarck, recognizing the impossibility of gaining his end directly, agreed to recognize the rights of Augustenburg on certain conditions, which he knew Augustenburg would never accept. Prussia and Austria thus differed from the outset as to the future of Schleswig and Holstein. Sources of friction were so numerous, tension became so great, that war between them seemed imminent in 1865. But Austria did not feel in condition for war, and, though Bismarck favored it, the King of Prussia opposed it. He was not yet prepared for a fratricidal contest which did violence to his patriotic and national feelings. Consequently, the Convention of Gastein was made by the two parties August 14, 1865. Joint rule was given up in practice, though not in principle. The duchies belonged to the two powers, but henceforth Austria alone should administer Holstein and Prussia Schleswig. Lauenburg was sold outright to Prussia by Austria for two and a half million thalers. This was the first of Prussian annexations. The treaty also signified a virtual abandonment of the Duke of Augustenburg.

Bismarck approved the Treaty of Gastein, because, in his opinion, it ended nothing. He called it a mere "stopping of cracks." He regarded it simply as a new trick in the game with Austria. That the Convention was universally denounced abroad and in Germany as merely cold-blooded bargaining was a matter of indifference to him. Out of the situation which it created he hoped to bring about the war with Austria, which he had desired for the past ten years as being the only means whereby German unity could be achieved by Prussia and for its advantage. In this he was successful within a year. There was not room

in Germany, he thought, for both powers, "one or the other must bend." He now directed his attention to the creation of an international situation which would leave Austria isolated in the event of a conflict. He turned to diplomacy, and the result was an interview with Napoleon III, and an alliance with Italy. The attitude of France he regarded as most important. Consequently, he took occasion to seek a conference with Napoleon III at Biarritz. The meeting at Biarritz (October 1865) has been considered, though incorrectly, to have had somewhat the same importance in German history that that of Plombières has in Italian. What passed we know only imperfectly. No formal, written engagements were made. Bismarck returned with the conviction that Napoleon would remain neutral in case of a war between Prussia and Austria, that the annexation of Schleswig and Holstein would call forth no opposition from him, that he would even view it with approval as being in harmony with his favorite doctrine of nationalities. Bismarck told the Emperor that the constitution of the German Confederation ought to be completely reformed. Napoleon seems to have entered no protest. Bismarck, holding that statesmanship is simply enlightened egoism, believed that in return for permission to make these changes France must be paid. Consequently, he dangled before the Emperor chances of enlarging the boundaries of France, but all this was very vague, though quite friendly, and resulted in no precise agreements.

Bismarck sought a treaty of alliance with Italy for the coming encounter. Italy coveted Venetia, and in April 1866, after much diplomatic manœuvering, arising from the fact that neither power had confidence in the honesty of the other, a treaty was made and signed on April 8, 1866. It was to the effect that if Prussia should within three months go to war with Austria for the sake of reforms in the German Confederation, Italy should also declare war against Austria; that neither would make a separate peace; that, if the allies were successful, Italy should receive Venetia from Austria and Prussia an equivalent amount of Austrian territory.

From the moment this treaty was signed Bismarck devoted all his efforts to bringing about the war with Austria within the three months. It was not difficult to find pretexts. The Treaty of Gastein proved a most convenient aid. Prussia protested vigorously against Austria's method of administering Holstein. Austria resented the criticism an an impertinent interference in her own affairs. Relations between the two powers

thus became strained to the breaking point, and both began to arm. Still some weeks went by before hostilities commenced.

Bismarck's ultimate purpose in all his actions was the acquisition of the leadership in Germany for Prussia away from Austria. He was preparing a German civil war for that end; but he wished to give it a broader basis than a mere sordid quarrel about the northern duchies, in which no idea was apparent save self-aggrandizement. He now sought to give a new turn and a more important character to this rivalry of Austria and Prussia. He preferred to appear to be fighting for the reform of the German Confederation rather than for the duchies. On April 9th, the very day after the signature of the treaty with Italy, and in consonance with one of its provisions, that very one, indeed, on which the whole treaty rested, he caused the Prussian plan for the reform of the Confederation to be introduced into the Diet at Frankfort. The plan was entirely unexpected. It was vague in all that concerned the relations of the princes to each other, but definite in that it proposed that in addition to the Diet there should be chosen by universal suffrage a popular chamber to share in the management of common affairs. The amazement of German Liberals was unbounded. Here was the man who had spent his life deriding and defying parliaments and ridiculing democracy now adopting its extreme demand — universal suffrage. The Liberals thought this a mere trick and did not take the proposal seriously. This was a turning point in Bismarck's career. He was now presenting a scheme for the reorganization of Germany, and he saw that if Prussia was to gain the leadership she must make some sacrifices to the feelings of the other states. They would not willingly accept the leadership of an autocratic, parliament-defying Prussia. By conceding universal suffrage, liberal opinion, hitherto hostile to Prussia, might be won. The full effect of this proposal was not seen until later. Prussia's power was not immediately increased, owing to the distrust which Bismarck's career inspired in the minds of Liberals. It seems likely that Bismarck did not now fear universal suffrage, as he had seen how favorably it had worked in France for a despotic Emperor.

Even after this there was delay. Bismarck was still waiting for the provocation to come from Austria. He wished to throw upon her the odium of beginning the civil war which he was doing everything in his power to render inevitable. At last the moment came. On June 1, 1866, Austria brought the Schleswig-Holstein question before the Diet. At once Bismarck declared that this

was a breach of the Treaty of Gastein. That agreement was, therefore, void and Prussian troops were sent into Holstein, Austria's jurisdiction. Austria on June 11 moved in the Diet that the Federal forces be sent against Prussia. Prussia announced to the other states that every vote in favor of this motion would be regarded as a declaration of war. On June 14 the vote was taken and the motion carried. Pronouncing this levying of war by the Confederation against one of its members illegal, Prussia declared the Confederation dissolved, again brought forward her reform plans, and prepared for immediate action.

Thus the German civil war began. Bismarck had brought about his dream of a conflict between peoples of the same race to determine the question of control. It proved to be one of the shortest wars in history, one of the most decisive, and one whose consequences were most momentous. It is called the Seven Weeks' War. It began June 16, 1866, was virtually decided on July 3d, was brought to a close before the end of that month by the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg, July 26th, which was followed a month later by the definitive Peace of Prague, August 23. Prussia had no German allies of any importance. Several of the North German states sided with her, but these were small and their armies were unimportant. On the other hand, Austria was supported by the four kingdoms, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Hanover; also by Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and Baden. But Prussia had one important ally, Italy, without whose aid she might not have won the victory. The Prussian army, however, was better prepared. For years the rulers of Prussia had been preparing for war, perfecting the army down to the minutest detail, and with scientific thoroughness, and when the war began it was absolutely ready. Moreover, it was directed by the greatest military genius Europe had seen since Napoleon, General von Moltke. Moltke had studied profoundly Napoleon's methods. A thorough master of the principles of war, he was particularly remarkable as an organizer. He had carefully worked out the relation to war of the modern means of rapid communication, the railway and the telegraph. Devoting endless time and thought to elaborate, minute preparation, so that it happened that no army ever in history had been able to get under way with the quickness of the one he commanded, he also displayed audacity in action. He had, moreover, under him men similarly trained in theory, in the actual

handling of troops, and with similar qualities of intelligence, judgment, and daring.

On the other hand, the Austrian army had as commander Benedek, who said of himself that he could command a division, but felt unable to command an army, forced, however, by loyalty to the Emperor to accept a command which he had at first refused. His army also had no such perfection of organization as had that of Prussia. Moreover, Austria had two enemies to fight — one in front, Prussia; one in the rear, Italy, a condition always full of danger.

Prussia had many enemies. Being absolutely prepared, while her enemies were not, she could assume the offensive, and this was the cause of her first victories. War began June 16th. Within three days Prussian troops had occupied Hanover, Dresden, and Cassel, the capitals of her three North German enemies. The Hanoverian army defeated the Prussian at Langensalza June 27th, but was compelled to capitulate two days later, the Prussians having received large reinforcements. The King of Hanover and the Elector of Hesse were taken prisoners of war. All North Germany was now controlled by Prussia, and within two weeks of the opening of the war she was ready to attempt the great plan of Moltke, an invasion of Bohemia. The rapidity of the campaign struck Europe with amazement. Moltke sent three armies by different routes into Bohemia, and on July 3, 1866, one of the great battles of history, that of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, was fought. Each army numbered over 200,000, the Prussians outnumbering the Austrians, though not at the beginning. Since the battle of Leipsic in 1813, so many troops had not been engaged in a single conflict. King William, Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke took up their position on a hill, whence they could view the scene. The battle was long and doubtful. Beginning early in the morning, it continued for hours, fought with terrific fury, the Prussians making no advance against the Austrian artillery. Up to two o'clock it seemed an Austrian victory, but with the arrival of the Prussian Crown Prince with his army the issue was turned, and at half-past three the Austrians were beaten and their retreat began. They had lost over forty thousand men, while the Prussian loss was about ten thousand. The Prussian army during the next three weeks advanced to within sight of the spires of Vienna.

On June 24th the Austrians had been victorious over the Italians at Custozza. Yet the Italians had helped Prussia in

detaining 80,000 Austrian troops, which, had they been at Königgrätz, would probably have turned the day. The Italian fleet was also defeated by the Austrian at Lissa, July 20th.

Prussia still had enemies, the Confederate armies, and the troops of the South German states, notably Bavaria. But she made equally short work of these obstacles. The Bavarian army was defeated at Kissingen July 10th. Finally Frankfort, hitherto the seat of the German Confederation, was entered July 16th. The southern states sued for peace.

The causes of the overthrow of Austria were numerous. Some have already been indicated. The armies which Moltke commanded were among the best that had ever appeared upon the field of battle, and they were directed by a single master-mind which gave coherence and harmony to their movements. The Austrian army, on the other hand, was, in point of military instruction, inferior. Moreover, it was not pervaded by the same single, national enthusiasm. Austria was not a single people, but a collection of peoples, who were separated by jealousies and animosities, and the army exemplified these divisions. The Hungarians gave no enthusiastic support, for, since 1849, they had been alienated from the Empire which had taken away their Constitution. The Slavs were lukewarm, hating the Government of Vienna, which was largely German. The allies of Austria in Germany were poorly equipped, poorly commanded, and unable to co-operate heartily. Again, while the Austrian artillery and cavalry were superior to the Prussian, the infantry was equipped with a weapon far inferior. The "needle gun is king," said the London *Times* after the news of Königgrätz. This gun was superior to the Austrian in that, being more easily loaded, it could be discharged four or five times a minute, while the Austrian gun could be discharged only once. In almost all the encounters of the war the losses were proportionate to the rapidity of fire. Again, the tactics of the Austrians increased their losses immensely. They fought in serried ranks, while the Prussians, having learned that the progress in firearms rendered such methods very costly, fought in loose order, taking advantage of the inequalities of surface, and of the protection afforded by trees and thickets.

The results of the Seven Weeks' War were momentous. Fearing the intervention of Europe, and particularly that of France, which was threatened, and which might rob the victory of its fruits, Bismarck wished to make peace at once, and consequently offered very lenient terms to Austria. His moderation was

NORTH SEA
DENMARK
Seeland
Fünen
Laaland
Langeland
Copenhagen
Helgoland, 1890 German, 1891 Russ.
Schleswig-Holstein
Prov.
Kg'd'm of
Hanover
Grd Duchy of Oldenburg
KING. OF THE NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND)
Prov. of Westphalia
Prov. Rhenish
Jülich-Kleve
Prov. of Malmedy
Lower Rhine
Nassau
Grd Duchy of Hesse
Elect. of Hesse-Cassel
Prov. of Hesse
Princ. Lippe
Princ. Schwarzbg
Princ.
Thüringian States
Kg'd of Saxony
Kg'd of Bavaria
Grd Duchy of Baden
Rhine Palatinate
Alsace
Lorraine
Kg'd. of Württemberg
Hohenzollern
Grd Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin
Duchy of Neuenburg (Neufchâtel)
FRANCE
Switzerland
Kiel B
Lübeck
Hamburg
Bremen
Hanover
Brunswick
Magdeburg
Münster
Cologne
Frankfort
Darmstadt
Würzburg
Nuremberg
Ansbach
Bamberg
Augsburg
Munich
Landshut
Ratisbon
Stuttgart
Karlsruhe
Mannheim
Mainz
Wiesbaden
Coblenz
Aachen
Leipzig
Dresden
Eisenach
Weimar
Meiningen
Coburg
Schweinfurt
Hof
Eger
Chemnitz
Zwickau
Halle
Dessau
Wittenberg
Rostock
Wismar
Schwerin
Stralsund
Ferteberg
Hameln
Hildesheim
Göttingen
Cassel
Fulda
Marburg
Wetzlar
Nassau
Homburg
Kissingen
Würzburg
Ulm
Tübingen
Hohenzollern
Sigmaringen
Freiburg
Donaueschingen
Neuenburg
Bern
Basel
Zürich
Schaffhausen
Aarau
Lucerne
Danube
Rhine
Elbe
Weser
Ems
Main
Neckar
Moselle
Saale
Isar
Inn
Regen
Donau
6
8
10
12
54
52
50

Greenwich
16
18
20
0
62.5
125
English Miles
BALTIC SEA
Bornholm
Danish
Memel
Kurisches Haff
Russ.
Tilsit
Ragnit
Insterburg
Königsberg
Pillau
Hela
Frisches Haff
Prov. East Prussia
Prus. Eylau
Friedland
Danzig
Elbing
Marienburg
Mohrungen
Allenstein
Lyck
Lenk
Kolberg
Kammin
Prov. of Pomerania
Prov. West Prussia
Stargard
Arnswalde
Schneidemühl
Bromberg
Thorn
Graudenz
Soldau
Mlawa
Ostrolenka
Pultusk
Landsberg
Warthe
Küstrin
Meseritz
Grd Duchy (Prov.)
Gnesen
Posen
Wloclawsk
Plozk
Modlin
Praga
Warsaw
Posen
Warta
Bsura
Xions
Skerneviz
Polish Russia
Lissa
Kalish
Ostrowo
Petrikau
Pilica
Ivangorod
Sagan
Glogau
Prov. Lusatia
Trachenbg
Liegnitz
Wahlstatt
Breslau
Görlitz
Wrtha
Kamenna
Kielze
Schweidnitz
Brieg
Malapane
Vistula
Zillerthal
Reichenbg
Trautenau
Braunau
Neisse
Münchengrätz
Nachod
Glatz
Austrian Silesia
Hosela
Hoslowitz
Kiedanitz
Sadowa
Josefstadt
Königgrätz
Jägerndf
Ratibor
Cracow
Galicia
Holin
Aussig
Bandskron
Tropbau
Bohemia
Zwittau
Olmütz
Prerau
Kremsier
Moravia
Brünn
Iglau
Sazawa
March
Waag
Trentchin
Neusohl
Nikolsbg
Lower Austria
HUNGARY
Tyrnau
Neutra
Shemnitz
Krems
Vienna
Pressburg
Danube
St. Pölten
48
52
54
1824
1878
The Growth of PRUSSIA SINCE 1815.
Prussia, 1815
1815. Newly acquired Territory
Acquisitions until 1861
Acquisitions of William I. 1861-1888
Acquisitions of William II
Territories lost and not regained
Numbers give the year of acquisition, in brackets year of loss.
B.- from Bavaria
D.- from Grand Duchy of Hesse
K.- from Electorate of Hesse.

bitterly opposed by the military leaders of Prussia,[1] but finally won the day, and the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg were agreed to, July 26th. Austria was to cede Venetia to Italy, but was to lose no other territory. She was to pay a small indemnity and was to withdraw permanently from the German Confederation, which, indeed, was to cease to exist. She was to allow Prussia to organize and lead a new confederation, composed of those states which were north of the river Main. The South German states were left free to act as they chose. Thus Germany, north of the Main, was to be united.

Having accomplished this, Prussia proceeded to make important annexations to her own territory. The Kingdom of Hanover, the Duchies of Nassau and Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfort, as well as the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, were incorporated in the Prussian kingdom. Her population was thereby increased by over four and a half million new subjects, and thus was about twenty-four million. Her territory was increased by thirteen hundred square miles, almost a fourth of her former area. Her western and eastern provinces were thus finally united by the absorption of those states that lay between, and she now gained a cohesion she had always lacked. She henceforth controlled the northern coast of Germany, with brief gaps, from Russia to Holland. There was no thought of having the people of these states vote on the question of annexation, as had been done in Italy, and in Savoy and Nice. They were annexed forthwith by right of military conquest. Reigning houses ceased to rule on order from Berlin. With singular fatuity European nations allowed the swift consummation of these changes, which altered the balance of power and the map of Europe — a mistake that France in particular was to repent most bitterly. "I do not like this dethronement of dynasties," said the Tsar, but he failed to express his dislike in action.[2]

[1] This is explicitly asserted by Bismarck in one of the most dramatic sections of his *Reflections and Reminiscences* (II, 47–54). On the other hand the correctness of his assertion has been subjected to very damaging criticism by Professor Max Lenz. See Lenz, *Zur Kritik der Gedanken und Erinnerungen des Fürsten Bismarck,* 58–132.

[2] The Russian Government, declaring that, as the German Confederation had been founded in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna, to which all the powers were parties, it could not be abolished by Prussia alone, proposed a new international congress to settle the terms of peace. Against this proposal Bismarck assumed an attitude so highly belligerent, threatening war *à outrance,* that it was dropped.

Bismarck, now wishing the support of the Liberals in his future work, came before the Chamber of Deputies and asked and received an indemnity for having governed without a budget. Thus he recognized the rights of the Chamber under the Constitution. But this action was more formal than real. The Crown had won these amazing successes in the face of the bitter opposition of the Chamber, opposition to the reorganization of the army, to the war with Denmark, and to the war with Austria. The Crown had defeated Parliament morally, as well as practically. The confidence of the German people in parliamentary government was seriously undermined.

The German Confederation, established in 1815, disappeared forever in the cataclysm of 1866. The Diet of Frankfort was no more. Austria was excluded from Germany by the Treaty of Prague. There was now formed a new confederation, more limited geographically, but of far greater power than the old — a real federal state. This North German Confederation included all Germany north of the river Main, twenty-two states in all: i.e., two kingdoms, Prussia and Saxony; ten duchies, seven principalities, and the free cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen. Not included were Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and that part of Hesse-Darmstadt south of the boundary river.

The Constitution of this new state merits examination, as, with certain slight and formal changes, it was later to become the constitution of the German Empire. Bismarck was its author. After some amendments were made in it with Prussia's consent, it was accepted by the Governments of the several states, and was then submitted in 1867 to a National Assembly chosen by manhood suffrage for the purpose. Passed by this body with some slight alterations, it was finally ratified without further amendment by the legislatures of the several states.

The new federal organization was to consist of a President, the King of Prussia, of a Federal Council (Bundesrat), and a Parliament (Reichstag). The Federal Council was really the old Diet of Frankfort, preserved in the new scheme. It was to be composed of delegates sent by the sovereigns of the different states, to be recalled at their pleasure, bound by instructions given them by their princes. The voting power of the different states was fixed arbitrarily and not according to population, differing from the Senate of the United States in that the number of votes allotted the different states greatly varied. There were to be 43 votes in all. Of these Prussia was to have 17, Saxony 4, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick 2, each of the

others 1. In order to have a majority, Prussia would have to gain the support of five little principalities, which she could easily do. In regard to military organization, no change might be made in the laws without the consent of Prussia.

Associated with this Bundesrat, or Council of Princes, as it really was, was the Reichstag, or Parliament, composed of 297 members, elected by direct manhood suffrage and by secret ballot, for three years. Of the two bodies the Reichstag was much the less important, therein differing from the popularly elected chamber in other countries. The emphasis in this new organization of Germany was put upon the princes, the sovereigns, not upon the people. The people were given a place in the system, but a subordinate one. Bismarck always considered the Bundesrat the key to the Constitution. Large powers of legislation were given to the new government. All laws and all taxes must pass both chambers.

The new Constitution went into force July 1, 1867. "Let us work quickly," Bismarck said, while the Constitution was under discussion, "let us put Germany in the saddle; she will soon learn to ride," another Bismarckian prophecy destined to come true. Germany now entered upon a period of remarkable progress, which continued down to the outbreak of the World War. Legislative activity supplemented and clinched the triumphs of diplomacy and war. The old Confederation had failed in two particulars, said Bismarck in the Parliament of 1867: it had failed to insure the national safety, and it had failed to develop adequately the prosperity of the nation. These were not to be the failures of the new. Its military strength was amply assured. The armies of the different states were now all organized on the Prussian model, with the President of the Confederation as chief. He now commanded an army of 800,000 men. Moreover, Bismarck was able, by playing upon their fear of France, to induce the South German states to enter into a military alliance, offensive and defensive, with the North German Confederation. This increased the army to over a million. In a military sense Germany was unified.

Laws were rapidly passed aiming to increase the material well-being, to enlist firmly on the side of the new experiment the capitalist, industrial classes. The growth of the modern industrial system had been, as we have seen, one of the forces making for unity. It had greatly helped to create the situation in which Bismarck had been able to work so effectively. The

business world now demanded that the state reward it by the removal of many restrictions which had survived the Zollverein and which hampered economic activity. Certain laws which restricted the free movement of the people were repealed, passports being suppressed, the absolute, unqualified right of every citizen to reside anywhere in the Confederation guaranteed. This aided industries by providing them a free and mobile labor market. In place of the medley of weights and measures of the different states, which were a hindrance to commerce, a uniform plan was adopted, based upon the metric and decimal systems. A single monetary system was also decreed in place of the great variety of currencies in vogue. The formation of business corporations was encouraged. Laws limiting the rate of interest were abolished. The postal system was reorganized. Commercial treaties were made with other nations. Workingmen were given the right to form unions. The results of all this activity were notable. The pecuniary advantage of large and influential classes lay in the success of the Confederation. Economic life bound the different states every year more tightly together.

Meanwhile Germans were biding the time when by the addition of the South German states the political unity would be complete. This was to be the result of the Franco-German war of 1870.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

We have traced the rise of Italy, the rise of Prussia. We have now to trace the decline and fall of the French Empire. The history of that Empire from its foundation in 1852 to 1860 has been described. It was a period of despotic government, and of great and uninterrupted success. The period from 1860 to 1870 witnesses the gradual transformation of the Empire from autocracy to liberalism, the rise of a vigorous party of opposition, a disastrous foreign policy, a growing demoralization within the state, and a final, tragic collapse.

The turning point in the history of the Empire was the Italian war. However beneficial to Italy, that war raised up for Napoleon a host of enemies in France. One of its features had been the attack upon the temporal power of the Papacy. That power was not overthrown in fact, but it was in principle. The Pope had lost most of his states, the rest were in danger. Catholics were bitter in their denunciation of Napoleon. This was most damaging for him, as his strongest supporters had hitherto been the clergy, the clerical press, and the faithful. But other groups also were offended: monarchists, because of the overthrow of the kingdom of Naples and the duchies; patriots of various affiliations and members of the liberal constitutional party in Parliament, because they believed the erection of a strong state to the southeast of France prejudicial to her best interests, it being better to have several weak states as neighbors than a single strong one.

Only the democratic party in France seemed pleased with this venture, and for reasons that might well give the Emperor pause. This was the smallest of all the parties. It was by its fundamental principles opposed to the very existence of the Empire. "To find partisans of an Italian war, one must seek them in those circles which are plotting the overthrow of the Empire," an official had reported to the Emperor before ever the war had begun. These democrats approved a war against Austria, the traditional opponent of liberalism. They favored a war that might damage another enemy of theirs, the Roman

Catholic Church. They applauded it warmly because its tendency seemed to be inevitably democratic and anti-clerical. They were pleased to have the Emperor enter upon a doubtful adventure, believing that one adventure might lead to others, that he would alienate former supporters, and would therefore be forced to seek new ones, and that thus a situation favorable to themselves might be created. But even they were disappointed at the outcome of the war and were therefore critical. The Austrians were still in Venetia; the Pope was still in Rome.

The Emperor's reputation as a ruler, of intelligent views and of decision of character, was damaged both at home and abroad. As the war progressed it revealed the lack in its author of any definite purpose to be vigorously adhered to, Napoleon III at first agreeing to drive the Austrians out of the peninsula and to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, then stopping midway in the process and dictating the Preliminaries of Villafranca and the Peace of Zurich, only to permit them both to become immediately dead letters, and watching the revolution, unchained by his act, progress until the most sweeping change in Italian history had been effected and unification had been practically achieved. By a policy, alternately so reckless and so pusillanimous, he lessened his prestige, for he showed that though he could inaugurate momentous movements, he had not the power or sagacity or courage to control them. By participating in the overthrow of long-established, legitimate governments, he made legitimate governments everywhere suspicious and even hostile; by declaring that he was seeking only justice and not aggrandizement and then adding Savoy and Nice to France as payment for his services, he alienated England, as well as other states, which saw only hypocrisy in his acts and which feared that he was desirous of repeating the policy of conquest of his illustrious uncle. Such was the outcome of a policy, fortunate for the Italians, unfortunate for the Emperor. The next decade is a long commentary upon Napoleon's initial error. For ten years he was to experience to the full the embarrassments created by his ill-advised Italian policy.

It was at this time that in a different sphere he offended another powerful interest at home. He made in 1860, with unusual secrecy, a treaty of commerce with England. This treaty involved a great reduction of duties on many articles, and was a step in the direction of free trade. While popular with political economists, and while probably advantageous to France as a whole, it was bitterly resented by the great manufacturers, who,

given no warning and therefore no time to adapt themselves to changed conditions, believed that they would be utterly ruined. Four hundred of them came to Paris to seek an audience with the Emperor in order to present their cause. They were unsuccessful. The audience was not granted, but they published a vehement protest against the new policy. "We are about to be condemned without having been heard." But while the manufacturers were indignant, many in France were grateful, notably the wine producers, who, according to the new treaty, would have a larger market in England than ever. But the Emperor had thus by 1860 offended large and influential classes: Catholics in their beliefs by his Italian policy; manufacturers, protectionists, in their interests by his treaty of commerce, a treaty which, it was declared, sacrificed French interests to English, as the war, it was likewise declared, had subordinated the welfare of France to that of Italy.

Feeling that he was losing strength with the Conservatives, Napoleon now began to seek the support of the Liberals, hitherto his bitter opponents. This was the beginning of the so-called Liberal Empire, marked, as the years went, by ever greater concessions, until at the end the character of the government was completely transformed. Thus in 1859 Napoleon issued an amnesty which permitted the Republicans who had been driven from France by the coup d'état of 1851 to return. Many were prisoners in Algeria, in Guiana. Many were exiles in Belgium, Switzerland, England. From these countries the exiles now came back, but not all of them. "I shall return," said Victor Hugo, "when Liberty returns."

Napoleon next took a step which seemed to indicate that he was finally to enter upon the work of crowning his régime with liberty, which he had declared to be the ideal of the Napoleonic system. In November 1860 he slightly enlarged the power of the legislature. By the decree of November 24th he gave the Senate and Legislative Body the right at the opening of each session to frame an address to the monarch in reply to his address from the throne. Such was the custom in England, and such had been the custom in France under the parliamentary monarchy from 1815 to 1848. This gave the legislature the chance once a year to discuss the whole policy of the Government, as each phrase of the address was being composed and debated. Everything could be passed in review at that time. Another innovation, hardly less noteworthy, was made at the same time. A full stenographic report of the sessions of the

Legislative Body was henceforth to be published. The people were no longer to be required to content themselves with a concise, dry, analytical report of these sessions, relegated to the most obscure part of the newspaper, but now the eloquence of the Chamber might be known to all the country, impassioned, incisive, instructive. Another article provided that henceforth ministers, representing the Government, should appear before the Chambers authorized to explain and defend its policy.

Though by this famous decree Napoleon III divested himself of none of his prerogatives, nevertheless the importance of Parliament was henceforth increased. This was the first and most important of the successive steps in the evolution of the autocratic into the liberal Empire. But the Emperor was mistaken in supposing that he could win the Liberals to his side. He was simply giving them greater opportunities for opposition. Under the operation of this decree parliamentary life awoke again in France. Communication between the Legislative Body and the country, broken since 1852, was re-established. Extraordinary interest was shown by the people in the next session of that chamber, which was characterized by much brilliant oratory and keen criticism. It was noted with surprise that many of the most effective speeches were directed against this or that phase of the imperial government. The Emperor had evoked a spirit which it would be difficult to suppress. The Opposition in the chamber was small numerically, but was aggressive. That it produced some effect was shown by the next elections, those of 1863, when its number increased from five to thirty-five, of whom seventeen were out-and-out Republicans. This was, of course, a powerless minority in a chamber of nearly 260 members. But the popular vote was significant. The opponents of the Empire, Catholics, Protectionists, Monarchists, Republicans, had obtained about two million votes — almost a third of those cast.

It was just this time, when various difficulties were arising about him more troublesome than any which he had previously encountered, that Napoleon chose for another enterprise most unnecessary, most reckless, and in the end most disastrous. He undertook to erect an empire five thousand miles away, in a country of which he knew but little, and in which political institutions had for half a century rested on a very shifting basis — Mexico.

England, Spain, and France had certain grievances against Mexico for her unjust treatment of their citizens resident there, and when the Mexican government suspended by arbitrary de-

cree the payment of interest on bonds held abroad, they proceeded to organize an intervention. They were the more able to do this than in ordinary times, owing to the fact that the United States, the natural opponent of any such intervention, was then involved in a civil war that forbade her attempting to prevent it. Consequently, in October 1861, these three powers signed the Treaty of London agreeing upon joint intervention for the sole purpose of securing adequate protection for Europeans resident in Mexico, and the proper discharge of financial obligations incurred by that country by previous treaties. The Allies expressly stated that they had no intention of making territorial conquests or of overthrowing the existing Mexican government, which was a republic under Juarez as president. The expedition was sent out, arriving in December 1861 and January 1862. But by April it became clear to Spain and England that France had distinctly other purposes in this affair than those stated in the treaty of alliance. Napoleon's real intentions, shortly apparent, were the overthrow of the republic and the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico under a European prince. The English and Spaniards would give no sanction to such a scheme, and consequently entirely withdrew in April 1862. The expedition now became one purely French. The question of financial honesty on the part of Mexico was lost sight of, and a war began, a war of aggression, entirely uncalled for, but a war which in the end punished its author more than it did the Mexicans, one of the most dishonorable, as it was one of the most costly and disastrous, for the Second Empire.

Napoleon III was a man of ideas, a man of imagination, with a mind ranging boldly and far at times. His ideas were frequently grandiose, yet vague and dim, his imagination lively, yet frequently unsound, superficial, deceptive. While a prisoner in the fortress of Ham he had written and published a pamphlet concerning America. In this he proclaimed the necessity of digging a great canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific. On it a "new Constantinople" might arise, near the borders of North America and South America, as ancient Byzantium had arisen at the point where Europe and Asia meet. The founder of such a place might work out for the new world what had been worked out in Europe — an equilibrium of the different forces — by strengthening the enfeebled Latin element and hemming in the overflowing Anglo-Saxon element.

The theory of nationalities would thus win another victory. Latins would hold in check the aggressive Anglo-Saxons. The

colonies of Spain and France would be more secure, French commerce would find new outlets, the materials for French industries would be more easily procured. And, said Napoleon, "We shall have established our beneficent influence in the center of America." Another reason may have influenced the Emperor. The Republic of Mexico had in some of its legislation deeply offended the Roman Catholic Church. Might he not win back the favor of Catholics forfeited by his Italian expedition by undertaking this one?

This expedition for the overthrow of the Mexican Republic, pronounced by courtiers "the grandest thought of the reign," was a long drawn out folly. The French troops were checked at Puebla on May 5, 1862 — the first military defeat of the Empire. But, reinforced, they were victorious, and General Forey, the French commander, called together an assembly of Mexican notables of the opposition party, which decreed that Mexico should henceforth be an Empire, and which offered the imperial crown to Archduke Maximilian of Austria, brother of Francis Joseph, since 1848 Emperor of Austria. This assembly represented, perhaps 350,000 people out of about 7,000,000. It offered a fatal gift. This young prince of thirty-one was of attractive and popular manners, and of liberal ideas. Young, handsome, versatile, half poet, half scientist, he was living in a superb palace, Miramar, overlooking the Mediterranean, amid his collections, his objects of art, and with the sea, which was his passion, always before him. From out of this enchanting retreat he now emerged to become the central figure of a short and frightful tragedy. Mexico lured him to his doom. Influenced by his own ambition and that of his spirited wife, Carlotta, daughter of Leopold I, King of Belgium, and receiving definite promises of French military support until 1867, he accepted the imperial crown and arrived in Mexico in May 1864.

This entire project, born in the brain of Napoleon III, was to prove hopeless from the start, disastrous to all who participated in it, to the new Emperor and Empress, and to Napoleon. The difficulties confronting the new monarch were insuperable. A guerilla warfare was carried on successfully by Juarez, using up the French soldiers and putting them on the defensive. Even the communications of the French army with the sea were seriously threatened. Maximilian at last issued a decree that any enemies taken with arms would be summarily shot — a decree that made him hated by all Mexicans, and that gave to the war a character of extreme atrocity. A greater danger threatened

the new empire when General Lee surrendered at Appomattox. The United States had looked from the first with disapprobation upon Napoleon's project. Now that the Civil War was over, she threatened intervention. Napoleon was unwilling to risk a conflict with this country, and consequently promised to withdraw his troops speedily from Mexico. Maximilian could not remain long an Emperor without Napoleon's support. His wife, Carlotta, returning to Europe to persuade Napoleon in frantic personal interviews not to desert them, received no promise of support from the man who had planned the whole adventure, and in the fearful agony of her contemplation of the impending doom of her husband became insane. Maximilian was taken by the Mexicans and shot June 19, 1867. The phantom empire vanished.

A most expensive enterprise for the French Emperor! It had eaten into the financial resources of France, already badly disorganized. It had prevented his playing a part in decisive events occurring in central Europe in 1864–66, in the Danish war, and the Austro-Prussian war, the outcome of which was to alter so seriously the importance of France in Europe by the exaltation of an ambitious, aggressive, and powerful military state, Prussia. It had damaged him morally before Europe by the desertion of his protégés to an appalling fate before the threats of the United States. His army had once been repelled, before Puebla in 1862, the first military defeat in his reign. He had squandered uselessly his military resources and had increased the national debt. It has been asserted that the Mexican war was as disastrous for Napoleon III as the Spanish war had been for Napoleon I.

In 1868, after the great humiliation resulting from the Mexican war and from the futile attempts to play an effective part in European diplomacy in the crowded years of 1864–68, which will be described later, Napoleon III, feeling greatly the need of new sources of strength, could only turn to the Liberals with still larger concessions. Other motives influenced him to go farther in this direction than he had previously gone. He had declared at the beginning of his reign that autocratic power was to be merely provisional, that liberty should crown the edifice. Liberal-minded by nature, he saw that he could not safely postpone the day. Time was passing. Sixteen years had gone by and the system of 1852 was still almost entirely intact. Moreover, he was now becoming prematurely old, and was suffering acutely from disease, a fact that must be borne in mind hence-

forth as helping to explain the vacillation and languor at critical times of this man, who had previously acted with decision and promptness. Self-interest also would be served in another way. As his policy was now sadly compromised in every way, there would be evident advantage in making the assembly, the people, share the responsibility with himself. In 1867 the right of *interpellation* was granted the Chamber, which gave its members the power to question the ministers concerning their acts and policies at any moment. In 1868, upon the Emperor's recommendation, a law was passed freeing the press from a considerable number of restrictions that had previously weighted it; also a law permitting, under certain elaborate conditions, the right of holding public meetings.

The Empire had thus entered upon a frankly liberal path. The result was not to strengthen, but greatly to weaken it. Many new journals were founded, in which it was assailed with amazing bitterness. A remarkable freedom of speech characterizes the last two years of Napoleon's reign. A movement to erect a monument to a Republican deputy, Baudin, who had been shot on the barricades in 1851 at the time of the coup d'état, seemed to the Government to be too insulting. It prosecuted the men who were conducting the subscription. One of these was defended by a brilliant, impassioned young lawyer and orator from the south of France, thirty years of age, who was shortly to be a great figure in politics, a founder of the Third Republic. Gambetta conducted himself not as a lawyer defending his client, but as an avenger of the wrongs of France for the past seventeen years, impeaching bitterly the entire reign of Napoleon III. Particularly did he dwell upon the date of December 2d. The coup d'état, he said, was carried through by a crowd of unknown men "without talent, without honor, and hopelessly involved in debts and crimes." "These men pretend to have saved society. Do you save a country when you lay parricidal hands upon it?" The end of this remarkable discourse remains famous: "Listen, you who for seventeen years have been absolute master of France. The thing that characterizes you best, because it is evidence of your own remorse, is the fact that you have never dared to say: We will place among the solemn festivals of France, we will celebrate as a national anniversary, the Second of December. . . . Well! this anniversary we will take for ourselves; we will observe it always, always without fail; every year it shall be the anniversary of our dead, until the day when the country, having become master

itself once more, shall impose upon you the great national expiation in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity."

This address had a prodigious effect. Nothing so defiant, so contemptuous of the Government, had been heard in France since 1851. Though Gambetta's client lost his case, it was generally felt that the Empire emerged from that court-room soundly beaten. It was clear that there was a party in existence bent upon revenge, and willing to use all the privileges a now liberal Emperor might grant, not gratefully, but as a means of completely annihilating the very Empire, a Republican party, aggressive, and growing, already master of Paris, and organizing in the departments.

There was also in existence another party which played a commanding and decisive part in the closing years of the reign, the Third Party, so called from the fact that it stood between the thorough-going supporters of the Empire and the Republicans, its active enemies. This party was willing to support the Empire loyally if Napoleon would make it frankly and completely liberal, that is, if he would substitute a completely parliamentary system of government for personal rule. This party was led by Ollivier, formerly a Republican.

Two policies were now urged upon Napoleon, one by those of his immediate circle — a return to the strong measures of 1852, a renouncement of all compromises with the Liberals; the other, the one advocated by the Third Party. The elections of 1869 reinforced the latter by showing that, though 4,438,000 votes had been cast for the official candidates, 3,355,000 had been cast for those opposed. Napoleon adopted the plan of the Third Party, and by a *senatus consultum* of September 8, 1869, supplemented by another of April 20, 1870, the political system of the Empire was completely transformed. The Senate was deprived of its powers as guardian of the Constitution, and became a law-making chamber simply. The Legislative Body became complete master of itself, having the right to choose its own officers, to make its own rules, to initiate legislation, and to demand explanations of the ministers, who were declared responsible. Finally, on January 2, 1870, Ollivier was himself made head of the ministry, and was supported by a majority of the Chamber. Ollivier felt that he could assure the Emperor a "happy old age," and his son a quiet accession to the throne.

The approval of the people was now sought for these changes. As the Constitution of 1852 had been ratified by popular vote, ought not the Constitution of 1870, so profoundly altered in

the course of the last ten years, to be likewise approved? Believing that a vote of France on all these changes would only consolidate them and put behind the Emperor an immense popular support, thus enabling him easily to dominate all the hostile parties which had recently become so aggressive and annoying, Napoleon now invited the people to vote on this proposition: "The French nation approves the liberal reforms made in the Constitution since 1860, and ratifies the *senatus consultum* of April 20, 1870." Then followed the Constitution in forty-five articles, assuring, among other things, the transmission of the imperial dignity in the direct line of Napoleon III. The plébiscite took place May 8, 1870, and resulted overwhelmingly in favor of the Empire; 7,358,786 voted yes; 1,571,939 voted no. Napoleon III could claim that he had as many supporters in 1870 as in 1852. The Republicans, a small minority, opposed this plébiscite, not because they did not believe in the right of the people to rule, but because they considered it in this case a mere trick to gain an apparent absolution for the sins of the Empire. Every one must approve the reforms, but would not such a vote mean that reform need go no further? Now, said Gambetta, only one form of government adequately expresses universal suffrage — the Republic. This party, revolutionary in its aims, appeared now to be utterly discredited by the great success of the Empire in the plébiscite. Yet its victory was very near. The Empire seemed solidly re-established upon the confidence of the people. In less than three months, however, it had declared a war against Prussia, in the midst of which it utterly collapsed and was succeeded by the Republic. To understand the reasons for this sudden and complete downfall, it is necessary to survey the diplomacy of the period just preceding 1870, and to describe the general and immediate causes of that war.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

Concerning that diplomacy much is known but much remains obscure. Not until the archives of France and Germany, the papers of Napoleon III, William I, Bismarck, and their ministers and agents are freely given to the world will it stand forth fully revealed. Yet fragmentary and unsatisfactory as our information is, the broad outlines of the story can be drawn with reasonable certitude.

Up to 1862 Napoleon had been uniformly successful. He had defeated Russia and Austria, supposed to be the two most redoubtable military powers in Europe, in the Crimean and Italian wars. In 1862, however, he entered upon the ill-starred Mexican expedition, the "grandest thought of the reign," as his courtiers mispronounced it. This weakened him in many ways, indicated above, but, particularly did it trammel him in his European diplomacy, at the very time when events were crowding upon each other thick and fast, altering profoundly the face of Europe. Napoleon, distracted by a wasting, distant, and inglorious war, was not able to act with decision in regard to the remodeling of central Europe, the rise of Prussia. Moreover, his intellectual limitations, his lack of clear thought and persistent action, his half-hearted, wavering, shifting nature were now brought out in high relief against the hard, practical, clean-cut, restrained yet ruthless character of the leader of this evolution of Germany, Otto von Bismarck. His doctrine of nationalties, on which he so prided himself, was now to turn against him to his own undoing. He had acted upon that doctrine in Italy with the result that an Italian Kingdom was in existence. He now, with singular fatuity, helped forward the development of another state on the frontiers of France — Prussia. In the Schleswig-Holstein affair of 1864 he secretly advised Prussia to take both duchies. "I shall always be consistent in my conduct," he had said in 1863. "If I have fought for the independence of Italy, if I have lifted up my voice for the Polish nationalities, I cannot have other sentiments in Germany, nor obey other principles."

The strengthening of Prussia was a far more serious matter for France than the strengthening of Piedmont, as Prussia held the left bank of the Rhine, the Rhine provinces, which Frenchmen regarded as rightfully theirs. Frenchmen protested against this dangerous policy of encouraging the growth of the ambitious neighbor.

In 1866 Napoleon had an excellent opportunity to recover from his initial mistake in Germany. In that year Prussia and Austria went to war, nominally over the question of these very duchies, in reality for the leadership of central Europe. Bismarck, long planning such a war, had been particularly anxious about the attitude of France, and had sought to divine the probable conduct of the French Emperor, in the famous interview at Biarritz (1865). We have no official details as to the result of that interview, but it is clear that Bismarck left it with the conviction that Napoleon would be neutral. This would free Prussia from any anxiety about her western boundary, and she could throw her whole force to the south against Austria and her allies. It is evident that Napoleon looked forward to such a war between the two German powers with complacency. He believed there was nothing to fear from Prussia. He even urged Italy to conclude the treaty with Prussia, apparently thinking that the two combined could hold out longer against Austria. Thus, in his opinion, the war would be long, exhausting both combatants. At the proper time he could intervene, and from the distress of the rivals could extract gain for France, possibly the left bank of the Rhine, which Prussia might be willing to relinquish in return for aid. His calculation was based upon his belief in the vast military superiority of Austria. The war came, and, contrary to expectation, it was short and swift. Prussia was victorious, not Austria. The battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, July 3, 1866, was decisive. Even then it was not too late for an intervention. Napoleon could have played a commanding part in determining the terms of peace had he threatened to come to the aid of Austria, as Austria desired. His Minister of Foreign Affairs said to him July 5th: "Let the Emperor make a simple military demonstration, and he will be astonished at the facility with which he will become arbiter and master of the situation without striking a blow." King William later said that the war of 1866 was the ruin of France, "because Napoleon should have attacked us in the rear." This was what Bismarck most feared.

But the golden hour slipped by. Napoleon missed one of the

greatest opportunities of his entire career. Had he refused to sanction the annexations of Prussia unless compensated, he could have secured important additions to France. Pacifically inclined, racked by a disease which reduced his powers of concentration and decision, perhaps distrustful of his army, which was depleted by the Mexican campaign and which had no eminent commander, his conduct was vacillating and weak. Accomplishing nothing for France, he yet irritated Prussia by a half measure of insisting that the new confederation should not extend south of the river Main.

The year 1866 is a turning point in the history of Prussia, of Austria, of France, of modern Europe. It profoundly altered the historic balance of power. By the decisiveness of the campaign, and by the momentous character of its consequences, Prussia, hitherto regarded as the least important of the great powers, had astounded Europe by the evidence of her strength. She possessed a remarkable army and a remarkable statesman. That both were the most powerful in Europe was not entirely proved, but the feeling was widespread that such was the case. The center of interest in central Europe shifted from Vienna to Berlin. The reputation of Napoleon III was seriously compromised. The instinct of the French people saw in the battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, as they called it, a humiliating defeat for France, though it was a battle exclusively between Prussia and Austria, France being no party to the war. The instinct was largely right. At least the Peace of Prague involved and indicated the diminution of the authority and importance of France. For a reorganization so sweeping in central Europe, as the overthrow of Austria, her expulsion from Germany, and the consolidation and aggrandizement of Prussia, a powerful military state, upset the balance of power. A feeling of alarm spread through France. "Revenge for Sadowa," was a cry often heard henceforth. Its meaning was that if one state like Prussia should be increased in area and power, France also, for consenting to it, had a right to a proportionate increase, that the reciprocal relations might remain the same. The hold of the Emperor upon his own people was greatly weakened, and Napoleon knew it. To recover this, to renew his prestige by securing an increase of territory, he now resorted to diplomacy, seeking to appeal to the generosity or gratitude of Bismarck, having neglected to appeal to his fears. For a year negotiations went on, in 1866 and 1867, between the two powers, looking to some possible enlargement of the boundaries of France. These nego-

tiations concerned, now the left bank of the Rhine, now Luxemburg, now Belgium. Bismarck drew them out in order to gain time and also evidence with which to discredit Napoleon still further. Then, at the ripe moment, he blocked every proposal, and no course was left open to the French Emperor but to adapt himself to his unhappy position. But French governmental circles, greatly chagrined and embittered, came more and more to entertain the idea of war. The Emperor tried to persuade France that all these changes in central Europe had really increased the strength of France. The argument was labored, and, moreover, reacted most disastrously, for when in 1868 he urged the reform of the French army, largely along the lines of the Prussian organization, which had proved so successful, the Chamber acceded only in slight part, quoting his own assertion that France stood in Europe stronger than ever as a result of the Seven Weeks' War in Germany. Thus the one method of augmenting the influence of France was rejected, and Parliament must share the responsibility for the lack of preparation of 1870 with the Emperor, and Liberals must share it with Conservatives. A few years earlier Napoleon might have forced such proposals through Parliament. In 1868 he was no longer in a position so to do. The Opposition was too numerous, and he had made too many enemies by his Italian and Mexican policies. Moreover, he had just increased the power of the legislature. And not for a moment admitting that the Empire was in danger, he could not use the greatest of all arguments — the safety of the state.

From 1866 to 1870 the idea that ultimately a war would come between Prussia and France became familiar to the people and governments of both countries. Many Frenchmen desired "revenge for Sadowa." Prussians were proud and elated at their two successful wars, and intensely conscious of their new position in Europe. The newspapers of both countries during the next four years were full of crimination and recrimination, of abuse and taunt, the government in neither case greatly discouraging their unwise conduct, at times even inspiring and directing it. Such an atmosphere was an excellent one for ministers who wanted war to work in, and both France and Prussia had just such ministers. Bismarck believed such a war inevitable, and, in his opinion, it was desirable as the only way of completing the unification of Germany, since Napoleon would never willingly consent to the extension of the Confederation to include the South German states. All that he desired was that it should

come at precisely the right moment, when Prussia was entirely ready, and that it should come by act of France, so that Prussia could pose before Europe as merely defending herself against a wanton aggressor. In his *Reminiscences* he avows that he entertained this belief as early as 1866: "That a war with France would succeed the war with Austria lay in the logic of history"; and again, "I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realized." The unification of Germany being his supreme aim, he was bound by logic and ambition to see that that war occurred.

Unfortunately, there entered in 1870 into the Foreign Office of France a pronounced and bitter opponent of Prussia, the Duke of Gramont, a reckless and unwise politician, whose brief career in office was to be very costly to his country. With two such willing ministers, a cause of war was not long in being found. It was offered in a form which did not directly concern either Germany or France, the filling of the vacant throne of Spain.

In 1868 a revolution had occurred in Spain, which resulted in the overthrow and exile of the Queen, Isabella II. The Provisional Government which then arose proceeded upon the task, always delicate, of finding a new ruler. It chose Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a kinsman of the King of Prussia, who at first declined. Three times the offer of the Spanish crown was made to Leopold, twice in 1869, and again in March 1870. In an interview with Bismarck in May 1869, Benedetti, French ambassador at Berlin, made it apparent that the candidacy of the Prince would be resented by France. Bismarck nevertheless secured from Spain a fourth offer, and Leopold this time accepted, largely persuaded thereto by Bismarck, who was sufficiently cognizant of the feeling of the French Emperor. The news that a Prussian Prince had accepted the throne of Spain reached Paris by way of Madrid, July 2, 1870. Instantly great indignation was expressed in the newspapers. The excitement in Paris rapidly increased. Gramont declared in the Chamber that the election of the Prince was inadmissable as "upsetting to our disadvantage the present equilibrium of forces in Europe," and imperiling "the interests and honor of France." To prevent it, "we shall discharge our duty without hesitation and without weakness." Benedetti was ordered by the French Government to proceed at once to Ems, a watering resort near the Rhine, where King William was at the time, and to make a formal

demand that the candidacy be withdrawn. Neither Napoleon III, more and more exhausted by disease, nor the Prime Minister, Ollivier, desired war, though both were anxious for a diplomatic victory. Nor did William I desire it. Moreover, the Governments of England, Austria, Russia, and Belgium labored in the interests of peace. On July 12 the candidacy was announced withdrawn by the father of Prince Leopold.

The tension was immediately relieved: the war scare was over. Two men, however, were not pleased by this outcome, Gramont and Bismarck. This was, says a biographer of Bismarck, "the severest check which Bismarck's policy had yet received; he had persuaded the Prince to accept against his will; he had persuaded the King reluctantly to keep the negotiations secret from Napoleon; however others might disguise the truth, he knew that they had had to retreat from an untenable position, and retreat before the noisy insults of the French press and the open menace of the French Government." [1] Bismarck considered the reverse so great and humiliating that he thought he must in self-respect resign and retire into private life.

He was to be saved from this by the folly of the French ministry, and by his own unscrupulousness. "The ministry has achieved," said Guizot, now a very old man, living in retirement, "the finest diplomatic victory which has been won in my lifetime." This victory was now thrown away. The whole matter was unwisely reopened and rendered far more acute by the French ministry, supported by the Parisian war party, which now made an additional demand, namely, that the King of Prussia should promise that this Hohenzollern candidacy should never be renewed. This demand was presented to William I by Benedetti, July 13, in Ems. The King refused but with entire courtesy. In the meeting of the French ministers, held on the evening of the 13th, it was not felt that this refusal made war necessary.

Meanwhile King William had caused a description of the events of that day (July 13) to be telegraphed to Bismarck, who was in Berlin, leaving with him the decision as to whether the facts of the new French demand and his refusal to entertain it be published. Here was Bismarck's opportunity, and he used it ruthlessly and joyously to provoke the French to declare war. The form in which the Ems despatch was published was intended by him to be "a red flag for the Gallic bull," and certainly fulfilled the intention. The Ems despatch was not falsified, as has been frequently asserted, but it was condensed in

[1] Headlam, *Bismarck*, 334.

such a fashion that the negotiations at Ems appeared to have been sharp and discourteous and abruptly terminated, whereas they had been courteous and respectful on both sides. While the text of the Ems despatch was not changed save by excision, the tone of it was greatly and intentionally altered, so that the Prussians thought that their King, the French that their ambassador, had been insulted. The effect of its publication on the 14th was instantaneous and malign. It aroused the indignation of both countries to fever heat. As if that were not sufficient, the newspapers of both teemed with false, abusive, and inflammatory accounts of the events at Ems. The voice of the advocates of peace was drowned in the general clamor. Napoleon did not wish war, but he was very ill, and was swept from his real convictions by the war party. The Empress, it appears, urged it out of hatred of Prussia as a Protestant nation, and in the belief that it would strengthen the imperial throne. The ministry went with the current. No one in authority dared brave unpopularity in Paris, and consequently war credits were voted amid great excitement on July 15th and France entered into the valley of the shadow. Ollivier, head of the French ministry, declared that he accepted this war "with a light heart." Thiers, demanding that the Chamber be informed of the contents of the despatches which were prompting such perilous action, and declaring that having gained "the essential thing we ought not to break because of a mere detail of form — ought not to effect a rupture on a question of touchiness," was hissed in the Chamber. War was declared by France virtually on July 15th, technically on July 19th. Only ten members in the Chamber, among whom were Thiers and Gambetta, voted against it. Paris resounded with cries, "On to Berlin!" Victory seemed certain. The Minister of War was confident. The Minister of Foreign Affairs believed that within a few hours the triple alliance for which there had been negotiations for some time would be concluded with Austria and Italy. The war grew directly out of mere diplomatic fencing. The French people did not desire it, only the people of Paris, inflamed by an official press. Indeed, until it was declared, the French people hardly knew of the matter of dispute. It came upon them unexpectedly. The war was made by the responsible heads of two Governments. It was in its origin in no sense national in either country. Its immediate occasion was trivial. But it was the cause of a remarkable display of patriotism in both countries.

The war upon which the French ministry entered with so

light a heart, was destined to prove the most disastrous in the history of their country. In every respect it was begun under singularly inauspicious circumstances. France declared war upon Prussia alone, but in a manner that threw the South German states, upon whose support she had counted, directly into the camp of Bismarck. They regarded the French demand, that the King of Prussia should pledge himself for all time to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern's candidature, as unnecessary and insulting. At once Bavaria and Baden and Würtemberg joined the campaign on the side of Prussia.

Not only Prussia, therefore, but united Germany stood confronting France. Moreover, Bismarck's diplomacy was able to isolate France from the rest of Europe. Bismarck published a draft of a treaty drawn up some years before, between Prussia and France, but never signed, which provided for the annexation of Belgium to France. France protested, but in vain, that the treaty had been dictated by Bismarck. This so worked upon English opinion, which has always opposed French extension northwards, that the English Government immediately proclaimed its neutrality. France had counted upon the ultimate aid of Austria, but Bismarck gained the support of Russia to this extent that Russia threatened to invade Austria if Austria supported France. Italy, too, was neutralized by the fact that she could not safely move alone.

Thus at the beginning of the month of August it was clear that France would have no ally. The French military authorities made the serious mistake of grossly underestimating the difficulty of the task before them. The Minister of War declared that France was ready, more than ready, that her preparations were more advanced than those of the enemy. The supreme folly of such an assertion was immediately shown. While the German armies mobilized and advanced toward the frontier with amazing swiftness, order, and ease, in the French army all was confusion. In Prussia everything had been for years prepared and orders only had to be taken out of their pigeonholes and dated. In France everything had to be improvised in the midst of unparalleled disorder. Particularly apparent was this in the case of the reserves. It frequently happened that men living in the east of France must cross to the west and get their arms and uniform, then recross to the east to join their regiments. Not only was time lost, but the railway system was deranged by the crowds of men traveling to and fro

for this purpose. Also the trains, thus crowded with soldiers going hither and yon, were prevented from transporting adequate supplies.

The confusion, the lack of preparation, the defects of the military machine were incredible and were apparent from the very first day. Despatches from corps commanders were all in the same strain. "We need everything," wrote General de Failly on July 19th. "We are in want of everything," telegraphed Bazaine on July 21st. "Everything is completely lacking," announced another a little later. Marshal Lebœuf, who, as Minister of War, had declared that everything was ready even to the last button on the last gaiter, soon lost his optimism, and on July 28th telegraphed that his troops could not advance because they lacked bread. Tents were frequently wanting, or there were tents without tent pins. Pots and kettles, medicines for men and for horses, means of transport, wagons, blankets, were frequently lacking. There were cannon without ammunition, horses without harnesses, machine guns without the men who knew how to fire them. Examples might be endlessly multiplied. More, however, are needless to show the chaos that reigned in the French army. Frequently soldiers and even generals went astray, not able to find their places. "Have arrived at Belfort," telegraphed General Michel on July 21st. "Can't find my brigade; can't find the general of the Division. What shall I do? Don't know where my regiments are." It has been observed that this document is probably unique in military records.

But the French were inferior to the Germans in numbers also. They could put into the field hardly 300,000 men, and they had no reserves worth speaking of upon which to draw. The Germans could put into the field nearly 450,000 men, and had very large reserves which could be gradually made into new armies. Again, on the French side there was confusion in the direction of the forces. The Emperor was very ill, of the disease of which he died three years later, yet, irresolute and feeble, he was at the outset commander-in-chief. During the first two weeks of the war he made three different arrangements concerning the command of the Army of the Rhine.

The French had dreamed of a swift invasion of Germany. Once in central Germany, they thought that the South Germans would rise to their aid, that then Austria and Italy would join, and the march to Berlin would begin. Nothing of the sort occurred. Their officers had maps of Germany, which they never

needed, few of France. The Germans crossed into Alsace and Lorraine, and between August 6th and September 2nd the French suffered reverse after reverse. On the former day MacMahon was defeated in the battle of Wörth and subsidiary engagements. The French fought bravely and the Germans paid heavily for their success. Nevertheless, it was an unmistakable victory. MacMahon retreated rapidly to the great camp at Châlons, east of Paris.

West of Wörth the Germans defeated the French on the same day (August 6th) at Forbach and Spicheren, and drove the army back toward Metz, one of the strongest fortresses in France. The German armies pressed on, endeavoring to prevent Bazaine, now commander of Metz, from retreating and joining MacMahon. This they succeeded in doing in a series of very bloody battles, Borny, to the east of Metz, on August 14th; Mars-la-Tours, to the west, on August 16th; and Gravelotte, also to the west, on August 18th. The result was that Bazaine, with the principal French army, was bottled up in Metz, surrounded by Germans.

The Emperor, now fearing to return to Paris with these defeats undermining his throne, conceived the unwise plan of having MacMahon's army move from Châlons, eastward, to the relief of Metz. This it attempted but did not accomplish. On September 1st the battle of Sedan was fought, with the result that the French were surrounded by the Germans. On the next day, September 2nd, the French army surrendered to the Germans. Napoleon himself was taken prisoner of war. The French lost, on September 1st, about 17,000 in killed and wounded, and 21,000 captured by the enemy. On the 2nd over 81,000 officers and men surrendered and became prisoners of war.

Disasters so appalling resounded throughout the world. France no longer had an army; one had capitulated at Sedan; the other was locked up in Metz. The early defeats of August had been announced in Paris by the Government as victories. The deception could no longer be maintained. On September 3rd this despatch was received from the Emperor: "The army has been defeated and is captive; I myself am a prisoner." As a prisoner he was no longer head of the government of France; there was, as Thiers said, a "vacancy of power." On Sunday, September 4th, the Legislative Body was convened. But it had no time to deliberate. The mob invaded the hall shouting, "Down with the Empire! Long live the Republic!" Gambetta, Jules Favre and Jules Ferry, followed by the crowd, proceeded

to the Hôtel de Ville and there proclaimed the Republic. The Empress fled. A Government of National Defense was organized with General Trochu at its head, which was the actual government of France during the remainder of the war.

The Franco-German war lasted about six months, from the first of August 1870, when fighting began, to about the first of February 1871. It falls naturally into two periods, the imperial and the republican. During the first, which was limited to the month of August, the regular armies were, as we have seen, destroyed or bottled up. Then the Empire collapsed and the Emperor was a prisoner in Germany. The second period lasted five months. France, under the Government of National Defense, made a remarkably courageous and spirited defense under the most discouraging conditions.

The new Government of National Defense, thus improvised, and representing only a spontaneous movement of opinion, never legally sanctioned, was the government of France till the close of the war. It threw all the blame of the war on Napoleon, and declared itself ready for peace; only it would not consent to a peace involving the violation of the territory of France. "Not an inch of our soil will we cede," said Favre, "not a stone of our fortresses." As Germany intended annexations as a result of her victories, this utterance meant that the war must continue.

The Germans, leaving a sufficient army to carry on the siege of Metz, advanced toward Paris. They began the siege of that city on September 19th. The siege, one of the most famous in history, lasted four months, and astonished Europe. Immense stores had been collected in the city, the citizens were armed, and the defense was energetic. The Parisians hoped to hold out long enough to enable new armies to be organized, and diplomacy possibly to intervene. To accomplish the former a delegation from the Government of National Defense, headed by Gambetta, escaped from Paris by balloon, and established a branch seat of government first at Tours, then at Bordeaux. Gambetta, by his immense energy, his eloquence, his patriotism, was able to raise new armies, whose resistance astonished the Germans, but, as they had not time to be thoroughly trained, they were unsuccessful. They could not break the immense circle of iron that surrounded Paris. After the overthrow of the Empire the war was reduced to the siege of Paris, and the attempts of these improvised armies to break that siege. These attempts were rendered all the more hopeless by the fall of Metz (October 27, 1870). Six thousand officers and 173,000 men were forced by

impending starvation to surrender, with hundreds of cannon and immense war supplies, the greatest capitulation "recorded in the history of civilized nations." A month earlier, on September 28, Strasbourg had surrendered, and 19,000 soldiers had become prisoners of war.

The capitulation of Metz was particularly disastrous because it made possible the sending of more German armies to reinforce the siege of Paris, and to attack the forces which Gambetta was, by prodigies of effort, creating in the rest of France. These armies could not get to the relief of Paris, nor could the troops within Paris break through to them. The siege became simply a question of endurance.

The Germans began the bombardment of the city early in January. Certain sections suffered terribly, and were ravaged by fires. Famine stared the Parisians in the face. After November 20th there was no more beef or lamb to be had; after December 15th only thirty grammes of horse meat a day per person, which, moreover, cost about two dollars and a half a pound; after January 15th the amount of bread, a wretched stuff, was reduced to 300 grammes. People ate anything they could get, dogs, cats, rats. The market price for rats was two francs apiece. By the 31st of January, there would be nothing left to eat. Additional suffering arose from the fact that the winter was one of the coldest on record. Coal and fire wood were exhausted. Trees in the Champs Elysées and the Bois de Boulogne were cut down, and fires built in the public squares for the poor. Wine froze in casks. On January 28th, with famine almost upon her, Paris capitulated after an heroic resistance. The armistice of Versailles was concluded which really closed the war.

The armistice was designed to permit elections to be held throughout France for an assembly that should pronounce upon the question of peace. As peace would involve the cession of French territory to the victors, the Government of National Defense felt that the people of France should themselves decide a matter so vital. Elections were accordingly held on February 8, 1871. The peasants voted overwhelmingly for those favoring peace. As Gambetta, leader of the Republicans, favored war to the bitter end, they voted largely against the Republican candidates. Thus the first Assembly, elected under the Third Republic, was composed of a majority of Monarchists, divided into two wings, the Legitimists and the Orleanists, and a minority of Republicans. Only a handful of Bonapartists were chosen, so vast was the disgrace now attached to that name. The

Assembly met at Bordeaux, February 12th, and, believing that if France continued the war she might ultimately be annihilated, believing that the fundamental necessity of self-preservation demanded an immediate cessation, voted overwhelmingly for peace.

The Government of National Defense now laid down its powers, yielding to the National Assembly. This Assembly chose Thiers as "Chief of the Executive Power," and empowered him to negotiate with Bismarck for peace. The question of the permanent government of France was postponed until a more convenient season. Thiers was now the most popular man in France. He had, in July 1870, done his utmost to prevent France from going to war. He had, during the war, journeyed from one capital of Europe to another, London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Florence, on a futile diplomatic mission, seeking to win foreign support for France. He was over seventy years of age, but he was about to render his most valuable services to France.

The terms of peace granted by Bismarck were extraordinarily severe. They were laid down in the preliminary Peace of Versailles, February 26, 1871. France must pay an indemnity of five thousand million francs ($1,000,000,000) within three years. She must cede Alsace and a large part of Lorraine, including the important fortress of Metz. She was to support a German army of occupation, which should be gradually withdrawn as the installments of the war indemnity were paid. After much controversy these preliminaries were embodied in the final Treaty of Frankfort, signed May 10, 1871, and ratified by the Assembly of Bordeaux by 433 votes to 98.

Meanwhile other events had occurred as a result of this war. Italy had completed her unification by seizing the city of Rome, thus terminating the temporal rule of the Pope. The Pope had been supported there by a French garrison. This was withdrawn as a result of the battle of Sedan, and the troops of Victor Emmanuel attacked the Pope's own troops, defeated them after a slight resistance, and entered Rome on the 20th of September 1870. The unity of Italy was now consummated and Rome became the capital of the Kingdom.

A more important consequence of the war was the completion of the unification of Germany, and the creation of the German Empire. Bismarck had desired a war with France as necessary to complete the unity of Germany. Whether necessary or not, at least that end was now secured. After the early German victories, and during the siege of Paris, negotiations were carried on between Prussia and the South German states, looking

toward their entrance into the Confederation. In the case of Bavaria and Würtemberg, states of considerable size, concessions had to be made, preserving to them certain powers not retained by the other states. Finally treaties were drawn up and the King of Bavaria, prompted and directed by Bismarck, urged the King of Prussia, in behalf of the princes, to assume the headship of united Germany, and to revive the Empire.

Finally on the 18th of January 1871, surrounded by the princes of Germany and by the generals of the army, King William I was proclaimed German Emperor. This memorable ceremony is one of the supreme ironies of history, as it occurred in the Hall of Mirrors, in the palace of Versailles, itself a mighty monument and symbol of the power and pride of Louis XIV, a power which had been secured to some extent by the humiliation of Germany.

The war of 1866 had resulted in the expulsion of Austria from Germany and from Italy. The war of 1870 completed the unification of both countries. Berlin became the capital of a federal Empire, Rome of a unified Kingdom.

CHAPTER XV

THE RISE OF SOCIALISM

One of the important forces in the modern world, Socialism, is the direct outgrowth of the Industrial Revolution. Only against the background of the factory system of industry can the various theories grouped under that name be properly examined. The factory system offered certain advantages which were undeniable and obvious, a greatly increased production of the commodities which men need or desire. Wealth increased rapidly through the greater power now exercised by man over the forces of nature. The improvements in manufacturing, in commerce and in communication were multifarious, astounding, far-reaching in the benefits they conferred. But along with these advantages went certain disadvantages, equally perceptible, equally serious, and also far-reaching in their effects. The development of the factory system meant the simultaneous development of the capitalist system, upon which, indeed, it rested. The new machines and factories were owned by one set of men, while those who utilized them and made them work constituted another set. Capitalists on the one hand, laborers on the other, such was the division in the world of industry, a world now split asunder into two elements of unequal strength. That fusion of capital and labor which had partially characterized the domestic system of industry, that essential solidarity of interest of all who participated in the work of production, did not characterize the new system, which emphasized, rather, the differences in status and in opportunity, of the directors of industry and of its manual laborers. The position of the former became more and more powerful and brilliant while that of the latter in many cases, and particularly at first, became harder and more depressing. The capitalists who built the factories and equipped them with machinery were anxious to make as large profits as possible, and in order to do this, they sacrificed the well-being and the health of their employees. The latter were obliged to have employment or they could not live, and they were forced therefore to accept whatever conditions and whatever wages were

offered them. The competition of the two factors in production, capital and labor, was most uneven, and the division of the product, of the wealth created only by the co-operation of the two, was also most unequal. On the one side the rapidly increasing wealth of the few; on the other the grinding toil of the laborer under new and harsh conditions, such was the situation. Life for the masses in the new industrial and mining centers was deadening, the outlook quite drab and hopeless.

Out of this contrast between the profits and opportunities offered by the factory system of large-scale production to the two component elements of that system, the owners and the laborers, arose that stream of thought which we call Socialism, a stream which, beginning feebly a century ago, has grown in volume and in force ever since. Socialism is the reply to capitalism of the disappointed and disillusioned employees of capitalism. As capitalism has gone on developing, so has Socialism, its counterpart and challenge. The steadily progressing Industrial Revolution has enormously stimulated the growth of each. Socialism in its origin was a cry of distress, a protest against conditions felt to be intolerable, a demand for justice in the economic sphere, as the French Revolution had been one in the political and social sphere.

It is not easy to define Socialism, because its representatives have themselves defined it differently at different times, and because, like any other growing thing, it has passed through various stages and has assumed Protean shapes. No hard and fast formulation, no precise and dogmatic definition of Socialism will be attempted here. But as a working definition enabling us to thread our way through the vast body of discussion, we may say that in contrast to the system of the private ownership of capital and of the means of production which prevailed a century ago, and which prevails to-day, Socialism demands their complete control by the community as a whole, by society in its entirety, in the interest of all the workers. Whether the changes which Socialism demands are likely to accomplish the ends aimed at, whether its theories are sound, whether the remedies which it recommends will cure the patient or will kill him, are questions which have been much discussed during the last half-century. Sufficient for the moment will be the study of the origins and the development of this new and significant school of thought and of some of the experiments in the art of social reform attempted by certain of its adherents. The conditions out of which the new theories emerged, the long process of criticism to which

those theories have been subjected by the zealots of the new philosophy themselves, the growing clarification of the issue between advocates and opponents will appear as we take up the careers of the prominent men who have been, at one time or another, identified with the progress of the movement, and as we seek to disengage their thought, to appraise their individual contributions to the cause.

One thing we meet at the outset. Socialism is a part of that passionate aspiration for freedom which has shown itself so unquenchable and so militant all through the modern period of history. Whether Socialists have added anything to the conception of human freedom, whether they have clarified or whether they have obscured that conception, whether Socialism means a larger freedom or the very negation of freedom, we will not now discuss. Certain it is that to the Socialists themselves the very question is preposterous, and can be answered only in one way.

The Industrial Revolution, by the evils which accompanied it, created the desire for their removal and thus started an agitation which has continued to this day, assuming many forms, enlisting the most diverse types of men, provoking a profusion of suggestions and panaceas, many of which have not been brought forward in vain, however inadequate all have been to solve the immense and complex problem. One type of man who has never rested since the first appearance of the abuses described above has been the reformer, generally denounced by his enemies as radical, and often radical in fact, who, sensitive to the iniquities of the existing social order, has aimed to remove them by an appeal to the sentiments of justice. Such men were Jeremy Bentham and James Mill and John Stuart Mill and many others, in England and in other countries, men who had no desire to disturb the system of private property, to see the state owning or controlling the means of production, but who thought that the inequalities and injustices created by existing institutions could be remedied or removed by measures, drastic, if need be, and yet not subversive of the existing organization of society which, with all its defects, contains too many excellences to be lightly sacrificed. This type of reformer has accomplished wonders since the eighteenth century. The imprint of his thought and action is to be seen everywhere and is often very deep. His has been a noble and very fruitful record of varied reform in the institutions and the modes of thought and feeling of the modern age. We shall see him at work everywhere in Europe, with varying success, as we proceed with the histories of

the different countries. He has contributed, without doubt, an important share to the increasing prosperity and power of the working classes.

But the nineteenth century produced another class of social reformers, revolutionary, not radical, in their outlook and their aim, insisting upon widespread and fundamental alteration of existing institutions. These men came early to be known as Socialists. The Industrial Revolution gave rise to Socialism, a doctrine which is hailed as a universal and final panacea for the evils of the economic world and, also, of society in all its departments. The reformers of the class first mentioned were in general highly individualistic in their philosophy and did not at all desire to magnify the rôle of the state in industry. The reformers of the latter class, the Socialists, on the other hand, would bring about the golden age by enormously magnifying the rôle of the state, by placing it at the very center of things, by making it the supreme director and inspirer of all economic activity, the manager-in-chief of society, its pilot or helmsman or guide or driver, as the case might be, in short the regulator of social evolution.

It is said that the man first to use the word socialism was Robert Owen (1771–1858), a Welshman endowed with many of the brilliant qualities of the Celt, a man who combined great practical ability with an ardent desire to improve the conditions of his fellowmen. The son of a saddler and ironmonger, Owen's schooling was poor and brief, being over when he was but nine years old. At the age of nineteen he became manager of a cotton mill in Manchester, which employed about five hundred people. Such was his talent for business that he made money rapidly and became one of the most successful manufacturers in England. But unlike most other manufacturers of the time he was not content with the mere acquisition of riches. A man of intelligence, a careful observer, he saw the evils of the factory system in all their harshness and crudity, though he himself had greatly profited by that system. Removing later to New Lanark, where he continued his business activity, he became increasingly absorbed in the problem of the poor and helpless. He became a social reformer. The condition of the workingmen revolted him, their interminably long hours of labor, the deadly drudgery of their lives, their lack of education, their cramped, wretched, unsanitary habitations, most families occupying but a single room, the prevalence among them of drunkenness and vice. He saw also the dreadful evils of child labor. Believing that men

are what their environment makes them, and hating this particular environment with deep and abiding hatred, he resolved to change it and change it he did, utterly. Such was his driving power, such his wisdom and enthusiasm, that New Lanark was made over and became a model factory town, with clean and healthy workrooms, decent homes, excellent schools for the children, a co-operative store where the laborers could buy the things they needed at nearly cost prices, and with societies designed to provide pensions for sickness and old age. The age at which children might be employed was raised from five to ten and Owen wished to raise the limit still further. During a business crisis he continued to pay the wages of his employees, temporarily thrown out of work. His operatives became self-respecting, intelligent and contented, the relations between employer and employees were always characterized by the best of feeling, and the business continued to prosper and to flourish. New Lanark was a shining evidence of what unselfishness, combined with ability, could accomplish for the betterment of a community. It became a place of pilgrimage for those interested in social reform.

Had all manufacturers shown the inclination or ability to follow in the footsteps of Robert Owen, Socialism might never have been heard of. Its appearance would at any rate have been long postponed. But that was not to be. The bulk of them continued to fix their entire attention on merely making money, paying no attention to the shocking conditions that existed among the laboring class, and Owen, seeing that there was no hope in them, denounced them, and the factory system as well, with burning indignation. If the manufacturers would not reform that system, then the state ought to. Such was his opinion.

Having made a success of New Lanark, Owen's career now widened out. He devoted the rest of his life to social reform, writing books and making experiments to that end. He would have been willing to have the necessary reforms come from above, from the manufacturers themselves, as those which had transformed New Lanark had come autocratically from himself. But when he saw the unbending selfishness of the manufacturers he turned more and more toward the laborers themselves as the element that must acomplish their own salvation. His ideas became, properly speaking, more socialistic. But at a time when he seemed to be gaining the attention of the country he went out of his way, quite unnecessarily, to offend it by declaring

his hostility to all the received forms of religion, thus damaging his cause and discrediting his ideas with large numbers of his fellow-citizens.

Robert Owen lived till 1858. Pessimistic about the chances of a widespreading or speedy reform in England, he came to America in 1825 in order to establish, in a supposedly more favorable atmosphere, a community so organized as to test his matured theories of social organization. His experiment at New Harmony, Indiana, failed after two or three years, and Owen returned to England impoverished. He spent the rest of his life expounding his ideas, through lectures, pamphlets and books. In 1835 he founded a society with a pompous title, "The Association of all Classes of all Nations," and it was in the discussions of this body that the word socialism seems to have been first launched upon its eventful career.

Robert Owen, says one writer, "was essentially a pioneer, whose work and influence it would be unjust to measure by their tangible results. Apart from his socialistic theories, it should, nevertheless, be remembered that he was one of the foremost and most energetic promoters of many movements of acknowledged and enduring usefulness. He was the founder of infant schools in England; he was the first to introduce reasonably short hours into factory labor, and zealously promoted factory legislation — one of the most needed and most beneficial reforms of the century; and he was the real founder of the co-operative movement. In general education, in sanitary reform, in his sound and humanitarian views of common life, he was far in advance of his time."[1]

If Owen may be considered the founder of English Socialism, Saint-Simon was the founder of Socialism in France. Owen was a business man who had been aroused by direct contact with the evils of the factory system to attempt their removal. Very successful within his own immediate sphere at New Lanark he failed in his larger aims, owing to certain serious defects of character and thought, and also owing to the fact that social reorganization is not the comparatively simple thing he considered it, but the most complex and difficult thing on earth. Count Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) was a very different type of person. A member of an old and famous family which has given many men of note to France, including that Duke de Saint-Simon whose memoirs of the Court of Louis XIV are among the treasures of French historical literature, claiming also de-

[1] Kirkup, *History of Socialism*, 69–70.

scent from no less a person than Charlemagne, Count Henri was the heir of ancient and aristocratic traditions, traditions which had, however, no hold upon his mind. He was educated under the direction of d'Alembert, the philosopher and Encyclopedist. As a youth of nineteen he came to America to aid the revolutionists in their fight against England. A man of very active mind he devoted his life to study and writing on scientific, political, and social subjects. During his later years he was reduced to the greatest distress, once, in despair, attempting suicide.

Saint-Simon as a thinker was not systematic nor always clear but he was fertile in ideas, ingenious in plans for social reform, and he exercised a considerable influence upon a small body of young and able men, who were attracted by the generous and benevolent character of his teachings. A profound student of science and of history, he wished to reorganize the world in accordance with the lessons to be learned from them. The future, he held, will belong to "the industrial state," that is, the exploitation of the globe by the material, intellectual and moral activity of men associated together. The new society will be dominated and directed, not by hereditary aristocratic or military classes, but by the intellectual élite, by savants, who alone will possess the necessary knowledge for the regular, scientific, fraternal utilization of the opportunities offered by nature. They alone will be capable of abolishing evil, of suppressing that individualism, that competitive spirit which creates social misery and ruin, that antagonism between states which creates wars, they alone capable of bringing all men together in associated labor. Humanity, organized and directed by them, will attain social happiness and prosperity.

Though Saint-Simon's was a Utopian scheme, no doubt, yet its modern character, as distinguished from other Utopian schemes of social reconstruction, is apparent. It advocated an industrial state directed by modern science. "Every human institution ought to aim at the physical and moral improvement of the most numerous and poorest class; society ought to be organized in the way best adapted for attaining this end."

This became the watchword for the entire school of Saint-Simon, for the master left behind him, when he died, a group of ardent disciples who continued to advocate his principles while at the same time expounding and clarifying them for the general public, such men as Bazard and Enfantin and Pierre Leroux. Some of these abandoned the cult as they grew older,

and the moral and intellectual excesses of some of them tended to discredit it. But Saint-Simonism long remained a fructifying influence in the world of thought. The school as a school, however, was soon torn by internal dissensions and disappeared.

The imagination of Saint-Simon saw farther than that of many of the bourgeoisie. In 1825 it correctly appraised the significance of the railroad, just being invented. This invention, wrote Saint-Simon, will bring about a great revolution in society: "With an ease and rapidity of communication so great, the provincial cities of an empire will become so many suburbs of the capital. Commodities, inventions, discoveries, opinions will circulate with a speed hitherto unknown, and, above all, the relations of men, of provinces, of nations with each other will be prodigiously increased."

Another Frenchman who was struck with the evils of the existing economic system and who elaborated a plan for their cure was Charles Fourier (1772–1837). Fourier's scheme took the commune, or what he called a phalanstery, as the industrial and social unit, a unit comprising about fifteen hundred persons who were to live and work together and share together the product of their toil. Fourier declared that the true foundation of society lay in the spirit of harmony. For his new system he therefore appealed to this spirit. Give every individual the opportunity for self-expression which he instinctively craves and social relations will become harmonious, peaceful, happy. The individual should engage in whatever work he likes, should leave it when he likes and should then take up something more to his taste. Ultimately he will find his perfect niche in society, the kind of work which will be most in harmony with his inclinations and qualities. Such, very summarily stated, were some of Fourier's ideas.

Fourier's scheme was fanciful enough and most shaky in its psychological foundations, grossly underestimating the force of human egotism. But so fervently did its author believe in it that for years he made it a point to be at home every day at noon to receive any rich capitalist who might appear to offer him the means for its realization. The rich man never came, but experiments were made, here and there, more or less according to the new principles. All of these experiments were short-lived, including one in America, at Brook Farm, about ten miles out of Boston, an experiment which had originally grown out of the transcendental movement, and which included among its members at various times George Ripley, George William Curtis,

Father Hecker, Nathaniel Hawthorne and others. Transformed into a "phalanx" in 1845, it disappeared in 1847.

All these men, Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier and their followers, planned for an entirely new social order. But their plans were in part so fantastic, in part such imperfect analyses of both human nature and the nature of human society, that they were for those very reasons predestined to failure. Moreover, their attacks on religion and the family rendered them suspect or odious in the eyes of many who might otherwise have been influenced by their purely humanitarian ideas. Their teachings and their experiments proved that what is essential for the social reformer, who would substitute a new world for an old one, is a sound and accurate knowledge of human nature and of the laws of social evolution as revealed to us by history. Otherwise he builds upon shifting sands, sands which will speedily engulf his temerarious creations. And the science of human nature, as John Ruskin has somewhere pointed out, has to deal with many very subtle elements.

The writings of Owen, Saint-Simon and Fourier were inspired by industrial discontent, by the evils attendant upon the introduction in greater and greater degree of the large-scale system of production. The same conditions also inspired two movements, in England and in France, which aimed at fundamental changes in politics and industry, Chartism in the former country and the Socialism associated particularly with the name of Louis Blanc in the latter. Both these movements are described elsewhere.[1] Both advocated political as well as social reform, necessarily, since in neither state did the working people have any voice in the government, in neither was education assured them, in neither were their interests seriously considered. The workingmen felt that only by attaining political power, by gaining the franchise, could they possibly secure any improvement in their conditions. But, while they advocated certain political measures as the only means to enfranchisement from intolerable burdens, the thing they had most at heart was the removal of those burdens themselves and such a change in social institutions that they could never be restored. The prevalent poverty and social misery of the masses was at the bottom of both movements.

Both movements reached their climax in 1848, when they received such blows that they never recovered. But they left their traces behind them. Particularly in England had one of the greatest literary figures of the nineteenth century, an incompa-

[1] See pp. 127–129, 426–428.

rable master of English prose, been aroused to fever heat by the sight of the suffering of the English masses, and had expressed his wrath with every accent of sarcasm, invective, satire, humor and pathos. Like an avenging god, Thomas Carlyle, on fire with a passionate sense of the wickedness of men and their institutions, played about him right and left with every literary weapon in a singularly capacious and well-stored armory. According to the mood of the moment he used the Damascus blade or the bludgeon, the battering ram or the bowie-knife, in his furious attempt to damage and disfigure those whom he held responsible for the flagrant evils all about him. Those who wish to see how this gladiator worked and the character of his assault have only to read his book on *Chartism*, his *Past and Present* and the frenzied *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, the first of which appeared in 1839, the last in 1850, when the battle was over, having apparently been lost, and which he wrote, he said, "after a period of deep gloom and bottomless dubitation." Carlyle was no patient and careful student but a man of terrific moods and Olympian exaggerations and in his *Latter-Day Pamphlets* he seemed to renounce in fury much that he had said in the earlier two volumes. But with all his limitations and idiosyncracies, with all his stormy, tumultuous haste, and his palpable contradictions, he was, as one writer has said, "the strongest influence toward socialism, in the wide sense of the word, among English writers of the nineteenth century, the first great writer to appreciate the supremacy of the social question and to burn it into the public conscience by eloquence and profound conviction."[1] He was a voice crying in the wilderness, not a still, small voice, far from it, but a strident trumpet call, or, to change the figure, a volcano in eruption, fulgurous and incinerating. Having no faith in pretentious panaceas, in schemes of swift regeneration, in sentimental and doctrinaire idealism, he was, however, a rude and rampant disturber of English complacency and cant, of the optimism of those who thought that because England was growing daily richer, all was well with Englishmen. A master of diatribe and tirade Carlyle shook the earth and made the welkin ring.

But another gladiator of a very different build and very differently accoutred had just entered the arena of social and economic discussion. Just as Chartism was being snuffed out in England under the vigilant and lowering eye of the Duke of Wellington, assisted by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and innumer-

[1] Marvin, F. S., *The Century of Hope*, 109.

able other constables and supporters of the existing order; just as Louis Blanc and all his works, putative and genuine, were being suppressed in France, and just as Carlyle was retiring from the scene of social controversy, soured by the futile sentimentality of light-weight reformers and the bovine stodginess of conservatives and reactionaries, another figure was stepping forth into the light and demanding the attention of the audience while he expounded an idea which had been maturing in his brain, namely that the state of the world was rotten and must be radically altered. The new critic, destined to great fame and influence, was a German, whereas the reformers we have thus far mentioned were Englishmen and Frenchmen. If one is interested in the psychology of peoples one may find in this fact an inviting field for study and reflection.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) was of Jewish origin. He was born in 1818 in the city of Treves. His father was a lawyer. Both parents were cultivated people who renounced Judaism and accepted Christianity, at the same time changing the family name from that of Mordechai to Marx. Young Marx was given a good education. He studied at the universities of Bonn and Berlin and was especially interested in philosophy and history. He fell under the influence of Hegel, then at the height of his celebrity as the leading philosopher of Germany. In 1841 Marx won his doctor's degree with an essay on the philosophy of Epicurus. He had intended to settle at Bonn as a teacher of philosophy but abandoned this idea and entered journalism. For a short time he worked on the *Rhenish Gazette*, a democratic paper published in Cologne, but he shortly removed to Paris, where he gave himself ardently to the study of the subjects that interested him most, economics and history. In Paris he came into contact with socialists of the Saint-Simonian type and with other radical thinkers, like Proudhon. He knew Heinrich Heine, then an exile, and became acquainted with Frederick Engels (1820–95), destined to be his life-long friend and most intimate co-worker. Like himself, Engels was of Jewish origin, and like himself, was absorbed in economic studies. Unlike Marx, Engels possessed a direct and practical knowledge of the condition of laborers under the factory system, having been connected for some time with a cotton mill in Manchester. The two men were henceforth inseparable, collaborating in research and agitation for nearly forty years.

In 1845 Marx was expelled from France and settled in Brussels, where he spent three years. He gave up his Prussian

citizenship and henceforth was a man without a country, since he never sought naturalization elsewhere. In 1845 Engels published a book on *The Condition of the Working Class in England.* Two years later Marx published a severe criticism of the theories of Proudhon, at that time one of the most prominent of European radicals. In 1848 appeared a document destined to be famous, the *Communist Manifesto,* written by Marx and Engels, which expressed for the first time and most effectively a new and revolutionary form of socialism, that form which the world has been discussing ever since.

In 1848 Marx returned to Germany for a short time, revolutions having broken out in that country, and edited a socialist newspaper in Cologne. This activity was soon interrupted, however, and he was expelled from the country. In 1849 he settled in London, which was to be his home henceforth until his death in 1883. He supported himself as best he could, mainly by writing articles for whatever newspapers would accept them, among which was the New York *Tribune,* edited by Horace Greeley, who was interested in the ideas of Fourier. Living very simply, and often in the severest financial straits, he devoted himself, day in and day out, to historical, economic, philosophical research of the most intense kind. The result of his investigations was a *Criticism of Political Economy,* published in 1859, and the first volume of his great work on *Capital* which appeared in 1867. After his death in 1883 the other two volumes of this famous treatise were published by Engels from manuscripts left by Marx. This monumental work became and has remained the Bible of Socialists the word over. Like the Bible, it has had a multitude of commentators and interpreters, "orthodox" and "heterodox." It has been the object of the most unbounded admiration and of severe and damaging criticism. During the past thirty years many of its most important features have been rejected by many able Socialists, as based upon false assumptions or reasoning, or upon inadequate and partial researches. It is in itself a controversial book of the most pronounced kind and has provoked memorable and bitter discussion, which shows few signs of subsiding. Claiming to prove the bankruptcy of the previous science of political economy, it pretends to establish in its place a political economy that is truly "scientific," as scientific, as comprehensive and irrefutable as the physics of Sir Isaac Newton or the biology of Charles Darwin. It has had, however, a far greater success as a work of popular propaganda, in which aspect, indeed, few books in history have surpassed or

equalled it, than it has had as a revelation of pure and final truth in the realm of economics and history.

Let us examine some of the most significant and characteristic of Marx's teachings, as set forth in the *Communist Manifesto* and *Capital*. Marx asserted that his brand of socialism was *scientific*, that is, was a presentation of certain immutable laws. He made short shrift of the socialistic theories of his predecessors which he declared "utopian." He treated with contempt all their schemes for a perfect social organization. The future state is not to be the product of the intellectual ingenuity or imagination of any man, however able; is not, like a great poem or a great work of art, something to be created, if only you have sufficient talent. The socialistic state is not to be the device of some gifted reformer. The future is determined by the past, is the inevitable, ineluctable product of certain forces operating in the world, the product of economic tendencies, and these tendencies are as irresistible as is the law of gravitation. These tendencies determine pitilessly the course of events. Amateurs, framing ideal plans of economic and social reorganization, are no more serious than children blowing soap-bubbles, which are often very beautiful but which are quite hollow and unsubstantial. The problem confronting the serious man is not, by taking thought, to elaborate the future order of the world, but is solely the study of the forces which are at work to-day among men and which will in the fulness of time create that order, whether he likes it or not. It is the business of the investigator to discover laws, not to prescribe panaceas.

Where do you find these laws? In history. Marxian socialism, differing so widely from all preceding so-called socialism, rests, as Engels says, upon one "fundamental proposition," namely the economic interpretation of history. "In every historic epoch," so runs the preface to the *Communist Manifesto*, "the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." In other words, economic conditions have determined the entire course of history, and history is but the record of economic conditions and the institutions and ideas to which they have given birth. Not only do the methods of production and distribution constitute the economic life, but they are the chief factors in determining every other part of life as well. Our political and social institutions, our religious conceptions and emotions, our stand-

ards of morality, our philosophies and literatures, our sciences, our bodies of law, all are inspired, shaped and fashioned and explained by the prevalent economic process. This is the famous economic or materialistic interpretation of history about which Socialists are so confident. It is to them the only safe key, indeed, the only possible key to history. It is the open sesame to knowledge, and there is no other. It is this which renders Marxian socialism "scientific."

Taking hold of this key and turning it, what do we learn in regard to the past? This, that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted fight, now hidden, now open, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large or in the common ruin of the contesting classes." History is but the progressive record of this desperate and destructive struggle of classes. The more it changes the more it is the same thing. The class struggle of to-day, which is to be the final one, is that between employers and laborers, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; in other words between those who own the instruments of production, the capitalists, and those who, in order to live, are compelled to accept whatever conditions the capitalists impose. Such are the modern "exploiters" and "exploited"; such the struggle which is now going on, the result of which is not in doubt, is inevitable and will be revolutionary. As the bourgeoisie defeated the old feudal and aristocratic class and then installed itself in its place, so the proletariat will dethrone the bourgeoisie and rule in its stead. Then will disappear the bourgeois system of law and government, bourgeois morality and religion, all so many "prejudices" — which is merely another word for economic "interests."

But there have been class conflicts in the past which grew and waxed for a time and then waned and faded away. What reason is there for supposing that this particular "class struggle" will become steadily more and more tense and acute and will finally end in revolution? The reason is that "capitalistic production" has two inevitable, unvarying tendencies, greater and greater concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people, and greater and greater misery for the wage-earners, the "exploited." Capitalists will become fewer and fewer and richer and richer as the big ones swallow up the little. The laboring class,

that is, the proletariat, will become larger and larger, as many small capitalists, small farmers and merchants, lawyers, doctors, teachers, the professional people in general, in other words, the middle classes, unable to hold their own with "big capital," will be driven down and down until they land in the proletariat. When you get society divided not into several classes but only into two, and those two sharply differentiated by increasing wealth and increasing misery, then there can be only one outcome, a social revolution. The vast majority of men will not be content to remain forever the wretched tools of a small and selfish minority, controlling all the means of production, that is, holding the veritable keys of life and death. They will, when that intolerable moment has been reached, rise in their wrath, overthrow their oppressors, and themselves take control of the instruments of production. On this point the *Manifesto* of 1848 speaks with its accustomed energy and clarity: "All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself without the whole superincumbent stratum of official society being blown into the air." As the capitalistic method of production is responsible for this situation, it may be said that "what the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are inevitable."

Capitalism is therefore finally hoist with its own petard, or to quote another Marxian phrase, "the expropriators are expropriated." "Let the ruling classes tremble at a communistic revolution," says the meaty *Manifesto*. "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win." If the struggle in which such tremendous things are at stake cannot be otherwise won no quarter is to be given. The year after the appearance of the *Manifesto*, Marx wrote: "We are ruthless and want no consideration from you [the bourgeoisie]; when our turn comes, revolutionary terrorism will not be sugar-coated. . . . There is but one way of simplifying, shortening, concentrating the death agony of the old society, as well as the bloody labor of the new world's birth — revolutionary Terror" — a phrase which Russian Bolshevists were to recall seventy years later.

Such are the three basic principles of Marxian Socialism, the economic or materialistic interpretation of history, the class

struggle, and the inevitable social revolution. There are also two or three other principles or theories which cannot be examined here in this brief summary, such as the theory of surplus value, and of recurring economic crises declared to be inherent in the present economic system. Another cardinal teaching of Marx is that the economic movement which he is describing is not national, but international. The laborers of a given country have far more in common with the laborers of other countries, than they have with the capitalists of their own. All Socialists are brothers, whereas not all Germans or Frenchmen or Americans are. All are "comrades." Class interests have precedence over national interests. The proletarian has no country, only a birthplace. "Workingmen of All Countries, Unite!", such are the closing words of the *Manifesto* of 1848.

How has this elaborate and imposing body of thought called Marxian Socialism fared at the hands of critics and at the hands of time? It may be said at once that if Socialism depended solely upon the truth of the principles which have been stated it would long ago have lost all force, for those principles have been riddled and disproved by an army of competent critics, including many Socialists themselves. And the lapse of time has not been kind to those so-called tendencies which were to lead to the complete collapse of capitalism. Marx's "truths" have turned out to be only half-truths, or truths for the time being, or no truths at all. His fundamental doctrine of the economic interpretation of history, while useful in inciting much fruitful investigation into the economic aspects of history, is woefully inadequate as an explanation of all history. Economic cause and effect have been important in the past, without question, but they do not suffice to reveal the whole story. The history of mankind is the history of the entire life of man on this earth, and that is a very complicated matter to which there is no single key. Life is much more than meat and much more than raiment, and no materialistic philosophy can explain it or adequately account for its immensely varied phenomena. The economic interpretation of history is a gross exaggeration. You cannot explain the action of the race during all past history, or during a century or two, or even during the present moment, by the magic of any single formula or rule. Marx claimed that his system was rigorously "scientific," to be forever distinguished from the "utopianism" of the systems of his socialistic predecessors. But the scientist does not get very far in postulating his laws, if he ignores or misconceives many of the elements in-

volved. Many other motives or instincts operate upon men besides the economic, and often these others act, in fact, in direct opposition to the economic. There are racial characteristics, religious and patriotic motives, the fighting instinct, the dynamic power of exceptional individuals, attested by all history, the influence of traditions and of customs, the power of eloquence inspiring the most surprising actions, the responsiveness of the masses to this or that suggestion, or "mob psychology," if you prefer a rather disobliging term, — all these and many other factors have gone into the making of history and it is the difficult business of the historian to analyze them and to show their relative contributions to any given period in man's evolution. No historian can for a moment claim to be scientific who ascribes all the phenomena of the past to the operations of one force, of one of the interests of men, of one of the aspects of his nature. He can be propagandist or sectarian, if he proceeds thus, but never scientific. It is highly useful and desirable to study economic history but it is also useful and desirable to preserve one's intellectual balance in so doing. Marx, himself, did not preserve this necessary balance. There is danger in positing the future upon a single category of tendencies, as did Marx, for if time proves that those tendencies were merely temporary, then your forecast of the end toward which they are verging, will prove an embarrassment to yourself. And this is what has happened to Karl Marx.

The theories of Karl Marx are based upon certain tendencies which their author observed and which he assumed would continue to persist until the great revolutionary change should occur. But in social matters it is hazardous to make so colossal an assumption as this. Society is likely to react against tendencies which it finds injurious. In other words tendencies develop counter-tendencies and this is what has happened in this instance with a result very damaging to the idea of the inevitability of social revolution.

"Every tendency," says Professor Simkhovitch, "that Marx and Engels confided in has been checked, retarded, deflected, or reversed. Industry has not concentrated to any such extent as the fathers of scientific socialism expected. Agriculture shows tendencies towards decentralization. The concentration of wealth and proletarization of the middle class has proved a fable; and moderate incomes are steadily increasing in number. The idea of the growing misery of the proletariat is abandoned in view of facts that prove the opposite; the class struggle, instead

of increasing, is as a whole diminishing. Commercial crises, that were to increase till they destroyed like an earthquake our whole industrial organization, are admittedly abating their fury. . . . What interests us is the fact that it is not our industrial society but the Marxian theory that has broken down." [1]

But despite this fact that most of the theories upon which Marx based his "scientific" Socialism have been discredited by the criticism which they have encountered, despite the fact that they have been rejected by many thoughtful Socialists themselves, such as Bernstein and the so-called Revisionists, nevertheless the Socialist movement has grown greatly and constantly since Marx first sounded his call to arms, Socialist parties exist in all countries, the Socialist vote is everywhere an appreciable factor in politics and in many countries a very weighty factor. How is this phenomenal growth to be explained in view of the fact that the theories of the school have proved so vulnerable?

This explanation lies in the fact that Socialism has been, apart from all theories, the severest critic of existing conditions, that it has pointed out concretely, repeatedly and unsparingly the evils and defects of the present industrial system, that it has studied and dilated upon every aspect of that most formidable and most complex problem of the relations of capital and labor. Society as it is, being the product of the industrial revolution, has persistently demanded reform, to conform to enlightened standards of justice and humanity. The Socialists are not the only ones to see the needs of the situation. All through the nineteenth century social reformers of many kinds have been at work and have, in sum, accomplished extraordinary results. But the Socialists have from the start had a better organization, and a definite and comprehensive plan, confidently advertised as ensuring the best means of escape from existing abuses. Moreover Socialists have directed their appeal directly to the masses and they have had a wide response. A theory does not need to be sound, a plan does not need to be practicable, in order to appeal to those who suffer or are dissatisfied. The history of error has always been a considerable part of the history of mankind. Moreover it should not be supposed that all those who, in different countries, vote the Socialist ticket are Socialists. Many voters plump for Socialist candidates merely as an emphatic way of expressing their discontent with other parties, or merely as a protest against certain abuses which those parties will not tackle. But, however this may be, and however large

[1] Simkhovitch, *Marxism versus Socialism*, 239.

the deductions must be, the rise and development of socialistic parties and of international socialism are subjects of the first importance in recent history.

Another feature of the philosophy of Karl Marx, namely, its international character, ought to be mentioned. This was openly proclaimed in the *Manifesto* of 1848: "Proletarians of all lands, unite!" Such was the watchword. Laborers were the largest element of the population in every country and success was assured them if they should only work together. In union would they find the necessary strength. Sixteen years after the announcement of this necessity, there was founded in London (1864) "The International Association of Working Men," now called the First International. The entrance of Socialism into politics is a fact of the first importance, within both the national and the international field. The International Association was founded for the purpose of co-ordinating and systematizing the operations of Socialistic societies, groups, parties everywhere. The labor problem was declared to be not a local nor a national problem but an international one. Numbers, as Marx told the workingmen, were on their side, but could only be made effective by union, and the union must transcend national boundaries. The International, as organized in London, was to have a General Council on which each nation was to be represented. This Council was to summon annual congresses, and was to stimulate and correlate as far as possible the efforts of the local societies and the national parties, whenever and wherever they should arise, was to serve as a clearing house of information and suggestion. It was to be a generator of energy, an organizer of propaganda, Socialism in action. It adopted the Marxian economic theories and was pledged to their advocacy everywhere. It inspired alarm in the minds of the governing classes in various countries, who saw in it the possibility of a general uprising of the laboring classes. The congress called to meet in Brussels in 1865 was forbidden by the Belgian government. After that a congress was held every year, usually in Switzerland. In its pronouncements the International became more and more revolutionary. Each succeeding congress added something in the line of defining the Socialistic position.

The International had on the whole a considerable success in educating the opinion of workingmen. Its membership was, however, never very large, its financial resources were slight. It was motley in composition, composed of radicals of various strains who harmonized none too well. Indeed its history was

signalized by a series of internal struggles for control, the chief of which was that between Marx and Bakunin, a Russian refugee who believed in anarchy and who wished to commit the International to the support of his theories. Here was a clash of two programmes, the collectivism of Marx and the anarchy of Bakunin, and a clash of two policies, Marx's policy of legal political action, Bakunin's of violence. In the end the anarchists were expelled.

Attacked from without, and torn within by rival factions, the International did not last long. It was really a society for the propagation of doctrine. It gave Marx a pulpit and a trumpet with which to address the world of labor. But the nationalism of the period, a period which was witnessing the unification of Italy and Germany, was unfavorable to the spread of a philosophy of internationalism. Moreover Karl Marx himself gave it a serious blow by his laudation of the Paris Commune of 1871: "The Paris of the workers, with its Commune, will ever be celebrated as the glorious herald of a new society. Its martyrs will be enshrined in the great heart of the working class. History has already nailed its destroyers on the pillory, from which all the prayers of their priests are impotent to deliver them."

The final congress of the International was held in 1873, and three years later the association was formally declared dissolved. While it had accomplished no positive results in legislation it had rendered familiar to large numbers of the working classes the thought that their problems and interests were international in character and could only be solved by the co-operation of the workers of all countries. This thought was destined to live on in such circles, circles ever widening. The International also started the ideas of Marx on their tour of the world. The progress of Socialism, however, was to be achieved, not through it, but, most strikingly, through the development of compact, aggressive Socialist political parties within the different states. The first of these and the most important, in itself and in its outside influence, was the Social Democratic Party of Germany. The preliminary work had been done, the socialistic dogmas had been defined. That had been the work of Marx. Organization and agitation along national lines only remained, and these were in process of formation during the years when the International was trying its futile experiment with an international Socialist party.

While the International was engaged in this attempt to found

a great international Socialist party which should unite the laborers of all countries under a common banner and a central authority, an attempt that proved futile and short-lived, there was being formed in Germany a nationalist Socialist party, which, by reason of its able and resourceful leadership, its supple and effective organization, its trenchant and vigorous programme, was destined to an extraordinary growth, until in the course of time it became the largest party in Germany, having also served, meanwhile, as a model for the Socialists of other countries. This party was founded by Ferdinand Lassalle, a man whose career was as brilliant and sensational as it was brief and energetic.

Like Marx, the founder of International Socialism, Lassalle, the founder of National Socialism, was of Jewish extraction. The son of prosperous parents, he was given the best opportunities for education, which, moreover, he utilized to the full. His father, a rich Breslau merchant, intended him for a business career, but as business was not at all to his taste, the young man gave himself up to the prosecution of his favorite studies, philology and philosophy, at the universities of Breslau and Berlin. Having completed his university work he went to Paris, where he made the acquaintance of his lyrical and witty fellow-countryman, the poet Heine. Heine, in giving him a letter of introduction to certain literary circles in Berlin, paints the young man as a person of the most remarkable gifts, who combines great knowledge with great acuteness, and altogether exceptional powers of expression with practical ability and driving force. Heine added that Lassalle was highly modern, a typical representative of the new age, quite lacking in all modesty and revealing no talent for self-denial.

In Berlin Lassalle was well received and made many acquaintances in the literary and political and university world. He was pronounced a *Wunderkind*, a miraculous child, by no less illustrious person than William von Humboldt. In Berlin he made the acquaintance of the Countess Hatzfeldt, whose husband was wasting his fortune in profligate living and leaving her in penury. Lassalle, like a true knight errant, believing the lady outrageously wronged, offered his services, fell to studying law, fought the case through thirty-six courts during nine years, brought the faithless Count to terms and won an ample fortune for the Countess. This long-drawn-out trial, one of the most extraordinary of the nineteenth century, had its element of scandal but it made the name of Lassalle known throughout Germany.

The spirit of revolt was in this man's blood. Taking part in the revolutionary movement of 1848 he had been sentenced to six months' imprisonment for having incited workingmen to acts of violence. Thus by the time he was twenty-three he was known as a champion of the laboring classes. For many years he was not allowed to reside in Berlin because of his participation in the events of 1848, but in 1859, he dared to enter that city disguised as a cart-driver, and, through the influence of Humboldt with the King, was finally allowed to remain. Plunging into the constitutional struggle, which shortly broke out between Bismarck and the Liberals of the Prussian Chamber, he advocated a cause represented by neither party in that famous quarrel, the cause of the workingmen. Lassalle was now launched upon that brief, agitated, pyrotechnical career as advanced democrat and radical social reformer which was to constitute his claim to a distinct place in history. By his facile pen, by his impassioned eloquence, by his extraordinary argumentative power, by the magnetism of his personality, by his boldness and his feverish activity, he impressed himself upon his age and started an agitation which has not yet stopped.

A curious leader for the poor, the world's disinherited! A man of fashion, sybaritic in his tastes and with plenty of money to satisfy those tastes, a connoisseur of wines, an amazing conversationalist, with the halo of successful authorship about him, this champion of the toiling masses gave the most brilliant dinners in Berlin, dinners which were the talk of the town. As vain as he was ambitious, he bragged unconscionably, saying, among other things, that in every line he wrote he was armed with the whole culture of his century. There was a streak of vulgarity and much that was theatrical in this man, who in 1864 tossed away his life in a wretched duel, born of a frenzied love-affair, and thus ended a most promising career.

But before he died he had left his mark on history. An unrivalled controversialist, an indefatigable worker, an agitator who knew no fear and who never rested on his oars, he conceived his mission to be to arouse the workingmen of Germany to a sense of their commanding future, to organize and instruct the masses. In speeches and in numerous treatises, which bore witness to the power of his altogether exceptional mind, he criticized the existing capitalistic system of production from every angle and advocated the substitution for it of social production, *productive association* with state credit, a plan somewhat like that which had been advocated by Louis Blanc. This idea was to have

no very great future. Indeed it soon disappeared. But another idea, namely, that the workingmen of Germany, who had hitherto had no political power, should form a great national political party, pledged to fight for democracy and for the amelioriation of the "normal conditions of the entire working classes," was destined to a vigorous life. Lassalle's fundamental idea was that only through the acquisition of political power could the social revolution be effected. In 1863 he founded the *General Workingmen's Association of Germany*, and was its first president, conducting its affairs with ability, making tours among the industrial cities of Germany which sometimes resembled triumphal processions, agitating, orating, corresponding, and appearing in a dozen state trials started against him by watchful, zealous officials. Lassalle died on August 31, 1864, at the age of thirty-nine, leaving a movement that had only begun. His influence was, however, destined steadily to increase among the working classes. Lassalle had also revived the old name of 1848, "Social Democrat," and it became the title of the party organ, established the year after his death.

Lassalle's field of action lay mainly in Prussia and North Germany. Meanwhile there was growing up in Saxony and in South Germany another workingman's party which derived its inspiration direct from Marx, and was in fact one of the fruits of Marx's international movement. William Liebknecht, the leader of this group, was a friend and disciple of Marx. A revolutionist of 1848, Liebknecht had had the usual fortune of the revolutionists of that period and had been driven from Germany and had taken refuge in Switzerland, where he had come into touch with Mazzini. Expelled from Switzerland he went to London where for thirteen years he was closely associated with Marx. Returning to Germany in 1862, he sought to spread the influence of the newly founded International. Liebknecht, like Lassalle and Marx, was a university man, of wide learning, a powerful debater. But he was not the man to win a large personal following, being rigid and dogmatic and lacking many of the qualities that please. He made a notable convert in August Bebel (1840–1913), a wood-turner, the son of Roman Catholic parents, a young man of twenty-five, fourteen years his junior. Bebel had had no such educational opportunities as had Liebknecht, but had educated himself as best he could and with considerable success. It was Bebel who captured the working classes for the new international Socialism of Marx, and who ultimately became the unquestioned leader of the German prole-

tariat, developing into an antagonist so redoubtable that even Bismarck himself found no pleasure in encountering him.

This international group of Socialists, as distinguished from the nationalist group, followers of Lassalle, founded in 1869, at Eisenach the Social Democratic Workingmen's Party, based upon Marxian principles. Thus there were two Socialist parties in Germany, the Lassalleans and the "Eisenachers." For several years the two parties held separate congresses, nominated separate candidates for the Reichstag, and fought each other generally. As their aims were, however, fundamentally the same it was only a question of time when they would fuse and this they did in 1875, at Gotha, assuming the name of the Socialistic Working Men's Party of Germany. The programme then adopted was, on the theoretical side, a compromise between the doctrines and and formulae of Marx and Lassalle; labor, "the source of all wealth and all culture," the ownership of the instruments of labor by society as a whole, the entire product of industry belonging to society, that product to be distributed justly. "The emancipation of labor must be the work of the laboring class, in contrast to which all other classes are only a reactionary mass." The party demanded "the establishment of Socialistic productive associations with State help under the democratic control of the laboring people."

The party also demanded, as the basis of the state, universal, direct and equal suffrage, secret and obligatory voting, a people's army in place of standing armies, questions of war and peace to be decided directly by the people; freedom of the press, of associations and public meetings; free justice and free and universal education; the unrestricted right of combination; prohibition of all child labor, and of all women's labor that is injurious to health and morality; laws for the protection of the life and health of workmen; inspection of mines, factories, workshops, and home industries by officials chosen by the workmen; a "normal working day corresponding to the needs of society" and the prohibition of Sunday labor. Religion was declared to be a private concern, which meant that church and state ought to be separated.

The work accomplished at Gotha was important. It created for the first time in a great European state a single, workingman's Socialist party, with a complete and permanent organization, and a definite programme of principles and practical aims. This party was to have its annual meetings and its own official organ. It was to compete with the other parties in the political arena offered by the institutions of the newly founded German

Empire. The party was also to exert a great and increasing international influence as it became a model for the Socialists in other countries. Indeed, its international influence was to be far greater than that of the International properly so-called, which after a brief existence of ten years had passed out of existence three years before the meeting at Gotha.

Three years after that meeting, in 1878, Bismarck turned his attention to this party which now seemed menacing. In 1871 the Socialists had elected two members to the Reichstag, three years later their representation increased to nine, and in 1877 to twelve. The Socialist votes polled in the first ordinary returns were: in 1871, 124,655 out of a total of 3,892,160; in 1874, 351,952 out of 5,190,254, and in 1877, 493,288 out of 5,401,021. Among the fourteen parties or factions of Germany it had, in 1877, reached the fifth place in the number of popular votes, and the eighth in the number of members in the Reichstag.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER WILLIAM I

The Franco-German war completed the unification of Germany. That unification was, however, no by-product of a war, no astounding improvisation of a genius in politics and diplomacy. The foundations had been laid before, and the superstructure had been slowly and painfully built up. Many forces had long been co-operating, as we have seen, and had at last converged toward this triumphant issue. Most effective of all was the passion for nationality, which gave to the nineteenth century such elevation of emotion everywhere. But all these factors might have failed of results in the domain of politics had it not been for the rise of a forceful and sagacious statesman to a position of vast power in the Prussian state. How he used that power has been shown.

The Constitution of the new state was adopted immediately after the close of the war with France, and went into force April 16, 1871. In most respects it was simply the Constitution of the North German Confederation of 1867. The name Confederation gave way to that of Empire, and the name of Emperor was substituted for that of President. But the Empire was a confederation, consisting of twenty-five states, and one imperial territory, Alsace-Lorraine. The King of Prussia was *ipso facto* German Emperor. The Bundesrath and the Reichstag continued, enlarged by the admission of new members from the new states, but with practically the same powers. The Emperor declared war with the consent of the Bundesrat; he made treaties which, if they concerned matters that fell within the sphere of imperial legislation, must be ratified by Parliament. He was head of the army and navy. He was assisted by a Chancellor whom he appointed, and whom he removed, who was not responsible to the Parliament but to him alone. Under the Chancellor were various secretaries of state, who simply administered departments, but who did not form a cabinet responsible to Parliament. The Empire was a constitutional monarchy, but not a parliamentary one.

Laws were made by the Bundesrath and the Reichstag. The Bundesrat consisted of delegates appointed by the rulers of the different states. The votes of each state, ranging in number from one to seventeen, were cast only as a unit and that according to the instructions of the state government. The Reichstag was the only popular element in the Empire. It consisted of 397 members, elected for a term of five years by the voters, that is, men twenty-five years of age or older. The powers of the Reichstag were inferior to those of most of the other popular chambers of Europe. It neither made nor unmade ministries. While it, in conjunction with the Bundesrath, voted the appropriations, certain ones, notably those for the army, were voted for a period of years. Its consent was required for new taxes, whereas taxes previously levied continued to be collected without the consent of Parliament being secured again. The matters on which Parliament might legislate were those concerning army, navy, commerce, tariffs, railways, postal systems, telegraphs, civil and criminal law. On matters not within the jurisdiction of the Empire each state legislated as it chose.[1]

The German Empire was unique among federal governments in that it was a confederation of monarchical states, which, moreover, were very unequal in size and population, ranging from Prussia with a population of 37,000,000, and covering two-thirds of the territory, down to Schaumburg-Lippe, with a population of 45,000. Three members of the Empire were republics: Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. The rest were monarchies. All possessed constitutions and legislatures, more or less liberal. This confederation differed from other governments of its class in that the states were of unequal voting power in both houses, one state largely preponderating, Prussia, a fact explained by its great size, its population, and the importance of its historic rôle.

Between 1871 and 1918, when the Empire was overthrown, Germany had three Emperors, William I (1871–1888), Frederick III (March 9–June 15, 1888), and William II, from 1888 to 1918.

The reign of William I, as Emperor, falls into two periods; from 1871 to 1878, a period of internal administrative reforms, and of bitter struggles with the Roman Catholic Church — and from 1878 till 1888, the year of his death, a period characterized by the prominence of economic questions, of protection to industries, of social reforms, and of the acquisition of colonies.

[1] The constitution is given in Howard, *The German Empire*, 403–435, and in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, I, 325–351.

During all this time Bismarck was the Emperor's chief minister or Chancellor. Having in nine years made the King, whom he found upon the point of abdicating, the most powerful ruler in Europe, and having given Germans unity, he remained the chief figure in the state twenty years longer until his resignation in 1890.

His position now was one of immense prestige and authority. Much legislation rendered desirable by the new situation was passed in the next few years. Imperial offices were organized. An imperial bureau of railroads was established (1873). In 1873 monometallism was adopted in the place of the confusion of groschen, kreutzer, which hindered trade. New coins were issued, bearing on one side the effigy of the Emperor, and on the other the arms of the Empire — "going to preach to the people the good news of unity." The Imperial Bank was erected in 1875, and, in 1877, elaborate laws on civil and criminal procedure, on bankruptcy, on the judicial organization, and still later, a civil code, were passed. A new system of local government was adopted for cantons, circles, or provinces, whereby the judicial and police authority of the nobility was abolished, and more power was given the voters.

THE KULTURKAMPF

No sooner was the new Empire established than it was torn by a fierce religious conflict that lasted many years, the so-called Kulturkampf, or war for civilization, a contest between the State and the Roman Catholic Church. Germany had, since the time of Luther, been divided among the Protestants and Catholics, the Protestants predominating. South German states, Bavaria, Baden, were Catholic. In Prussia, the stronghold of Protestantism, there were two strong Catholic sections, to the east in the Polish provinces, and to the west along the Rhine. Many causes contributed to the fanning of religious passions at this time. By the Prussian Constitution of 1850 almost complete liberty of action and control of organization were granted the Church, which availed itself most energetically of the advantage thus offered. Religious societies, monastic orders, missions, were established widely and conducted an active and uncommonly successful propaganda during the next fifteen years. Prominent among these were the Jesuits. Two classes were alarmed by this progress, the orthodox Protestants, and those devoted to freedom of

thought, who dreaded the rise of religious fanaticism as prejudicial to culture.

The wars with Austria and France increased the religious disturbance. They were victories by a Protestant state over two strongly Catholic powers. Leadership in Germany had passed from Austria, in Europe from Austria and France, to the principal Protestant nation of the continent, Prussia. In the Seven Weeks' War, the Catholic states, Bavaria, Baden, had sided with Austria. It was widely believed that the French war had been largely occasioned by the Jesuits, working through the Empress Eugénie, and animating her ardent desire to humble the growing Protestant power. Bismarck shared this belief. The loss of the Pope's temporal power just at this time, 1870, embittered Catholics. During the war of 1870 the Archbishop of Posen went to Versailles to solicit Bismarck's intervention in behalf of the Papacy. He was coldly received. Apparently with the purpose of bringing political pressure to bear upon the Chancellor, a Catholic party was organized at once, the so-called Center, and in the election to the first Imperial Parliament it won sixty-three seats; in the election to the Prussian legislature or Landtag, forty-seven. This party desired the restoration of the temporal power and the independence of the Church. The immediate cause of the conflict was the proclamation by the Vatican Council in 1870 of the new dogma of papal infallibility, the dogma that the Pope can not err "when he defines *ex cathedra*, and in virtue of his apostolic authority any doctrine of faith, or morals," a dogma that shocked Liberals thoroughly penetrated with the modern scientific spirit, and that seemed to politicians to assert that the Pope was superior to all rulers, and had a claim upon the loyalty of the faithful superior to that of their sovereigns.

On the promulgation of this dogma a conflict broke out between the Church and the State. In the Vatican Council the German bishops had opposed the new dogma, but had been in the minority. It was now required that all bishops and priests should subscribe to it; the large majority did so, but some refused. A leading opponent was Döllinger, a distinguished professor and theologian. Ordered to explain the dogma in his university of Munich, he denied the principles on which it was based. "As a Christian, a theologian, an historian and a citizen, I cannot accept this doctrine," he declared. He was accordingly excommunicated. As an answer to this the university elected him as its Rector. The conflict quickly widened, affecting schools and parishes. The dissidents called themselves Old Catholics, pro-

claiming their adherence to historic Catholicism, but rejecting merely this addition to their creed as false. These men were excommunicated and deprived of their positions as priests or teachers. People were forbidden to attend worship in churches where they officiated, students to attend the lectures of such professors. The Old Catholics thereupon appealed to the imperial and state governments for protection. A religious war was shortly in progress, which grew more bitter each year. First the Imperial Parliament forbade the religious orders to engage in teaching; then, in 1872, it expelled the Jesuits from Germany. Of all legislation enacted during this struggle, the Falk or May Laws of the Prussian legislature were the most important (passed in May of three successive years, 1873, 1874, 1875). Bismarck supported them on the ground that the contest was political, not religious, that there must be no state within the state, no power considering itself superior to the established authorities. The State must be lay. He also believed that the whole movement was conducted by those opposed to German unity. Anything that imperiled that unity must be crushed. These May Laws gave the State large powers over the education and appointment of the clergy. They forbade the Roman Catholic Church to intervene in any way in civil affairs, or to coerce citizens or officials; they required that all clergymen should pass the regular state examination of the gymnasium, and should study theology for three years at a state university; that all Catholic seminaries should be subject to state inspection. They also established control over the appointment and dismissal of priests. A law was passed making civil marriage compulsory. This was to reduce the power that priests could exercise by refusing to marry a Catholic and a Protestant, and now even Old Catholics. Religious orders were suppressed.

Against these laws the Catholics indignantly protested. The Pope declared them null and void; the clergy refused to obey them, and the faithful rallied to the support of the clergy. To enforce them the Government resorted to fines, imprisonment, deprivation of salary, expulsion from the country. The conflict spread everywhere, into little villages, as well as into the cities into the universities and schools. It dominated politics for several years. In more than a thousand parishes in Prussia, all religious services were suspended and churches were closed. There was no priest to baptize or to marry. Eight out of the twelve bishoprics were vacant. One bishop had fled to Austria, another was hiding in a little village in Holland, and in order

to visit his fellow-Catholics at Munich, had disguised himself as a peddler; another, a cardinal, had taken refuge within the Vatican itself. The national life was more and more troubled, and the end was not being accomplished. Indeed, the resistance of the Catholics only stiffened under what they called this "Diocletian persecution." In the elections of 1877 the Center succeeded in returning ninety-two members, and was the largest party in the Reichstag. It was evident that the policy was a failure. Meanwhile other questions were becoming prominent, of an economic and social character, and Bismarck wished to be free to handle them. Particularly requiring attention, in his opinion, and that of William I, was a new and most menacing party, the Socialist. Bismarck therefore prepared to retreat. The death of Pius IX in 1878, and the election of Leo XIII, a more conciliatory and diplomatic Pope, facilitated the change of policy. From 1878 to 1887 the anti-clerical legislation was in one detail after another abandoned. First the May Laws were suspended, in 1879; then rescinded in 1886; religious orders were permitted to return, with the exception of the Jesuits (1887). Of the various laws only those concerning civil marriage and the civil registration of births and deaths, and the state inspection of schools were left. In return for the measures surrendered Bismarck gained the support of the Center for laws which he now had more at heart.

The religious conflict lasted fifteen years, and was acute during five. Its only permanent result was to consolidate and strengthen the Center or Catholic party, which was henceforth for many years the strongest party in this Protestant country.

BISMARCK AND THE POLICY OF PROTECTION

In 1879, Bismarck brought about a profound change in the financial and industrial policy of Germany by inducing Parliament to abandon the policy of a low tariff, and comparative free trade, and to adopt a system of high tariff and pronounced protection. His purposes were twofold. He wished to increase the revenue of the Empire and to encourage native industries. The income of the Empire consisted mainly of customs duties. Further funds, if necessary, were furnished by the several states, their quotas being apportioned according to population. Now the revenue from customs proved insufficient. For some years there had been a deficit, which involved heavier and heavier taxation of the states, to enable them to meet the assessments. If

the revenue of the Empire should be increased so that it could meet its own expenses and have a surplus, its political strength would be greatly augmented. For, instead of appealing to the states for contributions, it could distribute the surplus to the states, thus relieving them of taxation for federal purposes; and could also use it as a fund for the social reforms which Bismarck had in mind and which will shortly be described.

Moreover, Bismarck now desired high tariff duties in order to protect and encourage home industries. In adopting the principle of protection, he was not influenced, he asserted, by the theories of economists, but by his own observation of facts. In his speech of the 2nd of May 1879, in which he introduced his protective policy, he said that he did not propose to discuss protection and free trade in the abstract. He observed that while England was the only nation following the latter policy, France and Austria and Russia and the United States were pronounced adherents of the former, and that it was too much to ask that Germany should permanently remain the dupe of an amiable error. "We have hitherto," he said, "owing to our policy of the open door, been the dumping-ground for the over-production of other countries. It is this, in my opinion, that has depressed prices in Germany, that has prevented the growth of our industries, the development of our economic life. Let us but close the door, let us raise the somewhat higher barrier which I am now proposing, and see to it that at least we preserve for German industry the same market which we are now good-naturedly allowing foreigners to exploit. . . . The fact is that our condition is unsatisfactory and, in my opinion, is worse than that of any of our protectionist neighbors. If the dangers of protection were as great as they are painted by enthusiastic free-traders, France would have been a ruined and impoverished country long ago, because of the theories which she has followed ever since the time of Colbert. . . . For the abstract teachings of science in this connection I care not a straw. I base my opinion on experience, the experience of our own time. I see that protectionist countries are prospering, that free-trade countries are retrograding and that great and powerful England, the mighty athlete, who, having hardened her sinews, stepped out into the open market and said: 'Who will fight me? I am ready for any and all,' even she is gradually returning toward protection, and will in a few years adopt it, in order to keep for herself at least the English market." [1]

[1] Kohl, *Die politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck,* VIII, 11–32.

On another occasion Bismarck pointed out that England had adopted free trade only after having given such ample protection to her industries that they were able to outstrip all others in the world. Only then did she dare to issue her challenge. He cited the remarkable development of the United States after "the most gigantic and expensive war of all history," as proof of his contention. "Because it is my deliberate opinion that the prosperity of the United States is chiefly due to her system of protection, I urge that Germany has now reached the point where it is necessary that she follow her example."

Bismarck won the day, though not without difficulty. Germany entered upon a period of protection, which, growing higher and applied to more and more industries, has continued ever since. Bismarck believed that Germany must become rich in order to be strong; that she could only become rich by manufactures; and that she could have manufactures only by giving them protection. The system was worked out gradually and piecemeal, as he could not carry his whole plan at once. By means of the tariff Bismarck wished to assure Germans the home market. Not only was that largely accomplished, but by its means the foreign market also was widened. Through offering concessions to foreign nations for concessions from them, Germany gained for her manufactured products an entrance into many other countries, which was denied them before. The prodigious expansion of German industry after 1880 is regarded as a vindication of this policy.

BISMARCK AND SOCIALISM

In 1878 Bismarck turned his attention to the Socialist party whose rise and development have been described in the preceding chapter. The steady growth of this party aroused the alarm of the ruling classes of Germany, and, as its aims were revolutionary and destructive of the entire existing order, it was a more serious enemy than the Center and Ultramontane party. William I regarded Socialism as his personal enemy, and considered himself commissioned by God to combat it. Bismarck had never yet proposed any comprehensive programme against it, but he had long hated the party, as was natural, considering his training and environment, and considering also the declarations of the Socialists themselves. Their leaders, Liebknecht and Bebel, had opposed the North German Confederation, the war with France, the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. The Socialists

expressed openly and freely their entire opposition to the existing order in Germany. It was only a question of time when they must clash violently with the man who had helped so powerfully to create that order, and whose life-work henceforth was to consolidate it. Again, the Socialist party was radically democratic, and Bismarck hated democracy. A conflict between men representing the very opposite poles of opinion was inevitable. The occasion came in 1878, when two attempts were made upon the life of the aged Emperor, the first on May 11th, and the second on June 2nd, the latter proving very serious. These attempts upon the life of a man who was their hero horrified and angered the people. The would-be assassins had acted of their own motion, but they were Socialists. The Socialists denounced their acts, nevertheless public opinion held them responsible. Bismarck determined to use this opportunity to crush them once for all. He would use two methods, one stern repression of Socialist agitation, the other amelioration of the conditions of the working class, conditions which alone, he believed, caused them to listen to the false and deceptive doctrines of the Socialist leaders.

First came repression. In October 1878 a law of great severity, intended to stamp out completely all Socialist propaganda, was passed by the Imperial Parliament. It forbade all associations, meetings and publications having for their object "the subversion of the social order," or in which "socialistic tendencies" should appear. It gave the police large powers of interference, arrest, and expulsion from the country. Martial law might be proclaimed where desirable, which meant that, as far as Socialists were concerned, the ordinary courts would cease to protect individual liberties. Practically a mere decree of a police official sufficed to expel from Germany any one suspected or accused of being a Socialist. This law was enacted for a period of four years. It was later twice renewed and remained in force until 1890. It was vigorously applied. According to statistics furnished by the Socialists themselves, 1400 publications were suppressed, 1500 persons were imprisoned, 900 banished, during these twelve years. One might not read the works of Lassalle, for instance, even in a public library.

This law, says a biographer of Bismarck, is very disappointing. "We find the Government again having recourse to the same means for checking and guarding opinion which Metternich had used fifty years before."[1] It was, moreover, an egregious

[1] Headlam, *Bismarck*, 409.

failure. For twelve years the Socialists carried on their propaganda in secret. It became evident that their power lay in their ideas and in the economic conditions of the working classes, rather than in formal organizations, which might be broken up. A paper was published for them in Switzerland and every week thousands of copies found their way into the hands of workingmen in Germany, despite the utmost vigilance of the police. Persecution in their case, as in that of the Roman Catholics, only rendered the party more resolute and active. At first it seemed that the law would realize the aims of its sponsors, for in the elections of 1881, the first after its passage, the Socialist vote fell from about 493,000 to about 312,000. But in 1884 it rose to 549,000; in 1887 to 763,000; in 1890 to 1,427,000, resulting in the election of thirty-five members to the Reichstag. In that year the laws were not renewed. The Socialists came out of their contest with Bismarck with a popular and a parliamentary vote increased threefold.

But Bismarck had at no time intended to rest content with merely repressive measures. He had purposed from the beginning to effect such sweeping reforms in the conditions of the working classes that they would see that the State was their true benefactor, and would rally around it, leaving the Socialist party stranded and with no further reason for existence. In the very year 1878 he said in the Reichstag, "I will further every endeavor which positively aims at improving the condition of the working classes," and he promised to consider "any positive proposal" coming from the Socialists "for fashioning the future in a sensible way." In this he and Emperor William I were in entire accord, as they had not been in the Kulturkampf. The Emperor in opening the Reichstag in 1879, said; "A remedy cannot alone be sought in the repression of socialistic agitation; there must be simultaneously the positive advancement of the welfare of the working classes. And here the case of those workpeople who are incapable of earning their own livelihood is of the greatest importance." Two years later (March 8, 1881) he said; "That the State should interest itself to a greater degree than hitherto in those of its members who need assistance, is not only a duty of humanity and Christianity — by which state institutions should be permeated — but a duty of state-preserving policy, whose aim should be to cultivate the conception — and that, too, among the non-propertied classes, which form at once the most numerous and the least instructed part of the population — that the State is not merely a necessary but

a benevolent institution. These classes must, by the evident and direct advantages which are secured to them by legislative measures, be led to regard the State, not as an institution contrived for the protection of the better classes of society, but as one serving their own needs and interests." [1] Bismarck said in 1884: "The whole matter centers in the question: Is it the duty of the state, or is it not, to provide for its helpless citizens? I maintain that it is its duty, that it is the duty not only of the Christian state . . . but of every state." [2]

The method by which Bismarck proposed to improve the condition of the working class was by an elaborate and comprehensive system of insurance against the misfortunes and vicissitudes of life, against sickness, accident, old age and incapacity. It was his desire that any workingman incapacited in any of these ways should not be exposed to the possibility of becoming a pauper, but should receive a pension from the state. His policy was called State Socialism. "Give the workingman the right to employment as long as he has health," he told the Reichstag, "assure him care when he is sick, and maintenance when he is old. If you will do that without fearing the sacrifice, or crying out 'State Socialism' as soon as the words 'provision for old age' are uttered . . . then I believe these gentlemen (the Socialists) will sound their bird call in vain; and as soon as the workingmen see that the Government is deeply interested in their welfare, the flocking to them will cease."

Bismarck's proposals met with vehement opposition, both in the Reichstag and among influential classes outside. It was only slowly that he carried them through, the Sickness Insurance Law in 1883, the Accident Insurance Laws in 1884 and 1885, and the Old Age Insurance Law in 1889. These laws are very complicated and cannot be described here at length.

Bismarck wished to have the state bear the entire expense. He did not wish to have it come as an additional burden to the working people. But he was not able to secure the consent of the Reichstag, which gave as reasons for its opposition the enormous amount of money required, the great centralization of power in the hands of the Government which would arise from a system requiring so many officials and handling such large sums, and the weakening of the sense of self-reliance and personal responsibility with the workingmen.

As finally enacted in the case of accident insurance the

[1] Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism*, 111.
[2] *Ibid.*, 118.

employers were to bear the burden alone. The employer was obliged by law to insure his employees, entirely at his own expense. In the case of sickness insurance, as a rule, the employer must pay one-third and the employee two-thirds of the premium, and in the case of the old age and incapacity insurance, the premiums were to be paid by the employers, the employees, and, to some extent, by the state.

Such was Bismarck's contribution to the solution of the social question, which grew to such commanding importance as the nineteenth century wore on. In this legislation Bismarck was a pioneer. His ideas have been studied widely in other countries, and his example followed in some. Dawson calls him "the first social reformer of the century." Bismarck, once charged with changing his opinions to meet the occasion, replied that he had frequently changed his opinions. "But I have been faithful to this: the unification of Germany under the leadership of Prussia. Everything else is accessory." That this system of state insurance, by relieving the mental and physical distress of millions of German laborers would strengthen the Empire, as well as benefit humanity, was, in his opinion, an additional reason for its adoption.

The Socialists did not co-operate with him in the passage of these laws, which they denounced as entirely inadequate to solve the social evils, as only a slight step in the right direction. Nor did Bismarck wish their support. They were Social Democrats. Democracy he hated. Socialism of the state, controlled by a powerful monarch, was one thing; Socialism carried through by the people believing in a democratic government, opposed to the existing order in government and society, a very different thing. At the very moment that Bismarck secured the passage of the Accident Insurance Bill he also demanded the renewal of the law against the Socialists. His prophecy, that if these laws were passed the Socialists would sound their bird call in vain, has not been fulfilled. That party has grown greatly and almost uninterruptedly ever since he began his war upon it.

ACQUISITION OF COLONIES

One of the important features of the closing years of Bismarck's political career was the beginning of a German colonial empire. In his earlier years Bismarck did not believe in Germany's attempting the acquisition of colonies. In 1871 he refused to demand as prize of war any of the French colonial

possessions. He believed that Germany should consolidate, and should not risk incurring the hostility of other nations by entering upon the path of colonial rivalry. But colonies, nevertheless, were being founded under the spirit of private initiative. Energetic merchants from Hamburg and Bremen established trading stations in Africa, and the islands of the Pacific, for the purpose of selling their goods and acquiring tropical products, such as cocoa, coffee, rubber, spices. The aid of the Government was invoked at various times, but Bismarck held aloof. The interest aroused in the exploits of these private companies gave rise towards 1880 to a definite colonial party and the formation of a Colonial Society, which later became important.

The change in the policy of the Government, however, from one of aloofness to one of energetic participation and acquisition of colonies was largely a result of the adoption of the policy of protection and active governmental encouragement of manufactures and commerce. In the debate on the tariff bill of 1879 Bismarck said that it was desirable to protect manufactures, that thus a greater demand for labor would arise, that more people could live in Germany, and that therefore the emigration which had for years drawn tens of thousands from the country, particularly to the United States, would be decreased. But to develop manufactures to the utmost, Germany must have new markets for her products; and here colonies would be useful. In 1884 he adopted a vigorous colonial policy, supporting and expanding the work of the private merchants and travelers. In that year Germany seized a number of points in Africa, in the southwest, the west, and the east. A period of diplomatic activity began, leading in the next few years to treaties with England and other powers, resulting in the fixing of the boundaries of the various claimants to African territory. This is the partition of Africa described elsewhere.[1] Germany thus acquired a scattered African empire of great size, consisting of Kamerun, Togoland, German Southwest Africa, German East Africa; also a part of New Guinea. Later some of the Samoan islands came into her possession, and in 1899 she purchased the Caroline and the Ladrone islands, excepting Guam, from Spain for about four million dollars.

[1] See Chapter . . .


THE COLLEGE OF
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THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

While domestic affairs formed the chief concern of Bismarck after the war with France, yet he followed the course of foreign affairs with the same closeness of attention that he had shown before, and manipulated them with the same display of subtlety and audacity that had characterized his previous diplomatic career. His great achievement in diplomacy in these years was the formation of the Triple Alliance, an achievement directed, like all the actions of his career, toward the consolidation and exaltation of his country. The origin of this alliance is really to be found in the Treaty of Frankfort, which sealed the humiliation of France. The wresting from France of Alsace and Lorraine, he felt, would inevitably render that country desirous of a war of revenge, of a war for their recovery. This remained the open sore of Europe after 1871. Firmly resolved to keep what he had won, Bismarck's chief consideration was to render such a war hopeless, therefore, perhaps, impossible. France must be isolated so completely that she would not dare to move. This was accomplished, first by the friendly understanding brought about by Bismarck between the three rulers of eastern Europe, the Emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria. But this understanding was shattered by events in the Balkan peninsula during the years from 1876 to 1878. In the Balkans, Russia and Austria were rivals, and their rivalry was thrown into high relief at the Congress of Berlin. Russia, unaided, had carried on a war with Turkey, and had imposed the Treaty of San Stefano upon her conquered enemy, only to find that Europe would not recognize that treaty, but insisted upon its revision at an international congress, and at that congress she found Bismarck, to whom she had rendered inestimable services in the years so critical for Prussia, from 1863 to 1870, now acting as the friend of Austria, a power which had taken no part in the conflict, but was now intent upon drawing chestnuts from the fire with the aid of the Iron Chancellor. The Treaty of Berlin was a humiliation for Russia and a striking success for Austria, her rival, which was now empowered to "occupy" Bosnia and Herzegovina. No wonder that the Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff, pronounced the Congress of Berlin "the darkest episode in his career," and that Alexander II declared that "Bismarck had forgotten his promises of 1870." By favoring one of his allies Bismarck had alienated the other. In this fact lay the germ of the two great international combinations of the future,

the Triple and Dual Alliances, factors of profound significance in the later history of Europe.

Of these the first in order of creation and in importance was the Triple Alliance. Realizing that Russia was mortally offended at his conduct, and that the friendly understanding with her was over, Bismarck turned for compensation to a closer union with Austria, and concluded a treaty with her October 7, 1879. This treaty provided that if either Germany or Austria were attacked by Russia the two should be bound "to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their military power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in agreement"; that if either Germany or Austria should be attacked by another power — as, for instance, France — the ally should remain neutral, but that if this enemy should be aided by Russia, then Germany and Austria should act together with their full military force, and should make peace in common. Thus this Austro-German Treaty of 1879 established a defensive alliance aimed particularly against Russia, to a lesser degree against France. The treaty was secret and was not published until 1887. Meanwhile, in 1882, Italy joined the alliance, irritated at France because of her seizure the year before of Tunis, which Italy herself coveted as a seat for colonial expansion. Thus was formed the Triple Alliance. The text of that alliance was kept secret and was first published only after the close of the World War but its purpose and character were fairly well revealed by the diplomatic history of the period. The alliance was made for a period of years, but was constantly renewed and remained in force until 1914. It was a defensive alliance, designed to assure its territory to each of the contracting parties.

Thus was created a combination of powers which dominated central Europe, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and which rested on a military force of over two million men.[1] At its head stood Germany. Europe entered upon a period of German leadership in international affairs which was later to be challenged by the rise of a new alliance, that of Russia and France, which for various reasons, however, was slow in forming.

[1] The history of the Triple Alliance has for the first time been set forth authoritatively by the publication of the documents concerning it contained in the Austrian archives. See the invaluable work of A. F. Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914,* English edition by A. C. Coolidge (1921). An admirable introduction to this whole subject is to be found in A. C. Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917).

CHAPTER XVII

GERMANY UNDER WILLIAM II

THE EDUCATION OF WILLIAM II

On the 9th of March, 1888, Emperor William I died at the age of ninety-one. He was succeeded by his son, Frederick III, in his fifty-seventh year. The new Emperor was a man of moderation, of liberalism in politics, an admirer of the English constitution. It is supposed that, had he lived, the autocracy of the ruler would have given way to a genuine parliamentary system like that of England, and that an era of greater liberty would have been inaugurated. But he was already a dying man, ill of cancer of the throat. His reign was one of physical agony patiently borne. Unable to use his voice, he could only indicate his wishes by writing or by signs. The reign was soon over, before the era of liberalism had time to dawn. Frederick was King and Emperor only from March 9 to June 15, 1888.

He was succeeded by his son, William II. The new ruler was twenty-nine years of age, a young man of very active mind, of fertile imagination, versatile, ambitious, self-confident, a man of unusual vigor. His education had been fashioned by events and by the pursuit of a regular programme of studies under competent masters. As a boy he had known all the excitement, all the exhilaration, the patriotic intoxication of the great era of Prussian and Hohenzollern victories, the defeat of Austria and of France, the home-coming of the laurelled soldiers of those stunning campaigns, the coronation of his grandfather William I, the exaltation and glory of the new empire, brought about by Prussia, the world-wide fame of Bismarck. All the intense emotions of that period of unparalleled triumphs played upon the sensitive and imaginative nature of the boy who never forgot the magic impressions of those days. They formed a significant part of his education.

Having completed his secondary studies at Cassel William entered the University of Bonn, which his father had attended in his day and which his son, the Crown Prince, was to attend in his. He joined the *Borussia*, the most famous student fighting corps

which counted many German princes among its members. He wore its ugly cap and gladly attended its meetings in which liberal libations of beer and much singing of chauvinistic songs beguiled the hours away most pleasantly. But William also applied himself to his studies with exemplary assiduity. One of the masters who exercised a great influence upon him at this time was Maurenbrecher, the historian, who caused him to understand Bismarck and to appreciate him. "By the time he left the University," said Maurenbrecher later, "he had, thanks to me, become a fervent admirer of the Prince von Bismarck. I am proud to have achieved this result, and, had I not written a single book, I could still bear witness that I had used my life gloriously." The professor, thus easily satisfied, was destined to know in 1890 that most melancholy experience that comes into the life of a teacher now and then to embitter it, the revelation, namely, that his pupil had quite forgotten his lesson.

The young prince used his university vacation in traveling and one of his trips was to Paris, which, at the age of nineteen, he visited in strict incognito. He saw all the classic sights, among them the Hall of Mirrors in the Château of Versailles, where, seven years before, the German Empire had been proclaimed and where the ruling house of Prussia had attained its apotheosis, and where, forty-eight years thereafter, a very different ceremony was destined to take place.

A Frenchman who saw much of the Prince during the student's days at Bonn has testified that the dominant traits of his character were energy, combativity and a will of iron. These traits were not likely to be diminished by the military education and training which William subsequently received, and all the obligations of which he discharged with application and with zeal.

It was now time to initiate the future occupant of the throne into some of the mysteries and activities of the state in order that he might be adequately prepared, and the old Emperor, William I, and Bismarck arranged, in 1886, that he should do the thing he desired to do, namely, have access to the Foreign Office and its sometimes exciting minutes and transactions, a decision which was emphatically but unavailingly disapproved by William's father, the Crown Prince Frederick, who stated his reasons in a letter to the Chancellor:[1] "But considering the unripeness and inexperience of my eldest son, together with his leaning toward vanity and presumption, and his overweening esti-

[1] In this section I have freely used my introduction and the letters contained in *The Kaiser versus Bismarck* (Harper & Bros., 1921).

mation of himself, I must frankly express my opinion that it is dangerous as yet to bring him into touch with foreign affairs," an interesting and striking pen portrait drawn by the hand that presumably was most qualified to draw, namely, the parental hand.

Interesting, too, and ironic, in view of what was before long to happen, is a letter of William to Bismarck, dated December 21, 1887, in which the Prince said: "The great and affectionate respect and heartfelt attachment which I cherish for Your Highness — and for you I would let my limbs be hewn piecemeal, one after the other, rather than undertake anything that would be disagreeable to you or cause you difficulties — should, I think, be sufficient guaranty that I have engaged in this work in no party spirit." And is not the future Emperor further adumbrated in another letter written at about the same time, November 29, 1887, in which he unfolds to the Iron Chancellor his plan of action toward his fellow sovereigns of Germany when he should be called to power by two deaths which he saw were imminent: "Elderly uncles must not put a spoke in the wheels of their dear young nephew." "It will be easy for me, as the nephew of these gentlemen, to win them over by little acts of complaisance, and to make them tractable by means of eventual visits of ceremony. If I have first of all convinced them as to my type and character and have got them well in hand, they will then obey me all the more readily. For I must be obeyed! But obedience is better obtained by persuasion and confidence than by compulsion."

But these letters, which contained such illuminating analysis by the father and such self-revelation by the son, were not known to the public. The new ruler, however, began, immediately upon his accession to the throne, to show forth the kind of man he was and the ideas which he found congenial. He inaugurated his reign with three proclamations. The first, issued a few hours after his father's death, was addressed to the soldiers. "The absolute and indestructible fidelity of the army to its commander" is the heritage transmitted in the army from father to son from generation to generation. . . . "We are made for each other, I and the army, and we shall remain inseparably united, whether God gives us peace or tempest." The army was, indeed, the new Emperor's first thought. The second was the navy, to which he issued a proclamation on the same day as that to the army, that is on June 15. This was the more striking, as hitherto the navy had played so slight a rôle in German history

that it did not seem to merit the honor of special mention, something which no previous Prussian ruler had accorded it.

It was not until four days later that William the Second addressed his people, promising "to be a just and clement prince, to foster piety and the fear of God, to maintain peace, to succor the poor and the downtrodden, to be a righteous man and a true protector."

The relative emphasis thus put upon the army, the navy and the German people in the Emperor's earliest utterances was destined to be preserved all through the reign, to be repeated in endlessly varied forms to the point of satiety. Another note, sounded early, was his enthusiasm for religious orthodoxy. He also held the doctrine of the divine origin of his royal power with medieval fervor, expressing it with frequency and in dramatic fashion. "My grandfather," the Emperor said to his faithful Brandenburgers in 1890, "considered that the office of king was a task that God had assigned to him, to which up to the last moment he consecrated all his strength. That which he thought I also think, and I see in the people and the country that have been transmitted to me a trust that is confided to me by God, which it is my duty to increase. . . . Those who wish to aid me in that task, whoever they are, I welcome with all my heart; those who oppose me in this work I shall crush." The idea of divine-right monarchy, which is the implicit negation of popular sovereignty, as it admits no intermediary between God and the princes who represent Him, was to find repeated and adequate expression in the speeches of the new Emperor.

It was evident that a man of such a character and of such opinions would wish to govern, and not simply reign. He would not be willing long to efface himself behind the imposing figure of the great Chancellor. Bismarck had prophesied that the Emperor would be his own Chancellor, yet he did not have the wisdom to resign when the old Emperor died, and to depart with dignity. He clung to power, and every evidence of his master's favor filled him with joy. And there were many such during the early months of the new reign. Had not William, as Crown Prince, as recently as April 1, 1888, proposed a resounding toast to him on the occasion of his birthday: "Standard-bearer of the imperial banner, may you long continue to hold it aloft!" And had not Bismarck composed the Kaiser's first speech from the throne and had not the Kaiser, having read it, extended his hand from the throne itself to Bismarck, and had not the resulting vigorous clasp seemed a sign to all the world that the mon-

arch and the minister were in complete accord? The young sovereign was "full of good will," Bismarck confided to his friends. Nothing could be more idyllic. Evidently his early premonitions had been quite baseless. When, in October, 1889, in the midst of an important interview with Alexander III of Russia, the Tsar interrupted Bismarck by saying, "Yes, I believe you, I have confidence in you, but are you sure of remaining in office?" Bismarck replied, "Certainly, Your Majesty, I am absolutely sure to remain a minister all my life." And the Emperor on his side seemed to be of the same opinion, for on December 30, 1889, he wrote to his Chancellor, "May God still for many years grant your true and tried counsel, in my difficult trade of king."

But as the Psalmist discovered long ago and announced to the world, put not your trust in princes. Princes are sometimes fickle, and generally very jealous of their rights. They wish to appear before the world not only as the power on the throne but the power behind the throne as well. Moreover there are always ambitious and ingenious intriguers at court engaged in the practice of the art of feathering their own nests, a practice which is facilitated if all watch dogs are removed. There were many such intriguers at the Court of Berlin, who lost no occasion to suggest to the monarch that he owed it to himself not to be eclipsed, in the present or the future, by any luminary, however effulgent, who pointed out that Frederick the Great had ruled in spirit and in truth, as well as in law, from the age of twenty-eight, and that he had made the greatest of all Hohenzollern reputations by relying upon himself. A courtier who himself aspired to be chancellor casually dropped a remark which is said to have produced a great impression upon the Emperor to the effect "that Frederick the Great would never have been Great if on his accession to power he had found and retained a minister of Bismarck's importance and authority."

But there were more serious reasons than these for that event of great pith and moment, the sudden and forced resignation of Bismarck on March 20, 1890. Behind the fair exterior of their public relations there were differences of opinion between the two men quite early in the reign. The Emperor noticed that things were kept from him and became distrustful. The Chancellor, on his part, confided that "the sudden decisions of His Majesty" were making his position difficult. But the fundamental difficulty lay in the character of the two men, was inherent in the situation. They belonged to different ages, they thought

differently, felt differently. At bottom the question was who should rule in Germany, the monarch or the minister? The struggle was for supremacy, since there was no way in which two persons so self-willed and autocratic could divide power. As Bismarck stayed on when he saw that his presence was no longer desired, the Emperor, not willing to be overshadowed by so commanding and illustrious a minister, finally demanded his resignation early in 1890. Thus in bitterness and humiliation ended the political career of a man who, according to Bismarck himself, had "cut a figure in the history of Germany and Prussia." Bismarck was most unceremoniously hustled out of the palace he had occupied for years, not even having time to superintend the packing of his papers, and his successor was rapidly installed. Bismarck was later obliged to return the proportion of his quarterly salary, which had been paid on January 1, for the eleven days from the date of his dismissal (March 20–31). In many countries a domestic servant is better treated. Republics are not the only governments that show ingratitude, or a mean vulgarity.

Bismarck left Berlin amid frenzied expressions of respect and homage from enormous crowds that sought to do him honor. He withdrew to his estate, Friedrichsruh, where he lived for eight years longer, surrounded by his family and friends. He found country life less attractive than he had thought it from previous experience, and retirement from the world's great stage soon became an intolerable bore. To be compelled, like any other human being, to read in the morning paper the news which he had been in the habit of creating was humiliating, indeed. To relieve the ennui and to indulge his still vigorous combative instincts, he used his time in writing his memoirs and in carrying on a guerilla war in the newspapers with his enemies and successors. Friedrichsruh became during these years a place of pilgrimage for patriotic Germans. Delegations, associations, distinguished individuals visited in almost endless succession the great exile, and formidable and heady was the volume of incense that arose. But all this, though gratifying enough in itself, was tame for one who had tasted abundantly of the real pleasures and pomp of power. The time for those had passed forever, and indeed, the end of all was approaching. Bismarck died on July 30, 1898, at the age of eighty-three, leaving as his epitaph, "A faithful servant of Emperor William I." Thus vanished from history one of the few great founders of states.

After 1890 the personality of William II was the decisive

factor in the state. His Chancellors were, in fact as well as in theory, his servants, carrying out the master's wish. Down to the outbreak of the Great War there were four: Caprivi, 1890–1894; Hohenlohe, 1894–1900; Bülow, 1900–1909, and Bethmann-Hollweg, from July, 1909. The war was to add three others to the list, whose terms were to prove exceedingly brief, Michaelis, Hertling, and Prince Maximilian of Baden.

The extreme political tension was at first somewhat relieved by the removal of Bismarck from the scene, by this "dropping of the pilot," after twenty-eight years of continuous service. The early measures under the new régime showed a liberal tendency. The Anti-Socialist laws, expiring in 1890, were not renewed. This had been one of the causes of friction between the Emperor and the Chancellor. Bismarck wished them continued, and their stringency increased. The Emperor wished to try milder methods, hoping to undermine the Socialists completely by further measures of social and economic amelioration, to kill them with kindness. The repressive laws lapsing, the Socialists reorganized openly, and have conducted an aggressive campaign ever since. The Emperor had said that Social Democracy was a "transient phenomenon which would be exhausted by its own violence." But, seeing his error and recognizing the futility of anodynes, he soon became the bitter enemy of the Socialists and began to berate them vehemently. In November, 1891, he told the recruits at Potsdam: "If Socialist agitations continue as they are doing, I may have to order you to shoot down your relatives, your brothers, even your parents — which God forbid! — but even then you must obey my commands without murmuring." Later he denounced the Socialists as "a pack of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans," as "a treasonable horde," as "vermin gnawing at the roots of the Imperial oak." Such passionate utterances only added fuel to the flames. The Emperor, who was so confident in his own judgment, was also evidently impulsive, changeable, swayed by sudden and violent emotions, likes and dislikes, prejudices and predilections. In this first important contact with affairs the superficiality of his judgment and the instability of his purpose were clearly shown.

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL EXPANSION

The reign of William II was notable for the remarkable expansion of industry and commerce which rendered Germany the redoubtable rival of England and the United States, an expansion

with which the Emperor was in full sympathy and which he encouraged in every way. This astonishing development, which transformed Germany from an agricultural into an industrial state, began under William I and was greatly furthered by Bismarck's policy of protection, but it was under William II that it attained its most signal triumphs. The successful issue of the war of 1870 and the founding of the Empire in 1871 gave a great impetus to the political and commercial life of the nation. Germany became conscious as never before of her power and of her manifold opportunities. The spirit of enterprise, of adventure, was in the air and sought expression in all departments of the national life. This old, historic people seemed to be born again, seemed endowed with a new youth, and with all the ardor and energy and audacity that go with youth. Particularly was this expansion to be observed in the economic life of the country. An unwonted energy sent its pulsations through every class of the population. The restless spirit of the Germans showed that they were passing into a new phase of their history. The industrial epoch had arrived.

One has only to consider the rapid growth of the cities of Germany to become aware of the tremendous power of the new factors in the situation. In 1870, Germany had only eight towns of over 100,000 inhabitants; in 1880 the number was fourteen; in 1890 twenty-six; in 1900 thirty-three; in 1910 forty-eight, sixteen of which had over 250,000 inhabitants. In Great Britain in 1911 there were forty-four towns with a population of over 100,000, fifteen of which had over 250,000 inhabitants. Berlin in 1870 had a population of over 800,000; in 1910 of over 2,000,000. The population of the German Empire was forty-one million in 1870, sixty-five million in 1910.

These statistics indicate several things, among which are to be particularly noted the expansion of industry and the shifting of population from the country to the urban districts. In 1870 the rural population of Germany was sixty-four per cent.; in 1910 about thirty-three per cent. The nation was rapidly becoming an industrial state, and industrial development tends to concentrate population in certain favored regions. Agriculture was becoming relatively less important. In every branch of industry the progress was astonishing and constituted an increasing menace for competitors. It was probably in the metallurgical and mining industries that the most striking advances were made. Modern industrialism is based upon two things, coal and iron. The nation which has had the richest deposits of these materials,

and which knows best how to exploit them, is the nation marked for industrial primacy. The development of these two basic industries during the last fifty years in Germany has been extraordinary. The principal coal-fields of Germany were those of the Ruhr, in Westphalia, of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Saxony, and of the Saar. In 1872 the coal output of Germany was thirty-three million metric tons, in 1912 a hundred and seventy-five million. The uses of coal are numerous. It serves not only to warm our houses, factories and public buildings, to run our machines, to furnish the power for light and transportation, but, in recent years, it has become the basis of new industries which have greatly flourished in Germany, the manufacture of various pharmaceutical preparations, such as saccharin, phenacetin, aspirin, and, most important of all, the anilin dyes which have become so essential to the textile industries of the world and in the manufacture of which Germany, thanks to the discoveries of her chemists, not only became the leader but practically the monopolist, thus having a thriving source of revenue from abroad, from France and England and the United States, countries which needed these dyes but knew not how to make them.

In other branches of activity we find the same extraordinary expansion. Between 1870 and 1914 Germany's output of iron increased about sixteen times and she became the second iron-producing country of the world, the United States being the first. In the steel industry a similar development occurred. Within twenty years, from 1890 to 1910, Germany's output increased seven times as fast as did that of England and at the outbreak of the war its total product was twice that of Great Britain.

In other industries, too, the same or similar results; in that of shipbuilding, in which rapid progress was made during the reign of William II, endowing Germany with a large and modern navy and with a mercantile marine, second only to that of England; in the industry of machine-making, in which Germany became an important exporter all over the world; in the textile and chemical and electrical industries which grew at a giant's pace; there was hardly a field of economic activity which had not its record of triumph.

There was too a remarkable growth in the foreign trade of Germany during this period, partly as a consequence of the rapid development of her manufactures, partly as a necessary aid to that development, Germany being compelled to import large stocks of raw materials to keep her factories going, com-

pelled to export for the same reason and, also, to pay for that portion of her food which her native agriculture could not furnish her. Between 1870 and 1914 Germany's foreign trade increased five hundred per cent., from a billion to five billion dollars. And this expansion of the foreign trade brought with it as concomitants the building of more and larger ships, an enormous growth in the merchant marine. The tonnage of German shipping engaged in world commerce increased not only steadily but rapidly. That shipping became concentrated more and more into a few great companies, of which the Hamburg American and the North German Lloyd lines were the chief. Hamburg and Bremen became the leading ports of the Continent, admirably equipped with all the facilities that modern commerce demands, docks and quays and warehouses. The expansion of commerce was also in part the cause and in part the effect of the endeavor to equip the whole country with adequate railroads and canals.

Germany thus became under William one of the busiest workshops of the world. Her economic development led to an increase in her population and the increase in her population facilitated her economic development. And her expanding industries were able in increasing measure to take care of the growing numbers. Germany, which had for forty or fifty years been a land of emigration, became one of immigration. Probably between four and five million Germans had gone to the United States alone since 1848, sometimes as many as two hundred thousand a year. But in the last decade of the nineteenth century this outgoing stream practically ceased to flow, Germany losing only about twenty thousand of her subjects annually, which was no more than a normal wastage for any country of her size. Not only was German industry so prosperous that it could offer an attractive field for the energies of a population which was growing at the rate of seven or eight hundred thousand a year, but it was even forced to draw upon neighboring countries for an additional labor supply. Hundreds of thousands of Russians, Italians, Austrians, came to Germany annually, for longer or shorter periods, to help work her mines and harvest her crops. From being a land of emigration, Germany became a land of immigration, temporary immigration. To such a pitch had the national enterprises developed that the national labor resources were no longer adequate.

The reasons for this notable economic development, which we have thus briefly sketched, are numerous. First, as already in-

dicated, the great quickening of the national energies, the broadening of the national horizon, the stimulus to national ambition that followed the exciting chapter of national unification, the extraordinary years from 1864 to 1871. But not only did that movement generate unwonted popular exhilaration, not only did it inspire great self-confidence in the German people, but it yielded them some very palpable and mundane advantages as well. War frequently pays, if only you but win it, and the war of 1870 brought Germany an indemnity of practically a billion dollars in gold, something unheard of until then, every penny of which was collected, and also brought Alsace-Lorraine with an industrious population of over a million and a half, with a large wheat area, with a flourishing cotton industry, and with rich stores of iron. Germany's industrial prosperity has been built up, as has that of England, upon coal and iron. Now at the close of the Franco-German war the boundary was so drawn as to give Germany half of the most valuable deposit of iron ore in Europe, and one of the largest deposits in the world, namely, that of Lorraine. The accruing advantage was enormous and ought to be visible even to those who think that war is never advantageous from an economic point of view. In 1913 out of twenty-eight million tons of iron ore extracted from the soil of Germany, twenty-one million came from the mines of annexed Alsace-Lorraine alone, that is to say, three-fourths of the production of the entire empire. The Treaty of Frankfort therefore was a godsend to German metallurgy, which received a conspicuous fillip toward that development which has been one of the features of her later history. Furthermore Germany also received that part of the coal basin of the Saar which had remained French in 1815 and which constituted perhaps a fourth of the field. An excellent birthday gift, these French minerals, for the new German Empire which had just been proclaimed in the mirrored and marble halls of the palace of Versailles. Being basic materials they represented a signal gain to German industry and a corresponding loss to the industry of France. German enterprise was to know how to exploit them to the full. The annexation of Lorraine was, then, something more than the transfer of territory and human beings from one sovereignty to another. It was an economic fact of great significance. It rendered possible the great metallurgical development of Imperial Germany which, in turn, was at the basis of her industrial and commercial expansion.

Such was the material gain of the Franco-German war. That

war also had its intellectual and moral reaction. Germany's brilliant successes, while they had a depressing effect upon the next generation in France, had an electrifying one upon the German people, stimulating all its energies to an exceptional pitch. A characteristic of the succeeding period was the enthusiasm of the German people for industrial and commercial pursuits, the national resolve to achieve in the economic sphere the greatness already achieved in politics and war.

Another reason helping to explain the rapid rise of Germany as an economic power was the profound respect of the Germans for science and their eagerness to apply scientific discoveries and scientific processes to the service of industry, at every point and constantly. The laboratory became, not merely an adjunct, but in many cases, the vital center of the factory, sending new forces pulsing through the industry, as, from time to time, new light emerged from the experiments of the chemists, or the physicists, or the engineers whom German manufacturers had the wisdom to gather about them. More than any other people did the Germans recognize that intelligently directed scientific research is a necessity for modern industry. This faith in science, this belief that science "pays" is illustrated by the story, which is typical and not exceptional, of the manager of a large chemical establishment who, pointing to the seventy highly trained chemists who were engaged in research, said to a visitor to his factory, "These seventy researchers cost us 350,000 francs a year; nine-tenths of them will produce nothing, but the tenth man may discover something which will enable us to earn several millions a year." Another company having purchased the patents for a process of making artificial indigo spent seventeen years in minute research in order to make this discovery commercially valuable. The famous Krupp munition works at Essen included an immense laboratory of physics and chemistry remarkably equipped — an agency of scientific research such as was possessed by no university in the world.

Now this scientific conception of industry is nothing peculiar to the Germans, is no German invention. Without going farther back we find the idea of applied sciences clearly grasped in England at the close of the eighteenth century and in France at the beginning of the nineteenth. But it was the Germans who erected this idea into a system. German universities and technical schools rendered Germany powerful in the markets of the world. By educating this scientific general staff for the factories of the country they were winning victories in the field of industry as

the military staff was preparing to win them on the field of battle.

Other reasons for the economic successes of the Germans are: the high birth rate, assuring Germany, toward the end of the period, seven or eight hundred thousand new pairs of arms every year; the industriousness of the German workman, his steady application, his sense of discipline, his habits of obedience, his satisfaction in being grouped and organized with others of his class, qualities remarkably adapted to the new conditions of industry, with its enormous aggregations of workers under concentrated leadership. Then again the Germans showed the national patience and care in their study of the market, in their study of the customer and their determination to please him at all costs, in their readiness to adapt methods and processes to the peculiarities or tastes of the particular country or people with which they wished to deal. In other words they sought to apply the maximum of intelligence to the great art of salesmanship.

Other nations had no legitimate grounds of complaint if the Germans forged ahead, and even won their markets away from them by the use they made of the national habits of industry and application, thoroughness and intelligence. But there was more to the story than merely a laudable exploitation of national virtues. This grandiose machine, once set up and put in motion, produced far more than was needed at home. A hunt for new markets, new and newer, consequently began. The Germans deliberately, intentionally, adopted the policy of systematic and enormous over-production and, to drain off the surplus, they must inundate the world. "We must export in order to import, and we must import, in order to live and work," they said. Once entered upon this path there was no stopping. An increasing population, an increasing industrial efficiency, an increasing output rendered absolutely necessary larger markets which could only be found abroad. Exportation, being essential to the national life, was organized with the customary German thoroughness. Markets must be procured at all costs, honestly if possible, dishonestly or unfairly, if needs must be. One conspicuous result, in the decade preceding the World War was the increasing resort on the part of the Germans to unfair methods of underselling and undermining rivals in the fierce competition for the markets of the world, methods, elaborately and minutely organized, in which the state, the railroads, the banks and the factories all combined in ingenious and unscrupulous collaboration. One of these methods was that called dumping, that is, the unloading upon

foreign markets at unreasonably low prices of goods which are sold much dearer in the country producing them. The object of dumping is to kill off the foreign competition by prices which are often far below cost, in the expectation that prices may be increased as soon as these rivals are driven into bankruptcy. Thus a commodity made in Germany and selling there for a hundred marks might be sold in France for eighty and in Italy for sixty, the rate being fixed low enough to cut under the French and Italian producer of the same commodity. Dumping, as the name itself shows, was no German invention. The English engaged in dumping long before the Germans, and certain French and American concerns had also sometimes practised it. But what with the latter was generally only a temporary expedient of relieving the home market from a momentary surplus of commodities, was erected by the Germans, according to their national habit, into a permanent system. It became a recognized policy of exploitation, openly encouraged by the state. Economic relations assumed under this system the character of military operations, the purpose of which is no longer exchange, but complete destruction of competitors, the prevention or annihilation of the same industries in other countries than Germany. As a matter of fact the Germans had succeeded by this and other methods of " economic penetration " in reducing Italian industry into practical serfdom to German industry, in bringing Belgium under the German yoke long before the invasion of 1914, and in crushing many competing industries in Switzerland and Spain, even in France, and in then occupying the field for the greater glory and advantage of Germany. The German will to conquer, by fair means or by foul, could only in the end arouse the determination of other peoples to defend themselves. The latter would not be willing permanently to acquiesce without a struggle, and in an attitude of impotence and resignation, in their own strangulation by a power bent on Germanizing the world.

The picture we have been painting of the extraordinary transformation of Germany under the Empire is still far from complete nor can we hope to make it complete within the space at our disposal. That transformation was to be observed in almost every aspect of the national life. The state and its head, the Emperor, by associating themselves closely and fruitfully with all this development, favoring in a multitude of ways the release and multifarious expression of the nation's energies, by personifying the national aspirations, by identifying themselves with the enterprising and adventurous spirit of the people, became

themselves immensely popular, and this, in turn, increased their influence for good or for evil, as the case might be. They stirred the national imagination.

NAVAL EXPANSION

The expansion of industry, of the foreign trade, of the mercantile marine naturally aroused a desire for a navy, for colonies, for a vigorous foreign policy, attentive to the national interests everywhere. To all of these concerns the government of William II was keenly alive. Strong on land for fifty years, William desired that Germany should be strong on the sea, that she might act with decision in any part of the world, that her diplomacy, which must be permeated with the idea that nothing great should be done in world politics anywhere, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, without her consent, might be supported by a formidable navy. To make that fleet powerful was a constant and a growing preoccupation of the Emperor. Here again William II was the faithful spokesman of the people, who supported him enthusiastically, convinced, as they were, of the economic necessity of a great navy, as a protection of the position Germany had acquired, as "insurance."

We have seen that the first official utterance of William II on the day of his accession was a proclamation to the army. The second was a proclamation to the navy, a small and neglected affair which no German Emperor before him had ever thought of thus addressing. The emphasis which William thus put upon the navy at the very outset of his career was but a harbinger of what was to come. Many of the most memorable phrases of this monarch, who had a taste and aptitude for swelling oratory, express this great interest which was to become an important factor in the history of the reign. As William I had made the modern and glorious German army, William II aspired to make a powerful navy, and he succeeded. "Our future lies upon the water," "sea power is world power," "Neptune with the trident is a symbol that we have new tasks to perform . . . and that trident must pass into our hands," such are some of the phrases by which William sought to impress his people with the importance of the new interest. He spoke of himself as "The Admiral of the Atlantic," forgetful that England might have some claims to that pretentious title. "The Admiral of the Atlantic salutes the Admiral of the Pacific," was a famous Imperial toast. The Emperor talked much of the "empire of the sea" and of Ger-

many's duty to " impose peace on the sea " as well as on land. On January 1, 1900, he said, " What my grandfather did for the army on land that is what I shall do for the navy; without permitting myself to be troubled, I shall accomplish the work of reorganization, in order that it may hold the same rank as my land forces, and that, thanks to it, the German Empire can take the place in the world that it does not yet occupy. By means of the two armies, land and sea, I hope to be able, with the aid of God, to realize the saying of Frederick William I 'when one wishes to decide anything in this world, the pen is not sufficient, if it is not supported by the sword.' "

Under such aggressive and ambitious leadership as this Germany supplied herself with a powerful and modern fleet, second only to that of England. The first great navy law was passed in 1900 and the words of the preamble revealed its temper and contained a pointed hint for the rest of the world, and particularly for Great Britain, to reflect upon: " Germany must possess a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest naval Power would endanger the supremacy of that Power." Under Admiral von Tirpitz, who was appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1897 and who presided for twenty years over the construction and development of the fleet, the training of its officers and men, and the establishing of its discipline and traditions proceded apace. In 1890 Heligoland was acquired by Germany from Great Britain and was made into an impregnable fortress. Five years later the Kiel Canal, connecting the North Sea and the Baltic, was completed. These were events of vital importance in the history of the German navy as a fighting force.

COLONIAL POLICY

Along with the steadily increasing interest in the navy went naturally enough an interest in colonial development. Here, however, Germany encountered obstacles which foiled and irritated her. In the competition for colonial possessions Germany arrived late upon the scene and did not fare well. We have seen that at first Bismarck and William I were opposed to a policy of colonial expansion, thinking that the pressing problem for Germany was internal consolidation, concentration not dispersion of effort, and not desiring to offend or alarm Great Britain. Bismarck even sought to divert the attention of France from " the gap in the Vosges " and to occupy her elsewhere by encouraging Jules Ferry in his colonial schemes, thereby showing, what he

showed more frequently than is generally supposed, shortsightedness. In the end, however, swept along by a current of opinion and circumstance which he neither created nor controlled, Bismarck had entered upon the path of acquisitions overseas and had acquired very considerable possessions in Africa. These, however, as time went on, proved disappointing, unsatisfactory for settlement, expensive for administration, breeders of costly local wars, which were occasioned by the arrogance and incompetence of German officials and the greed of German merchants and traders. The history of the German colonies in Africa was troubled and discreditable. There were repeated risings on the part of the natives, risings which were suppressed, but not without a heavy cost in men and money. These insurrections occurred in East Africa and in the Cameroons. In the latter no less than seventeen separate campaigns were necessary within a period of three years. In other words the people were in a state of chronic rebellion. But the worst outbreak was the rising of the Hereros in Southwest Africa which began in 1903 and which aimed at the expulsion, root and branch, of the intruders. It was admitted by a German judge located at the capital of the colony that the rebellion was due to the outrageous act of the German traders. The German government stopped at nothing to extinguish this dangerous revolt. When order was finally restored the Hereros had been reduced, by fire and sword and exile, from a tribe of 200,000 to one of 50,000. The war cost Germany two thousand men in killed and wounded and over a hundred million dollars.

The German public was disappointed at the outcome of the country's first effort to build a colonial empire. The enthusiasm of the early days waned rapidly in the face of the poor results. The colonies had cost much more than they had brought in. With the exception of Kiauchau, acquired in 1897 from China, and furnishing an excellent naval base in the Far East, and enabling Germany largely to gain commercial control of the province of Shantung, the German colonies were of no great value. A period of disillusionment of the public mind therefore followed the period of optimism and extravagant hopes. Capitalists saw no value in colonies that cost far more than they yielded. The people were indifferent. This mood, however, was brief and transitory. The Pan-German movement, then so strong, brought powerful support to the colonial cause. The colonial administration, which had hitherto been a department of the Foreign Office, was now made entirely independent and Bernard Dernburg, an enter-

prising and successful banker, was appointed first Colonial Secretary. His duty was to reform the methods of colonial administration, which he did after a careful study of English methods, to rescue the colonial movement for the disrepute into which it had fallen, to stir up colonial sentiment everywhere. This he was largely instrumental in doing and the interest in colonial development and expansion became a general feature of German imperialism. A more intelligent and humane exploitation of the colonies began. A feature which was somewhat menacing, however, was that Germany began to look with covetous eyes upon the possessions of her neighbors, England and France and Belgium, and that popular writers and politicians began to familiarize the public mind with the idea that colonies might be won by an aggressive foreign policy and also by war. These men talked most indiscreetly and in a way to disturb or alarm those nations which had more attractive colonies than Germany possessed. It was quite natural for Germany to covet her neighbors' plantations, but it was equally natural for the latter to desire to retain them. The Germans did acquire in 1911 a large slice of the Congo rubber region, which had previously been French and which France traded, under slightly veiled compulsion, for recognition of certain Moroccan claims of hers.

German colonies were valuable for the raw materials they furnished for German industry and commerce, but they were not inviting as fields for emigration. As Bernhardi expressed it in his popular book on *Germany and the Next War:* "For centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries and been lost to our Fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or which corresponds to the greatness of the German people and their intellectual importance."

The expanding German industries rendered desirable and even necessary larger markets, that thus the growing population of the Empire might secure essential food supplies and raw materials. If Germany's colonies were not adequate to this end, if new colonies were difficult to acquire, the world being already appropriated, the required outlets must be sought elsewhere, and German foreign policy for many years before the Great War was increasingly attentive to this problem. Commercial penetration

of other countries might prove a passable substitute for actual colonial possession and might in the long run even prepare the way for such possession. Brazil for a while seemed an inviting field, as for a half a century many Germans had emigrated to that country. In 1900 there were supposed to be about 400,000 Germans there, mostly concentrated in a few provinces. But ever to convert commercial relations into any form of political control was quite out of the question, owing to the growing prosperity and national sentiment of the Brazilians themselves, the sure opposition of the other South American states, and the blunt, forbidding fact of the Monroe Doctrine, any threat to which would be certain to arouse the United States.

But there were other lands, Morocco in Africa, and the Turkish Empire in Europe and, particularly, in Asia, which presented fewer obstacles to exploitation, economic and possibly political. The *Drang nach Osten*, the pressure to the East, became a favorite theme with writers on world affairs, with economists and politicians. It exercised a fascination upon the Emperor, William II, whose romantic turn of mind was fired by the mysterious and alluring Orient as the mind of the youthful Napoleon had been, a century earlier. General von Moltke as long ago as the forties of the nineteenth century had seen the chances there were for Germans in that section of the world, and had even thought of a German principality of Palestine. In the twentieth century such men as Dernburg, Germany's first Colonial Minister, Paul Rohrbach, one of her ablest publicists, Friedrich Naumann, a brilliant pamphleteer and later an immensely popular advocate of a wide-sweeping Middle Europe union, professors of repute and learning, like Sprenger and Hasse, all harped upon the self-same theme, and the ambitious and active Pan-German League took up the glad refrain enthusiastically. Eastward the path of Empire might easily take its way if only the Germans were wise enough to seize opportunities that were obvious and that could not fail to be richly rewarding. German influence must dominate in the Near East and shape its destinies. The Ottoman Empire was weak and inefficient. By proper handling it might be brought under German guidance. In an alliance of the two there could be no doubt as to where power would lie. Rohrbach, in a pamphlet on "The German Idea (*Gedanke*)," said that in Turkey there was "a sphere in which the German idea may have a great future, not only by way of material colonization, but also with a view to political domination and moral influence." Large markets for German manufactured goods, abundant raw materials for German

industries, possibly promising settlements for the surplus German population, fields for attractive investment of German capital in the building of railways, in the digging of irrigation canals, in mining, in agriculture, such were some of the prizes in view if only sufficient energy and sufficient wisdom should be applied to this problem of getting a control, of one kind or another, of a spacious, decadent, and neglected empire. And with the systematic and scientific development of that empire would also come other good or useful things. Persia, Arabia, finally India also might be penetrated by German commerce, and the influences that follow upon commercial conquest might then exert their sway. The prospect widened out as attention was fixed upon it, and for the more sanguine temperaments became entrancing, and even intoxicating. A railroad from Berlin to Byzantium, and from Byzantium to Bagdad, swung into view. The Turkish army might be reformed under German masters and might, as Rohrbach calmly pointed out, be used as a "spear-head" against the English in case the latter were unwise enough to oppose German plans elsewhere.

Attractive as the outlook was, it involved many factors and much preliminary work before it could entirely succeed, and the German mind was greatly occupied with such considerations for years before the war. Boundless were the possibilities, economic and political. But they involved risks. To realize these possibilities the ground between Germany and the East must be prepared and securely held. This meant that Austria-Hungary must dominate the Balkans and must herself not cross the German orbit, but proceed parallel with it. Also Russia and England, both threatened by these schemes, must naturally be considered. Here we are in the full current of all that planning and intriguing, of all that dreaming and scheming that led to the Great War, and whose preliminaries we shall treat more particularly later on. The central feature of German *Weltpolitik* was this ambition to dominate the Near East. How to realize this ambition was the subject of much discussion.

FOREIGN POLICY

The mention of *Weltpolitik* or World Policy brings us to another and very conspicuous aspect in the life of modern Germany. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Germans turned with increasing interest to the field of international affairs. All this industrial and commercial expansion which we have been

tracing, this growth of navy and merchant marine, this solicitude for colonial expansion, this desire for new markets everywhere, culminated in a fixed determination to play a greater rôle upon the stage of world affairs and one more commensurate with what the Germans felt to be their real importance among the peoples. World policy, world empire, world power were phrases increasingly in use, phrases which were somewhat vague and difficult to define but which revealed an ambition, a purpose and a temper that might constitute a serious menace for other nations, that would at least constitute a challenge. The new attitude was symbolized in the Kaiser's remark that "nothing must go on anywhere in the world in which Germany does not play a part." The word *prestige* entered into the current political vernacular, a word of no precise signification but which was, at best, of unhappy omen for the peace of the world and which might, at the worst, be made to cover a multitude of sins. Bismarck, who certainly was as active in Continental politics as any man of his day, always sought, in his various interventions, some definite end which would merely consolidate Germany's position in Europe and enable her to develop her resources in peace. He never followed so glimmering and uncertain a light as mere prestige. But as the reign of William I had signalized Germany's leadership in Europe, so William II was evidently resolved that his reign should signalize her leadership everywhere, in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, across the seas as well as at home. This would mean a spirited foreign policy and accordingly we find that, although William II identified himself whole-heartedly with all those activities of his people which have been described, his dominating interest was his international rôle. He was the adequate and loquacious spokesman of the new national mood, an explosive, unstable, exuberant, impetuous spokesman, whose utterances were often calculated to alarm his neighbors and to keep the world in troubled suspense. Such utterances were plentifully interlarded with warm expressions of devotion to the cause of international concord, but no candid biographer of William II can successfully maintain that his ways were ways of pleasantness and that all his paths were peace. Few sovereigns have made as many pacific declarations as did he, few have inspired less confidence by them. For William had a way of talking of peace that was singularly warlike and that might be easily confounded with an appeal to arms. Moreover the second half of the nineteenth century had known a monarch who had constantly protested his love of peace and yet whose reign had been a succession of wars,

the last of which had been fatal for his country and his dynasty. Was William the Second a more sincere pacifist than Napoleon the Third?

Even if he was, and there was little to show that such was the case, there were features of the public mind of Germany that were disquieting. Germany was evidently no longer content with the remarkable successes she had won in the economic sphere. As Prussia's leadership in Germany continued to assert itself more and more emphatically, certain modes of thought, certain sentiments and ambitions characteristic of Prussia as revealed in her history, became more and more general throughout the Empire, an aggressiveness of manner, an enormous pride of race, an ambition for power, a feeling that Germany ought to play a rôle in world affairs proportionate to the size of her population and her wealth and culture, and a belief in force as the means of acquiring whatever the nation might desire, or think its due. This heightened tone and temper, this aggressiveness and touchiness, were increasingly expressed after 1900. Along with all this went the assertion, frequent to the point of weariness, of the superiority of Germans over all other peoples, of the claim that Germany was destined in the modern world to play the rôle that Rome had played in the ancient, that she had a high and holy mission to achieve. "God has called us," exclaimed the Kaiser, "to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress." And again, "The German people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to erect and achieve the civilization of the world." Editors, pamphleteers, politicians, historians, philosophers, the so-called "Intellectuals," as well as high-flying military men, and even Socialists, sounded the same note of national self-esteem and of discontent with the existing situation. The history of national conceit is as vulgar as it is sometimes diverting. Among the oldest of phenomena it gains nothing in attractiveness by repeated exhibition. The theory that this nation or that is a chosen people, a supreme, illuminated leader of mankind, is justified neither by history nor by common sense. From the intellectual point of view nothing could be more tawdry and pretentious than such national self-inflation. If there is anything clear in this world it is that civilization is a highly co-operative undertaking, that it is not the work, largely or chiefly, of one selected people. This would appear the most obvious and tritest of truths yet the world has repeated need of being reminded of it. No doubt similar expressions could be found in other literatures, noisily claiming superiority for

other nations, but they would be found to be infrequent and innocuous in comparison with the overwhelming volume of such utterances in Germany. It was a dangerously swollen stream of national self-exaltation that was coursing through the German mind in the decade or two that immediately preceded the World War. What were isolated and generally insignificant voices in other countries became there a deafening chorus. The prevalent German psychology was preparing a grave international crisis.

PAN-GERMANISM

One of the most strident voices in this chorus of self-adulation, in this advocacy of the nation's special mission, was that which issued from the Pan-German League, an imperialistic and propagandist organization founded in 1894. Covering the whole country with a network of branches, standing outside and above the various political parties, this society developed multiple agencies of action upon public opinion. It was aggressive and chauvinistic. It advocated a policy of widespread territorial aggrandizement, which should realize the dream of the poet Arndt that the German Empire should extend as far as the German language is spoken. As there were Germans in parts of Austria, Switzerland, Holland, Luxemburg, and Belgium, these "brothers" ought to be redeemed as quickly as possible. The Pan-Germanists harped much upon ethnic theories, some of which were monuments of absurdity. None of the non-Germanic elements within the Empire, the Poles, the Danes, the French, were to be expelled from it out of devotion to the principle of ethnic unity, but the German-speaking people outside were to be brought in. The fact that the arguments given were often preposterous, that the propaganda was a threat at the neighbors of Germany who saw their integrity menaced, that the incessant agitation carried on in books and pamphlets, in the press and on the platform was calculated to arouse and did arouse widespread apprehension and resentment, did not deter the Pan-German League from carrying on its campaign with energy from the day of its foundation down to the outbreak of the war. While the Berlin government often denounced the active and compromising League before Europe, nevertheless the League exercised an increasing influence upon the governing authorities. Its insistence upon an aggressive foreign policy, its constant advocacy of world empire as the supreme aim of the nation, its praise of force as the method of solving questions of power, its extravagant lauda-

tion of everything German and its equally extravagant criticism of other peoples, all were so many contributions to national self-exaltation and to international unrest. One of the most sympathetic and intelligent of foreign students of contemporary Germany, Dawson, has given it as his opinion that "perhaps no body of political propaganda has on the whole exerted a more sinister or more immoral influence upon a nation's mind than that of this powerful organization, whose predatory doctrines implied the practical repudiation of international faith and the negation of public right." The same author quotes a recent German writer as saying of the Pan-German League: "Well as it may have acted as a national leaven amongst the Germans at home and abroad, it has greatly injured the reputation of Germany abroad by its fulsome boasting of the power of the Empire and its naïve depreciation of foreign nationalities."

THE PERSONALITY OF THE EMPEROR

But while Pan-Germanism cannot be ignored in any history of the present age, in any study of German psychology, we must not pass by other factors making for uncertainty or trouble. We must render unto Caesar what is due unto Caesar, and in the annals of our day the personality of William II has occupied a conspicuous and important position. Closely and enthusiastically associated with that economic expansion which brought Germany a sudden and hitherto unknown prosperity, William II was as reactionary in some ways as he was progressive in others. His conception of the royal office was, as we have already said, thoroughly medieval. "You Germans have only one will and that is my will; there is only one law, and that is my law," is one of his revealing epigrams. "The will of the king, that is the supreme law," was another. "As I will, so I order," was a third. And still another was: "There is only one master in the land; I am he and I will tolerate no other beside me." And again, "Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, without regard for the opinions and intentions of the day, I go my way, which is devoted solely to the welfare and peaceful development of the Fatherland." Entertaining such serene and exalted views of his powers and of their divine origin it was of course inevitable that William II should resolve to play the central and supreme rôle in the state. With such a conception of his mission he was not likely to efface himself behind either a ministry or a parliament. In fact his reign was one of "personal

rule" and therefore his personality, his qualities and defects, his thought and the limitations of his thought, were factors in the evolution of Germany, factors so direct and palpable, that no historian is at liberty to ignore them.

One quality which the greatest of his predecessors on the throne of Prussia had possessed and which he conspicuously lacked was the ability to choose wisely his collaborators, or, having chosen them, to support them loyally. Between 1888 and 1914 William II had five chancellors and over eighty ministers: Bismarck, whom he summarily dismissed after two years; Caprivi, a general inexperienced in political affairs; Hohenlohe, an aristocrat of conspicuous tact and lack of will; Bülow, a diplomat without principle but with much finesse and elegance of manner; Bethmann-Hollweg, a professional office-holder, of wide practical knowledge of administration but without suppleness and adaptability, rigid, rather doctrinaire. None of the five received that steady, loyal support which had been the making of Bismarck under William I. The center of the stage was occupied by the monarch whose vanity was obvious, who did not enjoy contact with really superior personalities, and did not solicit their aid, and who himself could not supply the qualities of intelligence, firmness, foresight, and technical competence which the state ought to command, if not in the sovereign, at least in the sovereign's chief assistants. Instead of these qualities we see in William II a masterful will, an impulsive character, a spontaneous, capricious, unstable, extremely active personality, an eager but superficial mind with a pronounced penchant for the dramatic, the histronic, and with a facility of utterance, an oratorical intemperance, that could only be assuaged by innumerable, and frequently indiscreet, harangues on every subject and on every occasion. While steadfast and unvarying in his pursuits of certain objects, such as the creation of a navy and an army that should be always powerful and always ready, there was nevertheless a certain incoherence in the policies of William II, a certain fluctuating tendency, which were indicative of weakness and indecision, and which caused his reign to contrast, behind its generally imposing exterior, unfavorably with that of William I, a less showy figure, less self-assertive, less theatrical, but more solid, and guided with maturer judgment and wider knowledge. A lack of unity in the political direction of the German Empire was one of the outstanding features of this reign. Royal energy is no substitute for perspicacity.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

There were still other disquieting elements in the situation of Germany besides Pan-Germanism, ministerial instability and mediocrity, a feeble and divided parliament and an impulsive and autocratic emperor. One of the most important forces operative in the nineteenth century was the principle of nationality. Aroused by the French Revolution, intensified by the Napoleonic wars and by the reaction which followed, that force gradually remade considerable parts of the map of Europe. The rise of the Balkan states, the unification of Italy, the creation of the German Empire were among its triumphs. But that principle was a two-edged sword. While it contributed to the liberation of certain states it threatened the dismemberment of others. It cut to pieces most of the Turkish Empire in Europe. It was suspended like the sword of Damocles over the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. If it should ever be directed at the Russian Empire it might effect considerable changes there. The principle of nationality is a dissolving as it is also a unifying principle. Closely connected as it is with the principles of modern liberalism, recognizing as it does the right of peoples to govern themselves, it may prove harmless to those countries, like France, which are essentially homogeneous, but it is a dangerous theory for complex countries, for countries that include peoples really distinct or which consider themselves distinct.

But while this principle, the great thought of the reign of Napoleon III, had greatly served the cause of German unification, nevertheless it had not made it. Bismarck's policy had rested upon no such romantic base, but upon the self-interest, primarily of Prussia, secondarily of Germany. When the operation of this principle was favorable to his plans Bismarck willingly exploited it; when it was unfavorable he ignored it. And the German Empire which he created rested upon a denial of the famous principle, in several respects. On the periphery of Prussia and of Germany were several subject peoples which resented their condition and protested against it. Prussia had incorporated within her kingdom Danish and Polish peoples, and Germany possessed a subject territory in Alsace-Lorraine. These conquered and protesting peoples were subjected to a régime that was in each instance odious and oppressive. They were too feeble successfully to challenge the supremacy of their German masters. Nevertheless, as open sores, as the victims of

injustice, they weakened the German Empire morally and somewhat compromised her. Germany had her problem of nationalities, as had Austria and Turkey, although in a less acute form.

The Poles had been conquered in the eighteenth century, the Danes in 1864, the Alsatians and Lorrainers in 1870. But while the Germans might conquer they knew not how to win, to assimilate.

In 1914 Germany was as far from the goal as ever. On the fringes of the Empire were various conquered and exasperated peoples whose dislike of German rule was kept active and was ever sharpened by the character of that rule. For Poles and Alsatians and Danes there was no equality of treatment with the Germans. They shared to a large extent the economic prosperity of the Empire, and they benefited from some of the legislation of the country with which they were associated, notably that establishing the system of social insurance. But they were subject peoples and they were made to feel in numerous and galling ways the inferiority of their position and the fragility of their rights and liberties. Indeed they were often made to feel that they had no rights whatever which their German masters were bound to respect. Not only were their natural and legitimate demands ignored or treated with contempt, but the ingenuity and harshness of their masters, in attempting to make them something which they were not and which they had no desire to be, revolted their consciences and aroused a grim and vigorous spirit of resistance which in turn was met by renewed oppression. The policy of compulsory Germanization failed in the end, but it created so passionate a feeling of resentment, so deep a sense of wrongs inflicted and endured, that the German Empire was unquestionably weakened both materially and morally.

Such then were some of the shadows upon the brilliant picture of German prosperity and power in the closing years of the reign of William II. Strong on land, strong on sea, growing amazingly in population and in wealth, progressing by leaps and bounds in the markets of the world, rich in the development of the sciences, pure and applied, nevertheless not all was well with Germany. The disaffection of her conquered peoples, while powerless to disrupt, was, however, an annoying and a weakening element in the state. A graver weakness lay in the character and operation of some of her institutions, which, as time went by, aroused an increasingly vigorous and acrimonious criticism among the Germans. Despite the formidable appearance of power offered to the gaze of the world by the German

Empire, there were many phenomena that showed that the national life was not in a healthy condition, and a Swiss publicist of great knowledge and acumen was able to show convincingly, in a book published in 1913,[1] that the Empire was already caught in a serious and dangerous crisis, growing out of the spirit of her institutions, the weakness of her government, the discontent of her democracy, resentful of repression and clamoring for recognition, the impotence and confusion of her parliament, the corroding disaffection of her subject nationalities. Let us examine some of these factors of the situation.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF GERMANY

In the political world the rise of the Social Democratic party was the most important phenomenon. It represented not merely a desire for a revolution in the economic sphere, it also represented a protest against the autocratic government of the ruler, a demand for democratic institutions. While Germany had a Constitution and a Parliament, the monarch was invested with vast power. Parliament did not control the Government, as the ministers were not responsible to it. There was freedom of speech in Parliament, but practically during most of this reign it did not exist outside. Hundreds of men were, during the last twenty years of William II, imprisoned for such criticisms of the Government as in other countries are the current coin of discussion. This is the crime of *lèse-majesté*, which, as long as it exists, prevents a free political life. The growth of the Social Democratic party to some extent represented mere liberalism, not adherence to the economic theory of the Socialists. It was the great reform and opposition party of Germany. It had, in 1907, the largest popular vote of any party, 3,260,000.[2] Yet the Conservatives with less than 1,500,000 votes elected in 1907 eighty-three members to the Reichstag to the forty-three of the Socialists. The reason was this: the electoral districts had not been altered since they were originally laid out in 1869–1871, though population had vastly shifted from country to city. The cities had grown rapidly since then, and it was in industrial centers that the Socialists were strongest. Berlin with a population in 1871 of 600,000 had six members in the Reichstag. It still had only that number

[1] W. Martin, *La Crise Politique de l'Allemagne Contemporaine*, Paris, 1913.

[2] In 1912 the Socialists cast 4,250,000 votes and elected 110 members to the Reichstag, thus displacing the Center as the largest party in that body.

in 1907, although its population was over 2,000,000, and although it would have been entitled to twenty members had equal electoral districts existed. These the Socialists demanded, but for this very reason the Government refused the demand. The extreme opponents of the Social Democrats even urged that universal suffrage, guaranteed by the Constitution, be abolished, as the only way to crush the party. To this length the Government did not dare to go.

In the closing years of the reign of William II several questions were much discussed; the question of the electoral reform in Prussia; of the redistribution of seats, both in the Prussian Landtag and the Imperial Reichstag; and of ministerial responsibility.

Prussia was the state that in practice ruled the German Empire. This was what was intended by Bismarck when he drew up the Constitution of the Empire, it was precisely the object of his entire policy. The Constitution was based on the two chief articles of Bismarck's creed, the power of the monarch and the ascendancy of Prussia, and such was the accepted idea of the governing classes down to the outbreak of the World War. As was said in 1914 by Prince von Bülow, the most important Chancellor of the Empire since Bismarck, " Prussia attained her greatness as a country of soldiers and officials, and as such she was able to accomplish the work of German union; to this day she is still, in all essentials, a state of soldiers and officials." The governing classes were, in Prussia, which, in turn, governed Germany, the monarchy, the aristocracy, and a bureaucracy of military and civil officials, responsible to the King alone. The determining factor in the state was the personality of the King.

Neither the Empire, nor the Kingdom of Prussia, was governed by democratic institutions. The Kingdom lagged far behind the Empire, and, so great was its power, impeded the development of liberty in the Empire. Prussia in 1914 was a country of 40,000,000 people. It had had a legislature of two chambers since 1850, and the lower house of the legislature was chosen by universal suffrage. Every Prussian man who had attained his twenty-fifth year had the vote. Was Prussia, therefore, a democracy? Not exactly, for this universal suffrage was most marvelously manipulated. The exercise of the right to vote was so arranged that the ballot of the poor man was practically annihilated. Universal suffrage was rendered illusory. The way in which this was done has already been described. The voters were divided in each electoral district into three classes according to

wealth. The amount of taxes, paid by the district, was divided into three equal parts. Those taxpayers who paid the first third were grouped into one class; those, more numerous, who paid the second third, into another class; those who paid the remainder, into still another class. The result was that a very few rich men were set apart by themselves, the less rich by themselves, and the poor by themselves. Each of these groups, voting separately, elected an equal number of delegates to a convention, which convention chose the representatives of that constituency to the lower house of the Prussian Parliament.

Thus in every electoral convention two-thirds of the members belonged to the wealthy or well-to-do class. There was no chance in such a system for the poor, for the masses. This system gave an enormous preponderance of political power to the rich. The first class consisted of very few men, in some districts of only one; the second was sometimes twenty times as numerous, the third sometimes a hundred, or even a thousand times. Thus, though every man had the suffrage the vote of a single rich man might have as great weight as the votes of a thousand workingmen. Universal suffrage was thus manipulated in such a way as to defeat democracy decisively and to consolidate a privileged class in power in the only branch of the government that had even the appearance of being of popular origin. Bismarck, no friend of liberalism, once characterized this electoral system as the worst ever created. Its shrieking injustice was shown by the fact that in 1900 the Social Democrats, who actually cast a majority of the votes, got only seven seats out of nearly 400. It was one of the most undemocratic systems in existence.

In 1908 there were 293,000 voters in the first class, 1,065,240 in the second, 6,324,079 in the third. The first class represented 4 per cent., the second 14 per cent., the third 82 per cent. of the population. In Cologne the first class comprised 370 electors, the second 2,584, while the third had 22,324. The first class chose the same number of electors as the third. Thus 370 rich men had the same voting capacity as 22,324 proletarians. In Saarbrücken the Baron von Stumm formed the first class all by himself and announced complacently that he did not suffer from his isolation. In one of the Berlin districts Herr Heffte, a manufacturer of sausages, formed the first class.

This system would seem to have been outrageous enough by reason of its monstrous plutocratic caste. But this is not all. This reactionary edifice was appropriately crowned by another device — oral voting. Neither in the primary nor the secondary

NORTH SEA
DENMARK
Copenhagen
Seeland
Fünen
Nyborg
Korsör
Sund
Möen
Falster
Laaland
Schleswig-Holstein
Flensburg
Schlesvig
Kiel
Neumünster
Lübeck
Rostock
Greifswald
Stralsund
Helgoland
Schlesw.-Holst.
West & East Frisian Is
Norderney
Borkum
Emden
Wilhelmshaven
Bremerhaven
Cuxhaven
Altona
Hamburg
Mecklenburg
Güstrow
Schwerin
Oldenburg
Bremen
Lüneburg Heath
Priegnitz
Wittenberge
Leeuwarden
Groningen
Zuider Sea
Amsterdam
Zwolle
Netherlands
Hanover
Celle
Salzwedel
Altmark
Spandau
Charlottenb.
Osnabrück
Minden
Brunswick
Hildesheim
Prov. Saxony
Magdeburg
Halberstadt
Dessau
Münster
Detmold
Paderborn
Westphalia
Dortmund
Bochum
Essen
Gelsenkch.
Duisburg
Düsseldorf
Elberfeld
Barmen
Solingen
Rhine Province
Cologne
Aachen
Liege
Spa
Bonn
Coblenz
Nassau
Wiesbaden
Frankfort
Homburg
Mainz
Darmstadt
Hesse
Cassel
Marburg
Giessen
Siegen
Northausen
Eisleben
Halle
Leipzig
Saxony
Erfurt
Gotha
Eisenach
Thuringia
Meiningen
Hildburghs.
Zwickau
Plauen
Hof
Schweinfurt
Würzburg
Kulmbach
Bamberg
Bayreuth
Franconia
Nuremberg
Erlangen
Fürth
Ansbach
Rothenbg.
Bavarian Palatinate
Ludwigsh.
Mannheim
Heidelberg
Speyer
Zweibrücken
Kaiserslautern
Alsace Lorraine
Metz
Nancy
Strassburg
Karlsruhe
Heilbronn
Stuttgart
Württemberg
Baden
Tübingen
Ulm
Nördlingen
Ingolstadt
Swabia
Augsburg
Wittelsbach
Landshut
Freising
Mühldorf
Munich
Kalmar
Freiburg
Belfort
Mülhausen
Schaffhs.
Constanz
Ravensburg
Rampten
Lindau
Switzerland
Basle
St. Gall
Rhine
Danube
Inn
Salzb.
Kufstein



THE
GERMAN EMPIRE
1914.

Abbreviations:

B.-Brunswick	L.-Lippe.
R.A.-Reuss elder Line.	R.J.-Reuss younger Line.
S.A.-Saxe Altenburg.	S.C.G.-Saxe Coburg-Gotha.
S.M.-Saxe Meiningen.	S.W.-Saxe-Weimar.
S.L.-Schaumburg-Lippe.	S.R.-Schwarzbg-Rudolstadt.
S.S.-Schwarzburg-Sondershn.	W.-Waldeck.

voting was a secret ballot used. Voting was not even by a written or printed ballot, but by the spoken word. Thus every one exercised his right publicly, in the presence of his superior or his patron or employer or his equals or the official representative of the King. In such a country as Prussia, where the police were notoriously ubiquitous, what a weapon for absolutism! The great landowners, the great manufacturers, the State, could easily bring all the pressure they desired to bear upon the voter, exercising his wretched rudiment of political power. Needless to say, under such a system as this the working classes were almost entirely unrepresented in the Prussian legislature.

Again, with the exception of a thoroughly insignificant measure passed in 1906, no changes were made in the electoral districts of Prussia after 1858. No account was taken of the changes in the population, and there were consequently great disparities between the various districts. Thus, in a recent election in the Province of East Prussia, the actual ratio of inhabitants to each deputy was 63,000, while in Berlin it was 170,000. In one election, 3,000,000 inhabitants of four large Prussian districts returned nine representatives, while three other millions, divided among forty smaller districts, returned 66. Naturally, the demand grew constantly louder that many districts should be partially or wholly disfranchised or merged with others, and that other districts should receive a larger representation. No attempt, however, was made to meet this demand.

In the Empire, also, a similar problem became yearly more acute. In 1871, Germany was divided into 397 constituencies for the Reichstag. The number remained the same from that time down to the war and, indeed, until the Reichstag disappeared in the convulsions of the closing months of 1918. Not a single district gained or lost in representation. Yet from 1871 to 1914 the population of the Empire increased from about forty-one millions to over sixty-five millions, and there was a great shifting in population from the country to the cities. One of the divisions of Berlin, with a population of 697,000, elected one representative, whereas the petty principality of Waldeck, with a population of 59,000, elected one. The 851,000 voters of Greater Berlin returned eight members; the same number of voters in fifty of the smaller constituencies returned forty-eight. A reform of these gross inequalities was widely demanded, but the demand passed unheeded.

Another subject much discussed during the later years of the Empire was that concerning ministerial responsibility. The in-

discretions of Emperor William II made this from time to time a burning question. An interview with him, in which he spoke with great freedom of the strained relations between Germany and Great Britain, was published in the London *Telegraph* on October 28, 1908. At once was seen a phenomenon not witnessed in Germany since the founding of the Empire. There was a violent protest against the irresponsible actions of the Emperor, actions subject to no control, and yet easily capable of bringing about a war. Newspapers of all shades of party affiliation displayed a freedom of utterance and of censure unparalleled in Germany. All parties in the Reichstag expressed their emphatic disapproval. The incident, however, was not sufficient to bring about the introduction of the system of the responsibility of ministers for all the acts of the monarch, and the control of the ministry by the majority of the Reichstag, in short, the parliamentary system in its essential features.

Neither in the Empire, nor in the Kingdom of Prussia, nor in any of the other states that composed the Empire, did the elected chamber control the Government. In every case the Prince had an absolute veto. Where there were second chambers, as in many of the states, they were not elected by the voters, but were either based on heredity or on appointment by the ruler or by certain narrow organizations. In any case the second chambers were a bulwark of a privileged class. And in Prussia, as we have seen, even the so-called popular house was merely another name for a privileged class. Neither in the Empire nor in the individual states were the ministers controlled by the popular assemblies. The assemblies might vote a lack of confidence as often as they felt like it. The ministers would go right on as long as the Emperor, King, Grand Duke, or Prince desired. In none of the German states could the constitution be amended without the consent of the sovereign of that state. The constitution of the Empire could not be amended without the consent of one man, William II, for a constitutional amendment must be passed not only by the Reichstag but by the Bundesrath, and the constitution provided that no amendment could pass the Bundesrath if fourteen votes were cast against it. In that body Prussia had seventeen votes and those votes were cast as the King of Prussia directed. If every individual in Germany except this one, and including the other Kings and Dukes, had desired a change in the constitution they could not have secured it if William II said "No"!

The power of the Prussian crown was virtually absolute —

" absolutism under the constitutional forms," as Rudolph Gneist, once considered in Germany a great authority on public law, said years ago. In the economic sphere Germany was enterprising, progressive, successful, highly modern; in the intellectual sphere she was active and productive; but in the political sphere she was in a state of arrested development. And it had been the amazing triumphs of Bismarck, based on force, that had caused the arrest. German legislatures were impotent and ineffective. For all practical purposes the Reichstag was merely a debating club, and a debating club that had no power of seeing that its will was carried out. As late as January, 1914, Dr. Friedrich Naumann, of " Middle Europe " fame, described the humiliating position of the body of which he was a member in the following words:

" We on the Left are altogether in favor of the parliamentary régime, by which we mean that the Reichstag cannot forever remain in a position of subordination. Why does the Reichstag sit at all, why does it pass resolutions, if behind it is a waste paper basket into which these resolutions are thrown? The problem is to change the impotence of the Reichstag into some sort of power. . . . The man who compared this House to a hall of echoes was not far wrong. . . . When one asks the question, ' What part has the Reichstag in German history as a whole? ' it will be seen that the part is a very limited one."

The effective seat of political power in Germany was, as it had always been, in the monarchs. Germans might have the right to vote, but of what value was it if the vote led nowhere, if the body elected by the voters was carefully and completely nullified by other bodies, princes and aristocratic hereditary upper chambers, over which the voters had no control?

Prussia was the strongest obstacle the democratic movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries encountered. Germany in 1914 was less liberal than in 1848. The most serious blow that the principle of representative government received during that century was the one she received at the hands of Bismarck. We have expert testimony of the highest and most official sort that the effects of that blow were not outlived. Prince von Bülow, writing in 1914, said: " Liberalism, in spite of its change of attitude in national questions, has to this day not recovered from the catastrophic defeat which Prince Bismarck inflicted nearly half a century ago on the party of progress which still clings to the ideals and principles of 1848."

The situation was still further defined by the utterance of

Professor Delbrück, successor to Treitschke in the chair of modern history in the University of Berlin, who wrote in 1914 to the effect that "Anyone who has any familiarity with our officers and generals knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the control of the Army by the German Parliament." Here was a very clear indication as to where real power lay in Germany. One has only to recall the great chapters in English history which tell of the struggle for liberty to know that it has been obtained solely by the recognition of the supremacy of Parliament over royal prerogative, over military power.

The German state was the most autocratic in Western Europe; it was also the most militaristic. Fundamental individual liberties, regarded as absolutely vital in England, France, America, and many other states, had never been possessed by Germans, nor were they possessed in 1914. Germany was rich, vigorous, powerful, instructed. It was not free. A military monarchy is the very opposite of a democratic state. Prince von Bülow in his book, *Imperial Germany*, published in 1914, says, "Despite the abundance of merits and the great qualities with which the German nation is endowed, political talent has been denied it." Any citizen of a free country knows that that talent grows only where an opportunity has been given it to grow. It need occasion no surprise that Mommsen, the historian of Rome, writing in 1903, should say of his own country, "There are no longer free citizens." Instead there were industrious, energetic, educated, ambitious, and submissive subjects.[1]

[1] In the above section liberal use has been made of a study published by the author in 1917 on *The Government of Germany*.

CHAPTER XVIII

FRANCE UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC

We have seen that the Republic was proclaimed by the Parisians September 4, 1870, as a result of the defeats of the Empire in the Franco-German war, culminating at Sedan. Immediately a Provisional Government of National Defense assumed control. In all this there was no appeal to the people of France, no ratification by them. This Government gave way in February 1871 to a National Assembly of 750 members elected by universal suffrage for the purpose of making peace with Germany. It was felt that the Provisional Government, not popularly chosen, but the creation of a Parisian insurrection, was not competent to settle so grave a matter, involving, as it necessarily would, the cession of territory to the Germans. This National Assembly, which first met at Bordeaux, showed a majority of Monarchists. The reason was that, as Gambetta and the leading Republicans wished to continue the war, and as the mass of peasants wished peace, the latter voted for the opponents of Gambetta, who were chiefly Monarchists. There is no evidence to show that in doing this the peasants were expressing an opinion against the Republic as a form of government and in favor of a Monarchy. They wished the war stopped, and took the most obvious means to that end. The Assembly of Bordeaux made the peace, ceding Alsace and Lorraine, and assuming the enormous war indemnity. But peace did not return to France as a result of the Treaty of Frankfort. The "Terrible Year," as the French call it, of 1870–71 had more horrors in store. Civil war followed the war with the foreigners, shorter, but exceeding it in ferocity, a war between the city of Paris and the Government of France, represented by the Assembly of Bordeaux. That Assembly had, as we have seen, chosen Thiers as "chief of the executive power," pending "the nation's decision as to the definitive form of government." Thus the fundamental question was postponed. Thiers was chosen for no definite term; he was the servant of the Assembly to carry out its wishes, and might be dismissed by it at any moment.

THE COMMUNE

Between the Government and the people of Paris serious disagreements immediately arose, which led quickly to the war of the Commune. Paris had proclaimed the Republic. But the Republic was not yet sanctioned by France, and existed only *de facto*. On the other hand, the National Assembly was controlled by Monarchists, and it had postponed the determination of the permanent institutions of the country. Did not this simply mean that it would abolish the Republic and proclaim the Monarchy, when it should judge the moment propitious? This fear, only too well justified, that the Assembly was hostile to the Republic, was the fundamental cause of the Commune. Paris lived in daily dread of this event. Paris was ardently Republican. For ten years under the Empire it had been returning Republicans to the Chamber of Deputies. These men did not propose to let a coup d'état like that of Louis Napoleon in 1851 occur again. Various acts of the Assembly were well adapted to deepen and intensify the feeling of dread uncertainty. The Assembly showed its distrust of Paris by voting in March 1871 that it would henceforth sit in Versailles. In other words, a small and sleepy town, and one associated with the history of Monarchy, was to be the capital of France instead of the great city which had sustained the tremendous siege and by her self-sacrifice and suffering had done her best to hold high the honor of the land. Not only was Paris wounded in her pride by this act, which showed such unmistakable suspicion of her, but she suffered also in her material interests at a time of great financial distress. Property-owners, merchants, workmen were affected by this decision which really removed the capital from Paris. The prosperity of Paris, sadly undermined by the war with the Germans, now received an additional blow from the Government of France.

Other highly imprudent acts of the Assembly tended in the same direction. The payment of rents, debts, notes falling due, had been suspended during the siege. The Parisians wished this suspension prolonged until business should revive. The Assembly refused to grant this, but ordered the payment of all such debts to be made within forty-eight hours. The result was that within four days 150,000 Parisians found themselves exposed to legal prosecution because of inability to pay their debts. This meant immense hardship to the business world.

Again, the majority of workingmen still without employment

had as their only means of support their pay as members of the National Guard. This was now suppressed by the Assembly, except for those supplied with certificates of poverty. The economic misery of large numbers was thus increased at the very time they needed relief, after the harrowing siege. The National Guard included most of the able-bodied male population of the city. It had defended the city during the siege, and its arms were left in its hands after the peace. As soon as the siege was raised the rich and well-to-do members of the Guard left Paris in large numbers, perhaps 150,000 of them, to rejoin their families in the provinces and abroad. The poor remained, perforce, without work, and now in most instances deprived of their franc and a half a day — an immense mass of discontented men, wretched, suspicious, armed, and inflamed by every rumor that the Republic was in danger.

There was also in Paris a considerable population having diverse revolutionary tendencies — Anarchists, Jacobins, Socialists. The last party had grown under the reign of Napoleon III, and had a large following among the working classes. Among the restless, discontented, poverty-stricken masses of the great city, their leaders worked with success. There arose out of the confusion of the time the idea of the commune, or the individual unit of the nation, the city, or the village. It was held that in the future government of France emphasis should be given to the commune, that it should be vested with large powers to exercise as it saw fit, that the rôle of the state as a whole should be circumscribed. Looked at in one light this was the old idea that France was too highly centralized, local government too limited, too much controlled by the state. Let France be decentralized, was the cry. Each commune should be largely independent, uncontrolled in most matters by the central government. Such a scheme had this connection with the situation of the hour: it would free the cities, most of which were republican, in great measure from the control of the central government, which in the Assembly was monarchical. It would also be of advantage to the Socialists, who aspired to invest the commune with extensive powers in order that they might be used to bring about in each unit an economic and social revolution. Thus the radical Republicans, suspicious of the Assembly and prone to believe that the Republic was in danger, and a revolutionary party influenced by Socialists and inciting the people of the crowded workingmen's quarters to revolt, both emphasized the importance of the commune.

It was through the National Guard that this confused discontent gained expression. The Guard chose in February 1871 a committee of sixty to direct it, and to prevent any action against Paris and against the Republic on the part of the National Assembly. It removed some cannon to one of the strongest points in the city. The Government, believing an insurrection likely, and not willing to strengthen it by leaving the cannon in the hands of the disaffected, endeavored to seize them on March 18, 1871, but failed. The National Guard protected them; popular defiance of the Government had begun. The insurrectionary spirit spread with great rapidity throughout Paris until it developed into a war between Paris and the Versailles Government. Two of the generals of the latter were seized and shot by the insurgents. The Government forces were withdrawn from Paris by Thiers, and the city was left entirely in the hands of the insurgents.

This action of the national government left a free field for the insurgents in the city. The more radical element now secured complete control. An election was held in Paris on March 26th of a General Council of 90 members to serve as the government of the commune. This government, commonly called the Commune, organized itself by appointing ministers or heads of various departments. It adopted the republican calendar of the Revolution, and the red flag of the Socialists. This government consisted of revolutionists, but the revolutionists differed widely and bitterly from each other, and in these divisions lay their weakness and the cause of their ultimate overthrow. The ideal of the new government, as announced to the people, was the decentralization of France. The central government should simply consist of delegates from the communes. France was to be a kind of federation of these local units. The Communists vehemently denounced as a slander that they were seeking to destroy the unity of France, as worked out by the French Revolution: they were simply trying to abolish the kind of unity "imposed on us up to this day by the Empire, the Monarchy, and Parliamentarism," which had been but "despotic, unintelligent, arbitrary, and onerous centralization." They wished by the new and free and spontaneous unity of the communes, co-operating voluntarily, to abolish the old system of "militarism, officialism, exploitation, stock jobbing, monopolies, and privileges to which the proletariat owes its servitude, and the fatherland its misfortunes and its disasters." They appealed to France to join them. "Let her be our ally in this conflict,

which can only end by the triumph of the communal idea or the ruin of Paris!" [1]

This government and this ideal did not succeed, as success depended on defeating the Versailles Government. Troops were sent out from Paris to break up the National Assembly in Versailles, but they failed, their leaders were seized and shot on the spot. The Commune in revenge ordered the arrest of many prominent men in Paris, who were to be kept as "hostages."

To Thiers and the National Assembly the whole affair was infamous. It imperiled the very existence of France. It was a bold and unscrupulous attempt of a single city to defy all France, the more infamous as foreign troops were still in control of the country. For Frenchmen to defy the Government of France, to begin civil war in the presence of the victorious Germans, was bitterly humiliating to the nation before all the world. Some attempts at bringing about a reconciliation were made, but failed. Thiers, to disarm the cry that the Republic was in danger, denied that the Government was preparing to destroy the Republic, flatly contradicted the Communist leaders — "they are lying to France" — and announced that if any such conspiracy existed anywhere he would not lend himself to its execution, and a law was passed, April 14th, enlarging the powers of local governing bodies. But he was emphatic that the unity of France must be preserved, and it was clear that the only way to do this was to put down the insurgents of Paris. This was for some time impossible, as the Assembly had few troops, and those were demoralized. But with the return of soldiers from Switzerland and from Germany, an army of 150,000 men was gotten together. With this army a regular siege of Paris was begun, this time by Frenchmen, Germans who controlled the forts to the north of Paris looking on, the second siege of the unhappy city within a year. Thus civil war succeeded foreign war, surpassing it in bitterness and ferocity. It lasted nearly two months, from April 2d to May 21st, when the Versailles troops forced their entrance into the city. Then followed seven days' ferocious fighting in the streets of Paris, the Communists more and more desperate and frenzied, the Versailles army more and more revengeful and sanguinary. This was the "bloody week," during which Paris suffered much more than she had from the bombardment of the Germans — a week of fearful destruction of life and property. The horrors of incendiarism were added to those of slaughter. "Everything,"

[1] Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 126.

says Hanotaux, of May 23d, "was burning; there were explosions everywhere. A night of terror. The Porte Saint-Martin, the church of Saint-Eustache, the Rue Royale, the Rue de Rivoli, the Tuileries, the Palais-Royal, the Hôtel de Ville, the left bank from the Légion d'Honneur to the Palais de Justice, and the Police Office were immense red braziers, and above all rose lofty blazing columns. From outside, all the forts were firing upon Paris. . . . The gunners were cannonading one another across the town, and above the town. Shells fell in every direction. All the central quarters were a battlefield. It was a horrible chaos: bodies and souls in collision over a crumbling world."[1] The Communists shot their hostages. Finally the agony was brought to a close. On May 28th the last insurgents were shot down in the cemetery of Père-Lachaise.

The revenge taken by the Government possessed no quality of mercy. Racked by the horror of the week, infuriated by the belief that the Communists, seeing their defeat approaching, had made a deliberate attempt to destroy the city, horror-stricken at the murder of the hostages, of whom one was the Archbishop of Paris, it punished right and left summarily. Many were shot on the spot. "The number of men," says Hanotaux, "who perished in this horrible fray, without any other form of law, is estimated at 17,000. The cemeteries, the squares, private or public gardens, saw trenches opened in which nameless corpses were deposited without register and without list, by thousands."[2] Arrests and trials went on for years. Up to 1875 over 43,000 had been arrested, over 350,000 denounced. The prisoners were judged by courts-martial. Nearly ten thousand were condemned summarily to various punishments, thousands being deported to New Caledonia. It was not until 1879 that an amnesty was passed for the remaining prisoners, and then only owing to the impassioned plea of Gambetta for pity. The result of all this was the deep embitterment of classes against each other. The revolutionary party, crushed and silenced, nourished its hatred of the bourgeoisie, who returned its hatred.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THIERS

Having put down the insurrection of Paris and signed the hard treaty with Germany, France was at peace. She had between July 1870 and June 1871 received such staggering blows

[1] Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, I, 215.
[2] Hanotaux, *Ibid.*, 225.

that she had sunk rapidly from the position of the first power on the Continent to the rank of fourth or fifth. Immense destruction of national wealth and national prestige had characterized the Terrible Year. Time was needed for reorganization. France, overwhelmingly crushed, must be built up anew. This work of reconstruction was immediately undertaken by the Government of Thiers. That Government lasted over two years, and its achievements were notable. Thiers had been chosen by the Assembly of Bordeaux "chief of the executive." The Assembly was the only authority in France for several years. It had been elected February 8, 1871, but no definite powers had been vested in it, nor had the length of its term been fixed. Would this Assembly, which had been elected to decide the question of peace and war, consider itself competent to sit longer, to determine the future government of France, and if so, to decide that the government should be a Monarchy, and not the Republic proclaimed by the crowd of Paris on September 4th? These were vital questions, which were, however, but slowly answered. The Assembly remained in power for nearly five years, from February 1871 to December 31, 1875, refusing to dissolve.

On August 31, 1871, it passed the important Rivet law, by which it accepted provisionally the existing government, declared that the chief of the executive should take the title of *President of the French Republic*, and that he should be responsible to the Assembly. The law also proclaimed that the Assembly possessed constituent powers, and was under the obligation to exercise them at the proper time. No definite term was established for the presidency. It was to last, so the Rivet law itself stated, as long as the Assembly lasted. The government, therefore, was one strictly by parliament. All sovereignty was declared vested in the Assembly. Thiers was really simply leader of the majority. As soon as he lost his majority he stepped down and out (1873).

But before that time came he accomplished an extraordinary work. Urging the parties to drop their merely partisan interests for the time being, he appealed to their patriotism, which was not lacking. France must be reorganized, the wounds of the past year healed. After that, let the question of the final form of government be brought forward.

The financial burdens created by the war, the Commune, and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, were found, on examination, to amount to over fifteen billion francs, or about three billion dollars. The loss in life was great. It is estimated that about

140,000 men were killed, and more than that number wounded; that about 340,000 entered hospitals for various diseases. France lost about 1,600,000 inhabitants by the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, and apart from that, her population suffered a loss of about a half a million.

The most imperative task confronting the Government was to get the Germans out of the country. By the Treaty of Frankfort France was to pay within three years a war indemnity of five billion francs. Until this was accomplished there was to be a German army of occupation in France, supported by France, and occupying a certain number of departments. This army was to be withdrawn gradually, as the instalments of the indemnity were paid. The army at first numbered about 500,000 men and 150,000 horses. The cost of their support was heavy.

Thiers wished to bring about evacuation with the utmost possible speed, in order to remove the humiliation of a victorious foreign soldiery in France, the possibility that their presence might at any moment provoke some incident which would lead to a new war, and also to save millions. Under his leadership the task of paying the Germans was undertaken with energy and carried out with celerity. The first five hundred million francs were paid in July 1871, and the German troops were withdrawn from Normandy. By the end of September 1871 1,500,000,000 had been paid, and troops had been withdrawn from all but twelve departments. By the end of 1871 the army of occupation numbered 150,000 men and 18,000 horses. Payments proceeded rapidly. In September 1873 the final instalment was met, and the last German soldiers left France. Thus French soil was freed nearly six months earlier than was provided by the treaty. This rapid liquidation of the indemnity had been effected by two successful loans contracted by the Government, one in 1871 for over 2,000,000,000 francs, the other in 1872 for nearly 3,500,000,000 francs. The former was oversubscribed two and a half times; the latter over fourteen times. This amazing success bore striking evidence to the wealth of the country. For his great services in this initial work of the reconstruction of France the National Assembly voted that Thiers had "deserved well of the country." That the country shared the sentiment was shown by its spontaneous bestowal of the grateful name, "The Liberator of the Territory."

The two years of Thiers' presidency were notable for the energy and success of the work of rebuilding France. Two measures in particular merit description, the local government

bill, and the bill whereby the army was reconstructed and put on a far larger and sounder basis than ever before.

Local government was partially reorganized in the direction of decentralization. Some of the powers hitherto belonging to the central government were now vested in the departmental and communal councils. Hitherto the prefect, head of the department, and appointed by the central government, had had almost unlimited powers throughout his department. Ever since the Revolution various attempts had been made to reduce this excessive concentration of power in the hands of the officials in Paris. The outbreak of the Commune had made this question acute. A law was passed in 1871 permitting all adult men of a year's residence in the commune to elect the communal council, and in the smaller communes permitting the council to choose the mayor. In all towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, and in the chief towns of departments or *arrondissements*, the mayors were still to be appointed by the central government. The measure was a compromise between Napoleonic centralization and the complete self-government demanded by radical reformers. In only 460 communes would the mayors henceforth be appointed from Paris.

The reconstruction of the army was also urgent. A law was passed in July 1872 which, in its essential features, still remains the basis of the military system of France. The example of Prussia, so successful, was followed. Henceforth there was to be universal compulsory military service. The National Guard was abolished. The new army, based on universal obligatory service, was to be divided into four parts, with various terms: five years in the active army, and different periods in the various reserves. Certain special classes were to be required to give only one year's service, as for instance, young men who showed certain certificates of advanced education. These must, however, pay to the state the amount of 1500 francs. Other classes were exempted entirely from service — ecclesiastics, teachers, and sons of widows, supposed to be supporters of families. The enactment of this law, with the principle of compulsory service for five years in the active army, was one of the most important acts of the early years of the Third Republic. In the face of the threats from Germany, alarmed at this revival of French military power, France went steadily ahead with her projects of reorganization. Not only was a new and large army provided, but fortresses were built, equipment created, all burdensome, yet willingly borne.

In regard to the subjects which grew out of the war, the

terms of peace, and the necessary measures of reconstruction, the Assembly was able to work on the whole harmoniously. But now a question, which could no longer be postponed, and which was highly divisive in its nature, entered upon its acute phase — the question of the permanent form of government. The Republic existed *de facto*, but not in law. It had been merely proclaimed by an insurrectionary body in Paris in September 1870. The Assembly, which was elected in the following February, and which represented all France, proved to be composed, as we have seen, in the majority, of Monarchists. Would these Monarchists consider that they were elected to make a constitution, not simply to determine the question of peace and war? If so, would they not simply declare the restoration of the Monarchy? They did not at first attempt this, probably because they preferred that the odium of a peace relinquishing French territory should attach to the Republic, not to the restored Monarchy. But now that the peace was made, the territory freed, the necessary laws passed, the Monarchists became active. They found they had in Thiers a man who would not abet them in their project. Thiers was originally a believer in constitutional monarchy, but he was not afraid of a republican government, and during the years after 1870 he came to believe that a Republic was, for France, at the close of a turbulent century, the only possible form of government. "There is," he said, "only one throne, and there are three claimants for a seat on it." He discovered a happy formula in favor of the Republic, "It is the form of government which divides us least." And again, "Those parties who want a monarchy do not want the same monarchy." By which phrases he accurately described a curious situation. The Monarchists, while they constituted a majority of the Assembly, were divided into three parties, no one of which was in the majority. There were Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists. The Legitimists upheld the right of the grandson of Charles X, the Count of Chambord; the Orleanists, the right of the grandson of Louis Philippe, the Count of Paris; the Bonapartists, of Napoleon III, or his son. The Monarchist parties could unite to prevent a definite, explicit establishment of the Republic; they could not unite to establish the monarchy, as each wing wished a different monarch. Out of this division arose the only chance the Third Republic had to live. As the months went by, the Monarchists felt that Thiers was becoming constantly more of a Republican, which was true; not a Republican of affection, but one of reason. He was, therefore, too dangerous a man to

leave in power, as he might, so great was the authority of his name and argument, persuade the former Monarchists to become Republicans. Indeed, it has been estimated that probably about a hundred members of the Assembly were influenced by him in that direction. If a monarchical restoration was to be attempted, therefore, Thiers must be gotten out of the way. But he had thus far been indispensable. Now, however, that peace was made, the finances regulated, the army reorganized, he was considered no longer necessary, and in 1873 was outvoted in the Assembly, and resigned, and Marshal MacMahon was chosen president to prepare the way for the coming monarch.

THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

Earnest attempts were made forthwith to bring about a restoration of the monarchy. This could be done by a fusion of the Legitimists and the Orleanists. Circumstances were particularly favorable for the accomplishment of such a union. The Count of Chambord had no direct descendants. The inheritance would, therefore, upon his death, pass to the House of Orleans, represented by the Count of Paris. The elder branch would in the course of nature be succeeded by the younger. This fusion seemed accomplished when the Count of Paris visited the Count of Chambord, recognizing him as head of the family. A committee of nine members of the Assembly, representing the Monarchist parties, the Imperialists holding aloof, negotiated during the summer of 1873 with the "King" concerning the terms of restoration. The negotiations were successful on most points, and it seemed as if by the close of the year the existence of the Republic would be terminated and Henry V would be reigning in France. The Republic was saved by the devotion of the Count of Chambord to a symbol. He stated that he would never renounce the ancient Bourbon banner. "Henry V could never abandon the white flag of Henry IV," he had already declared, and from that resolution he never swerved. The tricolor represented the Revolution. If he was to be King of France it must be with his principles and his flag; King of the Revolution he would never consent to be. The Orleanists, on the other hand, adhered to the tricolor, knowing its popularity with the people, knowing that no régime that repudiated the glorious symbol could long endure. Against this barrier the attempted fusion of the two branches of the Bourbon family was shattered. The immediate danger to the Republic was over.

But the Monarchists did not renounce their hope of restoring the monarchy. The Count of Chambord might, perhaps, change his mind: if not, as he had no son, the Count of Paris would succeed him after his death as the lawful claimant to the throne; and the Count of Paris, defender of the tricolor, could then be proclaimed. The Monarchists, therefore, planned merely to gain time. Marshal MacMahon had been chosen executive, as had Thiers, for no definite term. He was to serve during the pleasure of the Assembly itself. Believing that MacMahon would resign as soon as the King really appeared, they voted that his term should be for seven years, expecting that a period of that length would see a clearing up of the situation, either the change of mind or the death of the Count of Chambord. Thus was established the Septennate, or seven-year term, of the president, which still exists. The presidency was thus given a fixed term by the Monarchists, as they supposed, in their own interests. If they could not restore the monarchy in 1873, they could at least control the presidency for a considerable period, and thus prepare an easy transition to the new system at the opportune moment.

But France showed unmistakably that she desired the establishment of a definitive system, that she wished to be through with these provisional arrangements, which only kept party feeling feverish and handicapped France in her foreign relations. France had as yet no constitution, and yet this Assembly, chosen to make peace, had asserted that it was also chosen to frame a constitution, and it was by this assertion that it justified its continuance in power long after peace was made. Yet month after month, and year after year went by and the constitution was not made, nor even seriously discussed. If the Assembly could not, or would not, make a constitution, it should relinquish its power and let the people elect a body that would. But this it steadily refused to do.

There was a dispute even as to what the form of government was at that moment. Was it a Republic or not? It is true that the Assembly had elected a *President of the Republic*. It had thus inferentially ratified the proclamation of the Parisians of September 4, 1870. But was this merely provisional? The Republic needed to be founded on fundamental laws before it could really be considered established.

But not only would the Assembly not frankly proclaim the Republic, even after the attempt to restore "Henry V" had failed, but, on the other hand, it endeavored to stamp out the

Republican propaganda, which was steadily gaining ground among the people under the inspiring leadership of Gambetta. In order to increase its power in this contest with the Republicans, the Assembly altered the local government laws described above. By the law of 1873 the mayors of all the communes in France were to be appointed directly or indirectly by the ministry, and not elected by the local council, as by the law of 1871. This gave the ministry control of a number of office-holders in each town, who must do its bidding. Busts representing the Republic were removed from all public buildings; the name Republic was ostentatiously omitted from public documents. Republican newspapers were prosecuted and harassed in many ways. In a year more than 200 of them were arbitrarily suppressed. Such conduct rendered the Republicans more united and resolute. Gambetta journeyed from town to town, winning over to the Republic by his remarkable eloquence and powers of argumentation "new social classes," now influential by reason of universal suffrage, the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie, and the working class. The party grew steadily. Every day, therefore, the Assembly could less safely appeal to the people by a dissolution, yet with the rising tide of disaffection it must appeal to it or must set about giving the country permanent institutions, as a method of restoring quiet. Just at this time, when feeling ran so high, the Bonapartist party became aggressive, and won a number of successes at elections. The danger of a Bonapartist revival was one of the causes which prompted the Assembly finally to take up seriously the consideration of the constitution. Would not the people rush to the support of the Bonapartists when they saw that the Assembly could not establish the Monarchy and would not establish the Republic? A number of Orleanist members preferred even a republic to another Napoleonic empire, and it was through their secession that the majority shifted in the Assembly to the Republicans. Only, they insisted on making the Republic as *conservative* as possible, with as many of the attributes of monarchy as could be thrown about it. As the Republicans needed the votes of these Orleanists in order to carry through their plans at all, they were forced to make liberal concessions in this direction.

Out of this confused and abnormal situation arose the laws known as the Constitution of 1875; a law on the Organization of the Senate (February 24); on the Organization of the Public Powers (February 25); and on the Relations of the Public Powers (July 16); and other organic laws passed later. At

the beginning of the discussion it was found that the word "republic" was avoided in the texts. Proposed in the form of an amendment, it was voted down. Only later, and by indirection, was it adopted in speaking of the mode of election of "the President of the Republic." Even this phrase, the famous Wallon amendment, was adopted by a majority of only one vote, 353 to 352. Throughout the constitution it is only in connection with the presidential title that the word occurs. There is no formal but only this implicit statement that France is a republic. The difficult word was officially uttered by an Assembly that would have established monarchy if it could have.[1]

By the laws of 1875 a legislature consisting of two houses was established, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was to consist of 300 members, at least forty years of age. The Monarchists wished to have the members appointed by the President. It was finally determined, however, that one-fourth, or 75, should be elected for life by the Assembly itself, the remainder for a term of nine years. The Republicans wished to have these senators chosen by direct universal suffrage, but the Assembly wished to limit the sphere of universal suffrage as much as possible. It was finally decided that the senators of each department should be chosen by an electoral college. This electoral college should consist of various classes, the deputies from that department, members of the general department council, members of the arrondissement or district councils, and, more important than all the others because more numerous, of one delegate from each commune of the department, chosen by the communal council. The Monarchists insisted on this arrangement as likely to give them control of the Senate. No distinction was made between communes. A large city and a small country village were each to send one delegate to the college which should choose the senator. As the representatives from the country communes or villages were the more numerous class, and as the Monarchists, being large landed proprietors, had great influence in the rural districts, it was likely that the Senate could thus be controlled by them. One-third of the elective senators was to be renewed every three years.

There was also to be a Chamber of Deputies, elected by universal suffrage for a four-year term. The Senate and Chamber of Deputies, meeting together, should constitute a National

[1] A constitutional amendment adopted in 1884 renders the matter explicit: "The republican form of government shall not be made the subject of a proposed revision."

Assembly. Organized in this form they should have the power to elect the President and to revise the Constitution. The President is chosen for seven years, and may be re-elected. There is no vice-president, no succession provided by law. In case of a vacancy in the presidency the National Assembly meets and elects a new President, generally within forty-eight hours. The President has the right to initiate legislation, as have the members of the two chambers, the duty to promulgate laws after their passage, to superintend their execution, the pardoning power, the direction of the army and navy, and the appointment to all civil and military positions. He may, with the consent of the Senate, dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its legal term and order a new election. But these powers are merely nominal, for the reason that every act of the President must be countersigned by a minister, who thereby becomes responsible for the act, the President being irresponsible, except in the case of high treason.[1]

The most fundamental feature of the French Republic, as established by the laws of 1875, is the parliamentary system, as worked out in England. "The ministers are jointly and severally responsible to the Chambers for the general policy of the government, and individually for their personal acts," says the law. The ministry, therefore, is the real executive, and it is practically a committee of the Chambers, chosen to exercise the executive power under the nominal direction of the President. The ministry must resign as soon as it loses support of the Chambers. The Chambers, therefore, possess control of the executive, as of the legislative power. These powers, instead of being carefully separated, as in our constitution, are really fused, as in the English system. Parliament is the center and head of power. The President's position resembles that of the constitutional monarch; one of ceremonial representation of the state, without real power, other than that which may flow from his personality, his powers of suggestion or advice, which the ministers may listen to or not. The ministers are responsible to parliament, that is, practically to the Chamber of Deputies, as the popular chamber. It is the Chamber that really makes and unmakes ministries by its votes, that is, controls the executive branch of the government. The Chamber has proved able even to force the President to resign before the expiration of his

[1] These laws are given in Anderson, *Constitutions and Documents*, No. 133; also in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, I, 286–294; in French in Lowell, *Governments and Parties*, II, 337–344.

seven-year term by refusing to support any ministry, thus bringing all state action to a standstill. In 1875 France had a constitution more democratic than that of England or the United States, in both of which countries the popularly elected chamber encountered serious checks.

Not that this was apparent to the Assembly that created this system. Not for some years was it clear that the democratic element of this constitution was to be the vital part. The monarchical assembly that established the parliamentary republic in 1875 thought that it had introduced sufficient monarchical elements into it to curb the aggressiveness of democracy and to facilitate a restoration of the Monarchy at some convenient season. By reducing the presidency to a nominal position it aimed to prevent one-man power, the emergence of a Bonaparte, as in 1848 and 1851. The Senate, it thought, would be a monarchical stronghold. And the President and Senate could probably keep the Chamber of Deputies in check by their power of dissolving it. The Republicans accepted this system as better than monarchy or the existing provisional scheme. It bore the name Republic, and they hoped to make it a Republic in more than name. Some Radical Republicans, however, denounced the Constitution as a mockery.

The Constitution of 1875 was plainly a compromise between opposing forces, neither of which could win an unalloyed victory. It was as Hanotaux says, "a dose prepared for a convalescent country."

Having completed the Constitutional Laws, the National Assembly which had been in session since February 1871, which had ratified the Treaty of Frankfort, had liberated the territory, and had reorganized the army and local government, dissolved itself December 31, 1875. The elections to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were held at the beginning of 1876. The Monarchists secured a slight majority in the former, the Republicans a large majority in the latter. MacMahon at first appointed a ministry of Republicans, insisting, however, that three departments were outside politics, therefore not controllable by Parliament — the departments of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs.

The Monarchists now began a vigorous agitation against the Republicans. They were powerfully supported by the clerical party, which, ever since 1871, had been extremely active. The Republicans resented this intrusion of the Catholic party into politics, and their opinion was vividly expressed by Gambetta,

who in the Chamber threw out a phrase which became famous — "Clericalism — that is our enemy," — meaning that the Roman Catholic Church was the most dangerous opponent of the Republic. These Anti-Republican groups persuaded President MacMahon that he was not bound to accept a ministry at the bidding of the Chambers, that he had the right to a personal policy, a programme of his own. As certain elections of the bodies which participated in the choice of senators were to be held toward the close of 1877, and as they would probably result in the Republicans capturing the Senate, if conducted by a Republican ministry, and as he believed that the triumph of the Republicans would be harmful to France, to the army, to foreign prestige, MacMahon virtually dismissed, May 16, 1877, the Simon ministry, which had the support of the Chamber, and appointed a ministry, composed largely of Monarchists, under the Duke de Broglie. Thereupon, the Senate, representing the same views, consented to the dissolution of the Chamber, and new elections were prepared.

Thus a constitutional question was created — the relation of the Presidency to the Chamber of Deputies. If the President was to resemble the British sovereign, he had no right to a personal policy of his own, no right to dismiss ministers acceptable to Parliament. MacMahon's opinion was that he had that right, and that "if the Chamber did not approve, it remained for the people to decide between him and it" by a dissolution and new elections.

This was a contest for political power between the President and the Senate on the one hand, the Chamber on the other. As the Constitution gave the President and Senate the right to dissolve the Chamber, they had the upper hand, at least until the people voted. A crisis had arisen which involved an interpretation of the Constitution. The President did not consider himself a mere figurehead, did not propose to consider the Chamber of Deputies as supreme.

This question was now fought out before the people. A new Chamber of Deputies was to be chosen. The Broglie ministry used every effort to influence the voters against Gambetta and the Republicans. Republican office-holders were removed and reactionaries put in their place. The political machinery was used to hamper the Republicans, to silence or curb the Republican newspapers. Gambetta coined another famous phrase, when he declared that after the people should have spoken, MacMahon must "either submit or resign." For this he was prosecuted, and

condemned to three months of prison and a fine of 2,000 francs. Official candidates were put forth for the Chamber, supported by the ministry and office-holders. The clergy took an active part in the campaign, supporting the official candidates, and preaching against the Republicans, conduct which in the end was to cost them dear. The struggle was embittered. It was a contest between the monarchical and republican principles, with the clergy, then very influential, in favor of the former. The bishops ordered a supplication for a favorable vote. The supplication was apparently not heard. The Republicans were overwhelmingly victorious. In the new Chamber they had a majority of over a hundred. MacMahon "submitted," and took a Republican ministry.

In the next year, 1878, an election of one-third of the Senate occurred. The Republicans now gained control of that body. With both Chambers Republican, Marshal MacMahon's position became very difficult. The Chambers demanded the retirement from the army of certain generals, who were opposed to the Republicans. MacMahon refused to remove them on the ground that this would be prejudicial to the army, which should be kept out of politics. Rather than acquiesce he resigned the Presidency, January 30, 1879. The National Assembly immediately met and elected Jules Grévy president, a man whose devotion to Republican principles had been known to France for thirty years. For the first time since 1871 the Republicans controlled the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the Presidency. Since that time the Republic has been entirely in the hands of the Republicans.

REPUBLICAN LEGISLATION

Jules Grévy had in 1848 advocated the suppression of the Presidency on the ground that one-man power was dangerous. He now administered the office in a manner sharply contrasting with that of MacMahon. He had no personal policy, he never personally intervened in the conduct of affairs; that was the province of the ministry. His example has been followed by succeeding presidents. Thus the Presidency has lost any suggestion of monarchy it may ever have had. In the war of politics the President is a neutral figure, affiliating with no party.

The Republicans, now completely victorious, and no longer merely on the defensive, shortly broke up into numerous groups. Ministries changed with great frequency, and it is not in the permutations and combinations of politicians that the main sig-

nificance of the next period lies, but in the constructive work which aimed to consolidate the Republic. Two personalities stand out with particular prominence: Gambetta, as president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Jules Ferry, as member of several ministries and as twice prime minister. The legislation enacted during this period aimed to clinch the victory over the Monarchists and Clericals by making the institutions of France thoroughly republican and secular. The seat of government was transferred from Versailles, where it had been since 1871, to Paris (1880), and July 14th, the day of the storming of the Bastille, symbol of the triumph of the people over the monarchy, was declared the national holiday, and was celebrated for the first time in 1880 amid great enthusiasm. The right of citizens freely to hold public meetings as they might wish, and without any preliminary permission of the Government, was secured, as was also a practically unlimited freedom of the press (1881). Municipal councils were once more given the right to elect mayors (1882), and their administrative power was greatly augmented (1884). This was an enlargement of the sphere of local self-government, a great school of political training for the people. Workingmen were permitted, for the first time, freely to form trade unions (1884). Divorce, which Napoleon had introduced into the Code, but which was abolished in 1814, was restored in 1884.

The Republicans were particularly solicitous about education. As universal suffrage was the basis of the state, it was considered fundamental that the voters should be intelligent. Education was regarded as the strongest bulwark of the Republic. Several laws were passed, concerning all grades of education, but the most important were those concerning primary schools. A law of 1881 made primary education gratuitous; one of 1882 made it compulsory between the ages of six and thirteen, and later laws made it entirely secular. No religious instruction is given in these schools. All teachers are appointed from the laity. This system of popular education is one of the great creative achievements of the Republic, and one of the most fruitful. Before the close of the century it had increased the number of those in primary schools by 850,000. Illiteracy dropped from 25 per cent. to 4 per cent. for the men, and from 38 per cent. to 7 per cent. for the women. Large expenditures were necessary, to erect schoolhouses and to employ more teachers. Twenty-five thousand schoolhouses were built, or rebuilt, at an expense of over 140 million dollars, and the appropriations

for the maintenance, which fell upon the state, — for primary education is an affair of the nation, not of the locality, — trebled. This legislation was enacted under the vigorous direction and inspiration of the Minister of Public Instruction, Jules Ferry, and is one of his most enduring titles to fame. Laws were also passed concerning secondary, university, and technical education. The Government undertook in this legislation to free the schools from all clerical control, on the ground that the clergy were enemies of the Republic. Further evidences of this anti-clerical feeling are found in the expulsion of the Jesuits from France in 1880, and in the refusal to all unauthorized religious orders of the right to maintain schools. Schools might, however, be maintained by the secular clergy and by those orders which should receive the sanction of the Government.

The Republic also entered upon a policy of large expenditures for public works, such as the building of railways, canals, the dredging of harbors and rivers, the erection and equipment of fortresses along the Belgian and German frontiers.

In 1884 the Constitution was revised in that the principle of life membership in the Senate was abolished. There were 75 such seats. It was provided that, as these seats became vacant, they should be filled by the election of ordinary senators, for the regular term of nine years.

Under the masterful influence of Jules Ferry, prime minister in 1881, and again from 1883 to 1885, the Republic embarked upon an aggressive colonial policy. She established a protectorate over Tunis; sent an expedition to Tonkin, to Madagascar; founded the French Congo. This policy aroused bitter opposition from the beginning, and entailed large expenditures, but Ferry, regardless of growing opposition, forced it through, in the end to his own undoing. His motives in throwing France into these ventures were various. One reason was economic. France was feeling the rivalry of Germany and Italy, and Ferry believed that she must gain new markets as compensation for those she was gradually losing. Again, France would gain in prestige abroad, and in her own feeling of contentment, if she turned her attention to empire-building and ceased to think morbidly of her losses in the German war. Her outlook would be broader. Moreover, she could not afford to be passive when other nations about her were reaching out for Africa and Asia. The era of imperialism had begun. France must participate in the movement or be left hopelessly behind in the rivalry of nations. Under Ferry's resolute leadership the policy of expansion was carried out, and

the colonial possessions of France were greatly increased, but at the expense of political peace at home.

THE RISE OF BOULANGISM

Policies so decided, so far-reaching, so ambitious had many enemies — Clericals, Monarchists. Such sweeping undertakings as educational reform and empire-building were very expensive. The Government gave up all idea of economy, and was forced to negotiate new loans, thereby greatly increasing the national debt, and to levy new taxes. Moreover, there was a vigorous group of Republicans, the Radicals, whose leader was Clemenceau, who denounced these colonial enterprises as involving war, which they hated, as being an attack upon other peoples who had a right to be free, as expensive and therefore an unjustifiable luxury for a country that had been through the experience of France, and as tending to divert attention from domestic problems, whose solution they felt to be urgent. These Radical Republicans demanded the separation of Church and State, the reduction of the powers of the Senate, an income tax that wealth might bear its proper proportion of the burdens of the state. The rivalry of the Republican factions now lost all bounds, and when a false rumor reached Paris of a failure of the war in Tonkin, these Radicals joined with the Monarchists and Clericals in May 1885 to overthrow Ferry, one of the strong figures of the Republic's history. Though he had vastly augmented the empire, public opinion had been so vehemently aroused by the campaign of attack and slander against him that he had become extremely unpopular.

During the next three years, from 1886 to 1889, the political situation was troubled, uncertain, factious, nervous. There was no commanding personality in politics to give elevation and sweep to men's ideas. Gambetta had died in 1882 at the age of forty-four, and Ferry was most unjustly the victim of obloquy, from which he never recovered. Ministries succeeded each other with meaningless rapidity. Politics appeared to be merely a petty game of getting offices, not of pursuing matured policies of state. There was a great deal of discontent with the Republic. Many had been embittered by the policy of secularizing education; many by the colonial ventures. The Republic was a parliamentary republic, and parliamentary institutions were in the opinion of many utterly discredited. The incessant changes of ministries, the petty and bitter personalities of political life, the absence of conspicuous leaders with large ideas, rendered

France disillusioned and bored. The Republic was spending more than its income on the various undertakings described above, and deficits were the result, alarming the public mind. Just at this time, too, a scandal was unearthed in President Grévy's own household. His son-in-law, Wilson, was found to be using his influence for purposes of trafficking in the bestowal of places in the Legion of Honor, and as a result, the President, in no sense involved, yet defending his son-in-law, was forced to resign, and was succeeded by Carnot, a moderate Republican (December 3, 1887). Moreover, many believed that as no régime in France for a century had outlasted eighteen years, the Republic would form no exception, and the eighteen years were nearly up.

Such a state of discontent and despondency, justified in part, in part fictitious, created a real crisis for the Republic, in which its very life was at stake. If the Parliamentary Republic was unable to give a strong and intelligent government, might not France welcome a dictator, as she had done in the case of two previous republics? A person was at hand anxious to serve in this capacity, General Boulanger. A dashing figure on horseback, an attractive speaker, General Boulanger sought to use the popular discontent for his own advancement. Made Minister of War in 1886, he showed much activity, seeking the favor of the soldiers by improving the conditions of life in the barracks, and by advocating the reduction of the required term of service. He controlled several newspapers, which began to insinuate that under his leadership France could take her revenge upon Germany by a successful war upon that country. The scandal of the Legion of Honor decorations occurring opportunely, and involving the resignation of the President, encouraged his campaign. He posed as the rescuer of the Republic, demanding a total revision of the Constitution. His programme, as announced, was vague, but probably aimed at the diminution of the importance of Parliament, and the conferring of great powers upon the President, and his election directly by the people, which he hoped would be favorable to himself. For three years his personality was a storm center. Discontented people of the most varied shades flocked to his support — Monarchists, Imperialists, Clericals, hoping to use him to overturn the Republic. These parties contributed money to the support of his campaign, which was brilliantly managed, with the view to focusing popular attention upon him. To show the popular enthusiasm Boulanger now became a candidate for Parliament in many districts where vacancies occurred. In five months (1888) he was elected deputy six

times. A seventh election in Paris itself, in January 1889, resulted in a brilliant triumph. He was elected by over 80,000 majority. Would he dare to take the final step and attempt to seize power, as two Bonapartes had done before him? He did not have the requisite audacity to try. In the face of this imminent danger the Republicans ceased their dissensions and stood together. They assumed the offensive. The ministry summoned Boulanger to appear before the Senate, sitting as a High Court of Justice, to meet the charge of conspiring against the safety of the state. His boldness vanished. He fled from the country to Belgium. He was condemned by the Court in his absence. His party fell to pieces, its leader proving so little valorous. Two years later he committed suicide. The Republic had weathered a serious crisis. In the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of 1889 the Republicans badly defeated all opponents — Monarchists, Imperialists, Boulangists — gaining a majority of nearly a hundred and fifty. It was clear that the Republic was becoming year by year more solidly established in the devotion of the voters. This was shown again still more strongly four years later, in the elections of 1893.

The utter collapse of Boulanger had several important consequences. It strengthened the Republic, proved its vitality, and discredited its opponents. It also discredited the idea of a revision of the Constitution. From now on conditions began to improve. The Exposition of 1889 in Paris was a great success, proved to all the world the remarkable recuperation of France, and was a reminder of the Revolution of 1789, from which the country had gained so much. Convinced that the Republic was to be permanent and not a transitory phenomenon, Pope Leo XIII ordered the bishops to cease their attacks upon it, and in Parliament a certain number of Catholic politicians rallied to it. In 1891 an alliance was made with Russia, which ended the long period of diplomatic isolation, served as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and satisfied the French people, as well as increased their sense of safety and their confidence in the future. In 1892 France entered upon a policy of high tariffs for purposes of protection.

The Republicans were henceforth in an overwhelming majority, but divided into various groups. The Radicals were more numerous than before, and a new party appeared, the Socialists, with some sixty members. As the Republic was becoming more solidly established, it was also becoming more radical. The history of the next fifteen years was to be the proof of this.

In 1894 President Carnot was assassinated. Casimir-Périer was chosen to succeed him, but resigned after six months. Félix Faure, a moderate Republican, was chosen to succeed him. Under Faure the alliance with Russia was still further strengthened and proclaimed. This was the most important fact in the current diplomatic history of France, tending to raise her international position, and to make her more contented by gratifying her self-esteem, and by increasing her sense of security.

Faure died in office in 1899. Under his presidency (1895–1899) the most burning question of internal politics was the Dreyfus case, for many years a dominant issue, creating another serious crisis for the Republic. An examination of that case is essential to an understanding of contemporary French history.

THE DREYFUS CASE

In October 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew, and a captain in the artillery, attached to the General Staff, was arrested amid circumstances of unusual secrecy, was treated with great harshness, and was brought before a court-martial, where he was accused of treason, of transmitting important military documents to a foreign power, presumably Germany. The accusation rested on a document that had come into the possession of the War Office, and was soon to be famous as the "bordereau," a memorandum merely containing a list of several documents said to be inclosed. The bordereau bore no address, no date, nor signature, but it was declared to be in the known handwriting of Dreyfus. The court-martial, acting behind closed doors, found him guilty, and condemned him to expulsion from the army and to imprisonment for life. In January 1895 he was publicly degraded in a most dramatic manner in the courtyard of the Military School, before a large detachment of the army. His stripes were torn from his uniform, his sword was broken. Throughout this agonizing scene he was defiant, asserted his innocence, and shouted "*Vive la France!*" He was then deported to a small, barren, and unhealthy island off French Guiana, in South America, appropriately called Devil's Island, and was there kept in solitary confinement. A life imprisonment under such conditions would probably not be long, though it would certainly be horrible.

No one questioned the justice of the verdict. The opinion was practically unanimous that he had received a traitor's deserts. Only the immediate family and circle of Dreyfus maintained that a monstrous wrong had been done, and demanded further investi-

gation. Their protests passed unheeded. The case was considered closed.

It was reopened in 1896 by Colonel Picquart, one of the youngest and most promising officers in the army, attached since June 1895 to the detective bureau, or Intelligence Department of the General Staff. In the course of his duties he had become convinced that the "bordereau" was not the work of Dreyfus, but of a certain Major Esterhazy, who was shortly shown to be one of the most abandoned characters in the army. Picquart informed his superior, the Minister of War, of this discovery. The military authorities, instead of investigating the matter, not wishing to have the case reopened, sent Picquart to Tunis and Algeria, the purpose apparently being to get him out of the way. Colonel Henry was appointed to his place.

By this time the public was becoming interested. Some of the documents in the famous case had found their way into print; the mysterious elements in the proceedings aroused curiosity and some uneasiness.

Toward the end of 1897, Scheurer-Kestner, a vice-president of the Senate, who had become convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, tried to have the case reopened. His efforts met with the blunt statement of the prime minister, Méline, that the Dreyfus case no longer existed, was a *chose jugée*. But the fact that a man of such importance, and such known integrity of character and mind, as Scheurer-Kestner, was convinced that a cruel wrong had been committed, was of unmistakable consequence. The wrath of the anti-Dreyfus party was increased; criminations and recriminations flew back and forth. Race hatred of the Jews, zealously fanned for several years by a group of journalists, fed the flames.

Esterhazy was now brought before a court-martial, given a very travesty of a trial, and triumphantly acquitted, congratulated, *avec émotion*, by the members of the court itself (January 11, 1898). On the next day Colonel Picquart was arrested and imprisoned on charges made by Esterhazy. On the day following that, January 13th, Émile Zola, the well-known novelist, published a letter of great boldness and brilliancy, in which he made most scathing charges against the judges of both the Dreyfus and Esterhazy courts-martial, and practically dared the Government to prosecute him. His desire was thus to reopen the whole Dreyfus question. The Government prosecuted him in a trial which was a parody of justice, secured his condemnation to imprisonment and fine, and evaded the question of Dreyfus. The

Zola condemnation was later quashed by a higher court on a mere technicality. He was later tried again, and again condemned (July 1898) by default, having fled to London. The Dreyfus case had not been reopened.

Meanwhile, the Méline ministry had been overthrown, and the Brisson ministry had come into power, with Cavaignac as Minister of War. On July 7, 1898, Cavaignac, intending to settle this troublesome matter once for all, made a speech before the Chamber of Deputies, in which, omitting all mention of the bordereau, he brought forward three documents as new proofs of the guilt of Dreyfus. His speech was so convincing that the Chamber, by a vote of five hundred and seventy-two to two, ordered that it should be posted in every one of the thirty-six thousand communes of France. The victory was overwhelming.

Immediately, however, Colonel Picquart wrote to Cavaignac that he could prove that the first two documents cited had nothing to do with Dreyfus, and that the third was an outright forgery. He was rearrested. It was immediately after this that Zola was condemned for the second time, as stated above.

Events now took a most sensational turn. At the end of August the newspapers of Paris contained the announcement that Colonel Henry had confessed that he had forged the document which Picquart had declared was a forgery and that then he had committed suicide. Cavaignac resigned, maintaining, however, that the crime of Henry did not prove the innocence of Dreyfus.

The public was vastly disturbed by these events. Why was there any need of new proof to establish Dreyfus's guilt, and if the new proof was the work of crime, what about the original proof, the famous bordereau? At this juncture the case was referred to the Court of Cassation, the highest court in France. While it was deliberating, the President, Faure, known as an anti-Dreyfusite, died suddenly under somewhat mysterious circumstances, and on February 18, 1899, Émile Loubet, known to be favorable to a reopening of the question, was chosen as his successor.

Sensations showed no signs of abating. On June 2nd, Esterhazy, who had fled to England, announced that he had himself written the bordereau. The enemies of Dreyfus now asserted that he had simply been bribed by the Dreyfus party to make this declaration. On the next day the Court of Cassation annulled the decision of the court-martial of 1894, and ordered that Dreyfus be tried again before a court-martial at Rennes. Dreyfus

was brought from Devil's Island, and his second trial began in August 1899.

This new trial was conducted in the midst of the most excited state of the public mind in France, and of intense interest abroad. Party passions were inflamed as they had not been in France since the Commune. The supporters of Dreyfus were denounced frantically as slanderers of the honor of the army, the very bulwark of the safety of the country, as traitors to France.

At the Rennes tribunal, Dreyfus encountered the violent hostility of the high army officers, who had been his accusers five years before. These men were desperately resolved that he should again be found guilty. The trial was of an extraordinary character. It was the evident purpose of the judges not to allow the matter to be thoroughly probed. Testimony, which in England or America would have been considered absolutely vital, was barred out. The universal opinion outside France was, as was stated in the London *Times*, " that the whole case against Captain Dreyfus, as set forth by the heads of the French army, in plain combination against him, was foul with forgeries, lies, contradictions and puerilities, and that nothing to justify his condemnation had been shown."

Nevertheless, the court, by a vote of five to two, declared him guilty, " with extenuating circumstances," an amazing verdict. It is not generally held that treason to one's country can plead extenuating circumstances. The court condemned him to ten years' imprisonment, from which the years spent at Devil's Island might be deducted. Thus the " honor " of the army had been maintained.

President Loubet immediately pardoned Dreyfus, and he was released, broken in health. This solution was satisfactory to neither side. The anti-Dreyfusites vented their rage on Loubet. On the other hand, Dreyfus demanded exoneration, a recognition of his innocence, not pardon.

But the Government was resolved that this discussion, which had so frightfully torn French society, should cease. Against the opposition of the Dreyfusites, it passed, in 1900, an amnesty for all those implicated in the notorious case, which meant that no legal actions could be brought against any of the participants on either side. The friends of Dreyfus, Zola, and Picquart protested vigorously against the erection of a barrier against their vindication. The bill, nevertheless, passed.

Six years later, however, the Dreyfus party attained its vindication. The revision of the whole case was submitted to the

Court of Cassation. On July 12, 1906, that body quashed the verdict of the Rennes court-martial. It declared that the charges which had been brought against Dreyfus had no foundation, that the bordereau was the work of Esterhazy, that another document of importance was a forgery, that the Rennes court-martial had been guilty of gross injustice in refusing to hear testimony that would have established the innocence of the accused. The case was not to be submitted to another military tribunal but was closed.

The Government now restored Captain Dreyfus to his rank in the army, or rather, gave him the rank of major, allowing him to count to that end the whole time in which he had been unjustly deprived of his standing. On July 21, 1906, he was invested with a decoration of the Legion of Honor in the very courtyard of the Military School, where eleven years before he had been so dramatically degraded. Colonel Picquart was promoted brigadier-general, and shortly became Minister of War. Zola had died in 1903, but in 1908 his body was transferred to the Pantheon, as symbolizing a kind of civic canonization. Thus ended the "Affair."

The Dreyfus case, originally simply involving the fate of an alleged traitor, had soon acquired a far greater significance. Party and personal ambitions and interests sought to use it for purposes of their own, and thus the question of legal right and wrong was woefully distorted and obscured. The Anti-Semites used it to inflame the people against the Jews. They won the support of the Clericals, ingeniously suggesting that the so-called anti-religious legislation of the Third Republic, particularly that establishing secular education, was really the work of the Jews, influencing politicians by their money, and that the Jews were now getting control of the army, and that Dreyfus himself showed how they would use it for traitorous purposes. Further, reactionaries of all kinds joined the anti-Dreyfus party: Monarchists, anxious to discredit the Republic, that thus they might profit; so-called Nationalists, anxious to change the government along the lines of Boulangism and to adopt a vigorous foreign policy. On the other hand, there rallied to the defense of Dreyfus those who believed in his innocence, those who denounced the hatred of a race as a relic of barbarism, those who believed that the military should be subordinate to the civil authority and should not regard itself above the law, as these army officers were doing; all who believed that the whole opposition was merely conducting an insidious, covert, dangerous attack

upon the Republic, and all who believed that clerical influence should be kept out of politics.

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

One result of the Dreyfus agitation was the creation in the Chamber of Deputies of a strong coalition, called the "Bloc," which consisted of the Radical Republican and Socialist parties. This coalition was destined to control the government for many years. Its first conspicuous head was Waldeck-Rousseau, a leader of the Parisian bar, a former follower of Gambetta. In October 1900, Waldeck-Rousseau, then prime minister, made a speech at Toulouse which resounded throughout France and which foreshadowed a policy of great significance. The real peril confronting France, he said, arose from the growing power of religious orders — orders of monks and nuns. "In this country, whose moral unity has for centuries constituted its strength and greatness, two classes of young people are growing up ignorant of each other until the day when they meet, so unlike as to risk not comprehending one another. Such a fact is explained only by the existence of a power which is no longer even occult, and by the constitution in the state of a rival power." By which was meant that the youth of France were growing up, divided into two classes, whose outlook upon life, whose mental processes, whose opinions concerning politics and morals were so widely at variance that the moral unity of the nation was destroyed. And the cause of this was the astonishing and dangerous growth in recent years of religious orders or Congregations, whose influence upon a considerable and increasing section of the young was highly harmful. Here was a power that was a rival of the State. Waldeck-Rousseau pointed out that these orders, not authorized under the laws of France, were growing rapidly in wealth and numbers; that between 1877 and 1900 the number of nuns had increased from 14,000 to 75,000 in orders not authorized; that the monks numbered about 190,000; that their property, held in mainmorte, estimated at about 50,000,000 francs in the middle of the century, had risen to 700,000,000 in 1880, and was more than a billion francs in 1900. This vast absorption of wealth, thus withdrawn from circulation, was an economic danger of the first importance. But the most serious feature was the activity of these orders in teaching and preaching. Waldeck-Rousseau believed that the education they gave was permeated with a spirit of hostility to the Republic; that the traditional

hostility of the Roman Catholic Church to liberty was inculcated; that this Roman spirit was a menace in a country that believed in liberty; that it constituted a political danger to the State which Parliament must face; that to preserve the Republic defensive measures must be taken. Holding this opinion, the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry secured the passage, July 1, 1901, of the Law of Associations, which provided, among other things, that no religious orders should exist in France without definite authorization in each case from Parliament. It was the belief of the authors of this bill that the Roman Catholic Church was the enemy of the Republic, that it was using its every agency against the Republic, that it had latterly supported the anti-Dreyfus party in its attempt to discredit the institutions of France, as it had done formerly under MacMahon. Gambetta had, at that time, declared that *the* enemy was the clerical party. "Clericalism," said Combes, who succeeded Waldeck-Rousseau in 1902, "is, in fact, to be found at the bottom of every agitation and every intrigue from which Republican France has suffered during the last thirty-five years."

Animated with this feeling the Associations Law was enforced with rigor in 1902 and 1903. Many orders refused to ask for authorization from Parliament; many which asked were refused. Tens of thousands of monks and nuns were forced to leave their institutions, which were closed. By a law of 1904 it was provided that all teaching by religious orders, even by those authorized, should cease within ten years. The State was to have a monopoly of the education of the young, in the interest of the ideals of liberalism it represented. Combes, upon whom fell the execution of this law, suppressed about five hundred teaching, preaching, and commercial orders. This policy was vehemently denounced by Catholics as persecution, as an infringement upon liberty, the liberty to teach, the liberty of parents to have their children educated in denominational schools if they preferred.

This, as events were to prove, was only preliminary to a far greater religious struggle which ended in the complete separation of Church and State, the disestablishment of the former, the laicization of the latter.

The relations of the Roman Catholic Church and the State down to 1905 were determined by the Concordat, concluded between Napoleon I and Pius VII in 1801, and put into force in 1802. The Concordat provided that the archbishops and bishops should be appointed by the State with the consent of the Pope; that the bishops should appoint the priests, but only with the

consent of the Government; that the State should pay the salaries of the clergy, both priests and bishops, who thus became a part of the administrative system of the country. Ecclesiatical property, cathedrals, parish churches, residences of bishops and priests, and seminary buildings had all been declared the property of the nation in 1789, and still remained such, but these buildings were to be placed at the disposal of the clergy. Thus the Church was harnessed to the State, which had extensive power over it.

This system remained undisturbed throughout the nineteenth century, under the various régimes, but with the advent of the Third Republic serious friction began to develop. The Republicans believed in the thorough secularization of the State, and they were resolved that the clergy should not use their power over men's minds and consciences in opposition to the acts or principles of the Republic. In their determination to abolish ecclesiastical influence in the State, many measures were passed, between 1881 and 1903; schools were made undenominational, no clergyman might teach in them, no religious exercises might be conducted in them; prayers at the sessions of Parliament were abolished; hospitals were made secular; divorce, which had been abolished in 1814, was restored, and, as just described, the religious orders were brought into subjection to the State, and, indeed, largely dispersed. These acts were partly the reply of the Republicans to the anti-republican activity of the ecclesiatics which ran through the whole thirty years, partly the cause of that activity. The clergy were not friendly to the Republic, from which they drew their salaries. This is unquestionable. The Pope himself recognized it when, in 1893, he urged the clergy to accept the Republic as their lawful government. Many Republicans were not only intent upon maintaining the Republic, but were anxious to undermine religion, considering it an obstacle in the way of progress, of civilization. But many who were not opposed to religion believed that religion did not concern the State, but was a private matter. They held that the State had no right to tax people for the support of a Church in which many had no belief or interest; that the State had no right to favor one denomination over another or over all others; that it must, in justice to all its citizens, be purely secular, entirely neutral toward all creeds and churches.

There was ceaseless friction, then, for thirty years between Church and State. The opposition of the Republicans was augmented by the activity of the clergy in the Dreyfus affair. Diplomatic incidents, in themselves of comparatively slight importance,

brought matters to a head. In April 1904 the President of France, Loubet, went to Rome to render a visit to Victor Emmanuel III, a "usurper" in the eyes of the Pope. The latter protested to the Catholic powers of Europe against what he called "a grave offense to the Sovereign Pontiff." The French in turn resented what they regarded as an impertinent interference with their conduct of their foreign relations. Other disturbing incidents followed. These incidents did not cause the rupture; they merely furnished the occasion.

Ever since June 1903, a parliamentary committee had been studying the problem and trying to draft a measure of separation of Church and State. A law was finally passed, December 9, 1905, which abrogated the Concordat of 1801. The State was henceforth not to pay the salaries of the clergy; on the other hand, it relinquished all rights over their appointment. It undertook to pay pensions to clergymen who had served many years, and were already well advanced in age; also to pay certain amounts to those who had been in the priesthood for a few years only. In regard to the property, which, since 1789, had been vested in the nation, the cathedrals, churches, chapels, it was provided that these should still be at the free disposal of the Roman Catholic Church, but that they should be held and managed by so-called "Associations of Worship" (*associations cultuelles*), which were to vary in size according to the population of the community.

The law contained many provisions designed to prevent these associations from amassing more than a given small amount of wealth by legacies, gifts, or otherwise; and to prevent the clergy, now cut off from all official connection with the State, from using their influence against the Republic. The Church must not become too powerful. It was stated that the property thus to be left in the hands of the associations amounted to over a hundred million dollars. The disestablished Church would not have to make this enormous expenditure for the construction of new places of worship. A year was given for the making of the necessary arrangements.[1]

This law was not universally condemned by the Catholics of France. Many believed that the Church should adapt itself to it, at least provisionally. Seventy-four bishops decided to give it

[1] The Separation Law applied also to Protestant and Jewish churches, separating them from all connection with the State, discontinuing payment by the State of the salaries of their clergymen. These sects were in favor of the law.

a trial if a certain alteration could be made in the character of the Associations of Worship.

It is probable that this change would have been conceded by the Government, but this was not to be tested, for Pope Pius X condemned the law of 1905 unreservedly. He declared that the fundamental principle of separation of Church and State is "an absolutely false thesis, a very pernicious error." He denounced the Associations of Worship as giving the administrative control, not "to the divinely instituted hierarchy, but to an association of laymen," and declared that this was a violation of the principle on which rested the Church which "was founded by Jesus Christ."

The Pope's decision was final and decisive for all Catholics. It was based on fundamentals. No change in details could alter it. The bishops who had been willing to try the new law acquiesced in its condemnation. What would Parliament do about it? The year was running out. Would the churches be closed? If so, would not France be drawn into a lamentable religious war, the outcome of which no one could foretell? The Government was determined to avoid that contingency. The Minister of Public Worship, Briand, decided to apply to the situation a law passed in 1881 regulating the holding of public meetings. Designed for secular meetings, there was nothing to prevent its being applied to religious. It was therefore announced that priests might make use of the churches after merely filing the usual application, which should cover a whole year. This compromise also was rejected by the Pope.

Parliament therefore passed a new law, promulgated January 2, 1907. By it most of the privileges guaranteed the Roman Catholic Church by the Law of 1905 were abrogated. The critical point was the keeping of the churches open for public worship. It was provided that their use should be gratuitous, and should be regulated by contracts between the priests and the prefects or mayors. These contracts would safeguard the civil ownership of the buildings, but worship would go on in them as before. This system gradually gained lodgment in the life of France.

The result of this series of events and measures was this: Church and State were definitively separated. The people apparently approved in subsequent elections the policy followed by their Government. Bishops and priests no longer receive salaries from the State. On the other hand they have liberties which they did not enjoy under the Concordat, such as rights of

assembly and freedom from governmental participation in appointments. The faithful must henceforth support their priests, and bear the expenses of the Church. The churches have been left them by this practical but irrational device. Other ecclesiastical buildings, such as the palaces of bishops, the rectories of priests, and the edifices of theological seminaries, have been taken from ecclesiastical control, and are now used for educational or charitable purposes, or as government offices. The former palace of the Archbishop of Paris was forthwith occupied by the Minister of Labor. The famous seminary of St. Sulpice was for some time used in connection with the Luxembourg Museum.[1]

"By this separation of church and state," says Seignobos, "France broke with the European tradition of concordats, by which the state officially recognizes religion; she adopted the American system which leaves the churches to be organized by private initiative. This was a revolution in the ecclesiastical régime of France."

ACQUISITION OF COLONIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had possessed an extensive colonial empire. This she had lost to England as a result of the wars of the reign of Louis XV, the Revolution, and the Napoleonic period, and in 1815 her possessions had shrunk to a few small points, Guadaloupe and Martinique in the West Indies, St. Pierre and Miquelon, off Newfoundland, five towns on the coast of India, of which Pondicherry was the best known, Bourbon, now called Réunion, an island in the Indian Ocean, Guiana in South America, which had few inhabitants, and Senegal in Africa. These were simply melancholy souvenirs of her once proud past, rags and tatters of a once imposing empire.

In the nineteenth century she was destined to begin again, and to create an empire of vast geographical extent, only second in importance to that of Great Britain, though vastly inferior to that. The interest in conquests revived but slowly after 1815. France had conquered so much in Europe from 1792 to 1812,

[1] See the admirable and detailed article by Professor Othon Guerlac in *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1908, entitled, "Church and State in France." The best and fullest account of this subject is to be found in Debidour, *L'église catholique et l'état sous la troisième république*, Vol. II, 231–498. Most of the important documents are appended.

only to lose it as she had lost her colonies, that conquest in any form seemed but a futile and costly display of misdirected enterprise. Nevertheless, in time the process began anew, and each of the various régimes which have succeeded one another since 1815 has contributed to the building of the new empire.

The beginning was made in Algeria, on the northern coast of Africa, directly opposite France, and reached now in less than twenty-four hours from Marseilles. Algeria was nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, but the power of the Sultan was insignificant. A native Dey was the real ruler. The population consisted of Arabs, a nomadic and pastoral people, descendants of the Arabian conquerors of the seventh century, and of Berbers, an agricultural people, descendants of the natives who, more than twenty centuries before, had fought the Carthaginians. All the people were Mohammedans. The capital was an important town, Algiers.

Down to the opening of the nineteenth century Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli, nominally parts of the Ottoman Empire, were in reality independent, and constituted the Barbary States, whose main business was piracy. But Europe was no longer disposed to see her wealth seized and her citizens enslaved until she paid their ransom. In 1816 an English fleet bombarded Algiers, released about 3,000 Christian captives, and destroyed piracy.

The French conquest of Algeria grew out of a dispute concerning a loan made by the Dey to the Directory in 1797. This dispute ended in insults by the Dey to France, with the result that in 1830 the latter power sent a fleet of a hundred ships, and five hundred transports across the Mediterranean, and seized the capital. France had not intended the conquest of the whole country, only the punishment of an insolent Dey, but attacks being made upon her from time to time, which she felt she must crush, she was led on, step by step, until she had everywhere established her power. All through the reign of Louis Philippe this process was going on. Its chief feature was an intermittent struggle of fourteen years with a native leader, Abd-el-Kader, who proclaimed and fought a Holy War against the intruder. In the end (1847) he was forced to surrender, and France had added what is still her most important colony. This is also another episode in the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, whose disintegration in Europe, in the Balkan peninsula, is elsewhere described.

Under Napoleon III, the beginning of conquest in another part of Africa was made. France had possessed, since the time

of Louis XIII and Richelieu, one or two miserable ports on the western coast, St. Louis the most important. Under Napoleon III, the annexation of the Senegal valley was largely carried through by the efforts of the governor, Faidherbe, who later distinguished himself in the Franco-German war. Under Napoleon III, also, a beginning was made in another part of the world, in Asia. The persecution of Christian natives, and the murder of certain French missionaries gave Napoleon the pretext to attack the king of Annam, whose kingdom was in the peninsula that juts out from southeastern Asia. After eight years of intermittent fighting France acquired from the king the whole of Cochin-China (1858–67), and also established a protectorate over the kingdom of Cambodia, directly north.

Thus, by 1870, France had staked out an empire of about 700,000 square kilometers, containing a population of about six million.

Under the present Republic the work of expansion and consolidation has been carried much further than under all of the preceding régimes. There have been extensive annexations in northern Africa, western Africa, the Indian Ocean, and in Indo-China.

In northern Africa, Tunis has passed under the control of France. This was one of the Barbary states, and was nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, with a Bey as sovereign. After establishing herself in Algeria, France desired to extend her influence eastward, over this neighboring state. But Italy, now united, began about 1870 to entertain a similar ambition. France, therefore, under the ministry of Jules Ferry, an ardent believer in colonial expansion, sent troops into Tunis in 1881, which forced the Bey to accept a French protectorate over his state. The French have not annexed Tunis formally, but they control it absolutely through a Resident at the court of the Bey, whose advice the latter is practically obliged to follow.

In western Africa, France has made extensive annexations in the Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, and the region of the Niger, and north of the Congo. By occupying the oases in the Sahara she has established her claims to that vast but hitherto unproductive area. This process has covered many years of the present Republic. The result is the existence of French authority over most of northwest Africa, from Algeria on the Mediterranean, to the Congo river. This region south of Algeria is called the French Soudan, and comprises an area seven or eight times as large as France, with a population of

some fourteen millions, mainly blacks. There is some discussion of a Trans-Saharan railroad to bind these African possessions more closely together.

In Asia, the Republic has imposed her protectorate over the kingdom of Annam (1883) and has annexed Tonkin, taken from China after considerable fighting (1885). In the Indian Ocean, she has conquered Madagascar, an island larger than France herself, with a population of two and a half million. A protectorate was imposed upon that country in 1895, after ten years of disturbance, but after quelling a rebellion that broke out the following year, the protectorate was abolished, and the island was made a French colony.

Thus, at the opening of the twentieth century, the empire of France was eleven times larger than France itself, had an area of six million square kilometers, and a population of about fifty millions, and a rapidly growing commerce. Most of this empire is located in the tropics, and is ill adapted to the settlement of Europeans. Algeria and Tunis, however, offer conditions favorable for such settlements. They constitute the most valuable French possessions. Algeria is not considered a colony, but an integral part of France. It is divided into three departments, each of which sends one senator and two deputies to the chambers of the French Parliament.

On March 30, 1912, France established a protectorate over Morocco. For several years the status of that country had been one of the contentious problems of international politics. France had desired to gain control of it in order to round out her empire in northwestern Africa. In 1904 she had made an agreement with England whereby a far-reaching diplomatic revolution in Europe was inaugurated. This was largely the work of Théophile Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs for seven years, from 1898 to 1905, one of the ablest statesmen the Third Republic has produced. Delcassé believed that France would be able to follow a more independent and self-respecting foreign policy, one freer from German domination and intimidation, if her relations with Italy and England, severely strained for many years, largely owing to colonial rivalries and jealousies, could be made cordial and friendly. This he was able to accomplish by arranging a treaty of commerce favorable to Italy and by promising Italy a free hand in Tripoli and receiving from her the assurance that she would do nothing to hamper French policy in Morocco, a country of special significance to France because of her possession of Algeria.

More important was the reconciliation with England. The relations of these two neighbors had long been difficult and, at times, full of danger. Indeed, in 1898 they had stood upon the very brink of war when a French expedition under Marchand had crossed Africa and had seized Fashoda on the Upper Nile in the sphere of influence which Great Britain considered emphatically hers. The Fashoda incident ended in the withdrawal of the French before the resolute attitude of England. The lesson of this incident was not lost upon either power, and six years later, on April 8, 1904, they signed an agreement which not only removed the sources of friction between them once for all, but which established what came to be known as the Entente Cordiale, destined to great significance in the future. By this agreement France recognized England's special interests in Egypt and abandoned her long-standing demand that England should set a date for the cessation of her "occupation" of that country. On the other hand, England recognized the special interests of France in Morocco and promised not to impede their development.

One power emphatically objected to the determination of the fate of an independent country by these two powers alone. Germany challenged this agreement and asserted that she must herself be consulted in such matters; that her rivals had no right by themselves to preëmpt those regions of the world which might still be considered fields for European colonization or control. German interests must be considered quite as much as French or English.

Germany's peremptory attitude precipitated an international crisis and led to the international Conference of Algeciras in 1906, which was, however, on the whole a victory for France, acknowledging the primacy of her interests in Morocco. As France proceeded to strengthen her position there in the succeeding years, Germany issued another challenge in 1911 by sending a gunboat to Agadir, thus creating another crisis, which for a time threatened a European war. In the end, however, Germany recognized the position of France, but only after the latter had ceded to her extensive territories in Kamerun and the French Congo. For several years, therefore, Morocco was a danger spot in international politics, exerting a disturbing influence upon the relations of European powers to each other, particularly those of France and Germany. Finally, however, the independence of Morocco disappeared and the country was practically incorporated in the colonial empire of France.

CHAPTER XIX

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

The Kingdom of Italy, as we have seen, was established in 1859 and 1860. Venetia was acquired in 1866, and Rome in 1870. In these cases, as in the preceding, the people were allowed to express their wishes by a vote, which, in both instances, was nearly unanimous in favor of the annexation; in the former case by about 647,000 votes to 60; in the latter by about 130,000 to 1,500.

The new kingdom had to face problems of the gravest and most varied character, problems which the struggle for unity, so absorbing, had obscured, but which now appeared in all their saliency. Political unity had been gained, but not moral unity. "We have united Italy," said D'Azeglio in 1861, "now let us unite Italians," by which was meant that peoples differing in their historical evolution, in their institutions, in their economic life, in their temperaments, which had for centuries regarded each other with indifference or animosity, must be made to feel that they were one. These peoples had never been united since the fall of Rome, and Venetians, Sicilians, Tuscans, Romans, Piedmontese, differed profoundly. The contrast was sharpest between the north and the south. They were like two different countries. "To harmonize north and south," said Cavour, "is harder than fighting with Austria or struggling with Rome." A fusion of such dissimilar elements could only be slowly achieved, and must be the result of many forces. But it must imperatively be the first object of Italian statesmen to create a common patriotism, and mutual interests.

Since 1815 there had been several states, each with its own government, its own diplomatic corps, its own courts, system of taxation, its own tariff, and coinage. This variety could not be preserved in the new kingdom, which was not a federal state, like Germany, but a single government, unitary. Only one section had had training in parliamentary government, Piedmont, and that only since 1848. The others had been under despotisms, severe as in Naples, enlightened as in Tuscany. Piedmont had

accomplished the great work of unification, yet it was not, like Prussia, larger than all the other states combined, but was a mere fraction of four or five millions out of twenty-two or more. It could not, therefore, impose its will upon the others as Prussia could upon Germany. Could elements so dissimilar, men so little likely to understand each other's point of view, so little dominated by the same ideals, work together effectively? Might they not tear down the whole edifice, the mere shell of which had been so painfully erected? Now that Italy was united, it must be thoroughly transformed that it might continue. "Unify to improve," said Cavour, "improve to consolidate." A work of organization, so vast and varied, would need, not years, but generations. In 1870, after the fall of Rome, Victor Emmanuel showed that he understood the situation. "Italy is united and free; it remains for us henceforth to make her great and happy." This was the programme of the Government.

This work, begun in 1861, has continued ever since, marked by notable achievements, by distressing failures, but, on the whole, by distinct and great progress. Only certain features of the later story can be indicated here.

The work of construction was undertaken earnestly. In 1861 the Constitution of Piedmont was adopted, with slight variations, as the Constitution of Italy. There was to be a parliament of two chambers, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The suffrage for the latter was to be the same as it had been for the Lower House in Piedmont. The full parliamentary system was introduced, ministers representing the will of the Lower Chamber and controlled by it, legislation enacted by the two Houses. The first capital was Turin, then Florence in 1865, and finally Rome, since 1871. The kingdom was divided for administrative purposes into fifty-nine districts, resembling the French departments, which were increased to sixty-nine after the annexation of Venetia and Rome. This broke up the old provincial lines, centralized the state, by giving the appointment of all prefects and mayors of cities to the national government, tended to destroy the spirit of local individuality, and to exalt Italy and Italian patriotism.

The most perplexing question confronting the new kingdom concerned its relations to the Papacy. The Italian Kingdom had seized, by violence, the city of Rome, over which the Popes had ruled in uncontested right for a thousand years. Rome had this peculiarity over all other cities, that it was the capital of Catholics the world over. Any attempt to expel the Pope from

the city or to subject him to the House of Savoy would everywhere arouse the faithful, already clamorous, and might cause an intervention in behalf of the restoration of the temporal power. There were henceforth to be two sovereigns, one temporal, one spiritual, within the same city. The situation was absolutely unique and extremely delicate. It was considered necessary to determine their relations before the government was transferred to Rome. It was impossible to reach any agreement with the Pope, as he refused to recognize the Kingdom of Italy, but spoke of Victor Emmanuel simply as the King of Sardinia, and would make no concessions in regard to his own rights in Rome. Parliament, therefore, passed in Florence, May 13, 1871, the Law of Papal Guarantees, a remarkable act defining the relations of Church and State in Italy.

The object of this law was to carry out Cavour's principle of a "free Church in a free State," to reassure Catholics that the new kingdom had no intention of controlling in any way the spiritual activities of the Pope, though taking from him his temporal powers. Catholics must feel that the Pope was no creature of the Italian government, but had entire liberty of action in governing the Church. Consequently his person is declared sacred and inviolable. Any attacks upon him are, by this law, to be punished exactly as are similar attacks upon the King. He has his own diplomatic corps, and receives diplomatic representatives from other countries. He has his court, the Curia Romana, as the King has his. That he may communicate with the outside world directly, and not through agencies controlled by the Kingdom, he has his own independent postal and telegraph service. Certain places are set apart as entirely under his sovereignty: the Vatican, the Lateran, Castel Gandolfo, and their gardens. Here no Italian official may enter, in his official capacity, for Italian law and administration stop outside these limits. A similar exemption holds wherever a conclave or a church council is held. In return for the income lost with the temporal power, the Pope is granted 3,225,000 francs a year by the Italian Kingdom. This law has been faithfully observed by the Italian government. But neither Pius IX, nor any of his successors has been willing to accept it. The Pope considers himself the "prisoner of the Vatican," and since 1870 has not left it to go into the streets of Rome, as he would thereby be tacitly recognizing the existence of another ruler there, the "usurper." The Pope has never accepted the annuity. For many years Catholics were forbidden to vote in national elections,

or to accept national offices, as that would be a recognition that an Italian nation existed. They might vote in municipal elections. Municipalities existed long before the Kingdom.

The Pope has never recognized the existence of the kingdom, and the solution of the question of the relations of the Church and the State seems as remote as ever. The statement of Victor Emmanuel on entering the city as sovereign, July 2, 1871, still describes the situation. "Yes, we are in Rome, and we shall remain." The Italian Government has never feared the Pope, but it did for several years fear an intervention of Catholic powers, a danger which, with the lapse of time, has practically disappeared.

Another difficult problem for the Kingdom was its financial status. The debts of the different states were assumed by it and were large. The nation was also obliged to make large expenditures on the army and the navy, on fortifications, and on public works, particularly on the building of railways, which were essential to the economic prosperity of the country as well as conducive to the strengthening of the sense of common nationality. There were, for several years, large annual deficits, necessitating new loans, which, of course, augmented the public debt. Heroically did successive ministers seek to make both ends meet, not shrinking from new and unpopular taxes, or from the seizure and sale of monastic lands. Success was finally achieved, and in 1879 the receipts exceeded the expenditures.

In 1878 Victor Emmanuel II died and was buried in the Pantheon, one of the few ancient buildings of Rome. Over his tomb is the inscription, "To the Father of his Country." He was succeeded by his son, Humbert I, then thirty-four years of age. A month later Pius IX died, and was succeeded by Leo XIII, at the time of his election sixty-eight years of age. But nothing was changed by this change of personalities. Each maintained the system of his predecessor. Leo XIII, Pope from 1878 to 1903, following the precedent set by Pius IX, never recognized the Kingdom of Italy, nor did he ever leave the Vatican. He, too, considered himself a prisoner of the "robber king."

Another urgent problem confronting the new kingdom was that of the education of its citizens. This was most imperative if the masses of the people were to be fitted for the freer and more responsible life opened by the political revolution. The preceding governments had grossly neglected this duty. In 1861 over seventy-five per cent. of the population of the Kingdom were

illiterate. In Naples and Sicily, the most backward in development of all the sections of Italy, the number of illiterates exceeded ninety per cent. of the population; and in Piedmont and Lombardy, the most advanced sections, one-third of the men and more than half of the women could neither read nor write. "Without national education there exists morally no nation," Mazzini had said. "The national conscience cannot be awakened except by its aid. Without national education, common to all citizens, the equality of civic duties and rights is an empty formula."

In 1877 a compulsory education law was passed. This was extended by a new law passed in 1904. But as the support of primary schools rests with the communes, and as, in many cases, they have evaded their responsibility, the system of universal education has not been established in practice. Italy has done much for education, but much remains to be done. Illiteracy, though diminishing, is still widely prevalent. Recent statistics show that a large percentage of the recruits in the army are illiterate. Satisfactory results will probably not be obtained until the Government itself assumes the support and direction of the schools instead of leaving them in the hands of the local authorities.

In 1882 an electoral reform, which had long been discussed, was passed. Hitherto the suffrage had been limited to property-holders twenty-five years of age and older, paying an annual tax of at least forty lire. Under this system less than two and a half per cent. of the population possessed the right to vote. So widespread was illiteracy that it was not considered wise to proclaim universal suffrage. The property qualification was now reduced from forty lire to nineteen lire eighty centesimi, and the age qualification was lowered to twenty-one, and an additional method of securing the franchise was also established, namely an educational qualification. All men of twenty-one who have had a primary school education were given the franchise. This reform more than tripled the number of voters at once, from 627,838 to 2,049,461. Of these about two-thirds secured the right through meeting the educational qualification.

In 1912 Italy took a long step toward democracy by making the suffrage almost universal for men, only denying the franchise to those younger than thirty who had neither performed their military service nor learned to read and write. Thus all men over twenty-one, even if illiterate, were given the vote if they had served in the army. The number of voters was thus increased

from somewhat over three million to more than eight and a half million.

This period of internal reforms was interrupted by foreign politics. In 1882 Italy entered the alliance with Germany and Austria, thus forming the famous Triple Alliance which dominated Europe most of the time from its foundation down to the outbreak of the Great War. The reasons prompting Italy's action were various: pique at France, dread of intervention in behalf of the Pope, and a desire to appear as one of the great powers of Europe. The result was that she was forced to spend larger sums upon her army, remodeled along Prussian lines, and her navy, thus disturbing her finances once more.

Italy now embarked upon another expensive and hazardous enterprise, the acquisition of colonies, influenced in this direction by the prevalent fashion, and by a desire to rank among the world powers. Shut out of Tunis, her natural field, by France, she, in 1885, seized positions on the Red Sea, particularly the port of Massawa. Two years later she consequently found herself at war with Abyssinia. The minister who had inaugurated this movement, Depretis, died in 1887. He was succeeded by Crispi, one of the few striking personalities Italian politics have produced since the time of Cavour. Crispi threw himself heartily into the colonial scheme, extended the claims of Italy in East Africa, and tried to play off one native leader against another. To the new colony he gave the name of Eritrea. At the same time an Italian protectorate was established over a region in eastern Africa called Somaliland. But all this involved long and expensive campaigns against the natives. Italy was trying to play the rôle of a great power when her resources did not warrant it. The consequence of this aggressive and ambitious military, naval, and colonial policy was the creation again of a deficit in the state's finances, which increased alarmingly. The deficits of four years, ending January 1, 1891, amounted to the enormous sum of over seventy-five million dollars. To meet the situation new taxes had to be imposed upon a people already heavily over-burdened. The reaction of this upon internal politics was disastrous. The resultant economic distress expressed itself in deep dissatisfaction with the monarchy, and in the growth of republican and socialistic parties. Riots broke out in 1889 in Turin, Milan, Rome, and in the southern province of Apulia. Crispi adopted a policy of stern repression, which restored quiet on the surface, but left a widespread feeling of rancor behind. He fell from office in 1891, but, his successor

being unable to improve the financial situation and the internal conditions of the country, he came back into power in 1893 and ruled practically as a dictator until 1896. His policy was the same as before, vigorous repression of all opposition to the existing system. He made no attempt to remove the causes of discontent.

But Crispi only gave fuller range to his excessive ambitions in the colonial field. Extending the field of occupation in East Africa he aroused the bitter opposition of Menelek, ruler of Abyssinia. The result was disastrous. The Italian army of 14,000 under Baratieri, was overwhelmed in 1896 by Menelek with 80,000, no less than 6,000 of the Italian troops perishing. This crushing defeat sealed the doom of Crispi, who immediately resigned. The Marquis di Rudini became prine minister and attempted a policy of pacification. Italy renounced her extreme claims, restricted her colonial area, and secured the release of the soldiers who were prisoners of war in the hands of Menelek. The repressive policy at home was abandoned, and an attempt was made to investigate the causes of discontent. But this policy was suddenly cut short by formidable and sanguinary riots that broke out in various parts of Italy in May 1898. The movement was general, though most bloody in Milan. Its cause was the wretchedness of the people, which in turn was largely occasioned by the heavy taxation resulting from these unwise attempts to play an international rôle hopelessly out of proportion to the country's resources. In the south and center the movement took the form of "bread riots," but in the north it was distinctly revolutionary. "Down with the dynasty," was a cry heard there. All these movements were suppressed by the Government, but only after much bloodshed. They indicated widespread distress and dissatisfaction with existing conditions.

In July 1900, King Humbert was assassinated by an Italian anarchist who went to Italy for that purpose from Paterson, New Jersey. Humbert was succeeded by his son Victor Emmanuel III, then in his thirty-first year.

The new King had been carefully educated and soon showed that he was a man of intelligence, of energy, and of firmness of will. He won the favor of his subjects by the simplicity of his mode of life, by his evident sense of duty, and by his sincere interest in the welfare of the people, shown in many spontaneous and unconventional ways. He became forthwith a more decisive factor in the government than his father had been. He was a

democratic monarch, indifferent to display, laborious, vigorous. The opening decade of the twentieth century was characterized by a new spirit which, in a way, reflected the buoyancy, and hopefulness, and courage of the young King. But the causes of the new optimism were deeper than the mere change of rulers and lay in the growing prosperity of the nation, a prosperity which, despite appearances, had been for some years preparing and which was now witnessed on all sides. The worst was evidently over. The national finances were being conservatively managed. After 1897 the receipts were larger than the expenses. Between 1901 and 1907 the surpluses were successively thirty-two, sixty-nine, thirty-three, forty-seven, sixty-three, and one hundred and one million lire. This situation, so highly creditable, was brought about by strict economy and by heavy taxation. The market price of the five per cent. bonds, which had fallen as low as seventy-two in 1894, rose to par and above par. A beginning was also made in the imperative work of reducing taxes and of shifting somewhat their incidence, which was grossly unjust to the poorer classes.

These facts were full of encouragement, but they represented an effect as well as a cause. Behind a flourishing budget stood an expanding economic activity. Italy was becoming an industrial nation. Metallurgy made such progress that in the two lines of naval and railway construction Italy was no longer dependent upon foreign countries. The development of these two industries gave a powerful impulse to activity in other directions. The silk and cotton and chemical manufactures rapidly advanced. The merchant marine greatly increased.

More remarkable than the progress made in the last twenty years before the World War, and more engaging public attention, was the progress that seemed destined in the future, and for a special reason. Industry depended, up to the close of the nineteenth century, upon steam and steam depends upon coal. Italy is at a great disadvantage compared with other countries because she lacks the two indispensable elements — coal and iron — which she is therefore obliged to import. This is a tremendous handicap. But the last two decades of the nineteenth century revealed to the world the possibility of the use of electricity as a source of energy for industrial pursuits. From electricity, "white coal," as it is sometimes called, Italy expects her transformation into a great industrial power, for, while nature has refused her coal, she has given her immense water power in the streams which flow rapidly from the Alps and Apennines. It

has been estimated that the amount of energy she can draw from this source will be from three to five million horsepower. The motive power used in the manufacturing establishments of the United States in 1900 was, according to the census report, eleven million, three hundred thousand horse-power. It is appropriate that the land of Volta and Galvani should see her future in the new agency which is already profoundly altering the conditions of modern industry and which her mountain streams will furnish her so abundantly.

This transformation into a great industrial state was considered not only possible but necessary, owing to her rapidly increasing population, which grew, between 1870 and 1914, from about 25,000,000 to more than 35,000,000. The birth rate was higher than that of any other country of Europe. But during the same period the emigration from Italy was large and steadily increased. Official statistics show that, between 1876 and 1905, over eight million persons emigrated, of whom over four million went to various South American countries, especially Argentina, and to the United States. Perhaps half of the total number have returned to their native land, for much of the emigration is of a temporary character. Emigration has increased greatly under the present reign, while the economic conditions of the country tended, down to 1914, to improve. This is explained by the fact that the industrial revival described above has not yet affected southern Italy and Sicily, whence the large proportion of the emigrants come. From those parts which have experienced that revival the emigration is not large. Only by an extensive growth of industries can this emigration be stopped or at least rendered normal. Italy finds herself in the position in which Germany was for many years, losing hundreds of thousands of her citizens each year. With the expansion of German industries the outgoing stream grew less until, in 1908, it practically ceased, owing to the fact that her mines and factories had so far developed as to give employment to all.

This increasing population and this constant loss by emigration have served in recent years to concentrate Italian thought more and more upon the necessity of new and more advantageous colonies, that her surplus population may not be drained away to other countries. The desire for expansion has increased and with it the determination to use whatever opportunities are offered by the politics of Europe for that purpose. The result was the acquisition in 1912 of the extensive territory of Tripoli and of a dozen Ægean islands, spoils of a war with Turkey

which will be more fully treated later. With this desire for expansion went also a tendency to scrutinize more carefully the nature of her relations with her allies, Germany and Austria. The advantages of the Triple Alliance became, in the minds of many, more and more doubtful. One obvious and positive disadvantage in an alliance with Austria was the necessary abandonment of a policy of annexation of those territories north and northeast of Italy, which are inhabited by Italians but which were not included within the boundaries of the kingdom at the time of its creation. These were the so-called Trentino, the region around the town of Trent; Trieste, and Istria. These territories were subject to Austria, and as long as Italy was allied with Austria she was kept from any attempt to gain this *Italia Irredenta* or Unredeemed Italy, and thus so round out her boundaries as to include within them people who are Italian in race, in language, and in sympathy.

On May 4, 1915, Italy denounced her treaty of alliance with Austria. The famous Triple Alliance, which had been the dominant factor in European diplomacy since 1882, thus came to an end. On May 23, Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary and entered the European conflict on the side of the Entente Allies in the hope of realizing her "national aspirations."

CHAPTER XX

AUSTRIA–HUNGARY AFTER 1849

AUSTRIA TO THE COMPROMISE OF 1867

Austria, perilously near dissolution in 1848, torn by revolutions in Bohemia, Hungary, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and its influence in Germany temporarily paralyzed, had emerged triumphant from the storm, and by 1850 was in a position to impose her will once more upon her motley group of states. She learned no lesson from the fearful crisis just traversed, but at once entered upon a course of reaction of the old familiar kind. Absolutism was everywhere restored. Italy was ruled with an iron hand, Prussia was humiliated in a most emphatic manner at Olmütz, the German Confederation was restored, and Austrian primacy in it conspicuously reaffirmed. Hungary felt the full weight of Austrian displeasure. She was considered to have forfeited by her rebellion the old historic rights she had possessed for centuries. Her Diet was abolished, her local self-government, in her county assemblies, was suppressed, Croatia, Transylvania, and the Serbian districts were severed from her, and the Kingdom itself was cut up into five sections, each ruled separately. Hungary was henceforth governed from Vienna and largely by Germans. She was for the next few years simply a vassal of Austria, whose policy was to crush and extinguish all traces of her separate nationality. Francis Joseph, however, found it in the end impossible to break the spirit of the Magyars, who bent beneath the autocrat but did not abate their claims. During the revolution, Francis Joseph had granted a constitution to the whole Empire (March 4, 1849). This was revoked December 31, 1851, "in the name of the unity of the empire and monarchical principles." For ten years absolutism and centralization prevailed throughout the dominions of the youthful ruler. One achievement of the revolution remained untouched, the abolition of feudalism, the liberation of the peasantry, a great economic and social change benefiting millions of people.

To perpetuate a system of this character the Government must sedulously avoid any disaster that would weaken its power, any crisis in which it would need the support of all its subjects. This it did not do. The crisis of 1859, the failure of that year

in Italy, sealed the doom of a system universally odious, which was now seen to be unable to maintain the integrity of the Empire. As a result of the war Austria was forced to cede Lombardy to Piedmont, and afterwards to remain inactive while the Italians made waste paper of the Treaty of Zurich, which she had concluded with France. She was compelled to continue this passive attitude because of the utter demoralization of her finances, and particularly because of the threatening situation in Hungary. Austria's distress was Hungary's opportunity. Thousands of Hungarians had joined the armies opposed to her, and rebellion was likely to break forth at any moment in Hungary itself. Peace had to be secured at any price.

This time the Austrian government profited by experience. In order to increase the strength of the state by actively interesting his various peoples in it so that they would be willing to make sacrifices for it, Francis Joseph resolved to break with the previous policy of his reign, to sweep away abuses, redress grievances, and introduce liberal reforms. But the problem was exceedingly complicated, and was only slowly worked out after several experiments had been tried which had resulted in failure. The chief difficulty lay in the adjustment of the claims of the different races over which he ruled. How could these be granted, and yet the power of the monarchy remain strong, Austria remain a great European power, able to speak decisively in European councils? Opinion was divided as to the method to pursue. There were at least two parties — those who wished to emphasize the principle of federalism in the government, and those who wished to emphasize the principle of unity. The federalists demanded that the equality of all the countries within the Empire should be recognized, that each should make its own internal laws, and should administer them. Austria would then be a federal state with home rule as the recognized basis of the government of the several parts, and with a central parliament for purely imperial affairs. The other party, emphasizing the idea of unity, believed that the central government should possess large powers in order to play a commanding rôle among the European states. That the unity of the Empire might be preserved and emphasized home rule should be limited in scope, the central government must be endowed with great authority.

The Emperor at first tried the federal system in 1860. This experiment not working to his satisfaction, he inaugurated a new system in 1861. Under this there was to be a parliament for the whole Empire, divided into two chambers, meeting annually. Its

functions were important. The two chambers were to be a House of Lords, appointed by the Emperor, and a House of Representatives of 343 members to be chosen by the local diets (Hungary 85, Transylvania 20, Croatia 9, Bohemia 54, Moravia 22, Galicia 38). The local diets were to continue for local affairs but with reduced powers. By this constitution, granted by the Emperor, Austria became a constitutional monarchy. Absolutism as a form of government was abandoned.

But this constitution was a failure, and chiefly because of the attitude of the Hungarians. To the first parliament Hungary declined to send representatives, an attitude she maintained steadily for several years until a new arrangement was made, satisfactory to her. Why did she refuse to recognize a constitution that represented a great advance in liberalism over anything the Empire had known before? Why did she refuse to send representatives to a parliament in which she would have weight in proportion to the number of her inhabitants? Why did she steadily refuse to accept an arrangement that seemed both liberal and fair?

It must be constantly remembered that Hungary consisted of several races, and that of these races the Magyars had always been the dominant one, though in a numerical minority. This dominant race was divided into two parties, one of irreconcilables, men who bitterly hated Austria, who would listen to no compromise with her, whose ideal was absolute independence. These men, however, were not now in control. They were discredited by the failures of 1849. The leaders of Hungary were now the moderate liberals, at whose head stood Francis Deák, the wisest and most influential Hungarian statesman of the nineteenth century. These men were willing to compromise with Austria on the question of giving the requisite strength to the government of the whole Empire to enable it to play its rôle as a great European power, but they were absolutely firm in their opposition to the constitution just granted by Francis Joseph, and immovable in their determination to secure the legal rights of Hungary. Their reasons for opposing the new constitution, which promised so vast an improvement upon the old unprogressive absolutism that had reigned for centuries, for thwarting the Emperor, who was frankly disposed to enter the path of liberalism, are most important.

They asserted that Hungary had always been a separate nation, united with Austria simply in the person of the monarch, who was King of Hungary as he was emperor in his own heredi-

tary states; that he was King in Hungary only after he had taken an oath to support the fundamental laws of Hungary, and had been crowned in Hungary with the iron crown of St. Stephen; that these fundamental laws and institutions were in part centuries old, had in a sense been redefined in the laws of 1848, which Ferdinand I had formally accepted in their new statement; that no change could be made without the consent of both contracting parties; that the Emperor-King as merely one party to the contract had no right to alter them in jot or tittle by any exercise of his own power; that they were therefore still the law of the land; that Hungary was an historic state, with definite boundaries, including Transylvania and Croatia; "that a people which has had a past is never able to forget its history"; that the new constitution was one "granted" by Francis Joseph, and if granted, might be withdrawn; that whatever its abstract merits were, it was unacceptable by reason of its origin; that, moreover, it was designed for the whole Empire, and that its effect was to make Hungary a mere province of Austria; that what was wanted was not *a* constitution, but *the* constitution of Hungary, which had, since 1848, been illegally suspended.

This party differed from the revolutionary party of 1848 and 1849 in that it recognized that the times did not permit a merely "personal" union of Austria and Hungary, but that the interests of each demanded a certain "real" union, a certain strength for the central government that should enable it to act with decision and authority in foreign affairs, and the party was prepared to make concessions enough to render this possible. Only, the concessions must come later, after the Emperor had formally recognized the historic rights of Hungary, and must come then only after fair discussion. The unity represented by the new parliament it would never consent to. In that assembly it would be a minority outnumbered by "foreigners," for all the other peoples of the Empire were, in its eyes, foreigners; it would not fuse its individuality in the general mass of all the inhabitants; it was determined to preserve the historic personality of Hungary. Francis Joseph must first consider himself personally bound to accede to the laws of 1848, which his predecessor, Ferdinand, had ratified.

The new experiment of an imperial parliament finally broke down beneath the impact of this persistent Hungarian refusal to accept it. For four years, from 1861 to 1865, there was a deadlock, neither side giving way. The condition of the country grew worse, the deficit continued to increase. The Emperor.

recognizing the failure of his plans, recognizing that Hungary was really a separate nation, — strongly conscious of her own distinct history and personality and utterly unwilling to enter a unified monarchy however liberal, — finally determined to adapt himself to the situation. Negotiations were begun with the Hungarians, the object of which was to harmonize their claims with the unity and power of the Empire. These negotiations began in 1865, were interrupted in 1866 by the Austro-Prussian war, and were completed in 1867. Indeed, the war facilitated the great work, as showing once more how heavy was the cost to the Empire of Hungarian disaffection, how imperative it was for the power of the monarchy that Hungary should be contented. Moreover, as by that war Austria was expelled from Germany, it was imperative for the monarchy to gain additional strength elsewhere. The negotiations resulted accordingly, in 1867, in the Compromise, or *Ausgleich*, which remained the basis of the Hapsburg Empire as long as that Empire continued to exist. It was accepted by the Emperor and the Parliaments of both countries. Francis Joseph was in the same year crowned King of Hungary.

Thus was created a curious kind of state defying classification. Neither federalism nor unity was the outcome of the long constitutional struggle, but dualism. The Empire was henceforth to be called Austria-Hungary, and was to be a dual monarchy. Austria-Hungary was to consist of two distinct, independent states, which were to stand in law upon a plane of complete equality. They were to have the same flag. They were to have the same ruler, who in Austria was to bear the title of Emperor, in Hungary that of King. Each was to have its own parliament, its own ministry, its own administration. Each was to govern itself in all internal affairs absolutely without interference from the other.

But the two were to be united, not simply in the person of the monarch. They were to be united for certain affairs regarded as common to both. There was to be a joint ministry composed of three departments: Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. Each state was to have its own parliament, but there was to be no parliament in common. In order then to have a body that should supervise the work of the three joint ministries there was established the system of "delegations." Each parliament was to choose a delegation of sixty of its members. These delegations were to meet alternately in Vienna and Budapest. They were really to be committees of the two parliaments, sitting and debating separately, each using its own language, and com-

municating with each other in writing. If after three communications no decision had been reached a joint session was to be held in which the question was to be settled without debate by a mere majority vote.

Other affairs, which in most countries are considered common to all parts, such as tariff and currency systems, were not to fall within the competence of the joint ministry or the delegations. They were to be regulated by agreements concluded between the two parliaments for periods of ten years, an awkward arrangement creating an intense strain every decade, for the securing of these agreements was to prove most difficult.

This Compromise was satisfactory only to the Germans and the Magyars, each the dominant party in its section, but each also in a numerical minority.

One of the important results therefore of the expulsion of Austria from Germany after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 was the internal transformation of the Austrian Empire itself. The German element in that state was weakened, the Hungarians had to be appeased, and as a consequence the Ausgleich or Compromise of 1867 was worked out. By this the former Austrian Empire was divided into two states, the Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, the two together known henceforth as Austria-Hungary. The small river Leitha formed in part the boundary between the two, Hungary being known as Transleithania, Austria as Cisleithania. The capital of Austria was Vienna; of Hungary, Budapest. The Constitution of the collective state was the Compromise of 1867, already described. Each state also possessed a constitution of its own. In Austria the Constitution of 1861 was liberally revised by five laws passed in 1867, by which full parliamentary government was established, the Emperor choosing his ministry from the majority party or group in Parliament. The Parliament or Reichsrat was to consist of two chambers, a House of Lords and a House of Representatives, which numbered at that time 203 members. These were chosen, not directly by the voters, but by the diets or local legislatures of each of the seventeen provinces into which Austria was divided, for each province had its local legislature for local purposes.

In Hungary the Constitution of 1848 was restored, with some alterations. Thus Hungary had a parliament of two chambers, the Table of Magnates, composed chiefly of nobles, and the Table of Deputies, elected directly by the voters, all males twenty years of age and paying a certain amount in taxes.

Though this amount was small it resulted in the exclusion of about three-fourths of the adult males. Thus in neither state did universal suffrage exist. A demand for this was later repeatedly made in both countries with results that will appear.

Neither of the two states had a homogeneous population. In each there was a dominant race, the Germans in Austria, the Magyars in Hungary. The Compromise of 1867 was satisfactory to these alone. In each country there were subordinate and rival races, jealous of the supremacy of these two, anxious for recognition and for power, and rendered more insistent by the sight of the remarkable success of the Magyars in asserting their individuality. In Hungary there were Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania; in Austria there were seventeen provinces, each with its own diet, representing almost always a variety of races. Some of these, notably Bohemia, had in former centuries possessed a separate statehood, which they wished to recover; others were gaining an increasing self-consciousness, and desired a future controlled by themselves and in their own interests.

The struggles of these races were destined to form the most important feature of Austrian history during the next half-century. It should be noted that the principle of nationality, so effective in bringing about the unification of Italy and Germany, tended in Austria in precisely the opposite direction, the splitting up of a single state into many. Dualism was established in 1867, but these subordinate races refused to acquiesce in that as a final form. They wished to change the dual into a federal state, which should give free play to the several nationalities. The fundamental struggle all through this period was between these two principles — dualism and federalism. These racial and nationalistic struggles were most confusing, crossing each other in various ways, and rendered more complex by their connection with other forces, such as Liberalism, Clericalism, Socialism. In the interest of clearness, only a few of the more important can be treated here.

The Empire of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, having had different histories since 1867, may best be treated separately.

THE EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA AFTER 1867

The first years in Austria under her new constitution were years of liberal reform. The constitution guaranteed complete religious liberty. To give effect to this guarantee laws were passed greatly restricting the powers of the Roman Catholic

Church. Henceforth all forms of religion were on a basis of legal equality; each person might freely choose his church and that of his children, or might decline connection with any. The public schools were to be open to all citizens without regard to creed. Churches might maintain schools of their own if they wished to. A form of marriage by civil authorities was established for those cases in which the priest refused to officiate. By these laws religious liberty and secular education were established. The Pope denounced them as "abominable," and declared them null and void "for the present and the future." Despite these fulminations they went into force.

At this time also other useful laws were passed, regulating the finances, altering the judicial system, and introducing trial by jury, and reorganizing the military system along the successful Prussian lines of universal military service for three years, with service in the reserve for several years longer.

At the same time the Austrian Government was confronted by questions far more baffling. Various nationalities, or would-be nationalities, demanded that they should now receive as liberal treatment as Hungary had received in the Compromise of 1867. The leaders in this movement were the Czechs of Bohemia, who, in 1868, definitely stated their position, which was precisely that of the Hungarians before 1867. They claimed that Bohemia was an historic and independent nation, united with the other states under the House of Hapsburg only in the person of the monarch. They demanded that the kingdom of Bohemia should be restored, that Francis Joseph should be crowned in Prague with the crown of Wenceslaus.

The Galicians in the north, the Slovenes and Serbs in the south, brought forward similar, though not so sweeping, demands. These groups, imitating the successful methods of the Magyars, refused to sit in the Austrian Parliament in Vienna, declining to recognize the authority of institutions in the creation of which they had had no share. The moral authority of the new Parliament was therefore greatly reduced. The agitation became so great that the Emperor decided to yield to the Bohemians. On September 14, 1871, he formally recognized the historic rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia, and agreed to be crowned King in Prague, as he had been crowned King in Budapest. Arrangements were to be made whereby Bohemia should gain the same rights as Hungary, independence in domestic affairs and union with Austria and Hungary for certain general purposes. The dual monarchy was about to become a triple monarchy.

But these promises were not destined to be carried out. The Emperor's plans were bitterly opposed by the Germans of Austria, who, as the dominant class and as also a minority of the whole population, feared the loss of their supremacy, feared the rise of the Slavs, whom they hated. They were bitterly opposed, also, by the Magyars of Hungary, who declared that this was undoing the Compromise of 1867, and who feared particularly that the rise of the Slavic state of Bohemia would rouse the Slavic peoples of Hungary to demand the same rights, and the Magyars were determined not to share with them their privileged position. The opposition to the Emperor's plans was consequently most emphatic and formidable. It was also pointed out that the management of foreign affairs would be much more difficult with three nations directing rather than two. The Emperor yielded to the opposition. The decree that was to place Bohemia upon an equality with Austria and Hungary never came. Dualism triumphed over federalism, to the immense indignation of those who saw the prize snatched from them. Where the Bohemians had failed, obviously the weaker groups — Galicians, Serbs — could not succeed. The Compromise of 1867 remained unchanged. The House of Hapsburg continued to rule over a dual, not over a federal state.

A radical change in the constitution was thus definitely rejected. Gradually the extreme demands of the various races subsided. The Czechs lost much of their power by splitting into two groups. The constitutional régime slowly struck root. For some years it was the Germans who controlled the Austrian Parliament and the ministry. In 1873 a change was made in the electoral system. Hitherto the members of the Reichsrat, or Imperial Parliament, had been elected by the diets of the different provinces. This was objected to as giving the Reichsrat the appearance of a congress of delegates, rather than of a real parliament. Moreover, any diet, by refusing to elect delegates (as Bohemia had frequently done), could so reduce the national representation as to destroy its moral authority. The new law of 1873 withdrew this power from the provincial diets and gave it directly to those who had the right to elect the diets. Now the right to choose the members of these diets was not vested in a general mass of electors, but was vested in certain groups or classes, four in number — the landowners, the cities, the chambers of commerce, and the rural districts. Each class elected a certain number of members of the diets. It was now provided that each should henceforth elect a certain number of members of the

Reichsrat. All that the change of 1873 accomplished was to substitute direct election by the four classes for indirect election by the diets. The number of members of the Reichsrat was increased from 203 to 353. The number of voters in each class and the relative weight of the individual voter varied enormously. Thus in 1890, in the class of landowners, there was one deputy to every 63 voters, one to 27 in the class of chambers of commerce, one to 2,918 in that of cities, one to 11,600 in that of rural districts. With such a system further demands for reform were inevitable, and were, as we shall see, to figure prominently in later history.

The German element maintained control of the Austrian Parliament as long as it remained united, but breaking up finally into three groups, and incurring the animosity of the Emperor by constantly blocking his measures, its ministry fell in 1879, and was succeeded by one of a very different character under Taaffe. This ministry lasted fourteen years, from 1879 to 1893. While Taaffe steadily refused to alter the Constitution of 1867 in the direction of federalism, his policy nevertheless greatly stimulated the growth of the federalist spirit. Relying for parliamentary support upon the Czechs and Poles against the Germans, he was forced to make concessions to them. In Bohemia the Czechs were favored in various ways. They secured an electoral law which assured them a majority in the Bohemian Diet and in the Bohemian delegation to the Reichsrat; they obtained a university, by the division into two institutions of that of Prague, the oldest German university, founded in 1356. Thus there was a German University of Prague and a Czech University (1882). By various ordinances German was dethroned from its position as sole official language. After 1886 office-holders were required to answer the demands of the public in the language in which they were presented, either German or Czech. This rule operated unfavorably for German officials, who were usually unable to speak Czech, whereas the Czechs, as a rule, spoke both languages.

In Galicia the Poles, though a minority, obtained control of the Diet, supported by the Taaffe ministry, and proceeded to oppress the Ruthenians; in Carniola the Slovenes proceeded to Slavicize the province. Thus the Slavs were favored during the long ministry of Taaffe, and the evolution of the Slavic nationalities and peoples progressed at the expense of the Germans.

Under this long administration the financial condition of Austria improved. The chronic deficit disappeared and receipts

exceeded expenditures for the first time in many years. In social legislation the policies of Bismarck were imitated by the compulsory insurance of workingmen and the repression of Socialists, for it was also at this time that the Socialist party became prominent. This was, here as elsewhere, a radical democratic party, demanding universal suffrage, obligatory and free education, the complete laicization of the state. This party was not local, like the racial and nationalistic groups, but was interprovincial, thus cutting across the parties already existing and increasing the confusion.

In Bohemia there was a movement in favor of democracy, which was independent of the Socialists. The Czechs had long been divided into Old and Young Czechs. They had worked together as against the Germans, but now that they were in the main victorious in this, they flew apart. The Young Czechs were a democratic party, demanding universal suffrage, secular schools, liberty of the press and of public meetings. After 1887 this party, profiting by the concession of the Taaffe ministry, began to agitate fiercely in favor of a reconstruction of Bohemian nationality, whereas the Old Czechs were willing to abide by the Compromise of 1867. By 1891 the Young Czechs had swept the Old Czechs completely from the field. An attempt by the Government to stop this movement had resulted in total failure. The Germans of Bohemia, on the other hand, opposed with vehemence the nationalist aspirations of the Czechs. So fierce did race struggles become that in 1893 the Government was forced to proclaim the state of siege in Prague. The situation became so difficult for the Taaffe ministry that it resigned in 1893.

Thus racial movements and democratic movements were in full swing at the close of this long ministry. To satisfy the latter, Taaffe, just before his fall, brought forward a radical electoral reform, which would have increased the number of voters from about 1,500,000 to 4,500,000. The proposal failed, but, the agitation continuing, the succeeding ministry in 1896 carried through a more limited measure. The existing four electoral classes were left as they were; but a fifth class was created, which was to elect 72 additional members to Parliament. This class was to include all men of twenty-four years of age or older. It included, therefore, all those of the four other classes, members of which, consequently, possessed under the new system a double vote. The result was to make the system of representation more complex than ever, without giving numbers anything like their due weight. Thus five million and a half voters would choose 72

members, whereas the 1,700,000 voters of the four other classes would choose 353; the class of great landed proprietors, numbering only about 5,000, would choose 85 members. Obviously, such a system would not satisfy the growing demand for a democratic suffrage. It was a mere temporary expedient.

The agitation for universal suffrage continued to increase during the next decade, and was finally successful. By the law of January 26, 1907, all men in Austria over twenty-four were given the right to vote, and the class system was abolished. The most striking result of the first elections on this popular basis (May 1907) was the return of 87 Socialists, who polled 1,041,948 votes, nearly a third of those cast. This party had previously had only about a dozen representatives. The race parties, such as the Young Czechs, lost heavily. Whether this meant that the period of extreme racial rivalry was over and the struggle of social classes was to be the feature of the future, was not clear.

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AFTER 1867

Hungary, a country larger than Austria, larger than Great Britain, found her historic individuality definitely recognized and guaranteed by the Compromise of 1867. She had successfully resisted all attempts to merge her with the other countries subject to the House of Hapsburg. She was an independent kingdom under the crown of St. Stephen. The sole official language was Magyar, which was neither Slavic nor Teutonic, but Turanian in origin.

The political history of Hungary after the Compromise was much more simple than that of Austria. Race and language questions were fundamental, but they were decided in a summary manner. The ruling race in 1867 was the Magyar, and it remained the ruling race. Though numerically in the minority in 1867, comprising only about six millions out of fifteen millions, they were a strong race, accustomed to rule and determined to rule. This minority was steadily, after 1867, attempting the impossible — the assimilation of the majority. There were four leading races in Hungary — the Magyar, the Slav, the Roumanian, the German. The Roumanians were the oldest, calling themselves Latins and claiming descent from Roman colonists of ancient times. They lived particularly in the eastern part of the kingdom, which was called Transylvania. They did not constitute a solid block of peoples, for there were among them many German or Saxon settlements, and between them and the independent Kingdom of Roumania, inhabited by people of the same race, were

many Magyars. The Slavs of Hungary fell into separate groups. In the northern part of Hungary were the Slovaks, practically of the same race and language as the Czechs of Bohemia. In the southern and particularly the southwestern part, were Serbs and Croatians, related to the Serbs of the Kingdom of Serbia. Of these the Croatians were the only ones who had a separate and distinct personality. They had never been entirely absorbed in Hungary, they had had their own history, and their own institutions. In 1868 the Magyars made a compromise with Croatia, similar to the compromise they had themselves concluded with Austria in the year preceding. In regard to all the other races, however, the Magyars resolved to Magyarize them early and thoroughly. This policy they steadily persisted in. They insisted upon the use of the Magyar language in public offices, courts, schools, and in the railway service — wherever, in fact, it was possible. It is stated that there was not a single inscription in any post-office or railway station in all Hungary except in the Magyar language. The Magyars, in fact, refused to make any concessions to the various peoples who lived with them within the boundaries of Hungary. They, indeed, tried in every way to stamp out all peculiarities. For nearly fifty years this policy was carried out, and it did not succeed. Hungary was not Magyarized because the power of resistance of Slovaks, Croatians, Slavonians, Roumanians proved too strong. But in the attempt, which grew sharper and shriller than ever in the last decade before the Great War, the Magyar minority stopped at nothing. It committed innumerable tricks, acts of arbitrary power, breaches of the law, in order to crush out all opposition. Political institutions were distorted into engines of ruthless oppression, political life steadily deteriorated in character and purpose, under the influence of this overmastering purpose which recognized no bounds. Hungary, which boasted itself a land of freedom, insured freedom only to the dominant race, the Magyars. But for the other races Hungary was a land of unbridled despotism. Every imaginable instrument was used to crush the Slavs or convert them into Magyars — corruption and gross illegalities in the administrative service, in the control of elections, persecution of all independent newspapers, suppression of schools, the firm determination to prevent these subject peoples, for that they virtually were though theoretically fellow-citizens, from developing their own languages, literatures, arts, economic life, ideals. The situation was galling to the Slavs and other peoples. Magyar misrule steadily increased in intensity, seriously vitiated and

corrupted the national life and made Hungary a tinder box, where disaffection was bound to blaze up at the first opportune moment. It was an odious history of oppression. Had the Magyars recognized that the other races living within Hungary had the same rights as they, had they adopted a policy of fair play and justice, instead of amalgamation by force, Hungary might have been in a healthy condition. Hungary was not Magyarized. But racial animosities were raised to the highest pitch and the time of reckoning came with the Great War. Any detailed study of the relations of the dominant Magyars with the Croatians, the Serbs, the Slovaks, the Roumanians would amply prove the statements made.

The reply to these assertions, constantly given by the apologists of the Magyars, is that Hungarian law expressly and carefully recognized the absolute equality of all the various elements, and they point to the Law of 1868, which guaranteed the "Equal Rights of Nationalities." This law was admirable and enlightened and was composed in the finely liberal spirit of Francis Deák, who indeed was its chief author. But this law was a dead letter, and it had been a dead letter almost from the time of its passage. It was not repealed, as the advantage of having so liberal an enactment to point to for the purpose of silencing critics and throwing dust in foreign eyes was apparent to the Magyar tyrants. But the spirit of Francis Deák long ago passed out of the governing circles of Hungary.

That many Roumanians in Transylvania desired separation from Hungary and incorporation in the Kingdom of Roumania, that many of the Serbs or Slavs of southern Hungary desired annexation to the Kingdom of Serbia, need occasion no surprise. Had the Slavs of Hungary received justice, which they never did receive, they would not have become an element of danger to the state. There is no evidence even yet to show that the Magyars have learned this lesson.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century there grew up among the Magyars themselves a new party, which still further complicated an already complex situation. It was called the Independence Party and was under the leadership of Francis Kossuth, son of Louis Kossuth of 1848. This party was opposed to the Compromise of 1867, and wished to have Hungary more independent than she was. It demanded that Hungary should have her own diplomatic corps, control her relations with foreign countries independently of Austria, and possess the right to have her own tariff. Particularly did it demand the use of Magyar

in the Hungarian part of the army of the dual monarchy — a demand pressed passionately, but always resisted with unshaken firmness by the Emperor, Francis Joseph, who considered that the safety of the state was dependent upon having one language in use in the army, that there might not be confusion and disaster on the battlefield. Scenes of great violence arose over this question, both in Parliament and outside of it, but the Emperor would not yield. Government was brought to a deadlock, and, indeed, for several years the Ausgleich could not be renewed, save by the arbitrary act of the Emperor, for a year at a time. Francis Joseph finally threatened, if forced to concede the recognition of the Hungarian language, to couple with it the introduction of universal suffrage into Hungary, for which there was a growing popular demand. This the Magyars did not wish, fearing that it would rob them of their dominant position by giving a powerful weapon to the politically inferior but more numerous races, and that they would, therefore, ultimately be submerged by the Slavs about them. In 1914 less than twenty-five per cent. of the adult male population of Hungary possessed the vote. The normal operation of political institutions had for some time been seriously interrupted by the violent character of the discussions arising out of these extreme demands for racial monopoly and national independence. Parliamentary freedom had practically disappeared and at the outbreak of the War Hungary was being ruled quite despotically.

The House of Hapsburg lost during the nineteenth century the rich Lombardo-Venetian kingdom (1859–1866). It gained, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 these Turkish provinces were handed over by the Congress of Berlin of 1878 to Austria-Hungary to "occupy" and "administer." The Magyars at the time opposed the assumption of these provinces, wishing no more Slavs within the monarchy, but despite their opposition they were taken over, so strongly was the Emperor in favor of it. This acquisition rendered Austria-Hungary a more important and aggressive factor in all Balkan politics, in all discussions of the Eastern Question. In October, 1908, Austria-Hungary declared these provinces formally annexed. The great significance of this act will be discussed later in connection with the very recent history of southeastern Europe and the causes of the European War.

On November 21, 1916, Francis Joseph died after a reign of nearly sixty-eight years. He was succeeded by his grand-nephew, who assumed the title of Charles I.

CHAPTER XXI

ENGLAND TO THE REFORM BILL OF 1832

Great Britain appeared in 1815, to the superficial observer, in a brilliant light. She had persisted, when others had faltered, in her bitter hostility to Napoleon. She had been the soul of the coalitions, and the crowning victory of Waterloo seemed to place her at the very head of the nations of Europe. Her energy and her wealth seemed to be unbounded. Her population had been only 14,000,000 at the beginning of the great war; at the end it was 19,000,000. Her debt, it is true, had increased with appalling rapidity. Over a billion dollars in 1792, it was over four billion in 1815.[1] The annual interest charge amounted to 150,000,000 dollars. Her expenditures during those years exceeded seven billion dollars. But while her debt and the yearly expenditures grew at an unprecedented rate, the wealth of the country grew more rapdily, and the burden of the state was more easily borne than ever. For the period had been one of extraordinary material development. The growth of her industry at home and her commerce abroad had made her easily the first industrial and the first commercial power in the world. This industrial and commercial supremacy, fully revealed during the Napoleonic wars and the period just succeeding, rested upon a series of remarkable inventions and discoveries made by Englishmen in the latter part of the eighteenth century, inventions so momentous, so far-reaching in their results, that they effected what has been called the Industrial Revolution, which has already been described.

These inventions and processes were for a while monopolized by Great Britain, for it was not until after the downfall of Napoleon that they came into general use on the Continent. Manufacturing on a large scale, she was able to outstrip all possible rivals. She first developed the so-called factory system, and first utilized its advantages. These inventors, says an historian of modern England, "did more for the cause of mankind than even Wellington. Their lives had more influence on their coun-

[1] Debt in 1792, £239,650,000; in 1815, £861,000,000.

try's future than the career of the great general. His victories secured his country peace for rather more than a generation. Their inventions gave Great Britain a commercial supremacy which neither war nor foreign competition has yet destroyed." [1] "It is our improved steam engine," wrote Francis Jeffrey in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1819, "that has fought the battles of Europe, and exalted and sustained, through the late tremendous contest, the political greatness of our land. It is the same great power which enables us now to pay the interest of our debt, and to maintain the arduous struggle in which we are still engaged with the skill and capital of countries less oppressed with taxation." [2]

But England profited not only from the genius of her inventors. The long war itself had greatly contributed to her commercial expansion. England had not been invaded; her industries had not been injured, their activity interrupted or rendered precarious, as had been the case in all the countries of the Continent. She prospered both because she was unmolested and because they were molested, so that they were forced to rely upon her for many things which in normal times they would have manufactured for themselves. The war, too, had given her the command of the seas. The carrying trade of the world was almost entirely hers. The material development of England filled other nations with envy. Her empire was also commanding in its range and universality. As one after another of the countries of Europe became the enemy of Britain, she attacked its colonies. Thus at the close of the long war she had enriched herself with valuable possessions, hitherto belonging to France and Holland.[3]

The proud position that England held was ascribed, in the general opinion of Europe, to the excellence of her government. This government enjoyed a great reputation on the Continent. It had remained erect throughout a period when other governments, one after another, had collapsed. It had followed a uniform, persistent policy from the beginning to the end, with a single interruption, while the policy of other nations had veered and changed, and changed and veered again. It seemed that there must be some peculiar merit in a system that remained immutable in a world of change. Europeans heard of England as

[1] Walpole's *History of England since 1815,* I, 66; on the whole subject of this series of inventions and the expansion of industry see Walpole, I, 44–67.

[2] Quoted by Cheyney, *Readings in English History,* 614–615.

[3] On general material condition of Great Britain in 1815, Walpole, I, 22–113.

a land of freedom, of representative government, of local self-government. The renown of her Parliament had filled the world. It was known that her Parliament was her real ruler, that though the king reigned he did not govern, that the real executive was the ministry of the hour, that ministries rose and fell according to the will of Parliament. The fact that England was so successful under this parliamentary and cabinet system of government, which was supposed to be the mouthpiece of the English people, gave great impetus to the demand for similar institutions on the Continent. England was the model for Liberals everywhere.

Yet on examination it was seen that this structure was far from fair, that it was honeycombed with abuses, marked by glaring discriminations between social classes, that England was a land of privilege, a land of the old régime, that her institutions required radical change to bring them into proper adjustment with the new age and its ideas. While the French across the Channel had, by supreme and violent exertions, asserted that the modern state must rest upon the principle of equality, and had, in order to give that principle definite lodgment in the facts of the national life, reduced the aristocracy and humbled the church, in England the ruling class maintained its position unshaken. England remained a land of the old régime until 1832, forty years after the great transformation in France.

Power rested with the aristocracy, composed of the nobility and the gentry. This class largely controlled local government and local taxation. The "local self-government" of England, so much praised and idealized abroad, as if it were government of the people by the people, did not exist. In the counties the country nobility filled the most important offices in the local governing boards and in the militia. Smaller offices were occupied by its dependents. In the boroughs, too, its influence was generally decisive with the close corporations which controlled most of them. Its power was glaringly apparent at the top, in Parliament. The House of Lords was composed almost exclusively of large landed proprietors. This was the inexpugnable bulwark of the prevailing social class. But the House of Commons was also another stronghold hardy less secure. This body, supposed, as its name shows, to be representative of the commoners of England, conspicuously belied its name. Its composition was so extraordinary that it merits full description, particularly as the great reform movement of the next generation concerned it primarily, its thorough alteration being correctly

felt to be the condition absolutely precedent to all other reform.

The House of Commons in 1815 consisted of 658 members; 489 of these were returned by England, 100 by Ireland, 45 by Scotland, 24 by Wales. There were three kinds of constituencies — the counties, the boroughs, and the universities. In England each county had two members, and nearly all of the boroughs had two each, though a few had but one. Representation had no relation to the size of the population in either case. A large county and a small county, a large borough and a small borough, had the same number of members. In times past the king had possessed the right to summon this town and that to send up two burgesses to London. Once given that right it usually retained it. If a new town should grow up, the monarch might give it the right, but he was not obliged to. Since 1625 only two new boroughs had been created. Thus the constitution of the House of Commons had become stereotyped at a time when population was increasing and was also shifting greatly from old centers to new. An increasing inequality in the representation was a feature of the political system. Thus the county and borough representation of the ten southern counties of England was 237, and of the thirty others only 252; yet the latter had a population nearly three times as large as the former. All Scotland returned only 45 members, while the single English county of Cornwall (including its boroughs, of course), returned 44. Yet the population of Scotland was eight times as large as that of Cornwall.[1]

The suffrage in the counties was uniform, and was enjoyed by those who possessed land yielding them an income of forty shillings a year. But as this worked out it gave a very restricted suffrage, for England was the land of large estates, and the tendency toward the absorption of small estates in large ones was steadily increasing. The small farmer, holding his land in his own right, who was so common in France, had become almost universally in England a mere tenant of a large landholder. Accurate statistics are lacking, but Gneist estimates that at least four-fifths of the cultivable land of the United Kingdom belonged to not more than 7,000 of the nobility and gentry. The county voters, then, were chiefly the men who had large country estates, and not the farmers and peasantry who tilled them. The county representation was consequently a stronghold of the aristocracy. Counties in which there were so few voters could often be easily controlled by the wealthy landowners. Indeed,

[1] These numbers include not only the county representatives proper but also the representatives of the boroughs located in the respective counties.

in many counties the election of the landowners' nominee was accepted as so much a matter of course that there were no opposing candidates. In at least three counties there had been no contest for over a hundred years.

In Scotch counties the condition was even worse. There the suffrage was not determined by ownership of land, but by the possession of a so-called "superiority," or direct grant from the crown, producing at least 400 pounds a year. The result was that there were not three thousand county voters in all Scotland; yet the population of Scotland was nearly two million. Fife had 240 voters, Cromarty 9. In the county of Roxburgh in 1831 the result of the election was a "great majority" of 40 to 19. Yet that county had a population of more than 40,000. The climax was reached in Bute, where there were 21 voters out of a population of 14,000, only one of whom lived in the county. On a certain occasion only one voter attended the election meeting of that county. He constituted himself chairman, nominated himself, called the list of voters, and declared himself returned to Parliament.

Such was the situation in the counties of Great Britain, which returned 186 members to the House of Commons. But more important were the boroughs, which returned 467 members.[1] In the counties the suffrage was uniform; in the boroughs, on the other hand, there was a bewildering variety in the methods whereby the right to vote was secured. In the boroughs, too, the influence of the landowning and wealthy class was even greater and more decisive than in the counties. The boroughs were of several kinds or types — nomination boroughs, rotten or close boroughs, boroughs in which there was a considerable body of voters, boroughs in which the suffrage was almost democratic. It was the existence of the first two classes that contributed the most to the popular demand for the reform of the House. In the nomination boroughs, the right to choose the two burgesses was completely in the hands of the patron. Such places might have lost all their inhabitants, yet representation, being an attribute of geographical areas rather than of population, these places were still entitled to their two members. Thus Corfe Castle was a ruin, Old Sarum a green mound, Gatton was part of a park, while Dunwich had long been submerged beneath the sea, yet these places, entirely without inhabitants, still had two members each in the House, because it had been so decided centuries before, when they did have a population, and because the English Parlia-

[1] The universities returned 5 members.

ment took no account of changes. Thus the owner of the ruined wall, or the green mound, or this particular portion of the bottom of the sea, had the right of nomination.

In the rotten or close boroughs the members were elected by the corporation, that is, by the mayor and aldermen, or the suffrage was in the hands of voters, who, however, were so few, from a dozen to fifty in many cases,[1] and generally so poor that the patron could easily influence them by bribery or intimidation to choose his candidates. Elections in such cases were a mere matter of form. Walpole states that, in 1793, 245 members were notoriously returned by the influence of 128 peers. Thus peers, themselves sitting in the House of Lords, had representatives sitting in the other House. Lord Lonsdale thus returned nine members, and was known as "premier's cat-o'-nine-tails." Others returned six, five, four apiece. Some would sell their appointments to the highest bidder, and a common price was 10,000 pounds for two seats for a single parliament. Borough-mongering was common.[2] It was stated in 1817 that seats were bought and sold like tickets to the opera. Thus at the period at which this history opens a considerable majority of the members of the House of Commons was returned through the influence of a small body of patrons. These were noblemen, or wealthy landowners, who aspired to become noblemen and chose this method of acquiring political power, that thus they might in the end be raised to the peerage.

In the third class of boroughs, those with a fairly large electorate, there was much bribery, while the fourth class of practically democratic boroughs was very small. On the other hand, there were large industrial cities with no representation at all, such as Manchester, with a population of 140,000, Birmingham with 100,000, Leeds with 75,000, Sheffield with about 70,000.[3]

Bribery, as has been said, was customary. The polls were

[1] Ninety members represented places of less than 50 voters each.

[2] Some of the most honorable and useful members bought their seats as the only way of getting into Parliament on an independent basis, though they utterly detested the system. See the case of Romilly. Cheyney, *Readings in English History,* pp. 644–646.

[3] The salient fact about the suffrage in boroughs before 1832 is that it varied greatly from place to place. Molesworth considers the following a tolerably complete list of these qualifications: "House-holders, resident house-holders, house-holders paying scot and lot: inhabitants, resident inhabitants, inhabitants paying scot and lot: burgesses, capital burgesses, burgage-holders; freeholders, freemen, resident freemen; corporations, pot-wallopers, payers of poor rates." Molesworth, *History of England,* I, 66, note.

kept open for fifteen days. Where there were contests the expenses were borne by the candidates. These were sometimes enormous. A case is on record in which the two candidates spent 200,000 pounds in a single election. Rich men were willing to make these vast expenditures. For, once in Parliament, they were on the road to political power and social eminence. They or their sons might enter the peerage, and numerous sinecures might fall in the direction of the family. For this reason men who were making their fortunes in industry sought to enter the class of landed proprietors by purchasing large estates. Thus the established order gained additional support in the ambition of the newly arising moneyed class. Well might the younger Pitt exclaim: "This House is not the representation of the people of Great Britain; it is the representation of nominal boroughs, of ruined and exterminated towns, of noble families, of wealthy individuals, of foreign potentates." The government of England was not representative, but was oligarchical.

Closely identified with the State, and, like the State, thoroughly permeated with the principle of special privileges, was another body, the Church of England. Though there was absolute religious liberty in Great Britain, though men might worship as they saw fit, the position of the Anglican Church was one greatly favored. Only members of that church possessed any real political power. No Catholic could be a member of Parliament, or hold any office in the state or municipality. In theory Protestants who dissented from the Anglican Church were likewise excluded from holding office. In practice, however, they were enabled to, by the device of the so-called Act of Indemnity, an act passed each year by Parliament, pardoning them for having held the positions illegally during the year just past. The position of the Dissenter was both burdensome and humiliating. He had to pay taxes for the support of the Church of England, though he did not belong to it. He had to register his place of worship with authorities of the Church of England. He could only be married by a clergyman of that church, unless he were a Quaker or a Jew. There was no such thing as civil marriage, or marriage by dissenting clergymen. A Roman Catholic or a Dissenter could not graduate from Cambridge, could not even enter Oxford, owing to the religious tests exacted, which only Anglicans could meet. The natural result of the supremacy of this religion was that those embraced it who were influenced by self-interest, who were ambitious for political preferment, for social advancement, or for an Oxford

or Cambridge education for their sons. It was "ungentlemanlike" to be a Dissenter.

Not only was the Church of England privileged with reference to other churches, but within the Church itself there were great inequalities. Bishops and archbishops received large salaries, ranging from ten to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year. These prizes went to the younger sons or protégés of the great families. The assumption was, as Sir Leslie Stephen says, that "a man of rank who takes orders should be rewarded for his condescension." On the other hand, there were thousands of parish clergymen with wretchedly low salaries. The latter had little chance of promotion. There were pluralities and absenteeism in this Church, exactly as in the Roman Catholic Church in pre-revolutionary France. The clergy were eminently respectable, but eminently worldly, a social, if not a spiritual, force in the life of England, an interested bulwark of the established order.

The great institutions of England, therefore, were controlled by the rich, and in the interest of the rich. Legislation favored the powerful, the landed nobility, and the rich class of manufacturers that was growing up, whose interests were similar. The immense mass of the people received scant consideration. Their education was woefully neglected. Probably three-fourths of the children of England did not receive the slightest instruction. Laborers were forbidden to combine to improve their conditions, which the state itself never dreamed of improving. Even their food was made artificially dear by tariffs on breadstuffs passed in the interests of the landlords. The reverse side of the picture of English greatness and power and prosperity was gloomy in the extreme. England was in need of sweeping and numerous reforms to meet the demands of modern liberalism, whether in politics, in economics, or in social institutions.

The conditions just described had not escaped challenge. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, two writers in particular, of great vigor and originality, Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, had subjected English institutions and policies to trenchant and damaging criticism. Adam Smith had published in 1776 his "Wealth of Nations," a comprehensive condemnation of the prevalent economic theories and practices of Great Britain. He denounced protection and defended free trade, and urged liberty in the economic life in place of constant and minute governmental regulation. Bentham criticized government and jurisprudence and morals. Aroused by Blackstone's panegyric

of the British Constitution as the perfection of human wisdom, he published in 1776 a "Fragment on Government," in which he showed unsparingly its defects. He laid down in this, and in other books in later years, the principle that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation"; that "the end of all government is utility, or the good of the governed." Obviously, English government was not based on any such principle. Bentham applied his principle of utility to all the institutions of England in succession — the monarchy, the church, the courts, parliament — showing how harmful rather than useful each was. He was constructive also, showing how the grievous defects could be remedied.

The views of Smith and Bentham made no impression upon Parliament, but they gradually influenced the rising generation. They contributed greatly to the reforms effected from about 1825 to 1850. They would probably have been effective much earlier had it not been for the French Revolution, which, working much good for France, worked nothing but evil for England. English conservatism became stiff and implacable. Liberal demands must be resisted, because, as any one could see, they led to anarchy and violence and a Reign of Terror. From 1793 to 1815 the liberal reformers of England were silenced by the odium attached to the deeds of their French neighbors. Salutary changes were delayed for a whole generation. The Tory party, opposed to all change, was assured of a long lease of power, one that lasted, indeed, until 1830.

The demand for reform was resumed, however, after the final victory over Napoleon at Waterloo, and became more and more emphatic. It drew its main strength from the deep and widespread wretchedness of the people. Contrary to all expectations, the peace did not bring with it happiness and prosperity, but rather intense suffering and the hatred of class and class. The reasons for this are not far to seek. As long as war continued England was the manufacturer and the common carrier of the world. Now that the war was over this practical monopoly was destroyed, the foreign market was restricted by the renewed activity of European manufacturers and merchants, who could now conduct their business in security. The export trade fell off rapidly. Then the English Government reduced its expenditures suddenly by one-half, greatly injuring all those industries which had furnished it the materials of war. Thus manufacturers, losing customers at home and abroad, were forced, some into bankruptcy, others to curtail their activity, in other words, to

dismiss thousands of workmen. And at this very moment, when laborers were being thrown out of employment or were finding their wages reduced, their number was being increased by the disbandment of the militia and the reduction in the army and navy. The navy alone was reduced from 100,000 men in 1815 to 33,000 in 1816. At the time when the number of laborers was greater than the demand, 200,000 or more men were added to the labor market. Furthermore, the next few years saw a series of bad harvests. By these, and by the Corn Law of 1815, bread was made dearer. Add also the fact that the modern industrial or factory system was painfully supplanting the old system of household industries and temporarily throwing multitudes out of employment, or employing them under hard, even inhuman conditions, and it is not difficult to understand the widespread, desperate discontent of the mass of the population. A Parliament, organ of the rich minority, refused to help them; it even forbade them to help themselves, for it was a misdemeanor for workmen to combine. If they did, they would be sent to jail. Labor was unorganized.

The prevalence of such conditions naturally furthered the demand for reforms, long held in check by the war. Now that the war was over, the time seemed to have come for legislation remedial of the many abuses in English institutions, and of the existing economic distress. But the ministry and Parliament saw only danger in change, and set themselves grimly against all concessions. The years from 1815 to 1820 are years of repression and alarm, as pronounced in England as in most of the countries of Europe.

The demand for reforms came primarily from the poor and disheartened masses, who possessed a remarkable leader in the person of William Cobbett, the son of an agricultural laborer. For some years Cobbett had published a liberal periodical called "The Weekly Political Register," in which he had opposed the Government. In 1816 he reduced the price of his paper from a shilling to twopence, made his appeal directly to the laboring class, and became their guide and spokesman. The effect was instantaneous. For the first time the lower class had an organ, cheap, moreover brilliantly written, for Cobbett's literary ability was such that a London paper, the *Standard*, declared that for clearness, force, and power of copious illustration he was unrivaled since the time of Swift. Cobbett was the first great popular editor, who for nearly thirty years, with but little interruption, expressed in his weekly paper the wishes and the

emotions of the laboring classes. He was a great democratic leader, a powerful popular editor, a pugnacious and venomous opponent of the existing régime, a champion of the cause of parliamentary reform.

For Cobbett persuaded the working people that they must first get the right to vote before they could get social and economic reforms. Parliamentary reform must have precedence. Let the people get political power, let them change Parliament from the organ of a narrow class into a truly national assembly, and then they could abolish the evils from which they suffered, and put useful statutes into force. He demanded, therefore, universal suffrage. Other leaders appeared also, and a considerable fermentation of ideas among the unpropertied and working classes characterized these years.

Certain radicals took more active measures which aroused disproportionate alarm in the minds of the ministry, who scented a new French Revolution in every popular commotion, and were ready to go to almost any length to stamp out the troublesome spirit. The distress of the masses led to disturbances. Riots broke out in 1816. Farm buildings, barns, stacks, business premises were set on fire. Machines were broken by workmen who thought them the cause of their woes. Obnoxious tradesmen were attacked. The ministry, thinking it necessary in the interests of property to make an example, arrested seventy-three of the wretched rioters of Ely, secured the condemnation to death of thirty-four of them, and the actual execution of five. Such was the reply of the British Government to the prevalent discontent. Similar disturbances occurred elsewhere, and were similarly suppressed. A political demonstration of a radical character was held in Spa Fields in London in the same year (1816). The Government prosecuted the leaders for treason, but the jury declined to convict. Somewhat later when the Prince Regent was returning from Parliament, where he had declared that the English electoral system was the most perfect the world had ever seen, the people threw stones at his carriage, breaking one of its windows.

The legislation occasioned by these occurrences was harshly repressive. No less grave a measure was passed than one suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, an act which no Parliament in Great Britain, since that of 1817, has felt it necessary to suspend. An act for the suppression of seditious meetings was hardly more defensible. It was the object of this bill to prevent political discussion by the public. Only with the special permis-

sion of a magistrate could a debating club meet or a lecture be given or a reading room be opened. The ministry even declined to make any exception of lectures on medicine, surgery, and chemistry. Such legislation only the gravest necessity could justify, and such necessity did not exist. That it could be used to damage political opponents of the existing ministry was soon made evident. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act drove Cobbett, the most aggressive opponent of the ministry, into temporary exile.

Two years later a more important event occurred in Manchester. A public meeting was held in St. Peters Field, August 16, 1819, for the purpose of petitioning for parliamentary reform and the redress of grievances. This meeting had been declared illegal by the authorities, yet the organizers had determined to hold it nevertheless. Fifty thousand men, women, and children came together accordingly to listen to Hunt, a popular orator. The police attempted to arrest Hunt and the other leaders. The crowd closed in around them, jeering. The magistrates apparently lost their heads. They ordered a body of cavalry and yeomanry to rescue the police. The result, however, was that the troops charged the crowd which was unarmed. There was a scene of fearful confusion; several defenseless people were killed at once; many more were injured. This so-called Massacre of Peterloo angered the people, and in the end furthered the agitation for reform, but the Government warmly approved the action of the magistrates and induced Parliament to pass the famous Six Acts or Gag Laws which represent the climax of this sorry reaction in England, and which stringently restricted the freedom of speech, of the press, and of public meeting, which had long been the boast of England.

Such was the answer of the Tory aristocracy under Lord Liverpool to the demands of the discontented and distressed. No attempt on the part of the privileged classes to examine the grievances of the people, to seek to remove the causes of the universal discontent, but only harsh and repressive legislation that encroached gravely upon the traditional liberties of the British people. The conquerors of Napoleon were easily frightened. Their policy of coercion was successful. The radical party was silenced. It reappeared ten years later, however, and contributed immensely to the cause of parliamentary reform which then became irresistible.

In 1820 George III died at the age of eighty-one. He had for many years been insane, and the regency had been exercised by

his son, who now became George IV, and who reigned from 1820 to 1830.

After 1820 a change gradually came over the political life of England. The Tory party still retained its great majority in Parliament, but it showed a tendency toward liberalism. With returning prosperity after the resumption of specie payments in 1819, the disturbances of the last few years ceased, and the panic, into which the governing classes had been thrown by the French Revolution, passed away. Several of the more reactionary members of the ministry died or resigned, and their places were taken by men of a younger and more liberal generation. Canning, Peel, and Huskisson made the Tory party an engine of partial reform. Under Canning, as Foreign Secretary from 1822, England assumed the position that each nation is free to determine its own form of government, a doctrine opposed to that of the Holy Alliance of the right of intervention in the affairs of other states whose acts might be thought to imperil the principle of monarchy. Canning freed England from all connection with the Holy Alliance. He recognized the independence of the Spanish colonies in America. If Spain could reconquer them she might. But no foreign country, declared Canning, should subdue them for her. "I called the New World in," he said, "to redress the balance of the Old." The main significance of Canning's administration of the Foreign Office is that at least one of the great powers with boldness and success defied the smug and timorous reactionary policy of the absolute monarchies of the Continent. Similar interventions in Portuguese and Greek affairs served the cause of liberalism in those countries.

While Canning was making England's foreign policy more liberal, Huskisson was introducing greater liberty into commerce by carrying bills in 1823 altering the Navigation Laws, which threw restrictions about the carrying trade, and by reducing the duties on many articles of import. This was not free trade, but it was a step in that direction. The more strongly protected interests maintained their ground for a generation longer. When Huskisson began his reforms about 1,500 Acts of Parliament regulated the administration of the tariff system; the number was now reduced to eleven, thus greatly simplifying that department.

Another important reform of these years was that of the Penal Code. The code then prevailing was a disgrace to England, and placed her far behind France and other countries. There was a crying need for reform. The punishment of death could be legally

inflicted for about two hundred offenses — for picking a man's pocket, for stealing five shillings from a store, or forty shillings from a dwelling house, for stealing a fish, for injuring Westminster Bridge, for sending threatening letters, for making a false entry in a marriage register.[1]

This code, as a matter of fact, was not enforced. It was shown, for instance, that in the twelve years, from 1805 to 1817, 655 persons had been indicted for stealing five shillings from a shop. Of these 113 had been sentenced to death, but the sentence had not been carried into effect in a single instance. While this was an evidence that the humane feeling of the age condemned the law and would not enforce it, still the code, by its very harshness, tended to encourage indifference to law. Two great reformers, Romilly and Mackintosh, had labored for fifteen years to persuade Parliament to alter this barbarous code, but with only disheartening results. But now Sir Robert Peeel took up the reform, and proposed and carried, in 1823, the abolition of the death penalty in about a hundred cases. The Tory party now accepted proposals it had previously fiercely combated. It is a curious fact that even before this more humane policy was adopted with reference to the misdeeds and weaknesses of men, a law for the prevention of cruelty to animals, the first of its kind, had been passed (1822).

Another reform of these years no less significant lay in the direction of greater religious liberty. In 1815 there was in England religious freedom but not religious equality. People might worship as they saw fit. Nevertheless, as we have seen, men paid a penalty for belonging to any other than the established Church of England. Political privileges were conditioned upon creed. It has been only by a series of acts passed in the nineteenth century that England has thrown open her political life to all, irrespective of church connections or religious beliefs or professions. The first step taken was the removal of the disabilities from which Protestant Dissenters suffered. These were imposed by the so-called Test and Corporation Acts. These acts, put upon the statute book at a time when there was grave fear of a violent assault upon Protestantism, had been intended to destroy the political power of the Catholics. As a qualification for holding most offices, municipal and national, the sacrament must be received according to the rites of the Anglican Church, and the oaths of supremacy and allegiance taken. The Test Act required a declaration against transubstantiation.

[1] Walpole, II, 140–1, footnote, gives a partial list of these offenses.

Though these acts were designed to exclude Catholics, they went further and excluded as well Dissenters generally. Yet with singular inconsistency Dissenters were permitted to be members of Parliament, and thus to participate in the making of the laws of England. For a long time, however, they did not vigorously object to the injustice and inconvenience which they suffered, inasmuch as they hated and feared Catholics more than they coveted political power, and believed that the repeal of the Test Act would inevitably lead to the emancipation of the Catholics, which they did not wish to see. Moreover, as has been already stated, a convenient device was made to fit their case. They were, as a matter of practice, permitted to hold office, though in so doing they were lawbreakers. Then Parliament would pass an act of indemnity pardoning them for what they had done. This had for a long while been the established custom; consequently the Test Act no longer operated to the exclusion of Dissenters from office, but was only a badge of religious inferiority. In 1828 the Test and Corporation Acts were repealed as being no longer in harmony with the age or with the wishes of Dissenters. Henceforth every person on entering upon office must make a declaration "on the true faith of a Christian" that he would not use his authority in any way against the Established Church. These words had the effect of excluding Jews from office, thereby occasioning in the years to come a new agitation and a new reform.

Thus the monopoly of the Church had in one particular been broken. The repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts was an act of complete justice to Protestant Nonconformists, but of only partial justice to Roman Catholics. Though the latter could now hold most offices they were still excluded from Parliament, for their exclusion from Parliament depended not on the Test Act but upon an act passed in 1679, and which was still in force, requiring all members of Parliament to take the oath of supremacy and to make a declaration against transubstantiation and the adoration of the Virgin Mary. Thus, while after the repeal of the Test Act in 1828, Catholics might be appointed to municipal and national offices, they might not sit in either House of Parliament. They were not upon an equality with Protestants in political matters, and had no share in the legislation of the empire. Moreover, their position was anomalous and contradictory. In Ireland all forty shilling freeholders possessed the suffrage. Thus a large number of Catholics could vote for members of the House of Commons, but practically they could only

vote for Protestants, as Protestants alone would subscribe to the oath and declaration required of all members. Nevertheless it was not illegal for Catholics to vote for one of their own faith and elect him. They would, of course, be throwing away their suffrage, as such a person would certainly, for the reason given, not be permitted to take his seat.

Catholic Emancipation, as the removal of these disabilities was called, had for forty years been a prominent question in English politics. Some of the great statesmen of England had tried to solve it favorably to Catholic claims, notably Pitt and Canning, but without success, owing to the prevalent bigotry. George III and George IV were violently opposed, George III declaring that he should reckon any man his personal enemy who should propose any measure of relief, and they were supported by the more conservative Tories. The question entered upon the acute stage in 1828. The Duke of Wellington was prime minister and Sir Robert Peel was the most important member of the cabinet. Both were opposed on principle to Catholic emancipation. The ministry wished to postpone all discussion of the question. But events were just then occurring in Ireland which would have rendered further postponement of the settlement an act of sheer madness. An agitation, widesweeping and portentous, convulsed this long-suffering people. A man of remarkable powers of leadership had arisen and had forced the crisis. Daniel O'Connell is one of the most extraordinary men in Irish history. A thrilling orator and a shrewd and energetic lawyer he could inflame vast multitudes of men, yet could lead them safely past snares and pitfalls. Believing that Ireland could only obtain justice by an overwhelming display of force he founded the Catholic Association to advocate Catholic claims. This soon became so powerful a political body as to alarm the Government. A law was accordingly passed in 1825 ordering its dissolution. The law was from the start a dead letter. The Association, dissolved, immediately reappeared in another form. Monster meetings were held, where the witchery of O'Connell's oratory was displayed and his marvelous power of control of an excitable and injured people conspicuously manifested. These monster demonstrations were marked by no excesses. They constituted an indignant and resolute protest against unfair legislation. O'Connell now decided upon an act so bold that he believed it would mean the end of the agitation. A vacancy occurred in the parliamentary representation from the county of Clare. O'Connell decided to be a candidate. He was triumphantly elected. He

was a Catholic, therefore debarred by the laws from membership. The electors voted for him despite the fact that they were throwing their votes away. They aimed to produce a moral effect and they succeeded. It was evident that O'Connell could be similarly returned in almost every other county in Ireland should the occasion occur, that the people were in earnest, and united. It was the fear that this was the attitude of a united people on the very brink of a revolt, rather than any sense of the justice of the cause, that prompted Wellington and Peel to bring in the famous Emancipation Bill, to force it through an unwilling Parliament, and to impose it upon an unwilling King. Wellington candidly admitted that he was driven to this step by fear of civil war. George IV felt, as he afterward said, like a person with a pistol at his breast. Like most persons in such a predicament he yielded (1829). Catholics were henceforth admitted to both Houses of Parliament, and with a few exceptions they might now fill any municipal and state office. The act established real political equality between Catholics and Protestants.

But at the very time that Catholics were given the right to sit in Parliament, they were in large majority deprived of the suffrage, for the property qualification for voters in Ireland was raised from forty shillings to two hundred. Thus in removing one grievance a new one was created, certainly an ineffective method of pacifying Ireland. One hundred and ninety thousand forty-shilling freeholders were disfranchised offhand. It is to be said, however, that this Tory Parliament would not have consented to Catholic Emancipation had it not known beforehand that this blow would be dealt to democracy.

The reforms that have just been described were carried through by the Tory party. There was one reform, however, more fundamental and important, which it was clear that that party would never concede, the reform of Parliament itself. The significant features of the parliamentary system have already been described. That they required profound alteration had been held by many of the Whigs for more than fifty years. But the Whigs had been powerless to effect anything, having long been in the minority. A combination of circumstances, however, now brought about the downfall of the party so long dominant, and rendered possible the great reform. George IV died on June 26, 1830, and was succeeded by his brother, William IV (1830–1837). The death of the monarch necessitated a new election of Parliament. Many of the influential Tory politicians, indignant that Wellington and Peel had consented to the emancipation of the Catholics, wished

to punish their leaders by sending up members to the Commons who would be opposed to them. Wellington's foreign policy increased the unpopularity of the ministry. Moreover, just at this time the distress of the working classes was great, and they were demanding parliamentary reform with renewed vigor. Suddenly the French Revolution of 1830 occurred. It exerted a great influence in England. To the distressed and discontented it was an encouragement to further activity. But its influence upon the well-to-do middle class was more important, as it proved that great changes could be effected without bringing social anarchy in their train. Thus the specter of revolution that had haunted the imagination of the solid, conservative class of Englishmen was finally laid by a revolution both reasonably orderly and most salutary. This class was no longer unwilling to co-operate with the working people. It now took up with energy the demand for reform.

The elections of 1830, held under such circumstances, resulted in a Tory loss of fifty members in the Commons. Though that party still had a majority it was not likely to last long, as many Tories were opposed to Wellington. Parliament met in November 1830, and the question of reform was immediately introduced. The Duke of Wellington showed his position by a remarkable eulogy of the English Parliament as one which "answered all the good purposes of legislation, and this to a greater degree than any legislature had ever answered, in any country whatever," that it possessed and deservedly possessed "the full and entire confidence of the country." He would go still further and say "that if at the present moment he had imposed upon him the duty of forming a legislature for any country — and particularly for a country like this, in possession of great property of various descriptions — he did not mean to assert that he could form such a legislature as they possessed now, for the nature of man was incapable of reaching such excellence at once, but his great endeavor would be to form some description of legislature which would produce the same results." Under these circumstances he would himself never bring forward any measure changing that system, but he "should always feel it his duty to resist such measures when proposed by others." [1]

The result of this speech, which was entirely sincere but seemed the very abdication of the intellect, was to arouse such widespread indignation that the Wellington ministry was shortly

[1] Quoted in May, *Const. Hist. of Eng.*, I, 331–332. Kendall, *Source Book of English History*, No. 129.

swept from office, and the Whigs came in. Thus was broken the control the Tory party had exercised with one slight interruption for forty-six years.

Earl Grey, who for forty years had demanded parliamentary reform, now became prime minister. A ministry was formed with ease, and included many able men, Durham, Russell, Brougham, Palmerston, Stanley, Melbourne, and on March 1, 1831, a Reform Bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Lord John Russell. It aimed to effect a redistribution of seats on a more equitable plan, and the establishment of a uniform franchise for boroughs in place of the great and absurd variety of franchises then existing. The redistribution of seats was based on two principles, the withdrawal of the right of representation from small, decayed boroughs, and its bestowal upon large and wealthy towns hitherto without it.

Accordingly the bill proposed to deprive all boroughs having a population of less than 2,000 of their separate representation in Parliament; to deprive all boroughs of less than 4,000 inhabitants of one of their two members. It was estimated that 110 boroughs would be affected, and that 168 seats would be abolished.[1] The ministry proposed that these should be given to the counties and the great unrepresented boroughs. The bill amazed the House by its thoroughgoing character and encouraged the reformers. Neither side had expected so sweeping a change. The introduction of the bill precipitated a remarkable parliamentary discussion, which continued with some intervals for over fifteen months, from March 1, 1831, to June 5, 1832.

Lord John Russell in his introduction of the measure, after stating that the theory of the British Constitution was no taxation without representation, and after showing that in former times Parliament had been truly representative, said that it was no longer so. "A stranger who was told that this country is unparalleled in wealth and industry, and more civilized and more enlightened than any country was before it — that it is a country that prides itself on its freedom, and that once in every seven years it elects representatives from its population to act as the guardians and preservers of that freedom — would be anxious and curious to see how that representation is formed, and how the

[1] The list read by Lord John Russell of the boroughs which it was proposed wholly or partially to disfranchise, with the number of voters and "the prevailing influence" of each, that is the landowner, who had practical control, may be found in Molesworth, *Hist. of Eng.*, 1, 70–73; also, in part, in Cheyney, *Readings in English History*, 686–688.

people choose their representatives, to whose faith and guardianship they entrust their free and liberal institutions. Such a person would be very much astonished if he were taken to a ruined mound and told that that mound sent two representatives to Parliament; if he were taken to a stone wall and told that three niches in it sent two representatives to Parliament; if he were taken to a park where no houses were to be seen, and told that that park sent two representatives to Parliament. But if he were told all this, and were astonished at hearing it, he would be still more astonished if he were to see large and opulent towns, full of enterprise and industry and intelligence, containing vast magazines of every species of manufactures, and were then told that these towns sent no representatives to Parliament."

Lord John Russell estimated that the electorate would be enlarged by about a half a million additional voters by this measure, for it proposed the extension of the suffrage as well as the redistribution of seats.

The first man who arose to oppose the bill was the representative of the University of Oxford, Sir Robert Inglis, who represented the opinions and prejudices of the country gentlemen so vitally affected by the measure. He denied flatly that the population of a town had ever had anything to do with its representation or that representation and taxation were in any way connected in the British Constitution. "Can the noble lord show that any town or borough has been called into parliamentary existence because it was large or populous, or excluded from it because it was small? The noble lord has tried to make much of the instance of Old Sarum. In one and the same year, the 23rd Edward I, a writ was issued to both Old and New Sarum, and in neither case was it conferred on account of population or taxation. On the contrary, I believe it was given, in the first instance, to oblige some Earl of Salisbury by putting his friends into the House. And in an account of the borough it was stated that it had lately been purchased by Mr. Pitt, the possessor of the celebrated diamond of that name, who has attained an hereditary seat in the House of Commons as much as the Earl of Arundel possessed one in the House of Peers by being the owner of Arundel Castle. How then can it be said, that, according to the constitution of the country, noblemen are not to be represented and their interests regarded in this House. . . . It is in vain after this to talk of the purity of representation in former times. I defy the noble lord to point out at any time when the representation was better than it is at present. I say, therefore, that

what is proposed is not restorative. The House and the country may judge what it is, but I will state in one word that it is *Revolution*, a revolution that will overturn all the natural influence of rank and property." Sir Robert proceeded to show that some of the greatest men in parliamentary annals had entered the House as representatives of these nomination and close boroughs, the elder Pitt, who sat indeed for this very Old Sarum, which was to be embalmed as a classic in these debates, the younger Pitt, Burke, Canning, Fox, that thus they had had a chance to show their talents and were later chosen the representatives of large towns. But no such towns would ever have chosen them had they not previously had this opportunity to prove their ability. "It is only by this means that young men who are unconnected by birth or residence with large towns can ever hope to enter this House unless they are cursed — I will call it cursed — with that talent of mob oratory which is used for the purpose of influencing the lowest and most debasing passions of the people."

Hunt, one of the radical leaders, former hero of the field of Peterloo, and now a member of the House, took part in the debate. "How is this House constituted?" he asked, "How are many honorable members elected? Look at the borough of Ilchester and the boroughs of Lancashire and Cornwall, and see what classes of men return members to this House. I will tell the House a fact which has come to my knowledge, and which bears on that particular point. In the borough of Ilchester . . . many of the voters are of the most degraded and lowest class, who can neither read nor write, and who always take care to contract debts to the amount of £35 previous to an election, because they know that those debts will be liquidated for them. Is that, then, the class of men which the House is told represents the property of the country? I am one who thinks that this House ought to be what it professes to be — the Commons House of Parliament, representing the feelings and interest of all the common people of England."

Another member, Sir C. Wetherell, denounced the proposed loss of their positions by 168 members as "corporation robbery," as a new Pride's Purge, as an imitation of the illegalities of the Cromwellian period, as republican in principle, "destructive of all property, of all right, of all privilege."

Sir Robert Peel pointed out that the close boroughs not only brought out young talent that otherwise could get no opportunity to show itself, but that they furnished refuges for distinguished

members, who by some caprice of fortune had lost their hold upon their constituencies — and that thus these men could continue in the service of the nation. "During 150 years the constitution in its present form has been in force; and I would ask any man who hears me to declare whether the experience of history has produced any form of government so calculated to promote the happiness and secure the rights and liberties of a free and enlightened people." Stanley, later Lord Derby, replying to the contention that the nomination boroughs opened an opportunity to very able men to enter Parliament who might not find any other way, said, "Whatever advantage might be derived from this mode of admission would be more than balanced by this disadvantage — that the class of persons thus introduced would, whatever may be their talents and acquirements, not be looked upon by the people as representatives."

Macaulay delivered a speech on the second day of the debate that made his reputation as one of the foremost orators of the House. Replying to Sir Robert Inglis he said, "My honorable friend . . . challenges us to show that the constitution was ever better than it is. Sir, we are legislators, not antiquaries. The question for us is, not whether the constitution was better formerly, but whether we can make it better now?" Shall "a hundred drunken potwallopers in one place, or the owner of a ruined hovel in another," be invested with powers "which are withheld from cities renowned to the furthest ends of the earth for the marvels of their wealth and of their industry?" "But these great cities, says my honorable friend . . . are virtually, though not directly, represented. Are not the wishes of Manchester, he asks, as much consulted as those of any town which sends members to Parliament? Now, Sir, I do not understand how a power which is salutary when exercised virtually can be noxious when exercised directly. If the wishes of Manchester have as much weight with us as they would have under a system which should give representatives to Manchester, how can there be any danger in giving representatives to Manchester?" Referring to the utility of the close boroughs as affording careers to men of talent he said that "we must judge of the form of government by its general tendency, not by happy accidents," and that if "there were a law that the hundred tallest men in England should be members of Parliament, there would probably be some able men among those who would come into the House by virtue of this law."

Thus the debate went on, an unusual number of members partic-

ipating. But the bill did not have long to live. The Opposition was persistent, and on April 19th the ministry was defeated on an amendment. It resolved to appeal to the people. Parliament was dissolved and a new election ordered. This election took place in the summer of 1831 amid the greatest excitement and was one of the most momentous of the century. From one end of the land to the other the cry was, "The bill, the whole bill, and nothing but the bill." There was some violence and intimidation of voters, and bribery on a large scale was practised on both sides. The question put the candidates was, "Will you support the bill or will you oppose it?" The result of the election was an overwhelming victory for the reformers.

On June 24, 1831, Lord John Russell introduced the second Reform Bill, which was practically the same as the first. The Opposition did not yield, but fought it inch by inch. They tried to wear out the ministry by making dilatory motions and innumerable speeches which necessarily consisted of mere repetition. In the course of two weeks Sir Robert Peel spoke forty-eight times, Crocker fifty-seven times, Wetherell fifty-eight times. However, the bill was finally passed, September 22nd, by a majority of 106. It was then sent up to the House of Lords where it was quickly killed (October 8, 1831).

It was the Lords who chiefly profited by the existing system of nomination and rotten boroughs, and they were enraged at the proposal to end it. They were determined not to lose the power it gave them.

The defeat of the bill by the Upper House caused great indignation throughout the country. Apparently the Lords were simply greedy of their privileges. Again riots broke out in London and other towns, expressive of the popular feeling. Newspapers appeared in mourning. Bells were tolled. Threats of personal violence to the Lords were made, and in certain instances carried out. Troops were called out in some places. England, it was widely felt, was verging toward a civil war.

Parliament was now prorogued. It reassembled December 6th, and on the 12th, Lord John Russell rose again and introduced his third Reform Bill. Again the same tiresome tactics of the Opposition. But the bill finally passed the House of Commons, March 23, 1832, by a majority of 116.

Again the bill was before the Lords, who showed the same disposition to defeat it as before. The situation seemed hopeless. Twice the Commons had passed the bill with the manifest and express approval of the people. Were they to be foiled by a

chamber based on hereditary privilege? Riots, monster demonstrations, acrimonious and bitter denunciation, showed once more the temper of the people. There was only one way in which the measure could be carried. The King might create enough peers to give its supporters a majority in the House of Lords. This, however, William IV at first refused to do. The Grey ministry consequently resigned. The King appealed to the Duke of Wellington to form a ministry. The Duke tried but failed. The King then gave way, recalled Earl Grey to power and signed a paper stating: "The King grants permission to Earl Grey and to his Chancellor, Lord Brougham, to create such a number of peers as will be sufficient to insure the passing of the Reform Bill." The peers were never created. The threat sufficed. The bill passed the Lords, June 4, 1832, about 100 of its opponents absenting themselves from the House. It was signed and became a law.

The bill had undergone some changes during its passage. In its final form it provided that fifty-six nominations or close boroughs, with a population of less than 2,000, should lose their representation entirely; that thirty-two others, with a population of less than 4,000 should lose one seat each. The seats thus obtained were redistributed as follows: twenty-two large towns were given two members each; twenty others were given one each, and the larger counties were given additional members, sixty-five in all. Scotland and Ireland were by companion bills given increased representation. One hundred and forty-three seats were thus redistributed. There was no attempt to make equal electoral districts, but only to remove more flagrant abuses. Constituencies still varied greatly in population. The total membership of the House was not altered but remained 658.

The Reform Bill also altered and widened the suffrage. Previously the county franchise had depended entirely upon the ownership of land; that is, was limited to those who owned outright land of an annual value of forty shillings, the forty-shilling freeholders. The county suffrage was now extended to include also copyholders and leaseholders, i.e., farmers and tenants of land whose tenure was for sixty years, and of the annual value of ten pounds, and to tenants-at-will holding land worth fifty pounds a year. Thus in the counties the suffrage was dependent still upon the tenure of land, but not upon outright ownership. There were, it is seen, several methods of acquiring the county franchise.

In the boroughs a far greater change was made. The previous

local franchises were all abolished, the personal rights of living voters being guaranteed, and a new uniform suffrage was adopted. The right to vote was given to all ten pound householders, which meant all who owned or rented a house or shop or other building of an annual rental value, with the land, of ten pounds. Thus the suffrage was practically given in boroughs to the great middle class. There was henceforth a uniform suffrage in boroughs, and a varied suffrage in counties.

The law applied only to England. In the same session similar reform bills were passed for Scotland and Ireland. In order to reduce bribery, voting in each constituency was limited henceforth to two days.

The Reform Bill of 1832 was not a democratic measure, but it made the House of Commons a truly representative body. It admitted to the suffrage the wealthier middle class. The number of voters, particularly in the boroughs, was considerably increased; but the laborers of England had no votes, nor had the poorer middle class. The average ratio of voters to the whole population of Great Britain was about one to thirty. The measure, therefore, though regarded as final by the Whig ministry, was not so regarded by the vast majority, who were still disfranchised. No further alteration was made until 1867, but during the whole period there was a demand for extension. In 1831 and 1832 the people, by their monster meetings, riots, acts of violence, had helped greatly to pass the bill only to find when the struggle was over that others and not themselves had profited by their efforts.

The passage of the Reform Bill showed clearly the predominance in the state of the House of Commons over both King and Lords in case the House had the evident and emphatic support of the people.

CHAPTER XXII

ENGLAND BETWEEN TWO GREAT REFORMS (1832–1867)

England had entered upon a period of Whig government that was destined to be almost as prolonged as the preceding period of Tory rule. The Tories had been in power from 1784 to 1830, with but one short interval. From 1830 to 1874 the Whigs controlled the government, with the exception of short periods which amounted in all to eight years. In the elections of 1832, held under the new conditions, the Whigs were overwhelmingly victorious. The Tories returned only about 150 members. The terms Tory and Whig now gradually gave way to the terms Conservative and Liberal, which are still in use.

The reforming activity of the Whigs, which had achieved the notable triumph of the great change in the House of Commons, continued unabated for several years. Several measures of great importance were passed by the reformed Parliament during the next few years.

One of the first of these was the abolition of slavery in 1833. It had been long held by the British courts that slavery could not exist in the British Isles, that the instant a slave touched the soil of England he became free. Moreover, after a long agitation, England had abolished the slave trade in 1807. Henceforth it was a crime to kidnap negroes in Africa and sell them into slavery. But slavery itself existed in the West Indies, in Mauritius and in South Africa. There were about 750,000 slaves in these colonies. To free them was a far more difficult matter than to stop the African slave trade, for it was considered an interference with the rights of property, and it might ruin the prosperity of the colonies. Two causes were now working for the abolition of slavery, a growing sensitiveness to the moral iniquity of the institution, and the decreasing influence of its leading supporters, the West Indian planters, owing to the fact that their trade with Great Britain had fallen off greatly since 1815. For many years an anti-slavery agitation had been in progress, ably led by Wilberforce, Buxton, and Zachary

Macaulay, father of the historian, who had created the public opinion indispensably necessary to any reform.

Various acts of legislation had been passed looking toward the improvement of the position of slaves in the crown colonies, but not providing for the abolition of the institution itself. These measures were indignantly and hotly resented by the planters, who denounced the action of the English government in vituperative terms, unwise conduct, as it still further alienated public opinion in the mother country. A bill was passed in August 1833 decreeing that slavery should cease August 1, 1834. It provided for the immediate emancipation of all children of six years and under; for a period of apprenticeship for all others for seven years, during which three-fourths of their time was to belong to their former masters, one-fourth to themselves. This, it was argued, would give them the preparation necessary for a wise and intelligent use of freedom, but the provision did not work well in practice and was ultimately allowed to lapse. A gift of twenty million pounds was made to the slave owners as compensation for the loss of their property.

Conscience was aroused at the same time by a cruel evil right at home, the employment, under barbarous conditions, of children in the factories of England.

The employment of child labor in British industries was one of the results of the rise of the modern factory system. It was early seen that much of the work done by machinery could be carried on by children, and as their labor was cheaper than that of adults they were swept into the factories in larger and larger numbers, and a monstrous evil grew up. They were, of course, the children of the poorest people. Many began this life of misery at the age of five or six, more at the age of eight or nine. Incredible as it may seem, they were often compelled to work twelve or fourteen hours a day. Half hour intervals were allowed for meals, but by a refinement of cruelty they were expected to clean the machinery at such times. Falling asleep at their work they were beaten by overseers or injured by falling against the machinery. In this inhuman régime there was no time or strength left for education or recreation or healthy development of any kind. The moral atmosphere in which the children worked was harmful in the extreme. Physically, intellectually, morally, the result could only be stunted human beings.

This shocking abuse had been attacked spasmodically and unsuccessfully for thirty years. In 1802 a law was passed

limiting the number of hours to twelve a day, and providing that work should not begin before six in the morning, nor continue after nine at night. It applied, however, to but few mills. In 1816 a bill was introduced providing that no child should be employed for more than ten hours a day in any factory. The House of Lords limited this to cotton mills and extended the hours to twelve. Later it was voted that each child should have a quarter of a holiday on each Saturday. Such was the pitifully small protection guaranteed children workers by the laws of England.

This monstrous system was defended by political economists, manufacturers, and statesmen in the name of individual liberty, — in whose name, moreover, crimes have often been committed, — the liberty of the manufacturer to conduct his business without interference from outside, the liberty of the laborer to sell his labor under whatever conditions he may be disposed or, as might more properly be said, compelled to accept. A Parliament, however, which had been so sensitive to the wrongs of negro slaves in Jamaica, could not be indifferent to the fate of English children. Thus the long efforts of many English humanitarians, Robert Owen, Thomas Sadler, Fielden, Lord Ashley, resulted in the passage of the Factory Act of 1833, which prohibited the employment in spinning and weaving factories of children under nine, made a maximum eight-hour day for those from nine to thirteen, and of twelve for those from thirteen to eighteen. The bill also provided for the sanitary conditions of the factories, for a certain amount of recreation and education, and, most important, it created a system of factory inspectors whose duty it was to see that this law was enforced. This was a very modest beginning, yet it represented a great advance on the preceding policy of England. It was the first of a series of acts regulating the conditions of laborers in the interest of society as a whole, acts which have become more numerous, more minute, and more drastic from 1833 to the present day. The idea that an employer may conduct his business entirely as he likes has no standing in modern English law.

The reform spirit, which rendered the decade from 1830 to 1840 so notable, achieved another vast improvement in the radical transformation of municipal government. The local self-government of England enjoyed great fame abroad but was actually in a very sorry condition at home. Not only was the Parliament of 1830 the organ of an oligarchy, but so was the system of local government. Usurpations of power by a single

class had gone on flourishingly under the Tudor and Stuart and even Hanoverian kings. The whole political structure, local as well as general, was honeycombed with notorious abuses. The municipal and the parliamentary systems were closely bound together. The unreformed boroughs were natural supports of an unreformed House of Commons. Now that Parliament had been reformed it was natural that the same party should attempt to bring about the abolition of the evils of local government. In earlier centuries all the freemen of the borough had enjoyed full rights of citizenship, and local government had been popular in character. But with the lapse of time the term "freemen" had become technical and applied only to a few in each borough, and frequently to non-residents. Thus Cambridge, with a population of about 20,000, had only 118 "freemen," Portsmouth, with 46,000, only 102. Many of these were poor, paid small taxes, and were in no sense representative citizens, yet they alone possessed the right to vote in municipal elections. Thus, in Cambridge, the freemen paid only about two thousand pounds of the twenty-five thousand of the city taxes. But in many cases even the "freemen" had no political power, but only privileges of a pecuniary nature, such as a right to share in certain charitable funds and of exemption from tolls. In very numerous cases the local government was entirely in the hands of the corporation, that is, the mayor and the common council. The mayor was chosen by the council and the councilors sat for life and had the right to fill all vacancies in their body. The government in such cases was literally a close corporation. Thus, throughout all England, a very small minority had an absolute monopoly of political power in towns and cities.

These municipal governments were notoriously corrupt. Elected for life and self-elected they had no sense of responsibility to the community at large. Their proceedings were generally secret. They levied taxes but rendered no account of how they expended them. Neglecting the needs of the community for proper policing, paving, lighting, sanitation, they used the funds largely for self-gratification or personal advantage or the advantage of the party which they favored. In many of the smaller boroughs the mayor alone was practically the entire government. Generally speaking, those Englishmen who lived in boroughs were not only not self-governed, but were wretchedly misgoverned.

This system received its death-blow from the reform of Parliament. The two systems hung together, were mutually

interdependent. The reform of one had, as an inevitable consequence, the reform of the other. The power of the privileged class in the House of Commons had rested largely upon the ease with which they had been able to secure control of these little local oligarchies, which had had the right to elect the members of the boroughs to the House. In 1833 a commission was appointed to investigate the whole subject, which it did with convincing thoroughness.

In 1835 a law was passed, the Municipal Corporations Act, second in importance only to the Reform Bill. This act provided for the election of town councilors by all the inhabitants who had paid taxes during the preceding three years. This established a property and residence qualification. The town council was to elect the mayor. The town council and the constituency together formed the corporation. The proceedings of the council were to be public; the accounts were to be published and audited. Not only were property owners but property renters included in the new electorate. Those who rented property that was on the tax lists as worth ten pounds a year had the right to vote as well as those who paid taxes themselves; in other words, a man who paid a rent of about a dollar a week for his house or his store was now enfranchised. This bill did not apply to London, reserved for special treatment, nor to sixty-seven boroughs, which were very small, but concerned 178 boroughs, the large majority. It is estimated that about two million people were affected by it. The bill was not a democratic measure, but it gave borough government, as the bill of 1832 had given parliamentary, to the wealthy and the middle classes. It effectually restored self-government. The basis of representation has been widened since 1835. A similar act for Scotland, sweeping away abuses even more glaring, had been passed in 1833.

In the midst of this period of reform occurred a change in the occupancy of the throne. King William IV died June 20, 1837, and was succeeded by his niece, Victoria. The young Queen was the daughter of the Duke of Kent, fourth son of George III. She was, at the time of her accession, eighteen years of age. She had been carefully educated, but owing to the fact that William IV disliked her mother, she had seen very little of court life, and was very little known. Carlyle, oppressed with all the weary weight of this unintelligible world, pitied her, quite unnecessarily. "Poor little Queen!" said he, "she is at an age at which a girl can hardly be trusted to choose a bonnet for her-

self; yet a task is laid upon her from which an archangel might shrink." Not such was the mood of the Queen. She was buoyant and joyous, and entered with zest upon a reign which was to prove the longest in the annals of England. She impressed all who saw her with her dignity and poise. Her political education was conducted under the guidance, first of Leopold, King of Belgium, her uncle, and after her accession, of Lord Melbourne, both of whom instilled in her mind the principles of constitutional monarchy. The question of her marriage was important and was decided by herself. Summoning her cousin, Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg, into her presence, she offered him her hand — "a nervous thing to do," as she afterward said, yet the only thing, as "he would never have presumed to take such a liberty" himself as to ask for the hand of the Queen of England. The marriage, celebrated in 1840, was a marriage of affection. "She is as full of love as Juliet," said Sir Robert Peel. Her married life was exceptionally happy, and when the Prince Consort died, twenty-one years later, she was inconsolable. During these years he was her constant adviser, and so complete was the harmony of their views that he was practically quite as much the ruler of the country as was she.

The early years of the new reign were years of trouble and unrest. The accession of Victoria brought to an end the connection between England and Hanover, which had existed since the Elector of Hanover had become King of Great Britain in 1714, under the name of George I. As the Salic law obtained in Hanover, that kingdom now passed to the uncle of the Queen, the Duke of Cumberland, Ernest Augustus. This was, on the whole, more a gain for England than a loss, as it freed her from vexatious entanglements on the Continent. Far more serious was the disruption of the colonial empire, threatened by the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. This will be described elsewhere. More serious still was the widespread unrest and discontent in England itself, an unrest that found expression in the Chartist Movement.

The Reform Bill of 1832 had been carried by a combination of Liberals and Radicals, the latter furnishing in those exciting days the appearance and the reality of physical force, the monster meetings, the riots, which had made the Tories feel that a civil war would result if they did not yield to what was manifestly the people's will. A breach between these two elements now ensued. The Radicals looked upon the measure, to the passing of which they had so greatly contributed, as merely a step in the right direction, from which they themselves had

gained nothing. They were a genuinely democratic party, aiming at the introduction into England of truly democratic government, popular control of the House of Commons and legislation in the interest of the people, that is, the great mass of the workers of Great Britain. But when, after 1832, they attempted to bring forward measures for a wider suffrage as a necessary preliminary to all this, they met with uncompromising opposition on the part of their former allies. Lord John Russell took occasion to say publicly in 1837 that the Reform Act of 1832 had been made as extensive as possible in the hope that it might be final; and that the question of the franchise ought not to be reopened. The leader of the Liberals had spoken. It was clear that the Conservatives would be of the same mind on this matter. There had been a reform in 1832 in the interest of the middle classes. Clearly there was to be no reform in the interest of the lower classes. The middle classes had said so. The Radicals felt that a middle class Parliament would consider simply the interests of the middle class, and they desired a democratic Parliament to legislate for the masses of the laborers of England, whether in town or country, for the laborers were the *nation.* The breach between the former allies became complete. The Radicals dubbed Lord John "Finality Jack." They began a vehement agitation for further reform. Workingmen's associations, socialist societies, the discontented generally, worked together.

In a pamphlet entitled *The Rotten House of Commons* (December 1836), Lovett, one of their leaders, proved from official returns that, out of 6,023,752 adult males living in the United Kingdom, only 839,519 were voters. He also showed that despite the reform of 1832 there were great inequalities among the constituencies, that twenty members were chosen by 2,411 votes, twenty more by 86,072. The immediate demands of the Radicals were expressed in "The People's Charter," or programme, a petition to Parliament drawn up in 1838. They demanded that the right to vote be given to every adult man, declaring, "we perform the duties of freemen, we must have the privileges of freemen"; that voting be secret, by ballot rather than orally as was then the custom, so that every voter could be free from intimidation, and less exposed to bribery; that property qualifications for membership in the House be abolished; and that the members receive salaries so that poor men, laborers themselves and understanding the needs of laborers, might be elected to Parliament if the voters wished. They also demanded

that the House of Commons should be elected, not for seven years, as was then the law, but simply for one year. The object of this was to prevent their representatives misrepresenting them by proving faithless to their pledges or indifferent or hostile to the wishes of the voters. Annual elections would give the voters the chance to punish such representatives speedily by electing others in their place. "The connection between the representatives and the people, to be beneficial, must be intimate," said the petition. Such were the five points of the famous Charter designed to make Parliament representative of the *people*, not of a class. Once adopted, it was felt that the masses would get control of the legislature and then improve their conditions.

The Chartists had almost no influence in Parliament, and their agitation had consequently to be carried on outside in workingmen's associations, in the cheap press, in popular songs and poems, in monster meetings addressed by impassioned orators, in numerous and unprecedentedly large petitions. One of these was presented in 1839. It was in the form of a large cylinder of parchment about four feet in diameter, and was said to have been signed by 1,286,000 persons. The petition was summarily rejected. Notwithstanding this failure another was presented in 1842, signed, it was asserted, by over three million persons. Borne through the streets of London in a great procession it was found too large to be carried through the door of the House of Commons. It was therefore cut up into several parts and deposited on the floor. This, too, was rejected, as unworthy of serious consideration.

The Chartist movement lasted about ten years, from 1838 to 1848. It had periods of quiet, followed by periods of great activity. The latter were generally contemporary with hard times. The whole movement was born of the great distress and misery of the English working class. Unfortunately it lacked able leadership. Many of its supporters were men of ability, devotion, and disinterestedness, but during most of the time the real leader was Feargus O'Connor, an able orator, but a weak, vain, unstable man, who knew better how to alienate those who naturally wished to co-operate than to consolidate and magnify a party. The Chartists themselves divided into two groups: those who wished to use only peaceful methods in their agitation, and those who wished to make an ultimate appeal to physical force, believing the other method entirely ineffective. Whenever the physical-force Chartists attempted to act according to their principle they were severely punished.

The Chartist could look to neither great party for aid. The movement smoldered on for ten years, blazing up threateningly in times of unusual distress. Indeed, it was a kind of barometer measuring the misery of the people and their sense of injustice. After 1848 the movement subsided. Encouraged by the French Revolution of that year the Chartists held a great national convention or people's parliament in London, and planned a vast demonstration on behalf of the Charter. Half a million men were to accompany a new petition to Parliament, which it was expected would be overawed and would then yield to so imposing a demand of an insistent people. The Government was so alarmed that it entrusted the safety of London to the Duke of Wellington, then seventy-nine years of age. His arrangements were made with his accustomed thoroughness. One hundred and seventy thousand special constables were enrolled, one of whom was Louis Napoleon, who before the year was out was to be President of the French Republic. The result was that the street demonstration was a failure, and the petition, examined by a committee of the House, was found to contain, not 5,706,000 signatures, as asserted, but less than two million. It was summarily rejected. The movement died out owing to ridicule, internal quarrels, but particularly because of the growing prosperity of the country, which resulted from the abolition of the Corn Laws and the adoption of Free Trade.

It is difficult to appraise the value and significance of this movement. Judged superficially and by immediate results the Chartists failed completely. Yet most of the changes they advocated have since been brought about. There are now no property qualifications for members of the House of Commons, and the secret ballot has been secured; the suffrage is enjoyed by the immense majority of men, though not by all, and by several million women; the payment of members has been adopted for the House of Commons though not for the House of Lords. Parliaments are now elected for five years. It seems that some of the tremendous impetus of England toward democracy, which grew so marked toward the close of the nineteenth century, was derived from this movement of which Carlyle wrote in 1839: "The matter of Chartism is weighty, deep-rooted, far-extending; did not begin yesterday; will by no means end this day or tomorrow."

Simultaneously with the Chartist Movement another was going on which had a happier issue. The adoption of the principle of Free Trade must always remain a great event in

English history, and was the culmination of a remarkable movement that extended over forty years, though its most decisive phase was concentrated into a few years of intense activity. The change was complete from a policy which England in common with the rest of the world had followed for centuries.

In 1815 England believed thoroughly in protection. Hundreds of articles were subject to duties as they entered the country, manufactured articles, raw materials. English shipping was also protected by the Navigation Laws. The most important single interest among all those protected was agriculture. Parliament in 1815 was a parliament of landlords, and their legislation was naturally favorable to their interest. Corn is a word used in England to describe wheat and breadstuffs generally. The laws imposing duties on corn were the keystone of the whole system of protection, because they affected the most influential class in the nation and the one, moreover, which made the laws. The advocates of free trade necessarily therefore delivered their fiercest assaults upon the Corn Laws. If these could be overthrown it was believed that the whole system would fall. Not until they were abolished would England be a free trade country. The Corn Law of 1815 forbade the importation of foreign corn until the price should have reached ten shillings a bushel. Later, in 1828, in place of the fixed duty, was put the so-called sliding scale, the duty on foreign grain going up as the price of domestic grain fell, and decreasing as the home price rose. But the object was the same, high protection of British grain growers. This was the particular feature which the reformers attacked. But for a long while the landlord class was so entrenched in political power that the law remained impregnable. Small and piecemeal attacks were therefore made upon other parts of the system. Huskisson in 1823–5 succeeded in carrying through a modification of the Navigation Laws of 1651. Previously all commerce between England and her colonies had to be carried on in English ships; and all commerce between England and any other country had to be carried on by English ships or by those of the country concerned. An act was passed in 1823 empowering the Government to conclude reciprocity treaties with foreign countries, admitting their ships to British ports on the same conditions as British ships, if they would put British shipping on the same footing of equality with their own in their ports. This opened the way for the ultimate abolition of all restraints upon navigation. Huskisson also succeeded in securing legislation reducing duties on almost all foreign manufactures and on many raw

materials. These changes were a beginning in the direction of freer trade, but they did not touch the strongest interest, the landowners, protected by the Corn Laws.

For the next few years public interest was absorbed in the various reforms already described. In 1841 the Whig party, then under the leadership of Lord Melbourne, the successor to Earl Grey, was overthrown, and Sir Robert Peel, leader of the Conservatives, became prime minister. His ministry lasted from 1841 to 1846. The financial condition of the state was bad, and the distress of the laboring classes general and acute. To provide a surplus in place of a deficit, and to relieve trade Peel carried through an extensive tariff reform. In 1842 there were about 1,200 articles subject to tariff duties. Peel succeeded in abolishing or reducing the rates on about 750 of them. But the most important interest still remained essentially unaffected. The great struggle for free trade came over the Corn Laws.

In 1839 there was founded, in Manchester, a great manufacturing center, the Anti-Corn-Law League. Its leader was Richard Cobden, a young business man, successful, traveled, thoughtful. Cobden was convinced that the Corn Laws interfered with the growth of British manufactures. He was soon joined by John Bright, like himself a manufacturer, unlike him, one of the great popular orators of the nineteenth century. The League, under these two leaders, and Villiers, a member of Parliament, began an earnest agitation. It attempted to convince Englishmen that they should completely reverse their commercial policy in the interest of their own prosperity. The methods of the League were business-like and thorough. Its campaign was one of persuasion. It distributed a vast number of pamphlets, setting forth the leading arguments. Lecturers were sent to the large cities and to small country towns. In a single year four hundred lectures were delivered to 800,000 persons. A purely voluntary movement, gifts poured in until in 1845 the League was spending a million and a quarter dollars. Year after year this process of argumentation went on.

This free trade party consisted of manufacturers and merchants. The manufacturers felt that they did not need protection against foreigners, as they believed that their own processes were so far superior that the latter could not compete with them. The home market would remain theirs even if French and German manufacturers were at entire liberty to send their commodities into England duty free. They also believed that it was absolutely essential for them to gain foreign markets, and that this could not

be done under the existing system. Increase your foreign markets, they said, and you increase the employment of Englishmen in English factories, a thing of utmost importance as the population is growing rapidly. You will only be permitted to export freely to other countries if you consent to take freely in payment the commodities of those countries, their grain, their timber. If you will take these, they will purchase your woolens, your cottons, your hardware, and will not attempt to manufacture these themselves. If you do not, you will foster the growth of foreign competitors in manufacturing and will make them rivals in the markets of Europe, a suicidal policy. "In France," said one orator, "there are millions willing to clothe themselves in English garments, and you have millions of hungry mouths to take their corn. In Hungary, not being able to sell their corn to England, the people are turning their capital to manufacturing their own cloth." Replying to the argument that the removal of the Corn Laws would mean the ruin of English agriculture, which it was necessary to encourage in order that the country might produce an adequate food supply for its own needs, and not become dependent on other countries for the very necessaries of life, they pointed to Holland, declaring that it was "dependent upon every country, that there were no corn laws, yet no scarcity of food, that wages were high and trade brisk." One of the most effective arguments was that the time had come when the increasing population needed cheap food.

This agitation extended over seven years. It was conducted quite independently of political parties. It does not seem, however, that the repeal of the Corn Laws could have been carried had it not been for a great natural calamity, the Irish famine of 1845. "Famine itself, against which we had warred, joined us," said John Bright. The food of the vast majority of the Irish people was the potato. More than half of the eight million inhabitants of Ireland depended on it alone for sustenance, and with a large part of the rest it was the chief article of diet. A failure in the potato crop could mean nothing less than famine. In the fall of 1845 this was precisely what impended, for a potato disease had set in and it was evident that the crop would be hopelessly ruined. Potatoes could not be obtained from foreign countries, which, fearing for themselves, were forbidding their exportation. At the same time the English grain crops were very poor, and foreign grain could not be bought by these Irish peasants, so high was the duty. The alternatives seemed unavoidable, either starvation for multitudes or cheap grain, which

could be obtained only by the repeal of the Corn Laws. The famine came, and tens of thousands perished of starvation. Great charitable gifts from England and America aimed to relieve the distress but proved inadequate. Finally, in 1846, Sir Robert Peel carried against bitter opposition the repeal of the Corn Laws by a combination of Conservative and Liberal votes.[1] But in so doing he split his party. The bill was passed by 223 Liberals and 104 Conservatives, against 229 Conservatives. Peel had come into office in 1841 the head of a party pledged to the support of the Corn Laws; in 1846 he repealed them against the passionate opposition of two-thirds of his own party. The vengeance of the protectionists was not long in coming. Peel was shortly overthrown by their votes, after having revolutionized the commercial policy of Great Britain. Peel had been converted to the theory of free trade some time before the Irish crisis. That crisis simply gave an irresistible practical reason for putting the theory into immediate effect.

There still remained after this many duties for protective purposes in the English tariff, but the keystone of the whole system was removed. In 1849 the Navigation Laws were finally abolished, and the ships of all the world might compete with English ships for the carrying trade to England and her colonies, might enter British harbors as freely as British ships might. In 1853 Mr. Gladstone succeeded in having the duties removed from 123 articles, and reduced on 133 others. In 1860 the number of commodities subject to the tariff was reduced to 48. In 1866 the duty on lumber was abolished. England still had a tariff, but it was for revenue only, not for the protection of English industries. Nearly all of the revenue from the tariff, which in 1910 amounted to over a hundred and sixty million dollars, came from the duties on tobacco, tea, spirits, wine, and sugar. England is absolutely dependent upon other countries for her food supplies. It was evident as early as 1845 that English agriculture could not support England's population.

The twenty years succeeding the repeal of the Corn Laws were years of quiescence and transition. Comparatively few changes of importance were made in legislation. Those of greatest significance concerned the regulation of employment in factories and mines. Such legislation, merciful in its immediate effects and momentous in the reach of the principles on which it rested,

[1] Until 1849 there was still to be a duty, but a slight one, on corn. Then a nominal one of a shilling a quarter. This was abolished in 1869.

was enacted particularly during the decade from 1840 to 1850. The initial step in such legislation had been taken in the Factory Act of 1833, already described, a law that regulated somewhat the conditions under which children and women could be employed in the textile industries. But labor was unprotected in many other industries, in which gross abuses prevailed. One of the most famous parliamentary reports of the nineteenth century was that of a commission appointed to investigate the conditions in mines. Published in 1842, its amazing revelations revolted public opinion and led to quick action. It showed that children of five, six, seven years of age were employed underground in coal mines, girls as well as boys; that women as well as men labored under conditions fatal to health and morals; that the hours were long, twelve or fourteen a day, and the dangers great. They were veritable beasts of burden, dragging and pushing carts on hands and knees along narrow and low passageways, in which it was impossible to stand erect. Girls of eight or ten carried heavy buckets of coal on their backs up steep ladders many times a day. The abuses were so astounding and sickening that a law was passed in 1842 which forbade the employment of women and girls in mines; and which permitted the employment of boys of ten for only three days a week.

Once embarked on this policy of protecting the economically dependent classes, Parliament was forced to go further and further in the governmental regulation of private industry. In 1844 a law was passed which restricted the labor of children in factories to half of each day, or six and a half hours, or the whole of every other day, the labor of women to twelve hours, and also restricting night work still further. The Factory Act of 1847, altered somewhat by an act of 1850, practically established a ten-hour day for labor, a demand long urged by the laboring class and bitterly opposed by manufacturers as ruinous to industry, as certain to lower wages, and to drive capital to foreign countries, by economists as in violation of the "laws" of political economy, by both as a violation of the right of free contract.

Since then a long series of similar statutes has been enacted by the English Parliament, which it is here impossible to describe, so extensive and minute, that Morley, writing over forty years ago, and speaking of the Factory and Workshop Consolidation Act of 1878, an act of more than fifty printed pages, virtually a labor code could say: "We have to-day a complete, minute,

and voluminous code for the protection of labor; buildings must be kept pure of effluvia; dangerous machinery must be fenced; children and young persons must not clean it while in motion; their hours are not only limited, but fixed; continuous employment must not exceed a given number of hours, varying with the trade, but prescribed by the law in given cases; a statutable number of holidays is imposed; the children must go to school, and the employer must every week have a certificate to that effect; if an accident happens, notice must be sent to the proper authorities; special provisions are made for bake-houses, for lace-making, for collieries, and for a whole schedule of other special callings; for the due enforcement and vigilant supervision of this immense host of minute prescriptions, there is an immense host of inspectors, certifying surgeons, and other authorities, whose business it is 'to speed and post o'er land and ocean' in restless guardianship of every kind of labor, from that of the woman who plaits straw at her cottage door, to the miner who descends into the bowels of the earth, and the seaman who conveys the fruits and materials of universal industry to and fro between the remotest parts of the globe." [1]

Since 1878 the principle of governmental regulation has been much more extensively applied. The labor code of to-day is contained in the Factory and Workshop Act of 1901, called by Dicey "the most notable achievement of English socialism." [2]

This mid-century period of English history, so sterile in political interest, is thus seen to be highly significant in the economic sphere. It was the period in which trade-unionism grew rapidly, solidified itself, perfected its machinery, and discussed and clarified the demands of the laboring class. The effect of this preliminary work was apparent later. Workingmen were receiving in their unions a kind of education in politics and management that was a valuable training for the use of the suffrage, when they should get it, as they did in 1867. Meanwhile they came to attach less importance to purely political privileges, such as those demanded by the Charter, and to study far more carefully social questions, arising from the relations of

[1] Morley, *Life of Cobden,* Ch. XIII.

[2] The Combination Act of 1800, which, in connection with the law of conspiracy then in force, made a trade union an unlawful association, was repealed in 1824. Since then such organizations have not been illegal. They have grown greatly and now enjoy strong legal protection. See Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England,* 95–102; 190–200; 266–272.

capital and labor. During these years a remarkable change of opinion was going on. The beauties of individualism were seen to be less attractive; the advantages of collectivism or socialism were more and more emphasized. The economic and social beliefs of large classes of the population were undergoing a profound transformation. The revolution of thought was one tending distinctly toward socialism.[1] This transformation was proceeding quietly, and its significance did not become apparent until after the passage of the Reform Bill of 1867.

This period of comparative inaction in England was a time of great and stirring events and changes abroad, the period of the revolutions of 1848, of the Crimean War, in which England played a leading part, of the making of Italy, the rise of Prussia, the dismemberment of Denmark, the humiliation of Austria, the Civil War in the United States. The foreign policy of the ministry was active, the domestic very subordinate.

Yet during these years certain internal reforms were carried through, which are worthy of mention. In 1858 under the Derby-Disraeli ministry Jews were permitted to sit in the House of Commons; the oath required of members containing the words "on the true faith of a Christian," was altered, and thus another piece of religious intolerance was removed, another step in the secularization of the state taken, and a controversy of twenty-five years terminated. Another reform of the same session was the abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament. Thus one point of the Charter was registered quietly. The government of India also was greatly altered.

During many of these years Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852–1855; 1859–1866), and in this capacity was winning the name of the greatest finance minister since Peel, and was laying deep the foundations of his later power. His policy was economy, and the completion of the free trade policy, which he believed would augment the prosperity of England.

By the year 1860 the tariff list had been reduced to 48 articles. Largely through Gladstone's efforts the excise duty on paper was abolished, thus furthering the publication of books and papers at a price within the reach of the masses. Gladstone also carried through a great scheme of using the post offices of England as savings banks. Thus each locality could have its savings

[1] On this subject see the remarkable Chapter VII, in Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England,* entitled, "The Growth of Collectivism." On Trade Unionism see Bright, *History of England,* IV, 401–406.

banks without the creation of an entirely new and elaborate machinery. The system went into force in 1861, and has proved very successful in encouraging thrift among the working classes. Before the end of 1862, 180,000 accounts had been opened. Since then the deposits have increased each year. In 1907 these postal savings banks had deposits of £157,500,000, and the number of depositors was nearly 10,700,000. Deposits may be made from a shilling upward. The interest is small, but the security, that of the State, is perfect. Every little hamlet thus has its institution for savings, the local post office. Walpole calls this use of the post office "the most efficient machinery for the encouragement of thrift that the world had ever seen, or the imagination of man had ever conjectured." Two years later, in 1864, Mr. Gladstone was able to follow up this success by another, using the same machinery of the post office for the selling of small life insurance policies, to the maximum amount of a hundred pounds. Thus workingmen with small incomes were enabled to insure their lives cheaply, and with a sense of absolute safety.

While from the point of view of politics, of internal reforms effected by legislation, this period, from 1846 to 1866, is unusually barren and insignificant, changes of great importance were occurring in the domain of industry and science. The printing press was being perfected, which cheapened vastly the cost of production of newspapers and books, rendering the large circulation possible, which is so characteristic and vital a feature of the modern world, and which has contributed immensely to the democratic evolution of England. Railway construction advanced rapidly, the drawing power of locomotives was greatly augmented, iron ships were supplanting wooden, machinery was applied to agriculture, the sewing machine, which astonishingly lightened the work of the home, and which inaugurated a revolution in the clothing trade, was being very widely adopted, implements of war were being increased in power and deadliness. During this period the Atlantic Cable was finally laid, after great and distressing failures, by an American, Cyrus Field, supported by British capitalists. As a consequence, cables were later laid in every direction, which were to bind the whole world together by their rapid transmission of news, profoundly altering the conditions of commerce and international relations.[1]

During the period of transition just described, England was outgrowing old forms of thought and organization, was evidently tending towards democracy. Yet this general trend was not mir-

[1] On this remarkable chapter of history see Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years*, I, Ch. 7.

rored in her political life and institutions. Parliament remained what the Reform Bill of 1832 had made it. From 1832 to 1867 there was no alteration either in the franchise or in the distribution of seats in the House of Commons. This was the era of middle class rule, as its predecessor had been one of aristocratic rule.

But during this period the demand was frequently made that the suffrage be extended. Not more than one man in six then had the right to vote. The demand was pressed by the Chartists from 1838 to 1848. After that, from time to time, proposals were made in Parliament to enlarge the electorate. Bills to this effect were introduced in 1852, 1854, 1859, and 1860, but none of them progressed far. Both parties treated them gingerly and with trepidation. Furthermore, the exceptional position held by one man in English public life during these years, Lord Palmerston, was a deterrent, for Palmerston was strongly opposed to change in the institutions of England. So commanding was his personality that it came in a way to be tacitly understood that no change should be attempted as long as he remained in politics. But in 1865 Lord Palmerston died, and shortly afterward Lord Derby and Earl Russell passed from the scene of politics. In place of the old-time statesmen, two younger men, neither of whom feared innovation, occupied the center of the stage, Gladstone and Disraeli. Their rivalry was to constitute the central thread of parliamentary history for many years.

Then, too, the success of the United States in the Civil War greatly encouraged the democratic party in England, for it was considered a triumph of democracy over aristocracy. Moreover, in that war the sympathy of the working classes in England had been steadfastly with the North, though they suffered greatly from the war, while the upper classes had largely favored the South. The people, in other words, had been right, when the favored class had not, and when the ministry had so handled its relations with the United States as to leave an ugly feeling and a grave diplomatic difficulty behind to harass the coming years. Were not people who had shown such moral and intellectual qualities worthy of any share in the government of England? Thus the question of the further extension of the suffrage came once more prominently before the English people and Parliament.

In 1866 Mr. Gladstone, leader of the House of Commons, under Earl Russell as prime minister, brought forward a bill to enlarge the electorate. Earl Russell had himself of recent years been favorable to reform. By the bill of 1832 the suffrage was

given in the boroughs to those owning or "occupying" houses or buildings yielding ten pounds a year. From 1832 to 1867 England was consequently ruled by the "ten pound householders." But five out of every six men could not meet this qualification, and were, therefore, without political power. The masses of workingmen could not afford to pay ten pounds a year for the houses in which they lived.

The measure now introduced proposed but a slight change. In boroughs the suffrage was to be extended to seven pound householders. This would add only about 150,000 to the number of voters. The county franchise was not to be treated even as liberally as the borough. The timidity of this measure, and the half-hearted way in which it was urged, encouraged all the opponents of change, and failed to arouse any counteracting interest among the unenfranchised outside of Parliament. The Conservatives were united against it, and a body of the Liberals joined them. There was no sign that the people wanted the measure, therefore this coalition did not hesitate to defeat it. The ministry resigned and Derby became prime minister, with Disraeli as leader of the House of Commons. The Conservatives were now in power, and the opponents of reform thought that they had effectually stemmed the advance toward democracy. Never were politicians more completely deceived. The people instantly became alert and indignant at the rejection of even so modest a measure. Gladstone, in his final speech on the bill, had exclaimed defiantly to his opponents, "You cannot fight against the future; time is on our side," a phrase that now became a battle cry. Gladstone, aroused, lost all his timidity and became a fiery apostle of an extensive reform. A determined effort was made to influence the people, and it succeeded.

Mr. Bright, with ill-concealed menace, incited the people to renew the scenes of 1832. "You know what your fathers did thirty-four years ago, and you know the result. The men who, in every speech they utter, insult the workingmen, describing them as a multitude given up to ignorance and vice, will be the first to yield when the popular will is loudly and resolutely expressed. If Parliament Street, from Charing Cross to the venerable Abbey, were filled with men seeking a Reform Bill these slanderers of their countrymen would learn to be civil, if they did not learn to love freedom." Under the influence of such incitement the people speedily lost their indifference, and great popular demonstrations of the familiar kind occurred in favor of the bill.

Seeing this, and feeling that reform was inevitable, and that,

such being the case, the Conservative party might as well reap the advantages of granting it as to allow those advantages to accrue to others, Disraeli in the following year, 1867, introduced a reform bill. This was remodeled almost entirely by the Liberals, who, led by Gladstone, defeated the proposals of the ministry time after time, and succeeded in having their own principles incorporated in the measure. The bill as finally passed was largely the work of Gladstone, practically everything he asked being in the end conceded, but it was the audacity and sublety and resourcefulness of Disraeli that succeeded in getting a very radical bill adopted by the very same legislators who the year before had rejected a moderate one.

The bill as finally passed in August, 1867, closed the rule of the middle class in England, and made England a democracy. The franchise in boroughs was given to all householders. Thus, instead of ten pound or seven pound householders, all householders, whatever the value of their houses, were admitted; also, all lodgers who had occupied for a year lodgings of the value, unfurnished, of ten pounds, or about a dollar a week. In the counties the suffrage was given to all those who owned property yielding five pounds clear income a year, rather than ten pounds, as previously; and to all occupiers who paid at least twelve pounds, rather than fifty pounds, as hitherto. Thus the better class of laborers in the boroughs, and practically all tenant farmers in the counties, received the vote. By this bill the number of voters was nearly doubled.[1]

So sweeping was the measure that the prime minister himself, Lord Derby, called it a "leap in the dark." Carlyle, forecasting a dismal future, called it "shooting Niagara." Robert Lowe, whose memorable attacks had been largely instrumental in defeating the meager measure of the year before, now said, "we must educate our masters." It should be noted that during the debates on this bill, John Stuart Mill made a strongly reasoned speech in favor of granting the suffrage to women. The House considered the proposition highly humorous. Nevertheless, this movement, then in its very beginning, was destined to persist and grow.

Acts, similar in principle though differing in detail, were passed in 1868 for Scotland and Ireland.

[1] Just before 1867 the county voters numbered 768,705; the borough voters 602,088. By 1871 the former had increased to 1,055,467; the latter to 1,470,956.

CHAPTER XXIII

ENGLAND UNDER GLADSTONE AND DISRAELI

Mr. Gladstone possessed a more commanding majority than any prime minister had had since 1832. As the enlargement of the franchise in 1832 had been succeeded by a period of bold and sweeping reforms, so was that of 1867 to be. Mr. Gladstone was a perfect representative of the prevailing national mood. The recent campaign had shown that the people were ready for a period of reform, of important constructive legislation. Supported by such a majority, and by a public opinion so vigorous and enthusiastic, Gladstone stood forth master of the situation. No statesman could hope to have more favorable conditions attend his entrance into power. He was the head of a strong, united, and resolute party. The ministry contained a remarkable array of able men. Mr. Bright was there, one of the most eloquent orators who have spoken the English tongue; Mr. Forster, Mr. Goschen, Mr. Lowe, and Lord Clarendon were also members.

The man who thus became prime minister at the age of fifty-nine was one of the notable figures of modern English history. His parents were Scotch. His father had hewed out his own career, and from small beginnings had, by energy and talent, made himself one of the wealthiest and most influential men in Liverpool, and had been elected a member of Parliament. Young William Ewart Gladstone received "the best education then going" at Eton College and Oxford University, in both of which institutions he stood out among his fellows. At Eton his most intimate friend was Arthur Hallam, the man whose splendid eulogy is Tennyson's *In Memoriam*. His career at Oxford was crowned by brilliant scholarly successes, and here he also distinguished himself as a speaker in the Union, the university debating club. In one of the discussions he denounced the Reform Bill of 1832, then pending in Parliament, as destined to change the form of government and subvert the social order. Before leaving the university his thought and inclination were to take orders in the church, but his father was opposed to this and the son yielded. In 1833 he took his seat in the House of Commons

as representative for one of the rotten boroughs which the Reform Bill of the previous year had not abolished. He was to be a member of that body for over sixty years, and for more than half that time its leading member. Before attaining the premiership, therefore, in 1868, he had had a long political career and a varied training, had held many offices, culminating in the Chancellorship of the Exchequer and the leadership of the House of Commons. Beginning as a Conservative (Macaulay called him in 1838 the "rising hope of the stern and unbending Tories"), he came under the influence of Sir Robert Peel, a man who, conservative by instinct, was gifted with unusual prescience and adaptibility, and who possessed the courage required to be inconsistent, the wisdom to change as the world changed. Gladstone had, after a long period of transition, landed in the opposite camp, and was now the leader of the Liberal Party. By reason of his business ability, shown in the management of the nation's finances, his knowledge of parliamentary history and procedure, his moral fervor, his elevation of tone, his intrepidity and courage, his reforming spirit, and his remarkable eloquence, he was eminently qualified for leadership. When almost sixty he became prime minister, a position he was destined to fill four times, displaying marvelous intellectual and physical energy. His administration, lasting from 1868–1874, is called the Great Ministry. The key to his policy is found in his remark to a friend when the summons came from the Queen for him to form a ministry: "My mission is to pacify Ireland." The Irish question, in fact, was to be the most absorbing interest of Mr. Gladstone's later political career, dominating all four of his ministries.

To understand the question, a brief survey of Irish history in the nineteenth century is necessary. Ireland was all through the century the most discontented and wretched part of the British Empire. While England constantly grew in numbers and wealth, Ireland decreased in population, and her misery increased. In 1815 Ireland was inhabited by two peoples, the native Irish, who were Catholics, and settlers from England and Scotland, who were for the most part Anglicans or Presbyterians. The latter were a small but powerful minority.

The fundamental cause of the Irish question lay in the fact that Ireland was a conquered country, that the Irish were a subject race. As early as the twelfth century the English began to invade the island. Attempts made by the Irish at various times during six hundred years to repel and drive out the invaders only resulted in rendering their subjection more complete and more

galling. Irish insurrections have been pitilessly punished, and race hatred has been the consuming emotion in Ireland for centuries. The contest was unequal, owing to the far greater resources of England during all this time. The result of this turbulent history was that in 1815 the Irish were a subject people in their own land, as they had been for centuries, and that there were several evidences of this so conspicuous and so burdensome that most Irishmen could not pass a day without feeling the bitterness of their situation. It was a hate-laden atmosphere which they breathed.

The marks of subjection were various. The Irish did not own the land of Ireland, which had once belonged to their ancestors. The various conquests by English rulers had been followed by extensive confiscations of the land. Particularly extensive was that of Cromwell. These lands were given in large estates to Englishmen. The Irish were mere tenants, and most of them tenants-at-will, on lands that now belonged to others. The Irish have always regarded themselves as the rightful owners of the soil of Ireland, have regarded the English landlords as usurpers, and have desired to recover possession for themselves. Hence there arose the agrarian question, a part of the general Irish problem.

Again, in 1815 the Irish were the victims of religious intolerance. At the time of the Reformation they remained Catholic, while the English separated from Rome. Attempts to force the Anglican Church upon them only stiffened their opposition. Nevertheless, in 1815 they were paying tithes to the Anglican Church in Ireland, though they were themselves ardent Catholics, never entered a Protestant church, and were supporting their own churches by voluntary gifts. Thus they contributed to two churches, one alien, which they hated, and one to which they were devoted. Thus a part of the Irish problem was the religious question.

Again, in 1815 the Irish did not make the laws which governed them. In 1800 their separate Parliament in Dublin was abolished, and from 1801 there was only one Parliament in Great Britain, that in London. While Ireland henceforth had its quota of representatives in the House of Commons, it was always a hopeless minority. Moreover, the Irish members did not really represent the large majority of the Irish, as no Catholic could sit in the House of Commons. There was this strange anomaly that, while the majority of the Irish could vote for members of Parliament, they must vote for Protestants — a bitter mockery.

The Irish demanded the right to govern themselves. Thus another aspect of the problem was purely political.

The abuse just mentioned was removed in 1829,[1] when Catholic Emancipation was carried, which henceforth permitted Catholics to sit in the House of Commons. The English statesmen granted this concession only when forced to do so by the imminent danger of civil war. The Irish consequently felt no gratitude. Moreover, at the moment when Catholics were being admitted to Parliament, most of them lost their vote by the much higher franchise qualification enacted at the same time, for the qualification was raised in Ireland from forty shillings to ten pounds, though for England it remained at forty shillings. Shortly after Catholic Emancipation had been achieved, the Irish, under the matchless leadership of O'Connell, endeavored by much the same methods to obtain the repeal of the Union between England and Ireland, effected in 1801, and to win back a separate legislature and a large measure of independence. This movement, for some time very formidable, failed completely, owing to the iron determination of the English that the union should not be broken, and to the fact that the leader, O'Connell, was not willing in last resort to risk civil war to accomplish the result, recognizing the hopelessness of such a contest. This movement came to an end in 1843. However, a number of the younger followers of O'Connell, chagrined at his peaceful methods, formed a society called "Young Ireland," the aim of which was Irish independence and a republic. They rose in revolt in the troubled year, 1848. The revolt, however, was easily put down.

As if Ireland did not suffer enough from political and social evils, an appalling catastrophe of nature was added. The Irish famine of 1845–7, to which reference has already been made, was a tragic calamity, far-reaching in its effects. The repeal of the Corn Laws did not check it. The distress continued for several years, though gradually growing less. The potato crop of 1846 was inferior to that of 1845, and the harvests of 1848 and 1849 were far from normal. Charity sought to aid, but was insufficient. The government gave money, and later gave rations. In March 1847 over 700,000 people were receiving government support. In March and April of that year the deaths in the workhouses alone were more than ten thousand a month. Peasants ate roots and lichens, or flocked to the cities in the agony of despair, hoping for relief. Multitudes fled to England

[1] Catholics were permitted to hold offices after 1828 by the abolition of the Test Acts.

or crowded the emigrant ships to America, dying by the thousands of fever or exhaustion. It was a long drawn out horror, and when it was over it was found that the population had decreased from about 8,300,000 in 1845 to less than 6,600,000 in 1851. Since then the decrease occasioned by emigration has continued. By 1881 the population had fallen to 5,100,000, by 1891 to 4,700,000, by 1901 to about 4,450,000. Since 1851 perhaps 4,000,000 Irish have emigrated. Ireland, indeed, is probably the only country whose population decreased in the nineteenth century.

For many years after the famine, and the failure of "Young Ireland" in 1848, Irish politics were quiescent. Year after year the ceaseless emigration to the United States continued. Finally, there was organized among the Irish in America a secret society, called the Fenians, whose purpose was to achieve the independence of the republic of Ireland. The Irish in the two countries co-operated, and in 1865 and 1866 were active. James Stephens, the leader in Ireland, announced that the flag of the Irish republic would be raised in 1865. The Government, alarmed, took stringent measures, arresting many of the leaders, and even securing from Parliament the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. In May 1866 the Fenians in the United States attempted an invasion of Canada. About 1,200 of them crossed the Niagara River, but were soon driven back, though only after blood had been shed. Several, taken prisoners, were tried by courts-martial and shot. In 1867 various Fenian outrages occurred in Ireland and in England. There were many arrests, trials, and some executions. The chief significance of the Fenian movement was the alarm it aroused in England, and the vivid evidence it gave of the unrest and deep-rooted discontent of Ireland. The Irish question thus became again an exciting topic for discussion, a problem pressing upon Parliament for solution.

When Gladstone came into power in 1868 he was resolved to pacify the Irish by removing some of their more pronounced grievances, the three branches of the Irish Upas tree, as he called them — the Irish Church, the Irish land laws, and Irish education.

The question of the Irish Church was the first one attacked. This was the Anglican Church established and endowed in Ireland at the time of the Reformation. It was a branch of the Church of England. Its position was anomalous. It was a state church, yet it was the church not of the people, but of a small minority. Established to win over the Catholics to Protestantism, it had

signally failed of its purpose. Its members numbered less than an eighth of the population. There were many parishes, about 150, in which there was not a single member. There were nearly 900 in which there were less than fifty members. Yet these places were provided with an Anglican clergyman and a place of worship, generally the former Catholic church building. The Church was maintained by its endowment and by the tithes which the Catholics, as well as the Protestants, paid. Sidney Smith said of this institution: "On an Irish Sabbath the bell of the neat parish church often summons to service only the parson and an occasional conforming clerk; while two hundred yards off, a thousand Catholics are huddled together in a miserable hovel, and pelted by all the storms of heaven," and he added, "There is no abuse like it in all Europe, in all Asia, in all the discovered parts of Africa, and in all that we have heard of Timbuctoo." This favored corporation did not even discharge its religious functions with zeal. Many a clergyman used his position simply for the salary attached, employed a curate to perform his duties, and himself lived in England. The Irish resisted the payment of tithes, and the result was the so-called tithe war, in which the peasant's property, his cow or goat, his chickens or kettles, were seized and sold for payment. Even such methods were not successful. In 1833 out of £104,000 due only £12,000 could be collected. At length, in 1838, the system was abandoned. The tithes were made a tax upon the land, which simply meant that the peasants no longer paid them directly, but paid them indirectly in the form of the increased rent demanded by the landlord. The Catholics were still supporters of a wealthy and alien corporation. Meanwhile, their own priests were exceedingly poor, and their own services had to be held in the open air or in wretched buildings. The existence of this alien church was regarded as humiliating and oppressive.

Gladstone in 1869 procured the passage of a law abolishing tithes, even in this roundabout form, and disestablishing and partly disendowing the Church. The Church henceforth ceased to be connected with the State. Its bishops lost their seats in the House of Lords. It became a voluntary organization and was permitted to retain a large part of its property as an endowment. The rest was to be appropriated as Parliament should direct. It was to have all the church buildings which it had formerly possessed. It was still very rich, but the connection with the Church of England was to cease January 1, 1871. The bill, though very favorable to the Church, was

denounced as sheer robbery, as "highly offensive to Almighty God," as the "greatest national sin ever committed." Nevertheless, it passed and became law. One branch of the famous Upas tree had been lopped off.

Gladstone now approached a far more serious and perplexing problem — the system of land tenure. Ireland was almost exclusively an agricultural country, yet the land was chiefly owned, not by those who lived on it and tilled it, but by a comparatively small number of landlords, who held large estates. Many of these were Englishmen, absentees, who rarely or never came to Ireland, and who regarded their estates simply as so many sources of revenue. The business relations with their tenants were carried on by agents or bailiffs, whose treatment of the tenants was frequently harsh and exasperating. In the minds of the Irish their landlords were foreigners, who had acquired by robbery land which they regarded as rightly belonging to themselves. This initial injustice they never forgot. There had been from the beginning a wide gulf between the two. As, however, there were almost no industries in Ireland, the inhabitants were obliged to have land. They were, therefore, in an economic sense, at the mercy of the landlord. There was, properly speaking, no competition among landowners to rent their land, forcing them, therefore, to treat their tenants with some liberality and consideration. There was competition only among the applicants for land, applicants so numerous that they would offer to pay much more for a little plot on which to raise their potatoes, which furnished the chief food, than the value of the land justified. The result was that in many cases they could not pay the stipulated rent and were evicted. Their position only became still more deplorable, for land they must have or starve; consequently, they would promise a higher rent to some other landlord, with, in the end, another eviction as a result. Now, eviction was easy, because these petty farmers were tenants-at-will, that is, tenants who must leave their holdings at the will and pleasure of the landlord, or on short notice, generally six months, obviously a most insecure form of tenure. Lands were not rented for a year or five years or ten, but only as long as the owner should see fit. Occupation could be terminated abruptly by the landlord, starvation faced the peasant. Moreover, Irish landlords rented, as was correctly stated at the time, not farms, that is, land and the necessary buildings and improvements, but simply land. The tenant put up at his own expense such buildings and made

such improvements in the way of fences, draining, clearing, fertilizing, as he could, or wished; in very many cases the land would have had no value whatever, but for these improvements. Yet, as the law then stood, when a landlord evicted his tenant he was not obliged to pay for any buildings or improvements made during the tenant's occupation. He simply appropriated so much property created by the tenant.

It would be hard to conceive a more unwise or unjust system. It encouraged indolence and slothfulness. The land was wretchedly cultivated, because good cultivation of it was penalized. Why should a tenant work hard to improve the quality of his holding, to erect desirable farm buildings, when he knew that this would merely mean a higher rent or his eviction in favor of some one who would offer a higher rent, in which case all his improvements would benefit others and not himself? In other words, it was a positive disadvantage to a tenant to be prosperous. If prosperous, he made efforts to conceal the fact, as did the peasants in pre-revolutionary France. Now, the social effects of this system were disastrous in the extreme. Chronic and shocking misery was the lot of the Irish peasantry. "The Irish peasant," says an official English document of the time, "is the most poorly nourished, most poorly housed, most poorly clothed of any in Europe; he has no reserve, no capital. He lives from day to day." His house was generally a rude stone hut, with a dirt floor. The census of 1841 established the fact that in the case of forty-six per cent. of the population, the entire family lived in a house, or, more properly, hut of a single room. Frequently the room served also as a barn for the live stock.

Stung by the misery of their position, and by the injustice of the laws that protected the landlord, and that gave them only two hard alternatives, surrender to the landlord, or starvation, and believing that when evicted they were also robbed, and goaded by the hopeless outlook for the future, the Irish, in wild rage, committed many atrocious agrarian crimes, murders, arson, the killing or maiming of cattle. This in turn brought a new coercion law from the English Parliament, which only aggravated the evil.

Such was the situation. Mr. Gladstone, desiring to govern Ireland, not according to English, but according to Irish ideas, faced it resolutely. He had an important argument at hand. While the system just described was the one prevailing throughout most of Ireland, a different one had grown up in a single

province, Ulster, the so-called system of "tenant right." The tenant's right was undisturbed possession of his holding as long as he paid his rent, and fair payment for all permanent improvements, in case he should relinquish his holding, whether voluntarily or because of inability to pay the rent. This was mere custom, not law. But the result was that the peasants of Ulster were hard-working and prosperous, whereas in the rest of Ireland the contrary was the case. The outgoing peasant received, as a matter of fact, for his improvements from five to twenty times the amount of his annual rent. It paid him, therefore, to make them. Mr. Gladstone took this local custom and made it a law for all Ireland. In the Land Act of 1870 it was provided that if evicted for any other reason than for the non-payment of rent, the tenant could claim compensation for disturbance from the landlord, and also that he was to receive compensation for all improvements of a permanent character on giving up his holding. It was hoped that thus the peasants would have a sense of security in their occupation, and that with security would come prosperity and peace.

There were certain other clauses in the bill, not greatly approved by Gladstone, but strongly urged by Mr. Bright, whose influence with the people Gladstone did not wish to alienate. Bright desired that the Irish peasants should gradually cease to be tenants of other people's land, and should become landowners themselves. This could only be done by purchasing the estates of the landlords, and this obviously the peasants were unable to do. The Bright clauses, therefore, provided that the State should help the peasant up to a certain amount, he in turn repaying the State for the money loaned by easy installments, covering a long period of years. Accordingly, carefully guarded land purchase clauses were put into this bill.

The bill thus proposed went through Parliament with comparative ease. On one point it was vigorously attacked, the clause giving a tenant compensation from the landlord if the landlord evicted him for any other reason than for the non-payment of rent. This, said Disraeli, is revolutionary. It alters, by act of Parliament, the nature of property, the thing least to be tampered with safely by legislation. The landlord may no longer do what he will with his own. In place of absolute and uncontrolled ownership, you make the tenant part owner, for he can not be evicted as long as he pays his rent. You create a hybrid and dangerous form of land tenure, dual ownership. If you violate the sacredness of property in land, you

may do it in other kinds, and thus the people will come to see that they can acquire property not alone by labor, but by taking another's by act of Parliament. To which the reply was that one's absolute right to property is conditioned upon its conducing to the public welfare, that restrictions may be imposed when in the interest of society as a whole, and that the principle of the factory acts, and of the laws regulating banking, corporations, trade unions, was the same. It was simply now being applied for the first time to land.

The Land Act of 1870 did not achieve what was hoped from it; did not bring peace to Ireland. Landlords found ways of evading it, and evictions became more numerous than ever. The act did not forbid landlords to raise their rents, and did not guarantee the tenant compensation for disturbance if he were evicted for non-payment of rent, only if evicted arbitrarily. Practically, then, it was easy for a landlord to get rid of any tenant he might wish to, by simply raising his rent to a point the tenant could not meet. Nor did the land purchase clauses prove effective. Only seven sales were made up to 1877.

Nevertheless, the bill was very important, because of the principles upon which it was based. One principle was that the landlord's ownership of the soil was not absolute and unrestricted, that the tenant was in some sense a partner in the land he tilled, in the soil of Ireland. Another was the desirability of enabling the tenant to become complete owner. The land-purchase section of the act proved ineffective, largely because very timidly applied, but it contained an idea that was to grow more and more attractive and to be applied in a long series of laws destined in the end to be highly successful. In the principles on which it was based, the Land Act of 1870 was path-breaking.

Another measure of this active ministry was designed to provide a national system of elementary education. The educational system of England was deplorably inadequate and inefficient, inferior to that of many other countries. England possessed the famous endowed schools of Eton, Rugby, Harrow, but these and others were for the aristocratic and prosperous middle classes. But she possessed no national system of public schools for the mass of the population. It was long the accepted opinion in England that education was no part of the duty of the State.

The work that the State neglected was discharged in a measure, by the various religious denominations. Whatever education the children of the working class received, they received in schools

maintained by voluntary gifts, generally in connection with a church. Most of the schools were Anglican, some were Wesleyan, some Catholic, some Jewish. In 1833 Parliament appropriated the sum of £20,000 in aid of schools established by voluntary effort. The sum was ludicrously small. Prussia at that time was spending many times as much for its popular education, and Prussia was a far poorer country and a smaller one. Nevertheless, Parliament tacitly recognized by this vote that the State had a duty to perform in educating its citizens. The sum was enlarged to £30,000 in 1839. Once embarked upon this course, there could be no turning back. The parliamentary grant grew greatly, and, between 1860 and 1865, it averaged annually not far from £700,000. With this encouragement the number of voluntary schools increased, but was, nevertheless, totally inadequate to the needs of the nation. It came to be generally admitted that this system would not suffice for the education of the people. In 1869 it was estimated that of 4,300,000 children in need of education, 2,000,000 were not in school at all, 1,000,000 were in schools that received no grant from the government, were uninspected, and were generally of a very inferior character, and only 1,300,000 were in schools aided by the State and inspected by the State. Moreover, whatever facilities existed were unevenly distributed; many districts being entirely without schools.

Many forces combined now to make the question of popular education urgent. When the working classes in the boroughs were given the suffrage in 1867, the cause of education received a great stimulus. "We must educate our masters," was the watchword. Foreign countries were cited as examples. The northern states, which had conquered the southern in the American Civil War, were the home of the common school, and on the Continent men spoke of the victory of Prussia over Austria at Sadowa as the triumph of the Prussian schoolmaster, meaning that the Prussian army was the more intelligent. Moreover, the trades-unions, representing workingmen, favored popular education.

The Gladstone ministry carried, in 1870, a bill designed to provide England for the first time in her history with a really national system of elementary education. The system then established remained without essential change until 1902. It marked a great progress in the educational facilities of England. The bill did not establish an entirely new educational machinery to be paid for by the State and managed by the State. It divided

the country into school districts. It did not propose to establish new schools in each district to be administered by the State. Its aim was not to provide England with new secular schools, but to provide her with a sufficient number of schools of good quality. It incorporated in its scheme the already existing church schools. "Our object," said Mr. Forster, who was in charge of the bill, "is to complete the voluntary system, and to fill up the gaps." Each district was to be considered by itself. If, at the end of a year, it was found to possess already a sufficient number of schools, it was to be left alone. Such schools must submit to State inspection, and would then receive parliamentary aid. If the district were found to be inadequately supplied with schools of this character, then a new agency was to be created. Local school boards were to be elected with power to establish new schools, and to levy local taxes for the purpose.

Thus there would be two sets of schools, church schools supported by voluntary contributions, by grants of Parliament, and by children's tuition fees, and "board schools," supported by grants of Parliament, tuition fees and local taxes.

The main difficulty encountered by educational reformers in 1870, as had been the case before, and was long to be the case, was the question of religious instruction. There was a party among the Liberals who wished to have education entirely secular, but this party was in the minority. The supporters of the voluntary schools wished to have those schools permitted to teach the tenets of the denomination as they had done in the past. There was inserted in this bill a so-called conscience clause, providing that where voluntary schools included as a part of their teaching instruction in the religious beliefs of the denomination conducting them, parents might have their children excused from such instruction. To facilitate the operation of this provision all religious instruction must be given at the beginning or at the close of the school session. Thus the children of Methodists and Baptists could attend an Anglican school without being obliged to be instructed in the Anglican beliefs.

But should there be any religious instruction in the new board schools, schools to be supported in part by local taxes? A strong party demanded that these schools at least be entirely secular, but Parliament did not so decide. The bill as passed provided that the board in each district should decide whether there should be religious instruction or not, but that if it permitted such instruction, "no catechism or religious formulary which is dis-

tinctive of any particular denomination," should be taught.[1] In other words there might be reading of the Bible and comment on it, but no instruction in any creed or dogma. Moreover, in board schools, as in voluntary, there should be a conscience clause, and a time schedule enabling parents to have their children excused from such exercises.

The law of 1870 did not establish either free, or compulsory, or secular education. It adopted, under the restrictions indicated, denominational or voluntary schools, and allowed them to give denominational teaching, with, however, a conscience clause which rendered it possible, as has been said, for the son of a Methodist to attend an Episcopalian school. It permitted undenominational religious teaching in the board schools, but here, too, the conscience clause was attached. The schools were not free, but pupils were to pay tuition. It was held undesirable to relieve parents of all feeling of responsibility for the education of their children. School boards might, however, establish free public schools in districts where exceptional poverty prevailed or might pay the fees of poor children.

The Education Act of 1870 was a compromise between conflicting views. It did not create a national system of education throughout the land. It kept the denominational system and added another system to it. The bill was more acceptable to the opponents of the Liberal ministry, mainly Churchmen, than to its supporters and Non-Conformists. John Bright thought it the "worst act passed by any Liberal Parliament since 1832." Under it, however, popular education made great advances. In twenty years the number of schools more than doubled, and were capable of accommodating all those of school age. In 1880 attendance was made compulsory, and in 1891 made free.

The system just described remained in force till 1902, when a new education bill was passed.

Another reform carried through by this ministry, was that of the army, by the introduction of a short service with the colors, and a longer term in the reserve. Here we see, as we do everywhere in Europe, the tremendous influence of the Prussian military system, which had proved so victorious in the campaign culminating at Königgrätz. It had long been supposed that an army of veterans was the best. But Prussia had proved the contrary. There military service was compulsory but limited to a few years in the active army. Then the young men passed

[1] The Cowper-Temple amendment, which also provided that voluntary schools should receive no assistance from local taxes.

into the reserve, and might be called out if necessary. Military service was their profession for only a brief period. The Prussian army was consequently an army of young men in the prime of physical condition. Prussia's example was subsequently followed in all the great European armies. Universal obligatory service had never been adopted in England, but the period of active service of those enlisting was reduced by Gladstone so that the army became one of young men.

But no real reform in the army could be accomplished without an additional change in its structure. Men obtained promotion in the British army by purchasing positions of higher rank. There was a definite schedule of prices fixed by royal ordinance. To be an ensign in the infantry cost £450, to be a lieutenant-colonel £4,500. But the regulation price was by no means the actual price. So eager were men to secure these positions that they offered much more. Having paid for his position an officer considered it his property, to be sold for what he could get for it. He had a vested interest. Manifestly this system was unfair to poor men, who might be meritorious and able soldiers, as practically the desirable positions in the army were open only to the wealthy class. Naturally the growing democratic feeling of England, expressed in many ways by this ministry, was impatient of a system which rendered the army an appendage of the aristocracy. Gladstone brought in a bill to abolish purchase, paying present owners at the market price. "The nation," said he, "must buy back its own army from its own officers." Bitterly opposed by the officers and by their influential friends inside and outside Parliament, the ministry succeeded, however, in getting its bill through the Commons only to have it practically defeated in the House of Lords. Mr. Gladstone then took a step for which he was severely criticised. He advised the Queen to abolish purchase by royal ordinance, which could be done, as the whole system rested on royal ordinance, not upon an act of Parliament. In this way the system was abolished (1871), and promotion by merit substituted for promotion by purchase.

In the same session in which the military career was thrown open to merit, regardless of wealth or rank, civil and academic careers were also made free to all classes. In 1870, by an Order in Council, the system of appointment to most positions in the Civil Service was put on the basis of standing in open competitive examinations. This system had earlier been applied to the Indian service. The step now taken was strongly opposed, and

one argument was that it would result in eliminating the aristocratic class from the service and would fill all positions with a lower social class. Mr. Gladstone never shared this opinion, believing, indeed, that the better educated class would have all the stronger hold upon the higher positions, as has proved to be the case, the greater part of the successful candidates for those positions being Oxford and Cambridge men.

In 1871 the universities of England were made thoroughly national. The last remaining religious tests, which operated only to the advantage of the members of the Church of England, were abolished. Henceforth men of any religious faith or no religious faith could have all the advantages of university training and university degrees. This was another step in religious and intellectual liberty. It abolished another monopoly of the Established Church. The universities belonged henceforth to all Englishmen.

Another reform carried through by this ministry was the Ballot Act of 1872. Voting up to this time had been *viva voce*. Each voter declared his candidate in public at the polling place. For over forty years the question of making the ballot secret had been discussed. Indeed, it was considered at the time of the Reform Bill of 1832. For years Grote, the historian of Greece, had brought the matter up annually for discussion in the House of Commons. The secret ballot was one of the demands of the Chartists. But the movement made no progress as the years went by. The argument for open voting was that, as voting is a trust, it must be discharged in a manner known of all men, that thus it makes for courage and a due sense of responsibility. If you render a man's vote secret you undermine the citizen's courage, you foster evasion. This was Lord Palmerston's view. It was at one time also Gladstone's, who made the ingenious discovery that the secret ballot had led to the fall of the Roman Republic. But the facts were apparent to all the world that public voting led to extensive bribery and scandalous corruption. Intimidation, also, could flourish under such a system, and now that the poorer people were enfranchised by the act of 1867 they plainly needed further protection in the exercise of their right. As Morley says: "Experience showed that without secrecy in its exercise, the suffrage was not free. The farmer was afraid of the landlord, and the laborer was afraid of the farmer; the employer could tighten the screw on the workman, the shopkeeper feared the power of his best customers, the debtor quailed before his creditor, the priest wielded thunder-

bolts over the faithful. Not only was the open vote not free, it exposed its possessor to so much bullying, molestation, and persecution that his possession came to be less of a boon than a nuisance." [1]

It was evident that whatever the abstract arguments might be, the concrete ones were all in favor of the secret ballot. A bill was finally passed in 1872 providing for the Australian system in voting, so called because of its use first in the colony of Victoria.

Though Mr. Gladstone was losing popularity with every new reform, alienating in each case those affected disadvantageously by the measure in question, he still went on. He now approached the question of the third branch of the Upas tree, the system of Irish education. In February 1873 he introduced the Irish University Bill, designed to give adequate facilities to Ireland for higher education. That the facilities were not adequate was clear. There were in Ireland two universities, that of Dublin, which consisted of a single college, Trinity, a Protestant institution, though admitting Catholics to its courses and degrees, and Queen's University, established in 1845, and consisting of three colleges, at Belfast, Cork, and Galway. These were entirely secular; the Catholics called them "godless." The Catholics, constituting the mass of the population, desired a university of their own, endowed and authorized to grant degrees. There had been established some years before a so-called Catholic University of Dublin, but it was not empowered to grant degrees. Mr. Gladstone proposed in 1873 that there should be established a new university for the whole of Ireland, with which these various institutions and others should be affiliated. The new university was to be amply endowed. The bill made shipwreck, however, on the religious difficulty. It was provided that each college might be denominational and teach dogma if it chose, but the university was to be undenominational. Owing to the religious passions involved it was held that the university course should not include teaching in theology, moral philosophy, or modern history. The colleges might teach these subjects but not the university. There was added the remarkable provision that any professor might be suspended or removed from his position if he wilfully offended, in speaking or writing, the religious convictions of any student.

This bill satisfied no one. Catholics pronounced against it, saying that they wanted a Catholic university, not an undenominational one. Protestants, on the other hand, felt that at the

[1] Morley, *Gladstone*, II, 366.

very time they were liberalizing Oxford and Cambridge by opening them to all, regardless of religious affiliations, they ought not to encourage bigotry and sectarianism in an Irish university. Moreover, the "gagging" clauses were bitterly denounced. A university which should teach neither modern history nor philosophy, and whose professors should not have freedom of speech would be in the eyes of reasonable men ridiculous and not worth establishing.

The opposition was very general and violent. Disraeli, feeling that the moment had come when it would be possible to overthrow the ministry, reviewed the whole record in a caustic speech, denouncing all its reforming measures as simply "harassing legislation," endangering all the institutions of England. To which John Bright retorted that if the Conservatives had been in the wilderness they would have condemned the Ten Commandments as "harassing legislation." The bill was defeated, and Gladstone resigned, but as the Conservatives would not take office at that moment he came back into power for a few months.

Not only did Gladstone's domestic legislation give offense to many interested sections of the population, and thus raise up enemies, but his foreign policy was characterized by many as weak, humiliating for England, lowering her prestige, particularly his adoption of arbitration in the controversy with the United States over the *Alabama* matter.

The grievances of the United States against England because of her conduct during our Civil War were a dangerous source of friction between the two countries for many years. Mr. Gladstone agreed to submit them to arbitration, but as the decision of the Geneva Commission was against England (1872), his ministry suffered in popularity. Nevertheless, Mr. Gladstone had established a valuable precedent. This was the greatest victory yet attained for the principle of settling international difficulties by arbitration rather than by war. In this sphere also this ministry advanced the interests of humanity, though it drew only disadvantage for itself from its service.

Disraeli, seeing that the popularity of the ministers was on the wane, took occasion to indulge in mockery, saying that as he looked at them across the aisle of the House of Commons he was reminded of those marine landscapes not unusual on the coasts of South America: "You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes. Not a flame flickers on a single pallid crest. But the situation is still dangerous. There are occasional earthquakes, and ever and anon the dark rumbling of the sea."

All the accumulated disaffection of six years found vent in the elections of 1874. The Liberals were defeated by a majority of fifty. The Conservatives entered office with Disraeli as prime minister and remained in power till 1880. Thus fell Gladstone's first and most successful administration, with a record of remarkable achievement in legislation and in administrative reform.

Mr. Disraeli now found himself prime minister, chief of a party controlling by safe majorities both Houses of Parliament. His administration lasted from 1874 to 1880. It differed as strikingly from Gladstone's as his character differed from that of his predecessor. This was owing to several facts. The criticisms which his party had leveled at its opponents, of disturbing everything by harassing legislation, imposed upon him the obligation of leaving things alone, of inactivity in domestic legislation where possible, of effecting only mild reforms where reforms were necessary at all. Colonial and foreign affairs were the chief occupation of this ministry. Disraeli found the situation favorable and the moment opportune for impressing upon England the political ideal, long germinating in his mind, succinctly called imperialism, that is, the transcendant importance of breadth of view and vigor of assertion of England's position as a world power, as an empire, not as an insular state. In 1872 he had said: "In my judgment no minister in this country will do his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our colonial empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land." This principle Disraeli emphasized in act and speech during his six years of power. It was imperfectly realized under him; it was partially reconsidered and revised by Gladstone upon his return to power in 1880. But it had definitely received lodgment in the mind of England before he left power. It gave a new note to English politics. This is Disraeli's historic significance in the annals of British politics. He greatly stimulated interest in the British colonies. He invoked "the sublime instinct of an ancient people," and he invoked it not in vain.

The first two years of his administration were singularly uneventful. The work of the preceding six years was accepted and left in the main untouched. Laws were passed in the direction of economic improvement, to enable certain large towns to provide laborers with better dwellings, if they should wish to, to improve certain Friendly Societies so that the savings of the

poor would be more secure, to provide a system of land registration, so that land titles might be more certain, less exposed to litigation.

Disraeli had said that if Gladstone had been less eager to reform everything in England and more insistent upon maintaining her prestige abroad, it would have been better. He criticised the Liberal party as secretly undermining the Empire, as believing the Empire a burden, as looking upon the colonies simply in a financial light as a great and dubious expense. In opposition he spoke of the "cause of the Tory party" as the "cause of the British Empire," and he declared the "issue is not a mean one."

Now in power himself he set about reversing what he considered to have been the unimaginative, unpatriotic policy of his predecessors. His first conspicuous achievement in foreign affairs was the purchase of the Suez canal shares. The Suez canal had been built by the French against ill-concealed English opposition. Disraeli had himself declared that the undertaking would inevitably be a failure. Now that the canal was built its success was speedily apparent. It radically changed the conditions of commerce with the East. It shortened greatly the distance to the Orient by water. Hitherto a considerable part of the commerce with India, China, and Australia had been carried on by the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. Some went by the Red Sea route, and that involved transshipment at Alexandria. Now it could all pass through the canal. About three-fourths of the tonnage passing through the canal was English. It was the direct road to India. There were some 400,000 shares in the Canal Company. The Khedive of Egypt held a large block of these, and the Khedive was nearly bankrupt. Disraeli bought, in 1875, his 177,000 shares by telegraph for four million pounds, and the fact was announced to a people who had never dreamed of it, but who applauded what seemed a brilliant stroke, somehow checkmating the French. It was said that the high road to India was now secure. Financially it was an advantageous bargain. The shares are now worth several times what was paid for them.[1] The political significance of this act was that it determined at least in principle the future of the relations of England to Egypt, and that it seemed to strike the note of imperial self-assertion

1 The exact number of shares acquired was 176,602; amount paid 3,976,582 pounds. England, therefore, paid about $112 per share (par value $100). The stock was quoted in 1909 at $790.

which was Disraeli's chief ambition, and which was the most notable characteristic of his administration.

At the same time Disraeli resolved to emphasize the importance of India, England's leading colony, in another way. He proposed a new and sounding title for the British sovereign. She was to be Empress of India. The Opposition denounced this as "cheap" and "tawdry," a vulgar piece of pretension. Was not the title of King or Queen borne by the sovereigns of England for a thousand years glorious enough? But Disraeli urged it as showing "the unanimous determination of the people of the country to retain our connection with the Indian Empire. And it will be an answer to those mere economists and those diplomatists who announce that India is to us only a burden or a danger. By passing this bill then, the House will show, in a manner that is unmistakable, that they look upon India as one of the most precious possessions of the Crown, and their pride that it is a part of her empire and governed by her imperial throne."

The reasoning was weak, but the proposal gave immense satisfaction to the Queen, and it was enacted into law. On January 1, 1877, the Queen's assumption of the new title was officially announced in India before an assembly of the ruling princes.

In Europe Disraeli insisted upon carrying out a spirited foreign policy. His opportunity came with the reopening of the Eastern Question, or the question of the integrity of Turkey, in 1876. For two years this problem absorbed the interest and attention of rulers and diplomatists, and England had much to do with the outcome. This subject may, however, be better studied in connection with the general history of the Eastern problem in the nineteenth century.[1]

Disraeli, who in 1876 became Lord Beaconsfield, continued in power until 1880. The emphasis he put upon imperial and colonial problems was to exert a considerable influence upon the rising generation, and upon the later history of England. But it involved him in several undertakings, particularly wars in Afghanistan and South Africa, which did not prove successful, and which contributed to his overthrow and the temporary eclipse of his party. In the elections of 1880 the Liberals attacked the whole policy of the last six years with vehemence. The result of the elections was the return of a Liberal majority of over a hundred. In April 1880, Mr. Gladstone became prime minister for the second time.

[1] See Chapter . . .

Mr. Gladstone's greatest ability lay in internal reform, as his previous ministry had shown. This was the field of his inclination, and, as he thought, of the national welfare. Peace, retrenchment, and reform, the watchwords of his party, now represented the programme he wished to follow. But this was not to be. While certain great measures of internal improvement were passed during the next five years, those years on the whole were characterized by the dominance of imperial and colonial questions, with attendant wars. Mr. Gladstone was forced to busy himself with foreign policy far more than in his preceding administration. Serious questions confronted him in Asia and Africa. These may best be studied, however, in the chapter on the British Empire.[1]

Two pieces of internal legislation of great importance enacted during this ministry merit description, the Irish Land Act of 1881, and the Reform Bills of 1884–5.

The legislation of his preceding ministry had not pacified Ireland. Indeed, the Land Act of 1870 had proved no final settlement, but a great disappointment. It had established the principle that the landlord's ownership in Ireland was not absolute and unrestricted but was a kind of limited partnership. The tenant was to be compensated if deprived of his farm except for non-payment of rent, and was to be compensated, in any case, for all the permanent improvements which he had made upon the land. But this was not sufficient to give the tenant any security in his holding. It did not prevent the raising of the rent at the will of the landlord. The bill was not far-reaching enough adequately to safeguard the interests of the tenant; moreover, it contained too many exceptions and restrictions. The bill, in fact, proved no solution, but only the first of a long line of measures enacted since, aiming at the removal of the agrarian difficulties under which the island suffered.

In his new measure Gladstone sought to give the peasant, in addition to the compensation for improvement previously secured, a fair rent, a fixed rent, one that is not constantly subject to change at the will of the landlord, and freedom of sale, that is, the liberty of the peasant to sell his holding to some other peasant. These were the " three F's," which had once represented the demands of advanced Irishmen, though they no longer did. Henceforth, the rent of an Irish farm was not to be fixed by the ordinary law of supply and demand, by an agreement between landlord and tenant, but was to be determined by a court, estab-

[1] Chapter . . .

lished for the purpose. It was hardly proper to call this "fair" rent. It might not necessarily be fair, as the Land Court might lean too much in favor of the landlord, or in favor of the peasant. It was, however, a *judicial* rent. Rents, once judicially determined, were to be unchangeable for fifteen years, during which time the tenant might not be evicted except for breaches of covenant, such as non-payment of rent. There was also attached to the bill a provision similar to the one in the preceding measure of 1870, looking toward the creation of a peasant proprietorship. The Government was to loan money to the peasants under certain conditions and on easy terms, to enable them to buy out the landlords, thus becoming complete owners themselves.

The bill was attacked with unusual bitterness. Landowners, believing that it meant a reduction of rents, determined not by themselves but by a court, called it confiscation of property. "It is a bill," said the Duke of Argyll, "by which three persons are authorized to settle the value of the whole country." It was attacked because it established the principle that rents were not to be determined, like the price of other things, by the law of supply and demand. Rents were not to be what the landlord might demand and the peasant agree to pay, but were to be reasonable, and their reasonableness was to be decided by outsiders, judges, having no direct interest at all, that is, in last resort, by the State. The bill was criticized, as altering ruthlessly the nature of property in land, as establishing dual ownership. The only alternative, however, was the single ownership of the landlord, that is, his right to do as he liked with the land, the very thing which had, it was asserted, occasioned the many sufferings of Ireland, and the endless series of coercion acts by which it had been so long ruled arbitrarily. The bill passed. It did not pacify Ireland, which was now putting forth new demands of a political nature and was in the full swing of the Home Rule movement. It did not bring immediate but only ultimate improvement. Meanwhile disturbances, and even atrocious crimes, continued, evidences of the profound unrest of the unhappy island.

It was Mr. Gladstone who carried through the third great reform act of the nineteenth century, by which England has been transformed from an oligarchy into a democracy. The Reform Bill of 1832 had given the suffrage to the wealthier members of the middle class. The Reform Bill of 1867 had taken a long step in the direction of democracy by giving the vote practically

to all householders in boroughs. But those who lived, not in boroughs, but in the country, were not greatly profited by this measure. In England there are three classes of people who have to do with the land. First, the landlords, the owners of large estates. These men belonged to the nobility and gentry, and had controlled the House of Commons before 1832, when that house was called the landlords' Parliament. Second are the farmers, men who rent their farms from the landlords, and who conduct the agriculture of the country, but do not, as a rule, do the actual work of tilling the soil. These men were largely enfranchised by the Reform Bill of 1832. Third, there are the laborers, employed by the farmer to do his work, day laborers. Now the Act of 1867 did not give them the suffrage, though it did give it largely to the day laborers in the boroughs by establishing the household and lodger franchise, a franchise so low that many workingmen could meet it. The franchise in boroughs was much wider than the franchise in counties. There was apparently no valid reason for giving a vote to workingmen living in boroughs and not to those living in country villages or on farms. Mr. Gladstone's bill of 1884 aimed at the abolition of this inequality between the two classes of constituencies, by extending the borough franchise to the counties so that the mass of workingmen would have the right to vote whether they lived in town or country. The county franchise, previously higher, was to be exactly assimilated to the borough franchise. The bill passed, and in connection with bills enacted for Scotland and Ireland, doubled the number of county voters, and increased the total number of the electorate from over three to over five millions. Mr. Gladstone's chief argument was that the bill would lay the foundations of the government broad and deep in the people's will, and "array the people in one solid compacted mass around the ancient throne which it has loved so well, and around a constitution now to be more than ever powerful, and more than ever free."

The franchise bill of 1884 was accompanied, as had been those of 1832 and 1867, by a redistribution of seats in the House of Commons. By the Redistribution Act of 1885 inequalities of representation of the same type as those rendered familiar in connection with the Reform Bill of 1832, inequalities which had grown up in the last generation, were redressed, and certain new principles were adopted. Towns containing fewer than 15,000 inhabitants were to lose their separate representation and be merged in the counties in which they were situated. Towns

whose population ranged between 15,000 and 50,000 were to return one member only. Such were the two disfranchising clauses. There were some exceptions, but the result of the whole was the extinction of 160 seats. These were distributed among the more populous boroughs and counties.

The Act of 1885 provided that henceforth boroughs with more than 15,000, and less than 50,000 inhabitants, should have one member; those with more than 50,000 and less than 165,000, two members; those with more than 165,000, three, with an additional member for every 50,000 inhabitants above that number. Thus London, in place of the previous 22 members, was to have 62, to which it was entitled if population was to be the basis. Liverpool was to have nine, Glasgow seven, and so on. The same was to hold with the counties. Yorkshire was to have 26 members, Lancashire 23. The result was that the great industrial centers, towns and counties, received representation approximate to their importance.

The Redistribution Act of 1885 further applied in most cases the principle of single member divisions. Previously, if a borough had had two members it yet formed one constituency. All the voters had the right to vote for two members. Such boroughs were now divided into as many constituencies as they were allowed members. While previously some counties had been divided as being inconveniently large, no boroughs had been. The Act of 1885 applied the new principle to towns and counties alike, each constituency returning, with few exceptions, only one member. For instance, Liverpool, which had previously sent three members to Parliament, and which now was to send nine, was divided into nine distinct constituencies, each returning one member; Lancashire was now split into twenty-three divisions, with a single member from each.

The membership of the House of Commons was increased at this time to 670, where it remained until the Representation Act of 1918, which increased the number to 707. The number in 1815 was 658. This was not changed in 1832, nor in 1867, but after 1867 it had been reduced to 652 by the disfranchisement of several boroughs for corrupt practices.

Between 1885 and 1918 there was no new redistribution of seats, and no extension of the suffrage. The evolution of the parliamentary franchise, which we have traced through the three great measures of 1832, 1867, and 1884, stopped for a generation. During this period there was no single, uniform, universal qualification for voting. A man secured the right to vote by

being able to meet one of several qualifications, and he might have several votes, if he satisfied the qualifications in different constituencies (plural voting). He might vote if he owned land of forty shillings annual value, if he held land of the value of five pounds by a lease of sixty years, of fifty pounds by a lease of twenty years, if he was a householder, no matter what the value of the house was, if he was an "occupier" of a house or building or store, of the annual value of ten pounds, if he was a lodger of lodgings of the annual value, unfurnished, of ten pounds. Some enjoyed the right under the provisions of the Act of 1884, some under those of the Act of 1867, some even under those of the Act of 1832. "The present condition of the franchise is indeed," wrote President Lowell, in 1908, "historical rather than rational. It is complicated, uncertain, expensive in the machinery required, and excludes a certain number of people whom there is no reason for excluding, while it admits many people who ought not to be admitted, if any one is to be debarred." [1]

[1] Lowell, *The Government of England,* I, 213–14.

CHAPTER XXIV

ENGLAND FROM 1886 TO 1914

The Gladstone ministry fell from power in 1885 chiefly because of the unpopularity of its Egyptian policy, which will be described elsewhere. Lord Salisbury, since Lord Beaconsfield's death in 1881 leader of the Conservative party, formed a ministry. This lasted but a few months, for the general elections at the close of the year showed that the Liberals would have in the new Parliament 335 votes, the Conservatives 249, and the Irish Home Rulers 86. Thus the Liberals exactly equalled the other two parties combined. The Irish held the balance of power. It is necessary at this point to trace the history of this new party, which was destined to exert a profound influence upon the course of British politics.

During Gladstone's first ministry there was formed in Dublin the Home Government Association of Ireland, three years later reconstituted as the Home Rule League, and demanding an Irish Parliament for the management of the internal affairs of Ireland. The Irish had constantly smarted under the injury which they felt had been done them by the abolition of their former Parliament, which sat in Dublin, and which was abolished by the Act of Union of 1800. The feeling for nationality, one of the dominant forces of the nineteenth century everywhere, acted upon them with unusual force. They disliked, for historical and sentimental reasons, the rule of an English Parliament, and the sense as well as reality of subjection to an alien people. They felt that England must give them rights of self-government or else must rule them by coercion. The party grew into importance under Disraeli's administration, having 51 members in Parliament, who supported the principle of Home Rule. Their leader at first was Mr. Butt, who brought their demands before the House of Commons. The party did not wish the separation of Ireland from England, but a separate parliament for Irish affairs, on the ground that the Parliament at Westminster had neither the time nor the understanding necessary for the proper consideration of measures affecting the Irish. It became much more aggressive when Charles Stuart Parnell

became its leader in 1879. Parnell was a Protestant, of English education, a landowner. Unlike the other great leaders of Irish history — Grattan, O'Connell — he was no orator, and was of a cold and haughty nature, but of an inflexible will. For twelve years he played a great part in the politics of England and Ireland.

Discontented with the slow, easy, ineffective methods of urging Home Rule hitherto followed, Parnell persuaded the party to adopt a more vigorous and defiant attitude. His policy was to keep the Home Rule party entirely separate from the other parties, and to use the modes of procedure of the House of Commons in order to block the work of the House; in other words, to resort to endless dilatory motions and roll-calls and speeches, in short, obstruction. The rules of the House rendered this possible, as every member could propose as many amendments as he chose to any bill, and could speak on those proposals as long as he chose. This policy was carried out by the Irish members relieving each other systematically. In 1879 it was estimated that Parnell had spoken five hundred times, and that two others had spoken over three hundred times each. The purpose of this recourse to such methods was to paralyze the action of Parliament until it gave heed to Irish demands, to prevent or delay all legislation on even the most necessary subjects until their grievances were redressed, and to show conclusively that one Parliament was insufficient for the business of both countries. The House was obliged to change its rules in order to prevent this blocking of public business by a small fraction of its members.

In the Parliament of 1880 the Home Rulers numbered 63. Mr. Gladstone, still believing that land legislation would solve the Irish question, showed the intention of carrying further the policy begun in his first administration. He caused the Land Act of 1881 to be passed. But the Home Rulers all through his term pursued him even more vehemently than they had his predecessors. They accepted the bill as a mere instalment. But the first three years of Gladstone's second administration were years of unexampled bitterness. The Irish resorted to every means to get their object, intimidation, violence, mutilation of cattle, burning of houses, even the murder of landlords and some of the Government officials in Ireland, notably Lord Frederick Cavendish and Thomas Burke, shockingly assassinated in broad daylight in Phœnix Park, Dublin, in 1882. Gladstone replied by a policy of coercion. Conciliatory legislation and stern

repression of violence were his principles of action. After 1883 the condition of Ireland became somewhat calmer, but only after a confused and bitter struggle, which had aroused all the hostile feelings of both the Irish and the English. The Irish, it was clear, were prepared to fight to the knife, were biding the time when they might force Home Rule from Parliament by holding the balance of power in the House of Commons. In the next Parliament, which met in 1886, they were in this position. They had 86 members, all but one of whom represented Irish constituencies.

Mr. Gladstone entered upon his third ministry February 1, 1886. It lasted less than six months, and was wholly devoted to the question of Ireland.

It was evident that the Irish question would dominate Mr. Gladstone's third ministry, as it had dominated his first and largely his second. This would have been so even if the Home Rulers had not held the balance of power in the House of Commons. It would have dominated the Conservatives had not the Liberals won in the general election. Mr. Gladstone had expressed during the campaign his desire that either one or the other of the two great English parties should have so large a majority that the vexatious question could be handled without the aid of Irish votes. There is, indeed, evidence to show that he was quite willing that the Conservatives should solve this question if they would only honestly face it. He wished to raise it out of the realm of party conflict. That was not to be, however, and the election had resulted in creating just the situation he had dreaded and deplored. The Irish held the balance of power, and any proposals he might make would now be represented as simply a bribe for political position. Such a consideration, however, he proudly ignored, and it had no hold upon serious politicians of either party, for his noble record for fifty years gave it emphatic denial. This was the situation as it presented itself to his mind. The Irish people had expressed their almost unanimous wish by returning a solid body of 85 Home Rulers out of the 103 members to whom they were entitled. Mr. Gladstone had tried in previous legislation to rule the Irish according to Irish rather than English ideas, where he considered those ideas just. He believed the great blot upon the annals of England to be the Irish chapter, written, as it had been, by English arrogance, hatred, and unintelligence. Reconciliation had been his keynote hitherto. Moreover, to him there seemed but two alternatives — either further reform along the lines

desired by the Irish, or the old, sad story of hard yet unsuccessful coercion. Mr. Gladstone would have nothing more to do with the latter method. He, therefore, resolved to endeavor to give to Ireland the Home Rule she plainly desired. On the 8th of April, 1886, he introduced the Irish Government Bill, announcing that it would be followed by a Land Bill, the two parts of a single scheme which could not be separated.

The bill, thus introduced, provided for an Irish Parliament to sit in Dublin, controlling a ministry of its own, and legislating on Irish, as distinguished from imperial affairs. A difficulty arose right here. If the Irish were to have a legislature of their own for their own affairs, ought they still to sit in the Parliament in London, with power there to mix in English and Scotch affairs? On the other hand, if they ceased to have members in London, they would have no share in legislating for the Empire as a whole. "This," says Morley, "was from the first, and has ever since remained, the Gordian knot." The bill provided that they should be excluded from the Parliament at Westminster. On certain topics it was further provided that the Irish Parliament should never legislate, questions affecting the Crown, the army and navy, foreign and colonial affairs; nor could it establish or endow any religion. After two years it was to have control of the Irish police. Ireland must contribute a certain proportion to the imperial expenses, one-fourteenth, instead of two-seventeenths, as had been the case since 1801.

Mr. Gladstone did not believe that the Irish difficulty would be solved simply by new political machinery. There was a serious social question not reached by this, the land question. He introduced immediately a land bill, which was to effect a vast transfer of land by purchase from landlords to peasants, and which might perhaps involve an expenditure to the State of about £120,000,000.

The introduction of these bills, whose passage would mean a radical transformation of Ireland, precipitated one of the fiercest struggles in English parliamentary annals. They were urged as necessary to settle the question once for all on a solid basis, as adapted to bring peace and contentment to Ireland, and thus strengthen the Union. Otherwise, said those who supported them, England had no alternative but coercion, a dreary and dismal failure. On the other hand, the strongest opposition arose out of the belief that these bills imperiled the very existence of the Union. The exclusion of the Irish members from Parliament seemed to many to be the snapping of the cords that held

the countries together. Did not this bill really dismember the British Empire? Needless to say, no British statesman could urge any measure of that character. Gladstone thought that his bills meant the reconciliation of two peoples estranged for centuries, and that reconciliation meant the strengthening rather than the weakening of the Empire, that the historic policy of England towards Ireland had only resulted in alienation, hatred, the destruction of the spiritual harmony which is essential to real unity. But, said his opponents, to give the Irish a parliament of their own, and to exclude them from the Parliament in London, to give them control of their own legislature, their own executive, their own judiciary, their own police, must lead inevitably to separation. You exclude them from all participation in imperial affairs, thus rendering their patriotism the more intensely local. You provide, it is true, that they shall bear a part of the burdens of the Empire. Is this proviso worth the paper it is written on? Will they not next regard this as a grievance, this taxation without representation, and will not the old animosity break out anew? You abandon the Protestants of Ireland to the revenge of the Catholic majority of the new Parliament. To be sure, you provide for toleration in Ireland, but again is this toleration worth the paper it is written on?

Probably the strongest force in opposition to the bill was the opinion widely held in England of Irishmen, that they were thoroughly disloyal to the Empire, that they would delight to use their new autonomy to pay off old scores by aiding the enemies of England, that they were traitors in disguise, or undisguised, that they had no regard for property or contract, that an era of religious oppression and of confiscation of property would be inaugurated by this new agency of a parliament of their own. These feelings were expressed in characteristic ways by the leader of the Opposition, Lord Salisbury, and by Mr. Gladstone's close friend and previous political ally, John Bright. Lord Salisbury expressed all the contempt of an aristocrat belonging to a superior race. "Ireland," he declared, "is not one nation, but two nations. There were races like the Hottentots, and even the Hindoos, incapable of self-government. He would not place confidence in people who had acquired the habit of using knives and slugs. His policy was that Parliament should enable the government of England to govern Ireland. 'Apply the recipe honestly, consistently, and resolutely for twenty years, and at the end of that time you will find that Ireland will be fit to accept any gifts in the way of local govern-

ment or repeal of coercion laws that you may wish to give her.' "[1] He added that rather than spend the money in buying out the Irish landlords, it would be far better to spend it in assisting the emigration of a million Irishmen. Mr. Bright's opposition differed in temper, and was far more damaging in its effects. He had long been known as the friend of Ireland, as a disbeliever in the policy of coercion, as an advocate of measures adapted to relieve the discontent of the people. But he disliked intensely the idea of a second parliament in the United Kingdom, which he did not think would be successful or work harmoniously with the Parliament in London; he believed a new parliament would prove most oppressive to Irish Protestants; he spoke with extreme bitterness of the Irish party in Parliament, and its policy for the last six years; he did not believe these men either loyal or honorable or truthful, and he did believe that, if they obtained a Parliament of their own, they would use it against England.

Bitter personalities abounded in the debate. One member characterized the plan as the offspring of "verbosity and senility," as the "foolish work" of "an old man in a hurry." It was evident that the Home Rule Bill had aroused an amount of bitterness unknown in recent English history. The Conservative party opposed it to a man. And the Liberal party was in full process of disruption because of it. Even before the measure was brought in, many men who had hitherto worked side by side with Mr. Gladstone in his previous ministries, withdrew and went over to the Conservatives. These men called themselves Liberal-Unionists, Liberals, but not men who were prepared to jeopardize the Union, as they held that this measure would do — Lord Hartington (later the Duke of Devonshire), Mr. Bright, Joseph Chamberlain, Mr. Goschen, and many others. All the journals of London, with the exception of one morning and one evening paper, were vigorously opposed. The crucial question was, how large the secession from the Liberal party would be? Would it be large enough to offset the Irish vote which would be cast for the measure? Finally a vote was taken on the 8th of June, on the second reading of the bill. It was found that 93 Liberals had joined the Opposition, and that the Home Rule Bill was beaten by 343 votes to 313. The total poll was thus enormous, 656 out of the 670 members of the House. Between

[1] Morley, *Life of Gladstone,* III, 317, 318.

one-third and one-fourth of the Liberal party had withdrawn from it on account of this fateful measure.

Mr. Gladstone dissolved Parliament and appealed to the people. The question was vehemently discussed before the voters. The result was disastrous to the Gladstonian Home Rulers. 191 Gladstonians and 85 Irish Home Rulers were returned, and 316 Conservatives and 78 Liberal-Unionists. Thus a majority of over a hundred was rolled up against Gladstone's policy. Taking England alone, the result was even more striking. There he had only 125 seats out of 455; in London only 11 out of 62. On the other hand, Scotland approved in the ratio of 3 to 2, Wales of 5 to 1. Mr. Gladstone did not consider that such a result settled the issue irrevocably.

Lord Salisbury had said that if Parliament would rule Ireland resolutely for twenty years, at the end of that time she would be fit to accept any gifts in the line of local government or repeal of coercion acts that Parliament might see fit to give her. He was now prime minister, and in a position to put his opinion into force. Coercion more severe than that of previous years was the policy adopted by this ministry, largely under the direction of Arthur James Balfour, Chief Secretary for Ireland. That the measures followed were stringent was shown by a statement of Sir George Trevelyan that of the eighty-five Irish Nationalist members, one out of every seven was in prison, on his way to prison, or on his way out of prison. Needless to say, no reconciliation was to be effected by such methods. The exasperation of the Irish was only intensified. Nevertheless, the system steadily applied was successful at least in restoring quiet. In 1890 it was found possible to relax it somewhat.

But the policy of this ministry was not simply negative. The idea that buying out the landlords and enabling the peasants to become full owners of their farms would solve the agrarian question, and that the agrarian question was at the root of Irish discontent, was no discovery of a Conservative ministry. Clauses with this in view had been inserted in Gladstone's Land Acts of 1870 and 1881, and the Land Bill of 1886 was a gigantic measure designed to effect this on a grand scale. That measure, however, frightened the taxpayers by the amount of the expenditure involved, and, moreover, it necessarily fell with the Home Rule Bill of which it was intended to be the companion piece. Gladstone's earlier acts had not had great effect, as the State had offered to advance only two-thirds of the purchase price.

The present plan provided that the State should advance the whole of it, to be repaid by instalments until at the end of forty-nine years the peasant would have his land as an unencumbered freehold. Thirty-three million pounds were set aside for the purpose. The landlords were not required to sell, but the issue has proved them willing to do so in a large number of cases. The Government buys the land, sells it to the peasant, who that instant becomes its legal owner, and who pays for it gradually. He actually pays less in this way each year than he formerly paid for rent, and in the end he has his holding unencumbered. This bill was passed in 1891, and in five years some 35,000 tenants were thus enabled to purchase their holdings under its provisions. The system was extended much further in later years, particularly by the Land Act of 1903. From 1903 to 1908 there were about 160,000 purchasers.

A most important piece of legislation carried by this ministry was the County Councils Act of 1888. This act rendered the county governments of England and Wales democratic. Those governments had previously been entirely unrepresentative in character. They had been mainly in the hands of the landlord class, members of which were appointed by the Queen as magistrates or justices of the peace. As such they met four times a year in quarter sessions, and there regulated county affairs, levying taxes, discharging certain judicial functions, regulating the liquor trade, and the building and repair of highways, and supervising the actions of the officials of smaller areas. County government was in the hands of an oligarchy. The new act placed it in the hands of all ratepayers, who were to elect county councils for a term of three years, which were to conduct the local administration, with the exception of granting liquor licenses, a function which was to remain in the hands of the justices of the peace. Thus county government was made democratic. As local self-government had been established in the boroughs in 1835, it was now established in the counties. This was one of the most important achievements of this ministry. In 1889 a similar bill was passed for Scotland. Ireland lay outside this legislation.

This ministry passed other bills of a distinctly liberal character; among them an act absolutely prohibiting the employment of children under ten, an act designed to reduce the oppression of the sweat-shop by limiting the labor of women to twelve hours a day, with an hour and a half for meals, an act making education

free, and a small allotment act intended to create a class of peasant proprietors in England. These measures were supported by all parties. They were important as indicating that social legislation was likely to be in the coming years more important than political legislation, which has proved to be the case. They also show that the Conservative party was changing in character, and was willing to assume a leading part in social reform.

In respect to another item of internal policy, the Salisbury ministry took a stand which was to have important consequences. In 1889 it secured an immense increase of the navy. Seventy ships were to be added at an expense of £21,500,000 during the next seven years. Lord Salisbury laid it down as a principle that the British navy ought to be equal to any other two navies of the world combined.

In foreign affairs the most important work of this ministry lay in its share in the partition of Africa, which will be described elsewhere.

The general elections of 1892 resulted in the return to power of the Liberals, supported by the Irish Home Rulers, and Mr. Gladstone, at the age of eighty-two, became for the fourth time prime minister, a record unparalleled in English history. As he himself said, the one single tie that still bound him to public life was his interest in securing Home Rule for Ireland before his end. It followed necessarily from the nature of the case that public attention was immediately concentrated anew on that question. Early in 1893 Mr. Gladstone introduced his second Home Rule Bill. Again the crucial difficulty was found to be that of the retention or non-retention of Irish representatives in the Parliament in London. There were three possible methods — total exclusion, inclusion for all purposes, or inclusion for certain specified purposes. The bill of 1886 was based on the first (with slight exceptions), and immediately the cry had been raised, and had been most effective, that the unity of the kingdom was threatened. In the new bill the third method was adopted. It was provided that Ireland should send eighty members to Westminster, but that they were not to vote on questions expressly confined to England and Scotland, on taxes which were not to be levied in Ireland, or on appropriations for other than imperial concerns.[1]

[1] The bill of 1893 provided for two chambers in the Irish parliament; the bill of 1886 had provided for one chamber.

On this point the debate raged for a whole week. Mr. Gladstone was forced to change ground completely, and to propose the unconditional admission of the Irish members to the Parliament in London, with right to vote on all matters. Exclusion, as in 1886; partial inclusion as proposed in 1893; total inclusion as finally accepted by the ministry, these were the three possible ways of treating this crucial question. On this fundamental matter Lord Morley has written as follows: "Each of the three courses was open to at least one single, but very direct objection. Exclusion, along with the exaction of revenue from Ireland by the Parliament at Westminster, was taxation without representation. Inclusion for all purposes was to allow the Irish to meddle in our affairs, while we were no longer to meddle in theirs. Inclusion for limited purposes still left them invested with the power of turning out a British government by a vote against it on an imperial question. Each plan, therefore, ended in a paradox. There was a fourth paradox, namely, that whenever the British supporters of a government did not suffice to build up a decisive majority, then the Irish vote, descending into one or other scale of parliamentary balance, might decide who should be our rulers. This paradox — the most glaring of them all — habit and custom have made familiar." [1]

The opposition to the bill was exceedingly bitter and prolonged. Very few new arguments were brought forward on either side. Party spirit ran riot. Mr. Chamberlain was called Judas, and he in turn called Gladstone Herod. Lord Salisbury called the proposal "an intolerable, an imbecile, an accursed bill." Lord Randolph Churchill declared that the Irish leaders were "political brigands and nihilists," and that the ministry was "as capricious as a woman, and as impulsive and as passionate as a horde of barbarians."

Mr. Gladstone, who, incidentally, kept his temper, expressed with all his eloquence his faith in the Irish people, his belief that the only alternative to his policy was coercion, and that coercion would be forever unsuccessful, his conviction that it was the duty of England to atone for six centuries of misrule.

After eighty-two days of discussion, marked by scenes of great disorder, members on one occasion coming to blows to the great damage of decorous parliamentary traditions, the bill was carried by a majority of 34 (301 to 267). A week later it was defeated in the House of Lords by 419 to 41, or a majority of more than ten to one. The bill was dead.

[1] Morley, *Gladstone,* III, 498.

Gladstone attempted to carry through various English measures, but here again he was foiled by the hereditary chamber. A single legislative reform was enacted, the Parish Councils Bill of 1894. This established in every parish of more than 300 inhabitants a council elected by the taxpayers, and gave them certain powers of self-government. This was the natural supplement to the County Councils Act of 1888, completing the process of constitutional reform which began in 1832. Agricultural laborers were henceforth to have a political training in participating in the management of local affairs.

Mr. Gladstone's fourth ministry was balked successfully at every turn by the House of Lords, which, under the able leadership of Lord Salisbury, recovered an actual power it had not possessed since 1832. In 1894 Mr. Gladstone resigned his office, thus bringing to a close one of the most remarkable political careers known to English history. His last speech in Parliament was a vigorous attack upon the House of Lords. In his opinion, that House had become the great obstacle to progress. "The issue which is raised between a deliberative assembly, elected by the votes of more than 6,000,000 people," and an hereditary body, "is a controversy which, when once raised, must go forward to an issue." This speech was his last in an assembly where his first had been delivered sixty-one years before. Gladstone died four years later, and was buried in Westminster Abbey (1898).

He was succeeded in the premiership by Lord Rosebery, whose ministry lasted only sixteen months. The withdrawal of Gladstone showed the many rifts in the Liberal party, which a leader of less prestige and less commanding personality could not close. The party was discouraged by its failure to achieve Home Rule, was balked by the House of Lords, was divided into groups desiring various things, and was feebly supported by the people. Such a ministry could not long endure. Rosebery alienated the Irish by declaring that he agreed with Lord Salisbury, that before Home Rule should be granted Ireland, "England, as the predominant member of the partnership of the three kingdoms, will have to be convinced of its justice."

The Rosebery ministry accomplished very little. Its campaign against the House of Lords was half-hearted and ineffective. In one sphere, where the Lords were by custom forbidden to interfere in financial matters, it made an important change. England was now involved in the widespread militaristic movement, which was one of the striking features of the closing nineteenth century.

In England it took the form of very largely increasing the navy, and the principle was now being accepted which later became an axiom in British policy, of making the British fleet the equal of any two foreign fleets combined. This involved much larger taxation. In the budget of 1894, the work of Sir William Vernon Harcourt, the principle of graduation was introduced into the inheritance taxes. The tax imposed by the state was to vary from one per cent. on estates of five hundred pounds to eight per cent. on estates of over a million pounds. This change was bitterly resented by the wealthy.

In June 1895 the Rosebery ministry was defeated on a minor matter and seized the occasion to resign. Lord Salisbury became prime minister. A general election was at once held, which proved to be a crushing defeat for the Liberals. The Conservatives and the Liberal-Unionists, or the Unionist party, as it was generally called, so thorough had become the amalgamation of the two, had a majority in the new Parliament of about a hundred and fifty, a larger majority than any party had had in any Parliament since the one chosen immediately after the Reform Bill of 1832. This party was to remain uninterruptedly in power until December 1905.

Lord Salisbury was now prime minister for the third time. He remained such until 1902, when he withdrew from public life, being succeeded by his nephew, Mr. Arthur James Balfour. There was, however, no change of party. Lord Salisbury had an immense majority in the House of Commons. His ministry contained several very able men. He himself assumed the Foreign Office, Mr. Chamberlain the Colonial Office, Mr. Balfour the leadership of the House of Commons. The withdrawal of Mr. Gladstone and the divisions in the Liberal party reduced that party to a position of ineffective opposition. The Irish question sank into the background. Much social and labor legislation was enacted. The commanding question of this period was to be that of imperialism, and the central figure was Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, a man remarkable for vigor and audacity, and the most popular member of the cabinet. Chamberlain, who had made his reputation as an advanced Liberal, an advocate of radical social and economic reforms, now stood forth as the spokesman of imperialism. His office, that of Colonial Secretary, gave him excellent opportunities to emphasize the importance of the colonies to the mother country, the desirability of drawing them closer together, of promoting imperial federation.

A period of great activity in foreign and colonial affairs began almost immediately after the inauguration of the new ministry. The most important chapter in this activity concerned the conditions in South Africa, which led, in 1899, to the Boer War, and which had important consequences. This will better be described elsewhere.[1]

The Conservatives, resolutely opposed to the policy of an independent parliament in Ireland, and conscious that in this they had the support of the people, declined absolutely to consider Home Rule. But they proposed to "kill Home Rule by kindness," as the phrase ran. Rigorous coercion for the suppression of disorder was united with a Land Purchase Bill, of the now familiar type, aiming to facilitate, more than previous bills had done, the buying out of the landlords and the creation of a peasant proprietorship of the soil of Ireland (1896). More important was the Irish Local Government Act of 1898, which aimed to give some measure of local self-government to the Irish by establishing there, as had been done in England, county councils and district councils, but not parish councils. These bodies, which were to possess considerable powers in the management of local affairs, were to be elected on a franchise identical with the parliamentary franchise, except that Peers and women might vote. This was, of course, no substitute for Home Rule, nor was it intended to be.

The South African war, from 1899 to 1902, absorbed the attention of England until its successful termination. Internal legislation was of slight importance. In the course of the war Queen Victoria died, January 22, 1901, after a reign of over sixty-three years, the longest known in British history, and only exceeded elsewhere by the seventy-one years' reign of Louis XIV of France. She had proved during her entire reign, which began in 1837, a model constitutional monarch, subordinating her will to that of the people, as expressed by the ministry and Parliament. "She passed away," said Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons, "without an enemy in the world, for even those who loved not England loved her." The reign of Edward VII, then in his sixty-second year, began.

A very important measure passed by this Conservative ministry was the Education Act of 1902. The Forster Act of 1870, which had remained the basis of the elementary educational system of England since its passage, had adopted the voluntary or denominational schools, and had added, where these were not

[1] Pages 507–509.

adequate, board schools. Both were to receive generally fees from their pupils and grants from Parliament. In addition, the voluntary schools were to receive voluntary gifts as hitherto, and the board schools local taxes levied for the purpose by the boards. As the years went by, the voluntary schools found that they were being handicapped by the fact that the board schools had larger financial resources than they. The parliamentary grants were conditioned in amount by the sums raised in the other ways by the two kinds of schools. Now the board schools could, by raising more from taxation, earn larger grants from Parliament, while the voluntary schools, relying upon private subscriptions, could not gain increased appropriations unless they could get larger subscriptions. While they were able to do this for a while, they were not able to in the long run. In 1900 the average amount per pupil was somewhat less than thirty years before. They were thus at a disadvantage compared with the board schools. The voluntary schools, which were for the most part connected with the Church of England, began to demand further help from Parliament. In 1897 they were given an additional subsidy, which, in their opinion, was not large enough. Their agitation continued and resulted finally in the passage of the Act of 1902.

By this the school boards, established in 1870, were abolished, and their powers were vested in the county and borough councils, that is, in the regular local government bodies. These were to support both sets of schools, the former board and the voluntary, out of local taxes, parliamentary grants continuing. In other words, local taxes were to be raised for denominational schools, as well as for undenominational, parliamentary grants, as hitherto, also going to both. The actual management of the former board schools was to be in the hands of a committee of the county or borough council. That of the church schools was to be in the hands of a committee of six, two of whom were to represent the county or borough council, while four were to represent the denomination. In other words, people were to be taxed for both sets of schools, but were to control only one. The bill gave great offense to Dissenters and believers in secular education. It authorized taxation for the advantage of a denomination of which multitudes of tax-payers were not members. It was held to be a measure for increasing the power of the Church of England. The conscience clause was applied to all schools, as hitherto.

The opposition to this law was intense. Thousands refused

to pay their taxes, and their property was, therefore, sold by public authority to meet the taxes. Many were imprisoned. There were over 70,000 summonses to court. The agitation thus aroused was one of the great causes for the crushing defeat of the Conservative party in 1905. Yet the law of 1902 was put into force and remained the law of England until 1918, the Liberals having failed in 1906 in an attempt to pass an education bill of their own to supersede it. The educational system continued to be one of the contentious problems of English politics.

The popularity of the Unionist ministry began to wane after the close of the South African war. Much of its legislation was denounced as class legislation designed to bolster up the Conservative party, not to serve the interest of all England. Moreover a new issue was now injected into British politics which divided the Unionists, as Home Rule had divided the Liberals. Chamberlain came forward with a proposition for tariff reform as a means of binding the Empire more closely together. He urged that England impose certain tariff duties against the outside world, at the same time exempting her colonies from their operation. He called this policy "colonial preference." It would be that but it would also be the abandonment of the free trade policy of Great Britain and the adoption of the protective system.

As the discussion of this proposal developed it became apparent that Englishmen had not yet lost their faith in free trade as still greatly to their advantage, if not absolutely essential to their welfare. The new controversy disrupted the Unionist party and reunited the Liberals.

The result of this increasing disaffection was shown in the crushing defeat of the Unionists and the inauguration of a very different policy under the Liberals. After December, 1905, the Liberal party was long in power, first under the premiership of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and then, after his death early in 1908, under that of Herbert Asquith, who gave way, in December, 1916, to Lloyd George, a Liberal, but whose ministry was a coalition ministry, composed of members of both parties. The Liberals won in the General Elections of 1906 the largest majority ever obtained since 1832.

An important achievement of this administration was the passage in 1908 of the Old Age Pensions Act, which marked a long step forward in the extension of state activity. It granted, under certain slight restrictions, pensions to all persons of a

certain age and of a small income. Denounced as paternalistic, as socialistic, as sure to undermine the thrift and the sense of responsibility of the laborers of Great Britain, it was urged as a reasonable and proper recognition of the value of the services to the country of the working classes, services as truly to be rewarded as those of army and navy and administration. The act provided that persons seventy years of age whose income did not exceed twenty-five guineas a year should receive a weekly pension of five shillings, that those with larger incomes should receive proportionately smaller amounts, down to the minimum of one shilling a week. Those whose income exceeded thirty guineas and ten shillings a year were to receive no pensions. It was estimated by the prime minister that the initial burden to the state would be about seven and a half million pounds, an amount that would necessarily increase in later years. The post office was used as the distributing agent. This law went into force on January 1, 1909. On that day over half a million men and women went to the nearest post office and drew their first pensions of from one to five shillings, and on every Friday henceforth as long as they lived they might do the same. It was noticed that these men and women accepted their pensions not as a form of charity or poor relief, but as an honorable reward. The statistics of those claiming under this law are instructive and sobering. In the county of London one person in every one hundred and seventeen was a claimant; in England and Wales one in eighty-six; in Scotland one in sixty-seven; in Ireland one in twenty-one.

The Unionist party had been in control from 1895 to 1905. Its chief emphasis had been put upon problems of imperialism. Social legislation had slipped into the background. But the conduct and course of the Boer War, the great adventure in imperialism, had not increased the reputation for statesmanship or the popularity of the Conservatives, and their domestic legislation aiming, as was held, at the strengthening of the Established Church and the liquor trade, two stout and constant defenders of the party, exposed them to severe attack as aristocratic, as believers in privileged and vested interests, as hostile to the development of the democratic forces in the national life.

Now that the Liberals were in power they turned energetically to undo the class legislation of the previous ministry, to remove the obstacles to the development of truly popular government. The new Liberal party was more radical than the old Liberal party of the time of the first Home Rule Bill as the more conservative Liberals had left it then and had gone over to the oppo-

sition. Moreover there now appeared in Parliament a party more radical still, the Labor party, with some fifty members. Radical social and labor legislation was now attempted. That the existing social system weighed with unjust severity upon the masses was recognized by the ministry. "Property," said Asquith, "must be associated in the mind of the masses of the people, with the ideas of reason and justice." In the attempt to realize this aim the Liberal party was forced into new and momentous enterprises.

THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS

But when the Liberals attempted to carry out their fresh and progressive programme they immediately confronted a most formidable obstacle. They passed through the House of Commons an Education Bill, to remedy the evils of the Education Act of 1902, enacted in the interests chiefly of the Established Church; also a Licensing Bill designed to penalize the liquor trade which Conservative legislation had greatly favored; a bill abolishing plural voting, which gave such undue weight to the propertied classes, enabling rich men to cast several votes at a time when many poor men did not have even a single vote. The obstacle encountered at every step was the House of Lords, which threw out these bills and stood right athwart the path of the Liberal party, firmly resolved not to let any ultra-democratic measures pass, firmly resolved also to maintain all the ground the Conservatives had won in the previous administrations. A serious political and constitutional problem thus arose which had to be settled before the Liberals could use their immense popular majority, as shown in the House of Commons, for the enactment of Liberal policies. The House of Lords, which was always ruled by the Conservatives, and which was not, being an hereditary body, subject to direct popular control, now asserted its power frequently and, in the opinion of the Liberals, flagrantly, by rejecting peremptorily the more distinctive Liberal measures. The Lords, encouraged by their easy successes in blocking the Commons, blithely took another step forward, a step which, as events were to prove, was to precede a resounding fall. The Lords in 1909 rejected the budget, a far more serious act of defiance of the popular chamber than any of these others had been, and a most conspicuous revelation of the spirit of confidence which the Lords had in their power, now being so variously and systematically asserted.

In 1909 Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, introduced the budget. He announced correctly that two new lines of heavy expenditure, the payment of old-age pensions and the rapid enlargement of the navy, necessitated new and additional taxation. The new taxes which he proposed would bear mainly on the wealthy classes. The income tax was to be increased. In addition there was to be a special or super-tax on incomes of over £5,000. A distinction was to be made between earned and unearned incomes — the former being the result of the labor of the individual, the latter being the income from investments, representing no direct personal activity on the part of the individual receiving them. Unearned incomes were to be taxed higher than earned. Inheritance taxes were to be graded more sharply and to vary decidedly according to the amount involved. New taxes on land of various kinds were also to be levied.

This budget aroused the most vehement opposition of the class of landowners, capitalists, bankers, persons of large property interests, persons who lived on the money they had inherited, on their investments. They denounced the bill as socialistic, as revolutionary, as, in short, odious class legislation directed against the rich, as confiscatory, as destructive of all just property rights.

The budget passed the House of Commons by a large majority. It then went to the House of Lords. For a long time it had not been supposed that the Lords had any right to reject money bills, as they were an hereditary and not a representative body. They, however, now asserted that they had that right, although they had not exercised it within the memory of men. After a few days of debate they rejected the budget by a vote of 350 to 75 (November 30, 1909).

At once was precipitated an exciting and momentous political and constitutional struggle. The Liberals, blocked again by the hereditary chamber, consisting solely of the aristocracy of the land, and blocked this time in a field which had long been considered very particularly to be reserved for the House of Commons, indignantly picked up the gauntlet which the Lords had thrown down. The House of Commons voted overwhelmingly, 349 to 134, that the action of the Lords was "a breach of the Constitution and a usurpation of the rights of the House of Commons." Asquith declared in a crowded House that "the House would be unworthy of its past and those traditions of which it is the custodian and the trustee," if it allowed any time to pass without showing that it would not brook this usurpation.

He declared that the "power of the purse" belonged to the Commons alone. The very principle of representative government was at stake. For if the Lords possessed the right they had assumed the situation was exactly this: that when the voters elected a majority of Conservatives to the Commons then the Conservatives would control the legislation; that, when they elected a majority of Liberals, the Conservatives would still control by being able to block all legislation they disliked by the veto of the House of Lords, always and permanently a body adhering to the Conservative party. An hereditary body, not subject to the people, could veto the people's wishes as expressed by the body that was representative, the House of Commons. In other words, the aristocratic element in the state was really more powerful than the democratic, the house representing a class was more powerful than the house representing the people.

The question of the budget and the question of the proper position and the future of the Upper Chamber were thus linked together. As these questions were of exceptional gravity the ministry resolved to seek the opinion of the voters. Parliament was dissolved and a new election was ordered. The campaign was one of extreme bitterness, expressing itself in numerous acts of violence. The election, held in January, 1910, resulted in giving the Unionists a hundred more votes than they had had in the previous Parliament. Yet despite this gain the Liberals would have a majority of over a hundred in the new House of Commons if the Labor party and the Irish Home Rulers supported them, which they did.

In the new Parliament the budget which had been thrown out the previous year was introduced again, without serious change. Again it passed the House of Commons and went to the Lords. That House yielded this time and passed the budget with all its so-called revolutionary and socialistic provisions.

THE "LORDS' VETO"

The Liberals now turned their attention to this question of the "Lords' Veto," or of the position proper for an hereditary, aristocratic chamber in a nation that pretended to be democratic, as did England. The issue stated nearly twenty years earlier by Gladstone in his last speech in Parliament had now arrived at the crucial stage. What should be the relations between a deliberative assembly elected by the votes of more than six million voters

and an hereditary body? The question was vehemently discussed inside Parliament and outside. Various suggestions for reform of the House of Lords were made by the members of that House itself, justly apprehensive for their future. The death of the popular King Edward VII (May 6, 1910), and the accession of George V, occurring in the midst of this passionate campaign, somewhat sobered the combatants, though only temporarily. Attempts were made to see if some compromise regarding the future of the House of Lords might not be worked out by the two parties. But the attempts were futile, the issue being too deep and too far-reaching.

The ministry, wishing the opinion of the people on this new question, dissolved the House of Commons again and ordered new elections, the second within a single year (December, 1910). The result was that the parties came back each with practically the same number of members as before. The Government's majority was undiminished.

The Asquith ministry now passed through the House of Commons a Parliament Bill restricting the power of the House of Lords in several important particulars and providing that the House of Commons should in last resort have its way in any controversy with the other chamber. This bill passed the House of Commons by a large majority. How could it be got through the House of Lords? Would the Lords be likely to vote in favor of the recognition of their inferiority to the other House, would they consent to this withdrawal from them of powers they had hitherto exercised, would they acquiesce in this altered and reduced situation at the hands of a chamber whose measures they had been freely blocking for several years? Of course they would not if they could help it. But there was one way in which the opposition of the House of Lords could be overcome, no matter how overwhelming. The King could create new peers — as many as he liked — enough to overcome the majority against the measure in question. This supreme weapon the King, which of course meant the Asquith ministry, was now prepared to use. Asquith announced that he had the consent of George V to create enough peers to secure the passage of the bill in case it were necessary. The threat was sufficient. The Lords on August 18, 1911, passed the Parliament Act which so profoundly altered their own status, power and prestige. This measure establishes new processes of law-making. If the Lords withhold their assent from a money bill, that is, any bill raising taxes or making appropriations, for more than one month after it has

passed the House of Commons, the bill may be presented for the King's signature and on receiving it becomes law without the consent of the Lords. If a bill other than a money bill is passed by the Commons in three successive sessions, whether of the same Parliament or not, and is rejected by the Lords, it may on a third rejection by them, be presented for the King's assent and on receiving that assent will become a law, notwithstanding the fact that the House of Lords has not consented to the bill — provided that two years have elapsed between the second reading of the bill in the first of those sessions and the date on which it passes the Commons for the third time.

This Parliament or Veto Bill contained another important provision, substituting five years for seven as the maximum duration of a Parliament; that is, members of the Commons are henceforth chosen for five, not seven years. Their term was thus reduced.

Thus the veto power of the House of Lords is gone entirely for all financial legislation, and for all other legislation its veto is merely suspensive. The Commons can have their way in the end. They may be delayed two years.

The way was now cleared for the enactment of certain legislation desired by the Liberal party which could not secure the approval of the House of Lords. It was possible finally to pass a Home Rule Bill, to the principle of which the Liberal party had been committed for a quarter of a century. On April 11, 1912, Asquith introduced the third Home Rule Bill, granting Ireland a Parliament of her own, consisting of a Senate of 40 members and a House of Commons of 164. If the two houses should disagree, then they were to sit and vote together. On certain subjects the Irish Parliament should not have the right to legislate: on peace or war, naval or military affairs, treaties, currency, foreign commerce. It could not establish or endow any religion or impose any religious disabilities. The Irish were to be represented in the Parliament in London by 42 members instead of the previous number, 103.

This measure was passionately opposed by the Conservative party and particularly by the Ulster party, Ulster being that province of Ireland in which the Protestants were strong. They went so far in their opposition as to threaten civil war, in case Ulster were not exempted from the operation of this law. During the next two years the battle raged around this point, in conferences between political leaders, in discussions in Parliament and the press. Attempts at compromise failed as the Home Rule

party would not consent to the exemption of a quarter of Ireland from the jurisdiction of the proposed Irish Parliament.

The bill was, however, passed and was immediately vetoed by the House of Lords. At the next session it was passed again and again vetoed by the Lords. Finally on May 25, 1914, it was passed a third time by the House of Commons by a vote of 351 to 274, a majority of 77. The bill was later rejected by the Lords. It might now become a law without their consent, in conformity with the Parliament Act of 1911. Only the formal assent of the King was necessary.

But the ministry was so impressed by the vehemence and the determination of the "Ulster party," which went so far as to organize an army and establish a sort of provisional government, that it decided to continue discussions in order to see whether some compromise might not be arranged. These discussions were interrupted by the outbreak of the European War.

Meanwhile a bill disestablishing the Anglican Church in Wales had gone through the same process; had thrice been passed by the Commons and rejected by the Lords. Like the Home Rule Bill, it only awaited the signature of the sovereign.

Finally that signature was given to both bills on September 18, 1914, but Parliament passed on that same day a bill suspending these laws from operation until the close of the war.

England now had far more serious things to consider and she swept the deck clean of contentious domestic matters until a more convenient season. Whether the Home Rule Act when finally put into force would be accompanied with amendments which would pacify the Protestants of Ulster, remained, of course, to be seen, or whether, indeed, it would ever be put into force.

CHAPTER XXV

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

We have thus far concerned ourselves with the history of the European continent. But one of the most remarkable features of the nineteenth century was the reaching out of Europe for the conquest of the world, and the opening of the present century sees the process far advanced. What is known as European civilization is in its characteristic features becoming the civilization of all countries and continents. The age of world politics, of world commerce, has come; the age of a common world culture appears likely ultimately to prevail. This extraordinary transformation is being effected by a number of agencies, by the building up of great colonial empires, by conscious and resolute imitation of Europe on the part of countries like Japan, and, very recently, by China, India, and Persia; by the elaboration of a marvelous economic life, each decade making enormous strides, of which every nation and country are necessary parts, bound securely together in the mesh of reciprocal needs and advantages. Peoples may no longer live in splendid or inglorious isolation, even if they wish to. European nations dominate directly immense regions of the world outside of Europe, civilization is acting as a powerful dissolvent of other inferior or less complex civilizations. The nineteenth century was not only a century of nation building, as we have seen, but of empire building on a colossal scale. A movement so vast in its sweep, so varied in its manifestations, so momentous in its inevitable consequences, merits careful study. Of the forces furthering this evolution undoubtedly the most important is the British Empire.

At the close of the eighteenth century England possessed in the New World, Upper and Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and a large vague region known as the Hudson Bay territory; Jamaica, and other West Indian islands; in Australia, a strip of the eastern coast; in India, the Bengal or lower Ganges region, Bombay, and strips along the eastern and western

coasts. The most important feature of her colonial policy had been her elimination of France as a rival, from whom she had taken in the Seven Years' War almost all of her North American and East Indian possessions. This Empire she increased during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, largely at the expense of France and Holland, the ally of France. Thus she acquired the Cape of Good Hope, Guiana in South America, Tobago, Trinidad, and St. Lucia, in the Pacific Mauritius and Ceylon. In the Mediterranean she acquired Malta. She also obtained Heligoland, and the protectorate of the Ionian Islands.

Since 1815 her Empire has been vastly augmented by a long series of wars, and by the natural advance of her colonists over countries contiguous to the early settlements, as in Canada and Australia. Her Empire lies in every quarter of the globe.

INDIA

The acquisition of India, a world in itself, for the British crown was the work of a private commercial organization, the East India Company, which was founded in the sixteenth century and given a monopoly of the trade with India. This company established trading stations in various parts of that peninsula. Coming into conflict with the French, and mixing in the quarrels of the native princes, it succeeded in winning direct control of large sections, and indirect control of others by assuming protectorates over certain of the princes, who allied themselves with the English and were left on their thrones. This commercial company became invested with the government of these acquisitions, under the provisions of the laws passed by the English Parliament at various times. In the nineteenth century the area of British control steadily widened, until it became complete. Its progress was immensely furthered by the overthrow, after a long and intermittent war, of the Mahratta confederacy, a loose union of Indian princes dominating central and western India. This confederacy was finally conquered in a war which lasted from 1816 to 1818, when a large part of its territories were added directly to the English possessions, and other parts were left under their native rulers, who, however, were brought effectively under English control by being obliged to conform to English policy, to accept English *Residents* at their courts, whose advice they were practically compelled to follow, and by putting their native armies under British direction. Such is the condition of many of them at the present day.

The English also advanced to the north and the northwest, from Bengal. One of their most important annexations was that of the Punjab, an immense territory on the Indus, taken as a result of two difficult wars (1845 to 1849), and the Oudh province, one of the richest sections of India, lying between the Punjab and Bengal, annexed in 1856.

The steady march of English conquest aroused a bitter feeling of hostility to the English, which came to a head in the famous Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, which for a time threatened the complete overthrow of the British in northern India. There were various causes of this insurrection: the bitter discontent of the deposed princes and their adherents, who sent out emissaries to stir up hatred against the intruders; the fear of other princes that their turn might come; the introduction of railways and telegraphs, represented by the priests as an attack upon their religion; rumors that the English intended to force Christianity upon the people and destroy their religion and civilization; the attempts to stamp out the custom of female infanticide; a prophecy of the soothsayers that English domination was destined to end on the hundredth anniversary of its beginning at the battle of Plassey (1757).

English domination rested on military force, and in the main upon the native Indian soldiers. There were in India in 1857 about 45,000 English troops, and over 250,000 native soldiers, the Sepoys. In that year a mutiny broke out among the Sepoys of the Ganges provinces in northern India. The immediate occasion was the introduction of a new rifle, or rather of the paper-covered cartridges for it, which were lubricated, it was alleged, with the fat of cows and pigs. One end of the cartridges had to be bitten by the teeth before being put into the barrel. This outraged the religious feeling of the Hindus, who regarded the cow as a sacred animal, and of the Mohammedans, who regarded the pig as unclean, the lard as contaminating. The English tried to dispel the rumor by publishing a formula of the grease used, and ordering officers to assure the soldiers that these ingredients were not employed, but their efforts were unavailing. A cavalry regiment refused to receive the new munitions, some of its members were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, their comrades began an insurrection to save them, and the insurrection spread swiftly. The native soldiery seized Delhi, the ancient capital of the Moguls, Lucknow, Cawnpore, and other places, massacring with barbarous cruelty large numbers of men, women, and children. Shortly all northern India seemed lost.

The English took a fearful and decisive revenge. Many of the Sepoys remained loyal, European troops were rushed to the scene of the disturbance, and the insurrection was crushed. Beside themselves with rage and terrified by the narrowness of the escape, the English meted out ferocious punishment. Hundreds were shot in cold blood, without trial, and thousands were hanged after trials that were a travesty of justice. Many were fastened to the mouths of cannon and blown to pieces.

Since the mutiny of 1857 no serious attempts have been made to overthrow English control. One important consequence was that in 1858 the government of India was transferred to the Crown from the private company which had conducted it for a century. It passed under the direct authority of England. In 1876, as we have seen, India was declared an empire, and Queen Victoria assumed the title Empress of India, January 1, 1877. This fact was officially announced in India by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, to an imposing assembly of the princes.

An empire it surely is, with its three hundred and twenty million inhabitants. A Viceroy stands at the head of the government. There is a Secretary for India in the British Ministry. The government is largely carried on by the highly organized Civil Service of India, and is in the hands of about eleven hundred Englishmen. About 250 millions of people are under the direct control of Great Britain; about 70 millions live in native states under native rulers, the "Protected Princes of India," of whom there were, a few years ago, nearly seven hundred. For all practical purposes, however, these princes must follow the advice of English officials, or Residents, stationed in their capitals.

"The people of India," says President Lowell, "are not a nation, but a conglomerate of many different races and religions, often side by side in the same place, yet unmixed and sharply separate. It is this, as Seeley pointed out in his 'Expansion of England,' that has enabled the British to conquer and hold the country. If the inhabitants could act together, and were agreed in wanting independence, they could get it. In short, if they were capable of national self-government, the English would live on a volcano, and their occupation would be brief. The Mutiny was suppressed because it was not universal. The Sikhs helped to put down the Sepoys; and so long as large sections of the people distrust one another more than they do the English, disaffection has little chance of achieving any notable result."[1]

[1] Lowell, *The Government of England,* II, 424–425.

Not only did England complete her control of India in the nineteenth century, but she added countries round about India, Burma toward the east, and, toward the west, Baluchistan, a part of which was annexed outright, and the remainder brought under a protectorate. She also imposed a kind of protectorate upon Afghanistan, as a result of two Afghan wars (1839–42 and 1878–80).

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA

In 1815, as already stated, Great Britain possessed, on the continent of North America, six colonies: Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland; and the Hudson Bay Company's territories stretched to the north and northwest with undefined boundaries. The total population of these colonies was about 460,000. The colonies were entirely separate from each other. Each had its own government, and its relations were not with the others, but with England. The oldest and most populous was Lower Canada, which included Montreal and Quebec and the St. Lawrence valley. It was the French colony conquered in 1763. Its population was French-speaking, and Roman Catholic in religion.

The two most important of these colonies were Lower Canada, largely French, and Upper Canada, entirely English. Each had received a constitution in 1791, modeled along lines familiar to Englishmen at home. There was a Governor appointed by the monarch, an Executive Council, appointed by the same authority and corresponding to the cabinet, a Legislative Council, likewise appointed by the Crown and for life, intended as the nearest approach to the House of Lords possible in a frontier country, and a House of Assembly, the members of which were elected by the people.

Neither in Upper nor in Lower Canada did the constitution work well. In Upper Canada there were perpetual conflicts between the two Houses on the one hand, and the Governor on the other. The Governor could virtually veto the actions of the legislature, and considered himself responsible primarily to the English Government, not to the people of the province. He consulted the Executive Council only infrequently, and followed its opinion only when he chose to. What the two Houses were constantly struggling for was the creation of an executive, responsible, not to the monarch in England, but to themselves, and to this end they wished to make the Executive Council resemble the ministry

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS
of the
EUROPEAN POWERS
IN 1815.
West Longitude from Greenwich
ASIA
PACIFIC
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
SOUTH SEA
NORTH AMERICA
SOUTH AMERICA
Baffin Bay
Greenland
Alaska
Bering Sea
Hudson Bay
Labrador
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
Vancouver I.
Columbia
Charlotte I.
Aleutian Is
Sandwich Is
Hawai
Johnston I.
Fanning I.
Christmas I.
Equator
Manihiki
Marquesas I.
Society Is
Samoa Is
Tonga Is
Paumotu or Low I.
Tahiti
Tubuai
Austral (Tobuai) Is
Kermadec Is
Easter I.
Sala-y-Gomez
Chatham I.
Tropic of Capricorn
Tropic of Cancer
Florida
Bermudas
Canary Islands
Azores
Cape Verde Is
Caribbean Sea
Jamaica
Haiti
Cuba
Guiana
Trinidad
Georgetown
Galapagos I.
Quito
Lima
Brazil
Bahia
Rio de Janeiro
Fernando N.
Trinidad
Valparaiso
Santiago
Juan Fernandez Is
Buenos Ayres
Montevideo
Rio Negro
La Plata
Tristan da
Falkland Is
Str. of Magalhaes
Fire Island
Staten I.
C. Horn
S. Georgia I.
Sandwich
Antarctic
Mexico
Guatimala
Yucatan
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Venezuela
CARIBBEAN SEA
Curacao
Trinidad
Grenada
St Vincent
Barbadoes
St Lucia
Martinique
Dominica
Guadaloupe
Antigua
Montserrat
Nevis
St Christopher
Virgin Is
Porto Rico
Santo Domingo
Jamaica
Haiti
Bahama Is
Florida
Havana
Cuba
Yucatan
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Venezuela
WEST INDIES
British
French
Spanish
Danish
Dutch

East Longitude from Greenwich
ARCTIC OCEAN
EUROPE
ASIA
Russia
Siberia
Lappland
Mongolia
Desert of Gobi
Tibet
China
Japan Sea
Okhotsk Sea
PACIFIC OCEAN
Arabia
Persia
Bengal
Hindustan
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
Ethiopia
AFRICA
INDIAN OCEAN
Java
Sumatra
Borneo
Celebes
Philippines
Carolines
Marshall I.
Gilbert I.
Solomon Is
NEW HOLLAND
New Guinea
New Zealand
Tasmania
ANTARCTIC OCEAN
Taimyr Penins.
New Sibiria
Kamchatka
Baikal L.
Aral Sea
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Hindostan
Ceylon
Madagascar
Japan
Yesso
Sakhalin
Formosa
Manilla
Singapore
Moscow
Petersburg
Archangel
Tobolsk
Tomsk
Yenisseisk
Yakutsk
Irkutsk
Orenburg
Astrakan
Constantinople
Smyrna
Bagdad
Herat
Cabul
Candahar
Cashgar
Petchelee
Nankin
Canton
Pekin
Macao
Shanghai
Kiusiu
Bonin I.
Ladrones (Marianne) Wake I.
Palau Is
Gilolo
Timor
Torres Str.
N. Hebrides
N. Caledonia
Loyalty I.
Vih (Fiji Is)
Port Jackson
Botany Bay
North Is
South I
Rakiura
Macquarie I.
Bass Str.
Cape Horn
C. Agulhas
C. Leeuwin
Good Hope
Mauritius
Rodriguez
Reunion
Maldives
Laccadives
Comoro I.
Zanzibar
Mozambique
Seychelles
Chagos I.
Cocos I.
Amsterdam
St. Paul
Prince Edward I.
Crozet I.
Kerguelen Is
Heard I.
Nassau
Maurilius
Taimyr L.
C. Cheljuskin
Kotelnoi I.
Blishnij
White Sea
Karish Sea
Hammerfest
North Cape
Vardo
Archangel
Onega L.
Ladoga L.
Petersburg
Moscow
Kazan
Orenburg
Astrakan
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
Aral Sea
Tobolsk
Tomsk
Omsk
Yenisseisk
Irtish R.
Lena
Yakutsk
Indigirka
Kolyma R.
Kamchatka
V. Kliuchev
Okhotsk
Sakhalin
Amur R.
Baikal L.
Mongolia
Desert of Gobi
Petchelee
Nankin
Canton
Pekin
Macao
Shanghai
Kiusiu
Japan
Yesso
Empire of Japan
Bonin I.
Formosa
Manilla
Philippines
Ladrones (Marianne) Wake I.
Marshall I.
Carolines
Palau Is
Gilolo
Celebes
Borneo
Singapore
Java
Sumatra
Timor
Torres Str.
New Guinea
Gilbert I.
Solomon Is
S. Cruz I.
N. Hebrides
Vih (Fiji Is)
N. Caledonia
Loyalty I.
New Zealand
Tasmania
Bass Str.
Port Jackson
Botany Bay
North Is
South I
Rakiura
Macquarie I.
Cape Horn
C. Agulhas
C. Leeuwin
Good Hope
Mauritius
Rodriguez
Reunion
Maldives
Laccadives
Comoro I.
Zanzibar
Mozambique
Seychelles
Chagos I.
Cocos I.
Amsterdam
St. Paul
Prince Edward I.
Crozet I.
Kerguelen Is
Heard I.
Nassau
Maurilius
Taimyr L.
C. Cheljuskin
Kotelnoi I.
Blishnij
White Sea
Karish Sea
Hammerfest
North Cape
Vardo
Archangel
Onega L.
Ladoga L.
Petersburg
Moscow
Kazan
Orenburg
Astrakan
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
Aral Sea
Tobolsk
Tomsk
Omsk
Yenisseisk
Irtish R.
Lena
Yakutsk
Indigirka
Kolyma R.
Kamchatka
V. Kliuchev
Okhotsk
Sakhalin
Amur R.
Baikal L.
Mongolia
Desert of Gobi
Petchelee
Nankin
Canton
Pekin
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Palau Is
Gilolo
Celebes
Borneo
Singapore
Java
Sumatra
Timor
Torres Str.
New Guinea
Gilbert I.
Solomon Is
S. Cruz I.
N. Hebrides
Vih (Fiji Is)
N. Caledonia
Loyalty I.
New Zealand
Tasmania
Bass Str.
Port Jackson
Botany Bay
North Is
South I
Rakiura
Macquarie I.
Cape Horn
C. Agulhas
C. Leeuwin
Good Hope
Mauritius
Rodriguez
Reunion
Maldives
Laccadives
Comoro I.
Zanzibar
Mozambique
Seychelles
Chagos I.
Cocos I.
Amsterdam
St. Paul
Prince Edward I.
Crozet I.
Kerguelen Is
Heard I.
French
Portuguese
Dutch
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
80
70
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
70

in England. This struggle between executive and legislature was the fundamental problem in this province, which had, however, other grievances, such as the practical monopoly in office-holding which a few families had succeeded in acquiring.

In Lower or French Canada there was also a constitutional struggle, embittered by race animosity. The French, overwhelmingly predominant in population, controlled only the House of Assembly, while the three other branches of the Government, the Governor, Executive Council, and Legislative Council, all appointive and not elective, were controlled by the English element. The chief struggle in this colony was between the Assembly, controlled by the French, and the Legislative Council, controlled by the English. The French demanded that the Legislative Council be made elective, expecting, if that were done, to have the majority in it. They demanded also that the executive, with the exception of the Governor, be made responsible to the legislature. The French, unable to get control of any branch of the government except the Assembly, resolved to use this to force the concessions they desired. They refused to make the appropriations necessary for the running of the government. Year after year, from 1832 on, no moneys were voted for the payment of judges and civil officials. The struggle was similar to that witnessed in the eighteenth century in many of the thirteen colonies to the south.

The conflict was between the representative and the non-representative parts of the government. It was fundamentally a constitutional question. The colonies did not possess complete legislative power, as the upper chamber, non-elective, could block the lower chamber, representing the people. Nor had the legislature, as a whole, what it had in England — control over the executive. "The colonies have the mockeries, the shadows of English institutions, not the realities; the names, not the substances," said Lord Durham later. The principle which makes the English system of government workable, responsibility of the executive to the legislature, was lacking. The people had no efficient control of their rulers. England had not yet solved the problem of colonial government.

In 1837 disaffection had reached such a point that revolutionary movements broke out in both colonies. These were easily suppressed by the Canadian authorities without help from England, but the grievances of the colonists still remained.

The English Government, throughly alarmed at the danger of the loss of another empire, adopted the part of

discretion and sent out to Canada a commissioner to study the grievances of the colonists. The man chosen was Lord Durham, whose part in the reform of 1832 had been brilliant. Durham was in Canada five months. His acts were vehemently criticized in Parliament, the ministry, which had appealed to him to undertake the mission, did not loyally support him, and he shortly returned to England, humiliated and in official disgrace, the victim of the party and personal politics of England. He had "marred a career, but made a nation." The Durham Report, submitted to Parliament on his return, entitles him to the rank of the greatest colonial statesman in British history. It contained a full description of the situation in Canada, and proposed sweeping changes in colonial policy.

Examining the history of the six provinces, Lord Durham declared "that the natural state of government in all these colonies is that of collision between the executive and the representative body." He pointed out that the executive was irresponsible, and asked how long Englishmen at home would tolerate a ministry not in sympathy with the majority of the House of Commons. Such ministries were the common occurrence in Canada. "It is difficult," he declared, "to understand how any English statesman could have imagined that representative and irresponsible government could be successfully combined." He also declared that the situation in Canada "was the unavoidable result of a system which stinted the unpopular branch of the legislature of the necessary privileges of a representative body." The Assembly in Lower Canada had been conducting "a constant warfare with the executive, for the purpose of obtaining the powers inherent in a representative body by the very nature of representative government."

Fox had said that "the only method of retaining distant colonies, with advantage, is to enable them to govern themselves." This was what Lord Durham now proposed, namely, the introduction of complete ministerial responsibility to the popular chamber. "The Crown must consent to carry on the government by means of those in whom the representative members have confidence." "That sounds like a truism now," says Lord Durham's biographer, "but it was the first recognition by a responsible statesman of the principle of self-government in the colonies." [1]

No wonder then that this Report has been called "the Magna

[1] Reid, *Life and Letters of Lord Durham,* II, 314.

Charta of the Colonies," the "most valuable document in the English language on the subject of colonial policy," the "textbook of every advocate of colonial freedom in all parts of the globe," that it is asserted to have "broadened once for all the lines of constructive statesmanship in all that relates to the colonial policy of England."

Lord Durham believed also in a federal union of all the British colonies of North America, but, recognizing that the idea was premature, he recommended the union of Upper and Lower Canada into a single colony with a single government. This he also thought would have the advantage of putting the English, the more progressive element, in a majority in the united colony.

Durham's recommendations were not immediately followed, as they seemed to many Englishmen to render the colonies independent. In 1840, however, a bill was passed carrying out the latter suggestion of a fusion of Ontario and Quebec, Upper and Lower Canada, under a single government, the Assembly to have larger powers than previously. But the essential feature of Durham's report, ministerial responsibility, was not provided for in the law, and, as a matter of fact, during the next seven years the Governors did not act upon the principle that the Executive Council was to do as the majority of the Assembly wished. This vital and, as far as the colonies were concerned, revolutionary principle was adopted in 1847 by Lord Elgin, the Governor of Canada and the son-in-law of Lord Durham, who chose as members of the Executive Council members of the French party then in majority in the Assembly, an act very unpopular with the English, and leading to a riot in which the mob attacked the Governor's carriage and set fire to the Parliament building. Elgin adhered to his resolution, however, and the principle of ministerial responsibility was thus introduced, and has since been constantly maintained. It was custom, however, not law. It spread rapidly to the other colonies of Great Britain, which were chiefly of English stock and were therefore considered capable of self-government. Responsible government was granted to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1848, to Prince Edward Island in 1851, to New Zealand in 1854, and within the next two years to New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Newfoundland; to Queensland in 1859; to British Columbia in 1871; to Cape Colony in 1872; to Western Australia in 1890, and Natal in 1893; to Transvaal Colony in 1906, and Orange River Colony in 1907.

DOMINION OF CANADA

The Act of 1840, based largely upon Durham's Report, had united Upper and Lower Canada, or Ontario and Quebec, into one colony, had swept away the two legislatures and established a single one for the united colony. This union of two colonies so very dissimilar, the one English, the other largely French, did not work smoothly, and there was a strong feeling that each part should have a legislature of its own for purely local purposes.

Lord Durham had also suggested federation of all the North American colonies as a final settlement. Various reasons prevented this for many years, among others the very defective means of communication, but the desire for federation gradually increased.

The growth of population, the improvement of ways of communication by the building of railroads, the example of the successful federation across the border to the south, and the possible danger of attack from that side, as suggested by the Fenian movement and the *Alabama* contentions, all caused Canadian public opinion to express itself in favor of union. The English Parliament was therefore merely voicing Canadian sentiment when in 1867 it passed the British North American Act. Indeed, that act had been drawn up in Canada and was ratified by the English Parliament without change. By it Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were joined into a confederation called the Dominion of Canada. There was to be a central or federal parliament sitting at Ottawa. There were also to be local or provincial legislatures in each province to legislate for local affairs. Questions affecting the whole Dominion were reserved for the Dominion Parliament.

The central or Dominion Parliament was to consist of a Senate and a House of Commons. The Senate was to be composed of seventy members nominated for life by the Governor-General, himself appointed by the monarch, and representing the Crown. The House of Commons was to be elected by the people. In some respects the example of the English Government was followed in the constitution, in others that of the United States. This federation differs from ours in one very important particular. By our constitution certain definite powers are granted the federal government. All others are vested either in the states or the people of the states. In the Dominion certain powers are granted to the provinces. All others are vested in the federal government.

Though the Dominion began with only four provinces provision was made for the possible admission of others. Manitoba was admitted in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873.

In 1846, by the settlement of the Oregon dispute, the line dividing the English possessions from the United States was extended to the Pacific Ocean, and in 1869 the Dominion acquired by purchase (£300,000) the vast territories belonging to the Hudson Bay Company, out of which the great provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan have been carved and admitted into the union (1905). The Dominion now includes all of British North America except the island of Newfoundland, which has steadily refused to join. It thus extends from ocean to ocean. Except for the fact that she receives a Governor-General from England and that she possesses no treaty powers, Canada is practically independent. She manages her own affairs, and even imposes tariffs which are disadvantageous to the mother country. That she has imperial as well as local patriotism, however, was shown strikingly in her support of England in the South African war. She sent Canadian regiments thither at her own expense to co-operate in an enterprise not closely connected with her own fortunes.

The founding of the Canadian union in 1867 rendered possible the construction of a great transcontinental railway, the Canadian Pacific, built between 1881 and 1885. This has in turn reacted upon the Dominion, binding the different provinces together, and contributing to the remarkable development of the west. Another transcontinental railway has since been built farther to the north. Canada is connected by steamship lines with Europe and with Japan and Australia. Her population has increased from less than five hundred thousand in 1815 to more than nine million. Her prosperity has grown immensely, and her economic life is becoming more varied. Largely an agricultural and timber-producing country, manufactures are now developing under the stimulus of protective tariffs, and her vast mineral resources are in process of rapid development.

AUSTRALIA

An eminent English historian, Sir Spencer Walpole, has written that "the greatest fact in the history of England is that she is the mother of the United States. It may be similarly added, that the greatest fact in the history of the

nineteenth century is the foundation of a new Britain — which may eventually prove a greater Britain — in the Southern Hemisphere." [1]

Whether Australia will prove a greater Britain or not, only the future can show, but the opening of the twentieth century sees a new "colonial nation" in existence, prosperous, energetic, ambitious. The creation of that new empire was the work of the nineteenth century, an empire nearly as extensive territorially as the United States or Canada, about three-fourths as large as Europe, and inhabited almost entirely by a population of English descent.

No systematic exploration of this southern continent, *Terra Australis*, was undertaken until toward the close of the eighteenth century, but certain parts had been sighted or traced much earlier by Spanish, Portuguese, and particularly by Dutch navigators. Among the last, Tasman is to be mentioned, who in 1642 explored the southeastern portion, though he did not discover that the land which was later to bear his name was an island, a fact not known, indeed, for a century and a half. He discovered the islands to the east of Australia, and gave to them a Dutch name, New Zealand. The Dutch called the *Terra Australis* New Holland, claiming it by right of discovery. But they made no attempt to occupy it. The attention of the English was first directed thither by the famous Captain Cook, who made three voyages to this region between 1768 and 1779. Cook sailed around New Zealand, and then along the eastern coast of this New Holland. He put into a certain harbor, which was forthwith named Botany Bay, so varied was the vegetation on the shores. Sailing up the eastern coast, he claimed it all for George III, and called it New South Wales, because it reminded him of the Welsh coast. Seventeen years, however, went by before any settlement was made.

As Australia was remote, it was considered by English statesmen a good place to which to send criminals, and it was as a convict colony that the new empire began. The first expedition for the colonization of the country sailed from England in May 1787 with 750 convicts on board, and reached Botany Bay in January 1788. Here the first settlement was made, and to it was given the name of the colonial secretary of the day, Sydney. For many years fresh cargoes of convicts were sent out who, on the expiration of their sentences, received lands. Free settlers came

[1] *History of England*, VI, 336.

too, led to emigrate by various periods of economic depression at home, by promises of land and food, and by an increasing knowledge of the adaptability of the new continent to agriculture, and particularly to sheep raising. By 1820 the population was not far from 40,000. During the first thirty years the government was military in character.

The free settlers were strongly opposed to having Australia regarded as a prison for English convicts. They were not a desirable class of immigrants, and their presence tended to prevent men from coming whose immigration would have been desirable. As Englishmen came to see that this was an expensive and ineffective way of punishing criminals, and as the free men in Australia vehemently denounced the custom as a stigma upon their adopted land, it was finally abolished in New South Wales in 1840. The custom lingered on, however, in other colonies, and did not entirely disappear until 1853. This question of the transportation of criminals, was one of the important questions in Australia during the first part of its history.

Australia had thus far been mainly a pastoral country, producing wool and hides. But, in 1851 and 1852, rich deposits of gold were found, rivaled only by those discovered a little earlier in California. A tremendous immigration ensued. The population of the colony of Victoria (cut off from New South Wales) increased from 70,000 to more than 300,000 in five years. Australia has ever since remained one of the great gold-producing countries of the world.

Thus there gradually grew up six colonies, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and the neighboring island of Tasmania. These were gradually invested with self-government, parliaments and responsible ministries in the fashion worked out in Canada. The population increased steadily, and by the end of the century numbered about four million. In 1923 it was over five million.

The great political event in the history of these colonies was their union into a confederation at the close of the century. Up to that time the colonies had been legally unconnected with each other, and their only form of union was the loose one under the British Crown. For a long time there was discussion as to the advisability of binding them more closely together. Various reasons contributed to convince the Australians of the advantages of federation. They have been summarized by Lord Bryce as follows: "The gain to trade and the general convenience to be expected from abolishing the tariffs established on the frontiers of

each colony, the need for a common system of military defense, the advantages of a common legislation for the regulation of railways and the fixing of railway rates, the advantages of a common control of the larger rivers for the purposes both of navigation and of irrigation, the need for uniform legislation on a number of commercial and industrial topics, the importance of finding an authority competent to provide for old age pensions and for the settlement of labor disputes all over the country, the need for uniform provisions against the entrance of colored races (especially Chinese, Malays, and Indian coolies), the stimulus to be given to industry and trade by substituting one great community for six smaller ones." [1]

Moreover, the desire for nationality, which accomplished such remarkable changes in Europe in the nineteenth century, was also active here. An Australian patriotism had grown up. Australians desired to make their country the dominant authority in the Southern Hemisphere. They longed for a larger outlook than that given by the life of the separate colonies, and thus both reason and sentiment combined toward the same end, a close union, the creation of another "colonial nation."

Union was finally achieved after ten years of earnest discussion (1890–1900). The various experiments in federation were carefully studied, particularly the constitutions of the United States and Canada. The draft of the constitution was worked over by several conventions, by the ministers and the governments of the various colonies, and was finally submitted to the people for ratification. Ratification being secured, the constitution was then passed through the British Parliament under the title of "The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act" (1900). The constitution was the work of the Australians. The part taken by England was simply one of acceptance. Though Parliament made certain suggestions of detail, it did not insist upon them in the case of Australian opposition.

The constitution established a federation consisting of the six colonies which were henceforth to be called states, not provinces, as in the case of Canada. It created a federal Parliament of two houses, a Senate consisting of six senators from each state, and a House of Representatives apportioned among the several states according to population. The powers

[1] Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, I, 478–479.

given to the Federal Government were carefully defined. The new system was inaugurated January 1, 1901.[1]

NEW ZEALAND

Not included in the new commonwealth is an important group of islands of Australasia called New Zealand, situated 1,200 miles east of Australia. England began to have some connection with these islands shortly after 1815, but it was not until 1839 that they were formally annexed to the British Empire. In 1854 New Zealand was given responsible government, and in 1865 was entirely separated from New South Wales and made a separate colony. Emigration was methodically encouraged. New Zealand was never a convict colony. Population increased and it gradually became the most democratic colony of the Empire. In 1907 the designation of the colony was changed to the Dominion of New Zealand.

New Zealand consists of two main islands with many smaller ones. It is about a fourth larger than Great Britain and has a population of about 1,200,000, of whom about 52,000 are aborigines, the Maoris. Its capital is Wellington, with a population of over 100,000. Auckland is another important city. New Zealand is an agricultural and grazing country, and also possesses rich mineral deposits, including gold.

New Zealand is of great interest to the world of to-day because of its experiments in advanced social reform, legislation concerning labor and capital, landowning and commerce. State control has been extended over more branches of industry than has been the case in any other country.

The Government owns and operates the railways.[2] The roads are run, not for profit, but for service to the people. As rapidly as profits exceed three per cent., passenger and freight rates are reduced. Comprehensive and successful attempts are made by very low rates to induce the people in congested districts to live in the country. Workmen going in and out travel about three miles for a cent. Children in the primary grades in schools are carried free, and those in higher grades at very low rates.

[1] A valuable description of this constitution is to be found in Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence,* "The Australian Commonwealth." Abstract of this in Beard, *Intro. to Eng. Hist.,* pp. 645–662. See also Bright, *Hist. of Eng.,* V. 197–199. The constitution itself may be found in Dodd, *Modern Constitutions.* On inauguration of the new government see *Annual Register* 1901, 444–445.

[2] In 1921 the Government owned 3,009 miles. There was 138 miles of private lines.

The Government also owns and operates the telegraphs and telephones and conducts postal savings banks. Life insurance is largely in its hands. It has a fire and accident insurance department. In 1903 it began the operation of some state coal mines. Its land legislation is remarkable. Its main purpose is to prevent the land from being monopolized by a few, and to enable the people to become landholders. In 1892 progressive taxation on the larger estates was adopted, and in 1896 the sale of such estates to the Government was made compulsory, and thus extensive areas have come under government ownership. The State transfers them under various forms of tenure to the landless and working classes. The system of taxation, based on the principle of graduation, higher rates for larger incomes, properties, and inheritances, is designed to break up or prevent monopoly and to favor the small proprietor or producer.

In industrial and labor legislation New Zealand has also made radical experiments. Arbitration in labor disputes is compulsory if either side invokes it, and the decision is binding. Factory laws are stringent, aiming particularly at the protection of women, the elimination of "sweating." In stores the Saturday half holiday is universal. The Government has a Labor Department whose head is a member of the Cabinet. Its first duty is to find work for the unemployed, and its great effort is to get the people out of the cities into the country. There is an Old Age Pension Law, enacted in 1898 and amended in 1905, providing pensions of about a hundred and twenty-five dollars for all men and women after the age of sixty-five whose income is less than five dollars a week.

All this governmental activity rests on a democratic basis. There are no property qualifications for voting, and women have the suffrage as well as men. The referendum has been adopted.

The more advanced parties demand a further extension in the line of social reform: the nationalization of lands and mines, of marine and coastal and intercolonial services; state clothing and boot factories, flour and woolen mills, bakeries, iron-works, and ship-building yards. The Australian colony of Victoria has enacted much legislation resembling that described in the case of New Zealand.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

As an incident in the wars against France and her ally and dependent, Holland, England seized the Dutch possession in South Africa, Cape Colony. This colony she retained in 1814,

together with certain Dutch possessions in South America, paying six million pounds as compensation. This was the beginning of English expansion into Africa, which was to attain remarkable proportions before the close of the century. This Dutch colony had been founded as early as 1652 as a port of call for Dutch ships trading with the Orient. Immigrants came from Holland, and after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes under Louis XIV, many Huguenots joined them. These Frenchmen were gradually completely absorbed in the Dutch population, losing all distinguishing characteristics. England kept the colony in 1814 for the same purpose that the Dutch had founded it, as a port of call, for English commerce with India went by this route, there being then no Suez canal. The population at the time she took possession consisted of about 27,000 people of European descent, mostly Dutch, and of about 30,000 African and Malay slaves owned by the Dutch, and about 17,000 Hottentots. Immigration of Englishmen began forthwith.

Friction between the Dutch (called Boers, i.e., peasants) and the English was not slow in developing. The forms of local government to which the Boers were accustomed were abolished and new ones established. English was made the sole language used in the courts. The Boers, irritated by these measures, were rendered indignant by the abolition of slavery in 1834. They did not consider slavery wrong. Moreover, they felt defrauded of their property as the compensation given was inadequate — about three million pounds — little more than a third of what they considered their slaves were worth. Even that was made payable in London, a device which enabled London bankers to get a good share. For all the abolition of slavery meant a loss of property, for many a total loss.

The Boers resolved to leave the colony and to settle in the interior, where they could live unmolested by the intruders. This migration or Great Trek began in 1836, and continued for several years. About 10,000 Boers thus withdrew from Cape Colony. Rude carts drawn by several pairs of oxen transported their families and their possessions into the wilderness. Some went northeastward and settled in Natal only to find that they were not, for their pains, to be free from English control. In 1842 the English sent troops into Natal, and in the following year proclaimed it a colony. Many of the Boers trekked again to join their fellow Boers who, while they were going into Natal, had gone into the Orange River country. Such were the beginnings of the Orange Free State, whose capital was Bloemfontein. But

again they were followed. The English, in 1848, declared this region a part of the British Empire, under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. Many of the Orange River Boers, refusing to live under the British flag, trekked again, joining those who, in the earlier migration, had gone farther north across the Vaal, founding a state destined to become famous as the Transvaal or South African Republic, and where it seemed for many years they would be permitted to enjoy the independence which they had made such efforts to secure.

For, in 1852, Great Britain, apparently considering the Transvaal not worth annexing, formally recognized its independence, its entire right to manage its own affairs, by a treaty, the Sand River Convention, and two years later it abandoned the Orange River Sovereignty, by the Convention of Bloemfontein. From this time date the two Boer republics of South Africa, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal or South African Republic.

From 1854 to 1899 the Orange Free State pursued its peaceful career unmolested, its independence not infringed upon. The Transvaal, too, was left in the splendid isolation it so much enjoyed, but not for so long a time, for in 1877 England, under Lord Beaconsfield's administration, abruptly declared it annexed to the British Empire, on the ground that its independence was a menace to the peace of England's other South African possessions, as the Boers were frequently involved in wars with the natives, who, once aroused, constituted a general menace. A delegation of Boers was sent to England to protest and demand the restoration of their independence. One of the delegates was Paul Kruger, who, as a boy of ten, had followed his father's cattle as they were driven across the prairie in the Great Trek of 1836. The delegation was told in London by the British ministry that the annexation was irrevocable. The Boers' hatred of the English naturally grew more intense, and they fell to meditating plans for the future.

But in 1880 Lord Beaconsfield was overthrown and Mr. Gladstone came into power. Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation, and was convinced that a mistake had been made which must be rectified. He was negotiating with the Boer leaders, hoping to reach, by peaceful means, a solution that would be satisfactory to both sides, when his problem was made immensely more difficult by the Boers themselves, who, in December 1880, rose in revolt and defeated a small detachment of British troops at Majuba Hill, February 27, 1881. In a military sense this so-called battle of Majuba Hill was an insignificant affair, but

its effects upon Englishmen and Boers were tremendous and far-reaching. Gladstone, who had already been negotiating with a view to restoring the independence of the Transvaal, which he considered had been unjustly overthrown, did not think it right to reverse his policy because of a mere skirmish, however humiliating.

He therefore restored to the Boers their independence, but with the express reservation of the "suzerainty" of the British Crown, a word carrying no precise meaning, but resented in the Transvaal as a limitation upon its perfect independence, and so understood in England. The Boers were allowed complete self-government with this restriction. Gladstone's action was severely criticised by Englishmen who did not believe in retiring, leaving a defeat unavenged. They denounced the action of the ministry as inimical to the welfare of the South African colonies and damaging to the prestige of the Empire. Gladstone did not believe that he should be deflected from an act of justice and conciliation merely because of a military misfortune of no importance in itself, and he considered that giving up negotiations previously begun, promises previously made, would be an act of bad faith. He therefore concluded the Pretoria Convention of 1881 with its mysterious word "suzerainty."

The Boers, on the other hand, considered that they had won their independence by arms, by the humiliation of the traditional enemy, and were accordingly elated. In holding this opinion they were injuring themselves by self-deception and by the idea that what they once had done they could do again, and they were angering the British by keeping alive the memory of Majuba Hill. That name came to be spoken with passion on both sides.

The Pretoria Convention did not work smoothly, and consequently a new agreement was drawn up in 1884. This, the London Convention, restored to the Transvaal the old name of South African Republic, omitted the preamble of the Pretoria Convention, in which the word suzerainty occurred, and inserted a provision, which was destined to gain tremendous importance later, to the effect that "white men were to have full liberty to reside in any part of the republic, to trade in it, and to be liable to the same taxes only as those exacted from citizens of the republic." [1]

Mr. Gladstone's biographer in summing up the history of the relations of England and the Transvaal says that the Sand River Convention of 1852 conferred independence, that the Proclama-

[1] Morley, *Gladstone* III, 45.

tion of 1877 took independence away, that the Pretoria Convention of 1881 "in a qualified way gave it back," and that the London Convention of 1884 "qualified the qualification over again till independence, subject to two or three specified conditions, was restored." [1]

The London Convention was naturally regarded as a victory by the Boers, and encouraged them to believe that in time the restrictions it contained could be removed. The word "suzerainty" being omitted and "republic" being given them, they felt they were once more masters in their own house. On the other hand, they were not entirely independent, as England expressly had the control over their foreign relations. Moreover, the phrase concerning immigration contained the germ of future trouble, which in the end was to result in the violent overthrow of the republic, for a momentous change in the character of the population was impending.

The South African Republic was entirely peopled by Boers, a people exclusively interested in agriculture and grazing, solid, sturdy, religious, freedom-loving, but, in the modern sense, unprogressive, ill-educated, suspicious of foreigners, and particularly of Englishmen. The peace and contentment of this rural people were distributed by the discovery, in 1884, that gold in immense quantities lay hidden in its mountains, the Rand. Immediately a great influx of miners and speculators began. These were chiefly Englishmen. In the heart of the mining district the city of Johannesburg grew rapidly, numbering in a few years over 100,000 inhabitants, a city of foreigners. Troubles quickly arose between the native Boers and the aggressive, energetic Uitlanders or foreigners.

The Uitlanders gave wide publicity to their grievances. Great obstacles were put in the way of their naturalization; they were given no share in the government, not even the right to vote. Yet in parts of the Transvaal they were more numerous than the natives, and bore the larger share of taxation. In addition they were forced to render military service, which, in their opinion, implied citizenship. They looked to the British Government to push their demand for reforms. The Boer Government was undoubtedly an oligarchy, but the Boers felt that it was only by refusing the suffrage to the unwelcome intruders that they could keep control of their own state, which at the cost of much hardship they had created in the wilderness. In 1895 occurred an event which deeply embittered them, the Jameson Raid — an in-

[1] Morley, *Gladstone*, III, 45.

vasion of the Transvaal by a few hundred troopers under Dr. Jameson, the administrator of Rhodesia, with the evident purpose of supporting the Uitlanders, and probably of overturning the Boer Government. The raiders were easily captured by the Boers, who with great magnanimity handed them over to England. This indefensible attack and the fact that the guilty were only lightly punished in England, and that the man whom all Boers held responsible, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, was shielded by the British Government, entered like iron into the souls of the Boers and only hardened their resistance to the demands of the Uitlanders. These demands were refused, and the grievances of the Uitlanders, who now outnumbered the natives perhaps two to one, continued.

A special commissioner, sent out from England in 1897, Sir Alfred Milner, informed his Government early in 1899 that "the spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain, and the respect for the British Government." Milner was of the opinion that the Boers were aiming ultimately at nothing less than the union of all the Boers, including those of Cape Colony, the ultimate expulsion of the English from South Africa, and the establishment of a great Boer state. "I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa." This claim that the real point at issue was the maintenance of England's position as the paramount power in South Africa exerted a great influence at home. To stop this "mischievous propaganda," which was undermining British influence, the policy of the Transvaal Government must be changed, and it could only be changed by giving the Uitlanders political power. Therefore the right of the suffrage was insisted upon by the English Government, "no selfish demand," said Milner, as it is "asking for nothing from others which we do not give ourselves." Conferences were held in 1899 at Bloemfontein. But this demand the Boers would not grant, believing that it was a matter of self-preservation, that its bestowal would simply mean the handing over of the country to the foreigner.

War broke out in October 1899. The Orange Free State, no party to the quarrel, threw in its lot with its sister Boer republic.

This war was lightly entered upon by both sides. Each grossly underestimated both the resources and the spirit of the other. The English Government had made no preparation at all adequate, apparently not believing that in the end this petty state would dare oppose the mighty British Empire. The Boers, on the other hand, had been long preparing for a conflict, and knew that the number of British troops in South Africa was small, totally insufficient to put down their resistance. Moreover, for years they had deceived themselves with a gross exaggeration of the significance of Majuba Hill as a victory over the British. Each side believed that the war would be short, and would result in its favor.

The war, which they supposed would be over in a few months, lasted for nearly three years. England suffered at the outset many humiliating reverses. The war was not characterized by great battles, but by many sieges at first, and then by guerilla fighting and elaborate, systematic, and difficult conquest of the country. It was fought with great bravery and brilliancy on both sides. For the English, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were the leaders, and of the Boers several greatly distinguished themselves, obtaining world-wide reputations, Christian de Wet, Louis Botha, Delarey.

The English won in the end by sheer force of numbers. Awakening from the costly misapprehension of the first days concerning the nature of their problem, they proceeded to make war on a scale absolutely unprecedented in their annals. No general in English history had ever commanded so many troops as did Lord Roberts. During the war England sent about 450,000 men to South Africa. Three hundred and forty thousand came from Great Britain; the others from the colonies, Canada, Australia, India, and Cape Colony. In the closing months Lord Kitchener had more than 250,000 men against perhaps ten or twelve thousand opponents.

Peace was finally concluded on June 1, 1902. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State lost their independence, and became colonies of the British Empire. Otherwise the terms offered by the conquerors were liberal. Generous money grants and loans were to be made by England to enable the Boers to begin again in their sadly devastated land. Their language was to be respected wherever possible.

The work of reconciliation proceeded with remarkable rapidity after the close of the war. Responsible government, that is, self-government, was granted to the Transvaal Colony in

1906 and to the Orange River Colony in 1907. This liberal conduct of the English Government had the most happy consequences, as was shown very convincingly by the spontaneity and the strength of the movement for closer union, which culminated in 1909 in the creation of a new "colonial nation" within the British Empire. In 1908 a convention was held in which the four colonies were represented. The outcome of its deliberations, which lasted several months, was the draft of a constitution for the South African Union. This was then submitted to the colonies for approval and, by June 1909, had been ratified by them all. The constitution was in the form of a statute to be enacted by the British Parliament. It became law September 20, 1909.

The South African Union is substantially a unified, rather than a federal state. While the provinces are preserved, their powers are very limited. The central government consists of a Governor-General appointed by the Crown; an Executive Council; a Senate of forty members, eight from each province, and eight appointed by the Governor in Council, and serving for ten years; and a House of Assembly, consisting of 134 members, of whom 51 represent Cape of Good Hope Province, 49 Transvaal Province, 17 Orange Free State Province, and 17 Natal Province. Both Dutch and English are official languages and enjoy equal privileges. Difficulty was experienced in selecting the capital, so intense was the rivalry of different cities. The result was a compromise. Pretoria was chosen as the seat of the executive branch of the government, Cape Town as the seat of the legislative branch.

The creation of the South African Union was another triumph of the spirit of nationality which has so greatly transformed the world since 1815. The new commonwealth has a population of about 1,500,000 whites and five and a half million people of non-European descent. Provision has been made for the ultimate admission of Rhodesia into the Union.

IMPERIAL FEDERATION

At the opening of the twentieth century Great Britain possessed an empire far more extensive and far more populous than any the world had ever seen, covering about thirteen millions of square miles, if Egypt and the Soudan be included, with a total population of over four hundred and twenty millions. This Empire was scattered everywhere, in Asia, Africa, Australia, the two

Americas, and the islands of the seven seas. The population included a motley host of peoples. Only fifty-four million were English-speaking, and of these about forty-two million lived in Great Britain. Most of the colonies were self-supporting. They presented every form of government, military, autocratic, representative, democratic. The sea alone bound the Empire. England's throne was on the mountain wave in a literal as well as in a metaphorical sense. Dominance of the oceans was essential that she might keep open her communications with her far flung colonies. It is no adventitious circumstance that England is the greatest sea-power of the world, and intends to remain such. She regards this as the very vital principle of her imperial existence.

A noteworthy feature of the British Empire, as already sufficiently indicated, is the practically unlimited self-government enjoyed by several of the colonies, those where the English stock predominates, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand. This policy is in contrast to that pursued by the French and German governments, which have ruled their colonies directly from Paris and Berlin. But this system does not apply to the greatest of them all, India, nor to a multitude of smaller possessions.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA

Lying almost within sight of Europe and forming the southern boundary of her great inland sea is the immense continent, three times the size of Europe, whose real nature was revealed only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In some respects the seat of very ancient history, in most its history is just beginning. In Egypt a rich and advanced civilization appeared in very early times along the lower valley of the Nile. Yet only after thousands of years and only in our own day have the sources and the upper course of that famous river been discovered. Along the northern coasts arose the civilization and state of Carthage, rich, mysterious, and redoubtable, for a while the powerful rival of Rome, succumbing to the latter only after severe and memorable struggles. The ancient world knew therefore the northern shores of Africa. The rest was practically unknown. In the fifteenth century came the great series of geographical discoveries, which immensely widened the known boundaries of the world. It might seem that Africa, rather than America and Asia, would have been the important conquest of that marvelous period of human curiosity and courage. But this was not the case. Europe was seeking primarily riches, and riches were to be found, as events proved, in Peru, and Mexico, and India, rather than in the great continental mass on its very threshold. The age of exploration did, it is true, reveal the hitherto unknown outline and magnitude of the continent. Portuguese explorers pushed farther and farther south until they finally rounded the southern cape, and then sailed away toward India, so alluring with its gems and spices. Diaz, Vasco da Gama, are shining names in this romantic history. But the result was not the conquest of Africa and its introduction into European civilization. America, and even Australia, then unknown, were destined to receive the civilization of Europe long before that continent. A melancholy beginning was, however, made. No ancient civilization offered its riches to the spoliation of Europeans, as in Mexico, Peru, and India. But property in human beings was to be had in abundance for little effort. The African slave trade began,

"black ivory," and stations were established by the Portuguese, and later by other nations for this business, which was both lucrative and inhuman. These posts were simply along the shores. The great inner mass of the continent remained as before, unknown, mainly because of the difficulty of penetrating it, owing to its lack of rivers navigable from the sea. For centuries Europe, absorbed in multifarious struggles, whence emerged its modern civilization, paid slight attention to the mystery which lay near at hand. Moreover, it had not the means, mechanical and scientific, for the exploration of this enigmatic and dangerous land. And such remained the case down to the nineteenth century, and, indeed, well into it. Africa was the great field of discovery of that century as America was of the fifteenth and sixteenth.

In 1815 the situation was as follows: the Turkish Empire extended along the whole northern coast to Morocco, that is, the Sultan was nominally sovereign of Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria. Morocco was independent under its own sultan. Along the western coasts were scattered settlements, or rather stations, of England, France, Denmark, Holland, Spain, and Portugal. Portugal had certain claims on the eastern coast, opposite Madagascar. England had just acquired the Dutch Cape Colony, whence, as we have seen, her expansion into a great South African power has proceeded. The interior of the continent was unknown, and was of interest only to geographers.

For sixty years after 1815, progress in the appropriation of Africa by Europe was slow. The most important annexation was that of Algeria by France between 1830 and 1847. In the south, England was spreading out, and the Boers were founding their two republics.

European annexation waited upon exploration. Africa was the "dark continent," and until the darkness was lifted it was not coveted. About the middle of the century the darkness began to disappear. Explorers penetrated farther and farther into the interior, traversing the continent in various directions, opening a chapter of geographical discovery of absorbing interest. It is impossible within our limits to do more than allude to the wonderful work participated in by many intrepid explorers, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Portuguese, Dutch, Germans and Belgians. A few incidents only can be mentioned.

It was natural that Europeans should be curious about the sources of the Nile, a river famous since the dawn of history, but whose source remained enveloped in obscurity. In 1858 one

AFRICA
European Possessions
in 1884.
English Standard Mile (69,16 to 1°)
English
French
Portuguese
Spanish
Abbreviations:
Nat. - Natal
Po. - Pondo Land
Tr. - Transkei (Fingo Land)
E.Gr. - East Griqua Land
T. - Tembu Land
Bas. - Basuto Land.
BLACK SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
RED SEA
Persian G.
Gulf of Aden
Hadramaut
ARABIA
NEDJED
Libyan Desert
EGYPT
SAHARA
SUDAN
ABYSSINIA
Somali Land
Ogaden
Dar Fur
Kordofan
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
Mahdi Possessions
Nubia
Abyssinia
Tripoli
Barca
Fezzan
Algeria
Morocco
Mauretania
Senegal
French Guinea
Portuguese Guinea
Bissagos Is.
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Ivory Coast
Gold Coast
Ashanti
Dahomey
Lagos
Niger
Benue
Bornu
Sokoto
Borgu
Nupe
Yoruba
Adamaua
Cameroon
Rabeh
Equatorial Prov.
Bahr el-Ghazal
Kaffa
Abyssinia
Tropic of Cancer
Spain
Portugal
Italy
Turkey
Asia Minor
Greece
Cyprus
Crete
Rhodes
Malta
Sicily
Sardinia
Corsica
Canary Is.
Madeira Is.
Cape Verde
Gambia
Senegal
Kaarta
Timbuktu
Mauretania
Adrar
Air or Tintellust
Aspen
Damergu
Kanem
Wadai
Lake Chad
Kuka
Kanuri
Kanemi
Muo
Egga
Agades
Agadem
Bilma
Tibesti
Tummo
Fezzan
Ghat
Mursuk
Gatrun
Ghadames
Tripoli
Nalut
Gadamis
Sokna
Tuat
Ain Salah
Tidikelt
Tafilet
Figig
el Golea
Ouargla
Wargla
Guggurt
Gardaia
Bisharas
Tebessa
Constantine
Algiers
Bona
Tunis
Bizerta
Sfax
Gabes
Kairouan
Hodeida
Mocha
Aden
Sokotra
Berbera
Zeila
Harar
Addis Ababa
Shoa
Gondar
Khartum
Berber
Suakin
Wadi Halfa
Jedda
Mecca
Medina
Hail
Beirut
Damascus
Jerusalem
Alexandria
Cairo
Port Said
Suez Canal
Suez
Akaba
Sinai Pen.
Nile
Red Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Black Sea
Constantinople
Smyrna
Athens
Salonica
Adrianople
Bucharest
Odessa
Sebastopol
Trebizond
Batum
Angora
Erzerum
Aleppo
Bagdad
Bassorah
Bushire
Muscat
Aden
Perim I.
Bab-el-Mandeb
Hodeida
Loheia
Mokha
Said
Hadramaut
Machiat
Sokotra
Cape Guardafui
Ras Hafun
Berbera
Brit. Somali Land
Ogaden
Webi Shebeli
Juba
Lugh
Shidle
Gallinieria
Obbia
Mukdishu
Brava
Lamu
Pate I.
Zanzibar
Mombasa
Kilimanjaro
Victoria Nyanza
Albert Nyanza
Albert Edward Nyanza
Lake Rudolf
L. Stefanie
Lake Tsana
Blue Nile
White Nile
Bahr el-Ghazal
Bahr el-Jebel
Fashoda
Sobat
Denkur
Wau
Kafia
Dembo
Monbuttu
Niam-Niam
Makraka
Welle
Lado
Equatorial Prov.
Gaboon
Ogowe
Fernando Po
Cameroons
Old Calabar
Bonny
Benin
Brass
Niger
Nun
Forcados
Sierra Leone
Freetown
Sherbro I.
Monrovia
Liberia
Cape Palmas
Grand Bassam
Assinie
Ivory Coast
Gold Coast
Accra
Elmina
Cape Coast
Ashanti
Kong
Bonduku
Dahomey
Abomey
Porto Novo
Lagos
Benin
Yola
Rabeh
Adamaua
Cameroon
Kamerun
Mt. Cameroon
Victoria
Batanga
Gaboon
Ogowe
Loango
Congo
Kongo
Mayumba
Cape Lopez
Fernando Po
Annobon I.
Corisco I.
Elobey Is.
Cape St. John
Cape Catherine
Cape Frio
Cape Negro
Walfisch Bay
Damara Land
Great Namaqua Land
Little Namaqua Land
Orange R.
Cape Colony
Cape Town
Port Elizabeth
Natal
Durban
Delagoa Bay
Lourenzo Marques
Inhambane
Sofala
Beira
Mozambique
Quilimane
Zambesi
Shire R.
Nyassa
Tanganyika
Lake Bangweolo
Lake Mweru
Lake Moero
Lake Kisale
Lake Kamalondo
Lake Dilolo
Lake Ngami
Lake Shirwa
Lake Chiuta
Lake Kilwa
Lake Kisiba
Lake Kivu
Lake Albert Edward Nyanza
Lake Albert Nyanza
Lake Victoria Nyanza
Lake Rudolf
Lake Tsana
Kilimanjaro
Mombasa
Pate I.
Lamu
Brava
Mukdishu
Obbia
Gallinieria
Webi Shebeli
Juba
Lugh
Shidle
Harar
Addis Ababa
Shoa
Gondar
Khartum
Berber
Suakin
Wadi Halfa
Jedda
Mecca
Medina
Hail
Beirut
Damascus
Jerusalem
Alexandria
Cairo
Port Said
Suez Canal
Suez
Akaba
Sinai Pen.
Nile
Red Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Black Sea
Constantinople
Smyrna
Athens
Salonica
Adrianople
Bucharest
Odessa
Sebastopol
Trebizond
Batum
Angora
Erzerum
Aleppo
Bagdad
Bassorah
Bushire
Muscat
Aden
Perim I.
Bab-el-Mandeb
Hodeida
Loheia
Mokha
Said
Hadramaut
Machiat
Sokotra
Cape Guardafui
Ras Hafun
Berbera
Brit. Somali Land
Ogaden
Webi Shebeli
Juba
Lugh
Shidle
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Obbia
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Makraka
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Lado
Equatorial Prov.
Gaboon
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Fernando Po
Cameroons
Old Calabar
Bonny
Benin
Brass
Niger
Nun
Forcados
Sierra Leone
Freetown
Sherbro I.
Monrovia
Liberia
Cape Palmas
Grand Bassam
Assinie
Ivory Coast
Gold Coast
Accra
Elmina
Cape Coast
Ashanti
Kong
Bonduku
Dahomey
Abomey
Porto Novo
Lagos
Benin
Yola
Rabeh
Adamaua
Cameroon
Kamerun
Mt. Cameroon
Victoria
Batanga
Gaboon
Ogowe
Loango
Congo
Kongo
Mayumba
Cape Lopez
Fernando Po
Annobon I.
Corisco I.
Elobey Is.
Cape St. John
Cape Catherine
Cape Frio
Cape Negro
Walfisch Bay
Damara Land
Great Namaqua Land
Little Namaqua Land
Orange R.
Cape Colony
Cape Town
Port Elizabeth
Natal
Durban
Delagoa Bay
Lourenzo Marques
Inhambane
Sofala
Beira
Mozambique
Quilimane
Zambesi
Shire R.
Nyassa
Tanganyika
Lake Bangweolo
Lake Mweru
Lake Moero
Lake Kisale
Lake Kamalondo
Lake Dilolo
Lake Ngami
Lake Shirwa
Lake Chiuta
Lake Kilwa
Lake Kisiba
Lake Kivu

ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
Tropic of Capricorn
Ascension I.
St. Paul de Loanda
Kuanza R.
Mayumba
Loango
Leopoldville
Ebinda
Banana
Bomo
LUNDA
Urua
Katanga
Benguella
Bihe
Huilla
Mossamedes
Porto Alexandre
Cunene R.
I.S. Helena
Kaoko
Damara Land
Gr. Namaqua Land
Walfish B.
Angra Pequena
Orange R.
Cape Town
Cape of Good Hope
Table B.
Simon's B.
Hottentot B.
Algoa B.
Mossel B.
CAPE COL.
ORANGE FREE STATE
BECHUANA LAND
TRANSVAAL
Kimberley
Mafeking
Pretoria
Lourenço Marquez
Delagoa Bay
Inhambane
Durban (Pt. Natal)
ZULULAND
S. Lucia B.
Port Elizabeth
East London
KAFFRARIA
Natal
Zambesi R.
Barotse Ld.
Lobisa
Nyassa
Mashona Ld.
Matabele Land
Gasa Land
Sofala
Bazaruto I.
Mozambique
Mozambique Channel
Quelimane
Mozambique
Mojanga
Tullear
Ambahy
Ft. Dauphin
MADAGASCAR
Antahanarivo
Tamatave
Andevorante
I. Ste. Marie
Port Louis
Mauritius
Réunion
S. Denis
Seychelles
Amirante
Zanzibar
Pemba
Mombasa
Melinda
Lamu I.
Witu
Cosmoledo I.
Aldabra Is.
Farquhar I.
Gloriosa I.
Johanna
Comoro
Mayotta
Nossi Be
Vohimar
Diego Suarez B.
Pt. Amelia
Lindi
Kilwa
Mafia
Kiwindge I.
Dar-es-Salaam
Bagamoyo
Ruaha R.
Unyanwesi
Tanganyika L.
Leopold II L.
Kasai R.
Kwango R.
Congo R.
Lukuga R.
Luapula R.
Moero L.
Kassai
Cuango
Cuanza
Cangamba
Lulua
Lambeji R.
Bangweolo L.
Shire R.
Nyassa L.
Tete
Sena
Sabi
Limpopo
Shakespeare's Gr.
Ngami L.
Okavango
Chobe R.
Zambesi R.
Victoria Falls
Tropic of Capricorn
10
20
30
40
20
10
West Longitude
0
Greenwich
East Longitude
10
20
30
40
50
60

source was found by Speke, an English explorer, to consist of a great lake south of the equator, to which the name Victoria Nyanza was given. Six years later another Englishman, Sir Samuel Baker, discovered another lake, also a source, and named it Albert Nyanza.

Two names particularly stand out in this record of African exploration, Livingstone and Stanley. David Livingstone, a Scotch missionary and traveler, began his African career in 1840, and continued it until his death in 1873 at Chitambo, not far from the shores of Lake Bangweolo, which he had previously discovered. He traced the course of the Zambesi River, of the upper Congo, and the region round about Lakes Tanganyika and Nyassa. He crossed Africa from sea to sea in higher latitudes than had hitherto been traversed. He opened up a new country to the world. His explorations caught the attention of Europe, and when, on one of his journeys, Europe thought that he was lost or dead, and an expedition was sent out to find him, that expedition riveted the attention of Europe as no other in African history had done. It was under the direction of Henry M. Stanley, sent out by the New York *Herald*. Stanley's story of how he found Livingstone was read with the greatest interest in Europe, and heightened the desire, already widespread, for more knowledge about the great continent. Livingstone, whose name is the most important in the history of African exploration, died in 1873. His body was borne with all honor to England and given the burial of a national hero in Westminster Abbey.

Another African explorer was Cameron, sent out from England by the Royal Geographical Society to rescue Livingstone. He failed in this, as Livingstone died before his arrival, but Cameron made a remarkable journey across Africa from east to west. He was the first, indeed, to cross the continent in that direction.

By this time not only was the scientific curiosity of Europe thoroughly aroused, but missionary zeal saw a new field for activity. Thus Stanley's journey across Africa, from 1874 to 1878, was followed in Europe with an attention unparalleled in the history of modern explorations. Stanley explored the equatorial lake region, making important additions to knowledge. His great work, was, however, his exploration of the Congo River system. Little had been known of this river save its lower course as it approached the sea. Stanley proved that it was one of the largest rivers in the world, that its length was more than three thousand miles, that it was fed by an enormous number of tribu-

taries, that it drained an area of over 1,300,000 square miles, that in the volume of its waters it was exceeded only by the Amazon.

Thus, by 1880, the scientific enthusiasm and curiosity, the missionary and philanthropic zeal of Europeans, the hatred of slave hunters who plied their trade in the interior, had solved the great mystery of Africa. The map showed rivers and lakes where previously all had been blank.

Upon discovery quickly followed appropriation. France entered upon her protectorate of Tunis in 1881, England upon her "occupation" of Egypt in 1882. This was a signal for a general scramble. A feverish period of partition succeeded the long, slow one of discovery. European powers swept down upon this continent lying at their very door, hitherto neglected and despised, and carved it up among themselves. This they did without recourse to war by a series of treaties among themselves defining the boundaries of their claims. Africa became an annex of Europe. Out of this rush for territories the great powers, England, France, and Germany, naturally emerged with the largest acquisitions, but Portugal and Italy each secured a share. The situation and relative extent of these may best be appreciated by an examination of the map. Most of the treaties by which this division was effected were made between 1884 and 1890.

One feature of this appropriation of Africa by Europe was the foundation of the Congo Free State. This was the work of the second king of Belgium, Leopold II, a man who was greatly interested in the exploration of that continent. After the discoveries of Livingstone, and the early ones of Stanley, he called a conference of the powers in 1876 "to discuss the question of the exploration, and the civilization of Africa, and the means of opening up the interior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and scientific enterprise of the civilized world," and to consider measures for extinguishing "the terrible scourge of slavery known to prevail over wide and populous tracts in the interior of the continent." This conference was participated in by Great Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. As a result of its deliberations an International African Association was established, which was to have its seat in Brussels, and whose aim was to be the exploration and civilization of central Africa. Each nation wishing to co-operate was to collect funds for the common object.

But the international character of the movement thus started was not long maintained. Most of the contributions came from Belgium. Stanley reached Europe in 1878 with the remarkable

additions of knowledge which his trip across Darkest Africa had given him. He was sent back the following year nominally under the auspices of the International Association of the Congo, an organization formed in 1879, and the practical successor of the former African Association, just alluded to. Stanley, hitherto an explorer, now became, in addition, an organizer and state builder. During the next four or five years, 1879–84, he made hundreds of treaties with native chiefs and founded many stations in the Congo basin. Nominally an emissary of an international association, his expenses were largely borne by King Leopold II.

Portugal now put forth extensive claims to much of this Congo region on the ground of previous discovery. To adjust these claims and other matters a general conference was held in Berlin, in 1884–5, attended by all the states of Europe, with the exception of Switzerland, and also by the United States. The conference recognized the existence as an independent power of the Congo Free State, with an extensive area, most of the Congo basin. It was evidently its understanding that this was to be a neutral and international state. Trade in it was to be open to all nations on equal terms, the rivers were to be free to all, and only such dues were to be levied as should be required to provide for the necessities of commerce. No trade monopolies were to be granted. The conference, however, provided no machinery for the enforcement of its decrees. Those decrees remained unfulfilled. The state quickly ceased to be international, monopolies were granted, trade in the Congo was not really free to all.

The new state became practically Belgian. In 1885, Leopold II assumed the position of sovereign, declaring that the connection of the Congo Free State and Belgium should be merely personal, he being ruler of both, and that the former, like the latter, should be entirely neutral. The Belgian parliament gave its consent, and the powers gave their approval. Leopold granted to the new state a constitution of an autocratic character, and in the succeeding years acted as if it were entirely his private possession. His position was that of sovereign and proprietor combined. In 1889 he announced that by his will all his sovereign rights in the Congo should go to Belgium after his death. This, of course, was an infraction of the Berlin Act of 1885 as he had no right to will an international state without the consent of the powers. The powers, however, recorded no protest, probably because the new state was nearly bankrupt

and they were not disposed to contribute to its maintenance and development. In reality the Congo Free State was not a free state at all, but the personal property of King Leopold. He possessed there practically unlimited power in the making and execution of laws. An international state became a personal appanage of the King of Belgium, largely because the powers did nothing for the Congo while Leopold gave it liberal and constant support.

In later years Leopold's policy was vehemently denounced. State monopolies were established, and monopolies were granted to private companies. In the exploitation of the natural resources, particularly the immensely valuable rubber trees, and in the building of railroads, it has been asserted that the natives were reduced to practical slavery. Fearful stories of inhuman treatment meted out to women as well as to men, of endless and crushing toil imposed upon them, of outrage, murders, whippings freely inflicted, and greatly reducing the population, gained wide, and it would appear, making some allowance for exaggeration, justified credence. The existence of the gravest abuses was affirmed by a commission of investigation appointed by the King himself. After a study of their report, published in October 1905, a professor in the University of Brussels wrote as follows: "An examination of the Congo Free State administration reveals the clear and indisputable fact that the Congo Free State is not a colony in the proper sense of the term: it is a financial speculation. The real aims of those in authority are pecuniary — to increase the amount yielded by taxation, to exploit the natural wealth of the country, to effect all that can stimulate the powers of production. Everything else is subordinated to this end. The colony is administered neither in the interest of the natives nor even of the economic interest of Belgium; the moving desire is to assure the sovereign king the maximum of pecuniary benefit." [1]

As the years went by the revelations of the atrocious conditions prevailing in the Congo became steadily more numerous and more shocking. Other powers, notably England and the United States, finally aroused, demanded reforms. The result was that the Belgium ministry and Parliament were forced by the public opinion of the world to take up this question, and in 1908 the Congo Free State was converted outright into a Belgian colony, subject, not to the personal rule of the King, but to Parliament.

[1] Quoted in Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, 270.

EGYPT

Egypt, a seat of ancient civilization, was conquered by the Mohammedans soon after the rise of their religion. Some centuries later it was conquered by the Turks, and became a part of the Turkish Empire (1517). It remained nominally such down to 1914, its supreme ruler being the Sultan, who resided in Constantinople. But a series of remarkable events in the nineteenth century resulted in giving it a most singular and complicated position. To put down certain opponents of the Sultan an Albanian warrior, Mehemet Ali, was sent out early in the nineteenth century. Appointed Governor of Egypt in 1806, by 1811 he had made himself absolute master of the country. He had succeeded only too well. Originally merely the representative of the Sultan, he had become the real ruler of the land. His ambitions grew with his successes. In time he aspired to add Syria to his states, but was checked in this by a European intervention in 1840. He was compelled to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte once more, and to limit his rule to Egypt, but he gained in turn the important concession that the right to rule as viceroy should be hereditary in his family. The title was later changed to that of Khedive (1866).

The fifth ruler of this family was Ismail (1863–79). It was under him that the Suez Canal was completed, a great undertaking carried through by a French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the money coming largely from European investors. This Khedive plunged into the most reckless extravagance. As a result the Egyptian debt rose with extraordinary rapidity from three million pounds in 1863 to eighty-nine million in 1876. This, as well as the increased taxation which characterized the same years, was a crushing burden for a poor and ignorant population. Sir Alfred Milner after studying the situation declared: "There is nothing in the financial history of any country, from the remotest ages to the present time, to equal this carnival of extravagance and oppression."

The Khedive, needing money, sold, in 1875, his shares in the Suez Canal Company to Great Britain for about four million pounds, to the great irritation of the French. They are now worth many times as much. This was a mere temporary relief to the Khedive's finances, but was an important advantage to England, as the canal was destined inevitably to be the favorite route to India.

The extraordinary increase of the Egyptian debt is the key to

the whole later history of that country. The money had been borrowed abroad, mainly in England and France. Fearing the bankruptcy of Egypt, the governments of the two countries intervened in the interest of their investors, and succeeded in imposing their control over a large part of the financial administration. This was the famous Dual Control, which lasted from 1879 to 1883. The Khedive, Ismail, resented this tutelage, was consequently forced to abdicate, and was succeeded by his son Tewfik, who ruled from 1879 to 1892. The new Khedive did not struggle against the Dual Control, but certain elements of the population did. The bitter hatred inspired by this intervention of the foreigners flared up in a native movement that had as its war cry, "Egypt for the Egyptians," and as its leader, Arabi Pasha, an officer in the army. Before this movement of his subjects the Khedive was powerless. It was evident that the foreign control, established in the interests of foreign bond-holders, could only be perpetuated by the suppression of Arabi and his fellow-malcontents, and that that suppression could be accomplished only by the foreigners themselves. Thus financial intervention led directly to military intervention. England sought the co-operation of France, but France declined. She then proceeded alone. A British fleet bombarded Alexandria, and forced its abandonment by Arabi (July 11, 1882). Arabi and his troops withdrew. England then sent an army under General Wolseley, who, with great swiftness and precision, marched from the Suez Canal westward across the desert to Cairo. Wolseley defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir, September 13, 1882, and immediately seized Cairo. The rebellion collapsed. Arabi himself was captured and sent to Ceylon.

The English had intervened nominally in the interest of the Khedive's authority against his rebel, Arabi, though they had not been asked so to intervene either by the Khedive himself or by the Sultan of Turkey, legal sovereign of Egypt, or by the powers of Europe. Having suppressed the insurrection, what would they do? Would they withdraw their army? The question was a difficult one. To withdraw was, in the opinion of the British ministry, of which Gladstone was the head, and Lord Granville the foreign secretary, to leave Egypt a prey to anarchy; to remain was certainly to offend the European powers, which would look upon this as simply another piece of British aggression. Particularly would such action be resented by France, and by the Sultan. The ministry decided neither to annex the country to the British Empire nor to proclaim a British protectorate

over it, but to assume the position of "adviser" to the Khedive, whose power would nominally remain what it had been. Under British "advice" the Khedive would himself carry out the reforms considered necessary for the prosperity and welfare of his country. This policy was expressed by Lord Granville in a diplomatic note sent to the various powers of Europe. "Although," so runs the note, "for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meantime the position in which her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress." A gloss on the meaning of the word "advice" was furnished a year later by Lord Granville in a communication to the British representative in Egypt, Sir Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer. "It should," wrote Lord Granville, "be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and governors of provinces that the responsibility, which for a time rests on England, obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their office."

These two utterances described the anomalous position of England in Egypt in 1883, and they described it down to the outbreak of the Great War. A British force remained in Egypt, the "occupation" continued, advice was compulsory. England was often asked when she intended to keep her promise. No answer was forthcoming. She was ruler in fact, not in law. The Dual Control ended in 1883, and England began in earnest a work of reconstruction and reform which was carried forward under the guidance of Lord Cromer, who was British Consul-General in Egypt until 1907.

In intervening in Egypt in 1882, England became immediately involved in a further enterprise which ended in disaster and humiliation. Egypt possessed a dependency to the south, the Soudan, a vast region comprising chiefly the basin of the Upper Nile, a poorly organized territory with a varied, semi-civilized, nomadic population, and a capital at Khartoum. This province, long oppressed by Egypt, was in full process of revolt. It found a chief in a man called the Mahdi, or leader. who succeeded in

arousing the fierce religious fanaticism of the Soudanese by claiming to be a kind of Prophet or Messiah. Winning successes over the Egyptian troops, he proclaimed a religious war, the people of the whole Soudan rallied about him, and the result was that the troops were driven into their fortresses and there besieged. Would England recognize any obligation to preserve the Soudan for Egypt? Gladstone, then prime minister, determined to abandon the Soudan. But even this was a matter of difficulty. It involved at least the rescue of the imprisoned garrisons. The ministry was unwilling to send a military expedition. It finally decided to send out General Gordon, a man who had shown a remarkable power in influencing half-civilized races. It was understood that there was to be no expedition. It was apparently supposed that somehow Gordon, without military aid, could accomplish the safe withdrawal of the garrisons. He reached Khartoum, but found the danger far more serious than had been supposed, the rebellion far more menacing. He found himself shortly shut up in Khartoum, surrounded by frenzied and confident Mahdists. At once there arose in England a cry for the relief of Gordon, a man whose personality, marked by heroic, eccentric, magnetic qualities, bafflingly contradictory, had seized in a remarkable degree the interest, enthusiasm, and imagination of the English people. But the Government was dilatory. Weeks, and even months, went by. Finally, an expedition was sent out in September 1884. Pushing forward rapidly, against great difficulties, it reached Khartoum January 28, 1885, only to find the flag of the Mahdi floating over it. Only two days before the place had been stormed and Gordon and eleven thousand of his men massacred. Public opinion held Gladstone responsible, and as a result his ministry was quickly overthrown.

For the next decade the Soudan was left in the hands of the dervishes, completely abandoned. But it was certain that the reconquest of the provinces would some day be attempted. Various forces contributed to this end — the national honor, the feeling that Gordon must be avenged, the sense of humiliation that the Egyptian empire had grown smaller under English rule, the conviction that the power that controls the lower reaches of the Nile must, for its own safety, control the upper reaches and the sources, also. And another cause was the pronounced growth during these years, in England as elsewhere, of the spirit of imperialism, eager for an onward march. In 1896 an Anglo-Egyptian army was sent into the Soudan under General Kitchener. Building a railway as he advanced, in order properly to supply

his army, he progressed "very slowly, but very surely." At the battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1898, the power of the dervishes was completely annihilated. Thus the Soudan was recovered, but it was recovered, not for Egypt, but for England and Egypt. The British and the Egyptian flags were both raised over the conquered field. Thus the power of England in the Soudan rested technically upon a different basis than did its power in Egypt.

Egypt and the Soudan were practically declared annexed to the British Empire in 1914 as an incident of the European War. The Khedive was deposed and a new Khedive was put in his place, and Great Britain prepared to rule Egypt as she rules many of the states of India, preserving the formality of a native prince as sovereign. Egypt was declared a "Protected State." This protectorate was destined, however, to end in 1922.

CHAPTER XXVII

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

SPAIN AFTER 1823

We have traced the history of Spain from the downfall of Napoleon to the year 1823, and have seen the restored King Ferdinand VII reign in a manner so cruel, so unintelligent, and tyrannical that the people rose in insurrection and insisted upon being accorded a liberal constitution.[1] And we have seen that as a result the powers, commonly called the Holy Alliance, intervened in 1823 to put down this reform movement, sent a French army into the peninsula, and restored to Ferdinand his former absolute power. This recovery of his former position through foreign aid was followed by a period of disgraceful and ruthless revenge on the part of Ferdinand upon those who had stood out as Liberals, or had merely been lukewarm toward the King. Forced finally by the energetic remonstrances of the French, who had put him back upon his absolute throne, to moderate the frenzy of his wrath, he was obliged to grant an amnesty, which proved, however, to be most deceptive, as it excepted from its operation fifteen different classes. The royal rage was slow in subsiding. Hundreds were executed at the order of courts-martial for the most trivial acts in which there was the slightest tinge of liberalism, such as uttering so-called "subversive" cries, or possessing a portrait of Riego, or defacing an inscription "Long live the Absolute King." Various classes were carefully watched as "suspects," military men, lawyers, doctors, professors, and even veterinary surgeons. Universities and clubs, political and social, were closed as dangerous, yet most of them were entirely innocuous, and little disposed to criticise or disturb the existing order. The University of Cervera, for instance, had begun an address to the monarch with the reassuring words, "Far from us the dangerous novelty of thinking." After closing the universities as inimical to society, Ferdinand endowed a school of bull-fighting at Seville.

Ferdinand VII ruled for ten years after his second restoration,

[1] See Chapter III.

AFRICA
1910
English Statute Mile
European Possessions
German
French
Spanish
under Turkish Suzerainty.
British
Portuguese
Italian
Belgian
Abbreviations:
Nat - Natal
Bas. - Basuto Land
Tr. - Transkei (Kinge Land)
Po - Pondo Land
K. - British Kaffraria
W Gr - West Griqua Land
E. Gr. - East Griqua Land
T. - Tembu Land.
To. - Tongo Land.
SAHARA
Libyan Desert
Nubian Desert
Arabian Desert
EGYPT
ARABIA
NEDJED
Fezzan
TRIPOLI
Barca
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
ITALY
TURKEY
GREECE
Asia Minor
Cyprus
Crete
Rhodes
Mediterranean Sea
BLACK SEA
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Aden
Mauretania
Senegambia
Kaarta
Upper Senegal & Niger
French Guinea
Portuguese Guinea
Sierra Leone
Ivory Coast
Gold Coast
Togoland
Dahomey
Nigeria
Lagos
Kamerun
Gaboon
Congo Free State
Equatorial Prov.
Bahr el-Ghazal
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
Abyssinia
Somali Ld.
Ogaden
Mubia
Kordofan
Dar Fur
Wadai
Bornu
Sokoto
Adamaua
Rabeh
Mahdi
Khartum
Gondar
Harar
Addis Abbeba
Zanzibar
Pemba
Mombasa
Uganda
Nyanza
Victoria Nyanza
Tanganyika
Nyasa
Rhodesia
Nyasaland
Zambesi
Portuguese East Africa
Delagoa Bay
Natal
Cape Colony
Transvaal
Orange Free State
Basutoland
Bechuanaland
Damaraland
Ovampoland
Angola
Benguela
Mozambique
Madagascar
Tananarive
Diego Suarez
Nossi-Be
Comoro Is.
Mauritius
Reunion
Canary Is.
Madeira Is.
Cape Verde Is.
Fernando Po
Prince's Is.
St. Thomas
Annobon
Ascension
St. Helena
Tristan da Cunha
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
Tropic of Capricorn
Cairo
Alexandria
Port Said
Suez Canal
Khartum
Omdurman
Berber
Suakim
Jeddah
Mecca
Medina
Port Sudan
Aden
Berbera
Zanzibar
Mombasa
Lourenco Marques
Durban
Cape Town
Walvis Bay
Loanda
Benguela
Mozambique
Madagascar
Tananarive
Diego Suarez
Nossi-Be
Comoro Is.
Mauritius
Reunion
Canary Is.
Madeira Is.
Cape Verde Is.
Fernando Po
Prince's Is.
St. Thomas
Annobon
Ascension
St. Helena
Tristan da Cunha

ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
Tropic of Capricorn
West Longitude 0 East Longitude
Greenwich
Ascension I.
1815 Br.
St Helena I.
1651 Br.
Founded 1576
Founded 1840
Cape Town
Founded 1652
Cape of Good Hope
Angra Pequeña
Seychelles
Br.
Amirante
Br.
Aldabra I.
Cosmoledo
Farquhar I.
Glorioso I.
Diego Suarez B.
Nohinar
Comoro Is
Mozambique
Mozambique Channel
MADAGASCAR
French Protectorate
1896
Colony
1909
Port Louis
S. Denis
Reunion
1654 Fr
Mauritius
1598 / 1638 - 1710
Neth. 1715 Fr 1810
Br
Amsterdam
St. Marie
1643/1840 Fr
Antananarivo
Tamatave
Andevorante
Tullear
Ft. Dauphin
1642/72 Fr
Inhambane
Lourenço Marquez
Delagoa Bay
1875
Bazaruto I.
Sofala
1505
Quelimane
Lamoeri R.
Mashona Ld
Matabele
1888/94
Gasa
Laird
Bulawayo
Lobisa
Lobito
Benguella
Bihe
Huila
Mossamedes
Porto Alexandre
Gr. Fish B.
Cunene R.
Cuvelai
Cubango
Cuando
Cubango
Cuanza R.
Loanda
Cuanza R.
St Paul de
Loanda
Banana
Boma
Loango
Brazzaville
Stanley Pool
Leopoldville
Kabinda
1885/91
1886/1901
Kwango
Kasai
Kassumbi
Kwangoro
Kwamouth
Kwilu
Kwilu R.
Kwa R.
Kwa
Kasai R.
Lulua
Luluaburg
Lubefu
Lomami
Lomami R.
Lualaba
Lualaba R.
Congo R.
Congo
Stanley Falls
Stanley Falls
Basoko
Aruwimi
Aruwimi R.
Ituri
Ituri R.
Nepoko
Nepoko R.
Welle
Welle R.
Bomu
Bomu R.
Uele
Uele R.
Kibali
Kibali R.
Lado
Enclave
Mahagi
Albert L.
Albert Nyanza
Semliki
Semliki R.
Lake Edward
Ruwenzori
Mt. Gordon
Mt. Stanley
Mt. Speke
Mt. Baker
Mt. Emin
Mt. Wagner
Mt. Luigi di Savoia
Mt. Cameroon
Victoria Nyanza
Victoria Nile
Victoria Nile R.
Albert Nile
Albert Nile R.
Lake Kioga
Kioga
Kioga L.
Kioga R.
Kyoga
Kyoga L.
Kyoga R.
Lake Salisbury
Lake Rudolf
Rudolf
Rudolf L.
Turkana
Turkana L.
Lake Stefanie
Stefanie L.
Lake Baringo
Baringo
Lake Naivasha
Naivasha
Lake Elmenteita
Elmenteita
Lake Nakuru
Nakuru
Lake Hannington
Hannington
Lake Magadi
Magadi
Lake Natron
Natron
Lake Manyara
Manyara
Lake Eyasi
Eyasi
Lake Rukwa
Rukwa
Lake Nyasa
Nyasa
Lake Bangweolo
Bangweolo
Lake Mweru
Mweru
Lake Tanganyika
Tanganyika
Lake Kivu
Kivu
Lake Kisale
Kisale
Lake Kamalondo
Kamalondo
Lake Dilolo
Dilolo
Lake Ngami
Ngami
Lake Liambezi
Liambezi
Lake Chad
Chad
Lake Fitri
Fitri
Lake Leré
Leré
Lake Iro
Iro
Lake Rombo
Rombo
Lake Tsana
Tsana
Lake Abaya
Abaya
Lake Chamo
Chamo
Lake Margherita
Margherita
Lake Tana
Tana
Lake Zwai
Zwai
Lake Abbe
Abbe
Lake Assal
Assal
Lake Alemaya
Alemaya
Lake Haramaya
Haramaya
Lake Aussa
Aussa
Lake Gardula
Gardula
Lake Hora
Hora
Lake Dubbi
Dubbi
Lake Tumbi
Tumbi
Lake Kamaran
Kamaran
Lake Hanish
Hanish
Lake Dahlak
Dahlak
Lake Massawa
Massawa
Lake Suakin
Suakin
Lake Tokar
Tokar
Lake Kassala
Kassala
Lake Gedaref
Gedaref
Lake Sennar
Sennar
Lake Roseires
Roseires
Lake Tendelti
Tendelti
Lake Kosti
Kosti
Lake Malakal
Malakal
Lake No
No
Lake Rejaf
Rejaf
Lake Lado
Lado
Lake Yei
Yei
Lake Juba
Juba
Lake Kismayu
Kismayu
Lake Brava
Brava
Lake Merca
Merca
Lake Mogadishu
Mogadishu
Lake Warsheikh
Warsheikh
Lake Obbia
Obbia
Lake Alula
Alula
Lake Hafun
Hafun
Lake Guardafui
Guardafui
Lake Berbera
Berbera
Lake Zeila
Zeila
Lake Jibuti
Jibuti
Lake Tadjoura
Tadjoura
Lake Obock
Obock
Lake Perim
Perim
Lake Mocha
Mocha
Lake Hodeida
Hodeida
Lake Loheia
Loheia
Lake Kamaran
Kamaran
Lake Hanish
Hanish
Lake Dahlak
Dahlak
Lake Massawa
Massawa
Lake Suakin
Suakin
Lake Tokar
Tokar
Lake Kassala
Kassala
Lake Gedaref
Gedaref
Lake Sennar
Sennar
Lake Roseires
Roseires
Lake Tendelti
Tendelti
Lake Kosti
Kosti
Lake Malakal
Malakal
Lake No
No
Lake Rejaf
Rejaf
Lake Lado
Lado
Lake Yei
Yei
Lake Juba
Juba
Lake Kismayu
Kismayu
Lake Brava
Brava
Lake Merca
Merca
Lake Mogadishu
Mogadishu
Lake Warsheikh
Warsheikh
Lake Obbia
Obbia
Lake Alula
Alula
Lake Hafun
Hafun
Lake Guardafui
Guardafui
Lake Berbera
Berbera
Lake Zeila
Zeila
Lake Jibuti
Jibuti
Lake Tadjoura
Tadjoura
Lake Obock
Obock
Lake Perim
Perim
Lake Mocha
Mocha
Lake Hodeida
Hodeida
Lake Loheia
Loheia

and in the spirit of unprogressive, unenlightened absolutism. His reign is not signalized by any attempt to improve the conditions of a country that sorely needed reform. It is notable mainly for the loss of the immense Spanish empire in the new world, and the rise of the independent states of Central and South America. Practically nothing remained under the scepter of the King save Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines.

Ferdinand's chief interest in the last years of his reign was the determination of the succession. He had no heir. But, assured, in March 1830, that one was about to be born to him, he wished that the child, whether son or daughter, should succeed him. In the case of a daughter, however, the Salic law would stand in the way. This law was not a native product of the evolution of the Spanish monarchy. For centuries the laws of Castille and Leon had permitted women to rule, and one of the great figures in Spanish history was Isabella, Queen of Castille, the patroness of Columbus, who, moreover, upon her death was succeeded by her daughter. But with the accession of the Bourbon line of monarchs the Salic law was introduced. It was a French importation, resting on the decree of Philip V, issued in 1713. As the king was absolute, his decree made it law.

In 1789 Charles IV prepared to rescind this law. A decree was drawn up, called the Pragmatic Sanction, making the change. But this decree was not published, and was known only to a few. Forty years later, in March 1830, Ferdinand VII drew it forth and promulgated it, whereupon Don Carlos, his brother, and the next in the line of succession, if the Salic law were not repealed, issued a public protest and announced his intention to assert his rights to the crown if the contingency should arise. In October 1830 a daughter, Isabella, was born.

The matter now became the subject of court bickering and intrigue, one faction struggling for the withdrawal of the new decree, the other for its maintenance. In 1832 the King fell ill, and, believing his end to be near, and dominated at the time by the supporters of Don Carlos, he signed a paper revoking the Pragmatic Sanction, September 18, 1832. The King, contrary to all expectations, began to recover, whereupon his sister-in-law, aunt of the little Isabella, forced her way to his bedside, berated him for his weakness, had the decree revoking the Pragmatic Sanction brought her, and tore it up.

The King did not change his mind again, and when he died, September 29, 1833, his daughter Isabella, three years of age, was proclaimed Queen, with her mother, Christina, as Regent.

Christina was in power seven years, from 1833 to 1840, when she was driven into exile. During that time the Carlist war and the political evolution of the kingdom constituted the two chief series of events.

Don Carlos, true to his word, refusing to recognize the revocation of the Salic law, proclaimed himself king immediately after the death of Ferdinand, and a war of seven years was necessary to determine whether he or his niece, Isabella, should henceforth be the ruler of Spain. The supporters of Isabella, called Christinos, after the Regent Christina, had the advantage of being in actual possession of Madrid and the machinery of government. They also controlled a part of the army. Don Carlos, on the other hand, was supported by the clergy and nobility, and all who believed in thorough-going absolutism, many of whom considered even the régime of the late Ferdinand too mild. The war between these factions was very irregular and incoherent, and is of little interest. As neither side had numerous troops or large resources, the fighting was carried on in guerilla fashion by small detachments. Local issues entered in to make confusion worse confounded.

Christina had no desire to use her position for the purpose of reforming Spain. "I will maintain scrupulously," she said at the outset, "the form and fundamental laws of the monarchy, admitting none of the dangerous innovations of which we already know too well the cost. The best form of government for a country is that to which it is accustomed." Christina was an absolutist by training and conviction. Yet under her the Spanish monarchy was changed from an absolute to a constitutional one. She saw the Carlists victorious in the north, and even gaining a part of old Castille. She was forced to appeal to the Liberals for support, and to gain them was obliged to grant the Royal Statute of 1834. This established a parliament divided into two bodies, the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. The latter was to be elected by the property owners for a term of three years. The Chambers were to have the power to vote taxes and laws. But the Government was to have sole right to propose laws. Ministers, moreover, were not to be responsible to the Chambers, to rise and fall according to their will, but were to be responsible to the monarch alone. The Crown could summon and dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but a year must not pass without a meeting of Parliament. This statute resembled the French Charter of 1814. It granted a certain amount of individual liberty. It created a parliament which represented

the propertied class, but whose powers were not large. It marks some progress, as by it, by action of the Crown itself, instead of by action of revolutionists, as hitherto, Spain became a constitutional state. The gain, though largely nominal, was something. It did not satisfy the Liberals, but it contributed somewhat to the political education of the country.

The parliamentary history of Spain, opening in 1834, was much disturbed, bewildering and unprofitable to follow. Ministries changed with amazing frequency, parties were more nominal than real, not representing bodies of divergent political principles, but serving as masks for men who were eager to get into office as an easy method of gaining a livelihood. The ministries were short; in twenty-five years, from 1833 to 1858, there were 47 presidents of council, 61 ministers of the interior, 78 of finance, and 96 of war.

The Liberals were divided into two groups, the Moderates and the Progressists. The Moderates accepted the Statute of 1834, which so carefully guarded the rights of the monarch, and gave him such power over the chambers. But the Progressists demanded the far more liberal Constitution of 1812, which clearly proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and made Parliament more powerful than the monarch. As the Carlist war continued unfavorable, Christina was driven to make further concessions. The Constitution of 1837 was accordingly promulgated, more liberal than the Statute of 1834, less liberal than the Constitution of 1812. The Parliament or Cortes was henceforth to consist of a Senate and a Congress, the former to be appointed for life and, under certain restrictions, by the Crown, the latter to be elected by the voters for three years. This Constitution had been framed by a constituent Cortes, whereas the Statute of 1834 was merely a royal decree.

The Carlist war was finally brought to a close, with the help of England and France, in 1840, but at the same time the Queen Regent was driven from the country. Actual direction of the government now fell for many years into the hands of rival military leaders. The war had left the army the strongest force in the state. Isabella II was declared of age in 1843, and the government was carried on henceforth in her name. Her reign, which lasted until 1868, was one, on the whole, of reaction. Adhering tenaciously to the forms of religion, and to the principle of monarchical authority, the Queen was influenced throughout by her favorites, by a camarilla, and did not observe the spirit, and frequently not the letter, of the constitution. Her reign

was marked by absolutism nearly as unqualified as that of her predecessors. Constitutional forms were used to cover arbitrary actions. It was a period of short and weak ministries, court intrigue, petty politics, a period little instructive. Whatever disturbances occurred were vigorously repressed.

In 1861 Spain joined England and France in sending an expedition to Mexico to enforce certain claims upon the Mexican government. Spain and England quickly withdrew from this undertaking, leaving France to embark upon one of the most ill-starred enterprises of Napoleon III. In 1861 also Spain took possession again of her former colony of San Domingo, only to relinquish it a little later as the result of a revolt.

Dissatisfaction with the existing régime, marked, as it was, by arbitrariness, by religious and intellectual intolerance, by abuses and corruption, and by the scandalous immorality of the Queen, increased as the reign progressed. The more liberal politicians and officers in the army and navy, persecuted under this régime, became revolutionary. In 1865 an insurrection broke out, led by General Prim. It was suppressed and Prim sought refuge in exile. In 1866 and 1867 similar movements occurred, likewise abortive. But in 1868 the issue was different. More widespread than the others, and more carefully organized, this revolt resulted in the flight of the Queen to France, and in the establishment of a provisional government, in which Marshal Serrano and General Prim were the leading figures. The reign of the Spanish Bourbons was declared at an end, and universal suffrage, religious liberty, and freedom of the press were proclaimed as the fundamental principles of the future constitution. The Society of Jesus was suppressed.

The Cortes were elected a little later by universal suffrage, and the future government of Spain was left to their determination. They drew up a constitution based upon popular sovereignty, and promulgated it in June 1869. They pronounced in favor of a monarchy and against a republic, by a vote of 214 to 71. They established a regency under Marshal Serrano, to conduct the government until a king should be chosen. This proved to be no easy task. The queen, Isabella II, abdicated in favor of her son Alfonso, but those in power were opposed to any representative of the House of Bourbon. It was considered necessary that the king should be a Roman Catholic; that, moreover, he should be of royal blood. Some advocated a son of Louis Philippe, others a Portuguese prince. Finally, after long negotiations, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was chosen. His

candidacy is important in history as having been the immediate occasion of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. In the end Leopold declined the offer.

At length, November 1870, the crown was offered by a vote of 191 out of 311, to Amadeo, second son of Victor Emmanuel II.[1] The smallness of the majority was ominous. The new king's reign was destined to be short and troubled. Landing in Spain at the close of 1870, he was coldly received. Opposition to him came from several sources — from the Republicans, who were opposed to any monarch; from the Carlists, who claimed that the heir of Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand VII, was the lawful king; from the supporters of Alfonso, son of Isabella, who held that he was the legitimate ruler. Amadeo was disliked also for the simple reason that he was a foreigner. The clergy attacked him for his adherence to constitutional principles of government. No strong body of politicians supported him. Ministries rose and fell with great rapidity, eight in two years, one of them lasting only seventeen days. Each change left the government more disorganized and more unpopular. Believing that the problem of giving peace to Spain was insoluble, and wearying of an uneasy crown, Amadeo, in February 1873, resigned his powers into the hands of the Cortes. In a letter to that body he said: "I realize that my good intentions have been in vain. For two long years have I worn the crown of Spain, and Spain still lives in continual strife, departing day by day more widely from that era of peace and prosperity for which I have so ardently yearned. I am to-day firmly convinced of the barrenness of my efforts and the impossibility of attaining my aims. These, deputies, are the reasons that move me to give back to the nation, and in its name to you, the crown offered me by the national suffrage, renouncing it for myself, my children, and my successors."

The abdication of Amadeo left the nation without an executive. The ministry necessarily disappeared with the monarch, whose servant it was. The Cortes alone remained as a depository of power. In the Cortes there were many Republicans. Feeling that monarchy by divine right had failed in the person of Isabella II, and ought not to be restored by calling either her or her son to the throne, feeling also that elective monarchy had failed in the person of Amadeo, they held that the only alternative was the republic, that, moreover, it was the only form

[1] Sixty-three voted for a republic; the other votes were scattering or blank.

of government consistent with the principle of the sovereignty of the people. The Monarchists, taken by surprise, had no definite plan. The Cortes, therefore, proclaimed the Republic, February 12, 1873, by a vote of 258 to 32, and declared that the constitution should be framed by a convention to be chosen especially for that purpose. Castelar, a prominent Republican, speaking of the fall of the monarchy, declared that it had not been brought about by violence. "No one destroyed it. It died of natural causes. The monarchy died of internal decomposition. It died by the providence of God. The Republic is the creation of circumstances. It comes from a conjuncture of society and nature and history."

But the advent of the Republic did not bring peace. Indeed, its history was short and agitated. European powers, with the exception of Switzerland, withdrew their diplomatic representatives. The United States alone recognized the new government. The Republic lasted from February 1873 to the end of December 1874. It established a wide suffrage, proclaimed religious liberty "in all its purity," proposed the complete separation of the church and state, and voted unanimously for the immediate emancipation of slaves in Porto Rico.

The causes of its fall were numerous. The fundamental one was that the Spaniards had had no long political training, essential for efficient self-government, no true experience in party management. The leaders did not work together harmoniously. Moreover, the Republicans, once in power, immediately fell apart into various groups, of which the principal were those who believed in a centralized republic and those who believed in a federal republic. The Federalists differed even among themselves as to the size of the various units that should form the federation. The avowed enemies of the Republic were numerous, the Monarchists, the clergy, offended by the proclamation of religious liberty, all those who profited by the old régime, and who resented the reforms which were threatened. Also, the problems that faced the new government increased the confusion. Three wars were in progress during the brief life of the Republic — a war in Cuba, a Carlist war, and a war with the Federalists in southern Spain.

Presidents succeeded each other rapidly. Figueras was in office four months, Pi y Margall six weeks, Salmeron and Castelar for short periods. Finally, Serrano became practically dictator. The fate of the Republic was determined by the generals of the army, the most powerful body in the country, who declared in

December 1874 in favor of Alfonso, son of Isabella II. The Republic fell without a struggle. Alfonso, landing in Spain early in 1875, and being received in Madrid with great enthusiasm, assumed the government, promising a constitutional monarchy. The Carlist war was brought to an end in the following year. Thus, six years after the dethronement of Isabella, her son was welcomed back as king. Those six years had been characterized by instability and governmental confusion. The new King had followed his mother into exile in 1868, and had spent the intervening years in study in France, Austria, Switzerland, and England. He was now seventeen years of age. His reign lasted ten years, until his death in November 1885. In 1876 a new Constitution was voted, the last in the long line of ephemeral documents issuing during the century from either monarch or Cortes or revolutionary junta. Still in force, the Constitution of 1876 declared the person of the king inviolable, created a responsible ministry, a parliament of two chambers, a Congress of Deputies, elected by voters meeting a property qualification, and a Senate, consisting of three classes, those sitting in their own right, such as sons of the king, grandees of a certain wealth, admirals of the navy, archbishops, life members appointed by the king, and elective members, chosen for five years by certain corporations, such as provincial legislatures and universities, and by the wealthier citizens. The executive power was vested in the king, the legislative in the king and the parliament. No project should become law unless passed by both houses. Spain possesses the machinery of parliamentary government, ministries rising and falling according to the votes of parliament. Practically, however, the political warfare is largely mimic. The two chief parties in 1876 were the Conservatives, led by Canovas, and the Liberals, led by Sagasta. But they were divided, not so much by principle, as by a desire for office. Parliamentary institutions have been used for purposes of personal advantage rather than for the increase of the national well-being through courageous and intelligent legislation. They constitute a parody on the parliamentary system.

Alfonso XII died in 1885. His wife, an Austrian princess, Maria Christina, was proclaimed regent for a child born a few months later, the present King Alfonso XIII. Maria Christina, during the sixteen years of her regency, confronted many difficulties. Of these the most serious was the condition of Cuba, Spain's chief colony. An insurrection had broken out in that island in 1868, occasioned by the gross misgovernment of the

mother country. This Cuban war dragged on for ten years, cost Spain nearly 100,000 men and $200,000,000, and was only ended in 1878 by means of lavish bribes and liberal promises of reform in the direction of self-government. As these promises were not fulfilled, and as the condition of the Cubans became more unendurable, another rebellion broke out in 1895. This new war, prosecuted with great and savage severity by Weyler, ultimately aroused the United States to intervene in the interests of humanity and civilization. A war resulted between the United States and Spain in 1898, which proved most disastrous to the latter. Her naval power was annihilated in the battles of Santiago and Cavite; her army in Santiago was forced to surrender, and she was compelled to sign the Treaty of Paris of 1898, by which she renounced Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. The Spanish Empire, which at the opening of the nineteenth century bulked large on the map of the world, comprising immense possessions in America, and the islands of both hemispheres, has disappeared. Revolts in Central and South America, beginning when Joseph Napoleon became King in 1808, and ending with Cuban independence ninety years later, have left Spain with the mere shreds of her former possessions, Rio de Oro, Rio Muni in western Africa, a strip of northern Morocco, and a few small islands off the African coast. The Canary Islands are not colonies but form one of the provinces of the kingdom. The disappearance of the Spanish colonial empire is one of the most significant features of the nineteenth century. Once one of the great world powers, Spain is to-day a state of inferior rank, a negligible quantity in this era of world politics.

In 1902 the present King, Alfonso XIII, formally assumed the reins of government. He married in May 1906 Princess Ena of Battenberg. Profound and numerous reforms are necessary to range the country in the line of progress. Though universal suffrage was established in 1890, political conditions and methods have not changed. Illiteracy is widespread. Out of a population of 18,000,000 perhaps 12,000,000 are illiterate. In recent years attempts have been made to improve this situation; also to reduce the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the state. Nothing important has yet been accomplished in this direction. Liberty of public worship has only recently been secured for Protestants and other religious bodies.

PORTUGAL, 1815–1909

Portugal, like other countries, felt the full shock of Napoleonic aggression. French armies were sent into the peninsula in 1807 for the purpose of forcing that country into the Continental System, of closing all Europe to English commerce. The royal family fled from Lisbon just as the French were approaching, and went to the capital of Portugal's leading colony, Brazil. The actual authority in Portugal for several years was the English army and Lord Beresford. Portugal suffered during this period the immense loss of a million in population. After the fall of Napoleon the Portuguese hoped for the return of the royal family, but this did not occur. The King, John VI, was contented in Rio de Janeiro; moreover, he felt that his departure from Brazil would be the signal for a rebellion in that colony, which would result in its independence. The situation gave great dissatisfaction to the Portuguese, whose pride was hurt by the fact that they no longer had a court in Lisbon, and that the mother country seemed to be in the position of a colony, inferior in importance to Brazil. Moreover, Beresford remained in Portugal after 1814, and was the real ruler of the country. The relations between the Portuguese and the English were strained from the beginning. The army was disaffected because it was not promptly paid, and because many of the positions in it were held by Englishmen. An occasion for the explosion of the growing discontent was furnished by the Spanish revolution of 1820. Encouraged by the movement in the sister state, the Portuguese army revolted, and the Cortes were summoned to frame a constitution. This body adopted, in 1822, what was practically the famous Spanish Constitution of 1812, which, as has been shown, was largely the French Constitution of 1791, the ideal of radicals in various countries; which, moreover, possessed the advantage of being ready made. The King accepted it, and Portugal, hitherto an absolute monarchy, became a constitutional one. The King meanwhile had returned from Brazil, leaving his eldest son, Dom Pedro, as regent of that country. In 1822 Brazil declared itself an independent empire, under Dom Pedro I. Three years later its independence was recognized by Portugal.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese Constitution proved short-lived. As the absolutists regained control in Spain in 1823, the absolutists in Portugal also were encouraged to attempt to recover their power, and succeeded. The first experiment in constitutional government had been very brief, but it resulted in leaving a constitutional party confronting an absolutist party.

The death of King John VI in 1826 created a new crisis, which distracted the country for many years. His eldest son, Dom Pedro, was Emperor of Brazil. His younger son was Dom Miguel. Dom Pedro was lawfully King of Portugal. He opened his reign as Pedro IV by granting a liberal constitutional charter introducing parliamentary government of the English type. Then, not wishing to return from Brazil, he abdicated in favor of his daughter, Donna Maria da Gloria. Hoping to disarm his brother Dom Miguel, who himself wished to be king, he betrothed his daughter, aged seven, to Dom Miguel, decreeing that the marriage should be consummated when Donna Maria became of age. He then appointed Dom Miguel regent for the little princess. But Miguel, landing in Portugal in 1828, was proclaimed king by the absolutists. He accepted the crown. His reign was odious in the extreme, characterized by cruelty and arbitrariness, by a complete defiance of the law, of all personal liberty, by imprisonments and deportations and executions. Dom Pedro abdicated his position as Emperor of Brazil, and returned to Europe to take charge of the cause of his daughter. This civil war between Maria da Gloria and Dom Miguel resulted in the favor of the former. Dom Miguel formally renounced all claims to the throne and left Portugal never to return (1834).

Maria reigned until her death in 1853, a reign rendered turbulent and unstable by the violence of political struggles and by frequent insurrections. In 1852 the Charter of 1826, restored by Maria's government, was liberalized by important alterations, with the result that various parties were satisfied, and political life under her successor, Pedro V, was mild and orderly. His reign was uneventful. He was followed in 1861 by Louis I, and he in 1889 by Carlos I.

Of recent years radical parties, Republican, Socialist, have grown up. Discontent during this period expressed itself by deeds of violence. The Government replied by becoming more and more arbitrary. The King, Carlos I, even assumed to alter the Charter of 1826, still the basis of Portuguese political life, by mere decree. The controversy between Liberals, Radicals, and Conservatives developed astounding bitterness. Parliamentary institutions ceased to work normally, necessary legislation could not be secured. On February 1, 1908, the King and the Crown Prince were assassinated in the streets of Lisbon. The King's second son, Manuel, succeeded him. Manuel's reign was brief, for, in October, 1910, a revolution broke out in Lisbon. After several days of severe street fighting the monarchy was

overthrown and a Republic was proclaimed. The King escaped to England. Dr. Theophile Braga, a native of the Azores, and for over forty years a distinguished man of letters, was chosen President. The constitution was remodeled and liberalized. The Church was separated from the State in 1911, and State payments for the maintenance and expenses of worship ceased.

Since 1910, therefore, Portugal has been a Republic. The problems confronting her are numerous and serious. She is burdened with an immense debt, disproportionate to her resources, and entailing oppressive taxation. Although primary education has been compulsory since 1911, a very large percentage of the population over six years of age still remain illiterate. Portugal's population is about six millions. She has small colonial possessions in Asia and extensive ones in Africa, which have thus far proved of little value. The Azores and Madeira are not colonies, but are integral parts of the republic.

Portugal was destined to play a minor but honorable rôle in the European War, side by side with the Entente Allies.

CHAPTER XXVIII

HOLLAND AND BELGIUM AFTER 1830

HOLLAND

We have described the dismemberment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830, and the years succeeding. That kingdom, which included what we know as Holland and Belgium, was the work of the Congress of Vienna, created as a bulwark against France. The Belgians had revolted, and, supported in the end by some of the great powers, had won their independence. Since then there have been two kingdoms.

The old Dutch provinces preserved the name henceforth of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This kingdom, more frequently called Holland in English-speaking countries, has had a history of comparatively quiet internal development, and has played no important rôle in international politics. It has passed through several reigns, that of William I, from 1814 to 1840; of William II, from 1840 to 1849; of William III, from 1849 to 1890, and of Queen Wilhelmina since 1890. The questions of greatest prominence in her separate history have been those concerning constitutional liberties, educational policy, and colonial administration.

The political system rested upon the Fundamental Law granted by William I in 1815. By this the kingdom became a constitutional monarchy, but a monarchy in which the king was more powerful than the parliament, or States-General. By that law, the States-General were composed of two chambers, one of which consisted of members appointed for life by the king, the other of members chosen by the estates of the provinces, which themselves were chosen by voters meeting a certain property qualification. The legislative power of the States-General was restricted to the acceptance and rejection of bills submitted by the Government. They had no powers of origination or of amendment. The budget was voted for a period of years; the civil service was beyond their control. The ministry was not responsible to them, but to the king alone.

Such a system was an advance upon absolutism, but it left the king extensive powers, not easily or adequately controlled,

and rendered possible the personal government of William I, which ended in the revolt of the Belgians in 1830. The Liberals of Holland demanded that this system should be radically changed, and that thenceforth the emphasis should be laid upon parliament, and that parliament should be brought into closer connection with the people. After an agitation of several years they were rewarded with a considerable measure of success. A revision of the constitution was made by a commission appointed by the King, and was adopted by an extraordinary States-General in 1848, the general revolutionary tendency of that time no doubt facilitating the change. By the revised Constitution of 1848 the power of the king was diminished, that of parliament greatly increased. The Upper House was no longer to be appointed by the monarch, but elected by the provincial estates. The Lower House was to be chosen directly by the voters, that is, those who paid a certain property tax, varying according to locality. The ministers were made responsible to the States-General, which also acquired the right to initiate legislation, to amend projects submitted, and to vote the budget annually. Their sessions became public. Later reforms reorganized the provincial estates. Holland is divided into eleven provinces, each with its estates. The principle at the basis of these, of division into orders, or estates, was abolished. They were henceforth to be elected directly by those who were entitled to vote for the popular chamber of the States-General. Properly speaking, they ceased to be estates, and became legislatures in the modern sense, though the old name was preserved. Since 1848 the constitution has been subjected to slight amendments, one of the more important being the enlargement in 1887 of the electorate and the extension of the suffrage practically to householders and lodgers, as in England. This increased the number of voters from about 140,000 to about 300,000. By a later reform, voted in 1896, increasing the variety of property qualifications, the number was augmented to about 700,000, or one for every seven inhabitants. Universal suffrage and proportional representation were introduced in 1917. The Second Chamber is elected directly by citizens of both sexes who are twenty-five years of age or older. The electoral body now numbers over three million voters.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands possesses extensive colonies in the East Indies and the West Indies. Of these the most important is Java. Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes in Asia, Curaçao and Surinam or Dutch Guiana in America, are valuable possessions.

The Dutch colonial empire has a population of about 47,000,000, compared with a population of about 7,000,000 in the Netherlands themselves. The colonies are of great importance commercially, furnishing tropical commodities in large quantities, sugar, coffee, pepper, tea, tobacco, and indigo.

BELGIUM

The constitution adopted by the Belgians in 1831, at the time of their separation from Holland, is still the basis of the state. It established an hereditary monarchy, a parliament of two chambers, and a ministry responsible to it. The King, Leopold I, scrupulously observed the methods of parliamentary government from the outset, choosing his ministers from the party having the majority in the chambers. Leopold's reign lasted from 1831 to his death in 1865. It was one of peaceful development. Institutions essential to the welfare of the people were founded. Though the neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed by the powers, it was nevertheless essential that she should herself have force enough to maintain her neutrality. The army was, consequently, organized and put upon a war basis of 100,000 men. State universities were founded, and primary and secondary schools were opened in large numbers. Legislation favorable to industry and commerce was adopted. Railroads were built. Liberty of religion, of the press, of association, of education, was guaranteed by the Constitution. Foreign relations were prudently conducted by Leopold I, whose influence with other rulers of Europe was great, owing to his extensive acquaintance with European statesmen, his knowledge of politics, his sureness of judgment. Under Leopold I Belgium's material and intellectual development was rapid.

He was succeeded in 1865 by his son, Leopold II, who ruled for forty-four years. The two most important political questions during most of this period concerned the suffrage and the schools. The suffrage was limited by a comparatively high property qualification, with the result that in 1890 there were only about 135,000 voters out of a population of six millions. As the cities had grown rapidly, and as the working classes were practically disfranchised, the demand for universal suffrage became increasingly clamorous until it could no longer be ignored. In 1893 the Constitution was revised, and the suffrage greatly enlarged. Every man of twenty-five years of age, not disqualified for some special reason, received the franchise. But supple-

mentary votes were given to those who, in addition to the age qualification, could meet certain property qualifications. This is the principle of plural voting, and was designed to give the propertied classes more weight than they would have from numbers alone. It was provided that no voter should have more than three votes. This form of suffrage was strongly opposed by the Socialists, a growing party which attempted to secure the recognition of the principle of "one man, one vote," but which was not destined to succeed until after the close of the Great War.

The political parties of most importance have been the Liberal and the Catholic, and latterly the Socialist. The Catholics have struggled to gain sectarian religious instruction in the schools, and have in great measure succeeded. Their opponents desire unsectarian schools.

Belgium is the most densely populated country in Europe. Its population of more than seven millions is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. It possesses one colony, the former Congo Free State, transformed into a colony in 1908.

Leopold II died December 17, 1909, and was succeeded by his nephew, Albert I. Less than five years after the accession of King Albert the Great War broke out and Belgium was its first victim, a very conspicuous and very influential victim, for many reasons, one of which should be mentioned here.

There were in Europe in 1914 about twenty different states. It is difficult to give the precise number, since the exact status of one or two of them was somewhat doubtful. Some of these states were extremely small. There were two petty republics. One was Andorra, located in the Pyrenees, and consisting chiefly of a valley surrounded by high mountain peaks and having a population of about five thousand. Its maximum length is seventeen miles, its width eighteen. Andorra is under the suzerainty of France and of the Spanish Bishop of Urgel, paying 960 francs a year to the former, 460 pesetas to the latter. The other of these republics is San Marino, which claims to be the oldest state in Europe, is located on a spur of the Apennines, entirely surrounded by Italy, and possesses a population of about twelve thousand. San Marino is the sole survivor of those numerous city-republics which abounded in Italy during the Middle Ages. Then there was also the little principality of Liechtenstein, lying between Switzerland and Austria, and having a population of about eleven thousand. There was also in 1914 the principality of Albania, a state which was created by international action in

1912 and 1913, and which collapsed in the following year at the outbreak of the war. But whatever the exact status of these petty states may be, they may be ignored in our survey as, with the exception of Albania, they have not counted in the general politics of Europe.

There were in 1914 three other states which occupied a peculiar position. They were the so-called neutralized states, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland. A neutralized state is one whose independence and integrity are solemnly guaranteed by international agreement. Such states may generally maintain armies, but only for defense. They may never make aggressive war; nor may they make treaties or alliances with other states that may lead them into war. The reason why a state may desire to become neutralized is that it is weak, that its independence is guaranteed, that it has no desire or ability to participate in international affairs, in the usual struggles or competitions of states. The reasons why the great powers have consented to the neutralization of such states have differed in different cases. But the chief reason has been connected with the theory of the balance of power, the desire to keep them as buffers between two or more neighboring large states. Switzerland was neutralized in 1815 at the close of the Napoleonic wars, and its neutrality has never been infringed. Belgium was neutralized in 1831 when it separated from Holland and became an independent state, and its neutralization was confirmed in the treaties of 1839, and was recognized generally by the states of Europe. Luxemburg was neutralized in 1867 when it was freed from its previously existing connections with Germany as an incident to the reorganization of Germany and the establishment of the North German Confederation, after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the famous battle of Königgrätz or Sadowa.

A neutralized state may, as has been said, have an army and a navy and may build fortresses, as long as this is done for purposes of self-defense only, for a neutralized state is obliged to defend its neutrality, if attacked, to the full extent of its powers. Thus, in 1914, Belgium and Switzerland had armies and universal military service. Luxemburg, however, was an anomaly, as the treaty of 1867, neutralizing her, provided explicitly that she should not be allowed to keep any armed force, with the exception of a police for the maintenance of public security and order. Under the circumstances, Luxemburg could do nothing for the defense of her neutrality when invaded in August, 1914. Belgium, however, could and did make a

spirited, though ineffectual, resistance to the invader. Switzerland was not attacked, but nevertheless she mobilized her army at the outbreak of the war and stood ready to defend herself, if necessary. Whether Belgium and Luxemburg, whose guaranteed rights were so poor a protection in 1914, would be neutralized again remained, of course, to be seen.

It was doubtful whether neutralization as an international device could stand the test of history, or not. Belgium's neutrality was observed by its guarantors for eighty-three years and then ruthlessly broken by one of them; Luxemburg's for forty-seven, then broken by the same power, Germany. Switzerland, was destined to be the only one of these specially "protected" states which was to pass unscathed through the Great War, its neutrality respected by its protectors for a full century and more.

From the point of view of recent European politics, the significance of Belgium and of her northern neighbor, Holland, from whom she revolted in 1830, has lain in the fact that they have been coveted by those Germans who have wished to increase the boundaries of the German Empire, and who have, to that end, advocated the absorption of certain territories lying beyond the boundaries of Germany. Belgium and Holland have been desired by the Pan-Germans because of their riches, industrial and agricultural, because of their coastline, abounding in excellent harbors on the Atlantic, fronting England, and also because of their colonies, Belgium possessing a vast African domain, now called the Congo Colony, rich in tropical products, and Holland possessing invaluable tropical islands in the East Indies, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes. The Belgian colony had, in 1914, an area of some 900,000 square miles, an area about a fourth as large as that of the United States, including Alaska, with a population of perhaps ten million. The colonies of Holland or the Netherlands, as that state is officially called, had an area of about 800,000 square miles and a population of approximately thirty-eight millions. The Pan-Germans looked with greedy eyes upon these spacious and inviting territories, belonging to countries which, in a military sense, were conveniently weak. These colonies, and even the countries to which they belonged, were included in the Pan-Germanic dream of conquest.

The history of Belgium during and after the Great War will be narrated in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XXIX

SWITZERLAND

Switzerland in 1815 was a loose confederation of twenty-two states or cantons.[1] These varied greatly in their forms of government. A few were real democracies, the people meeting *en masse* at stated periods, generally in some meadow or open place, to enact laws and to elect officials to execute them. But these were the smaller and poorer cantons. In others, the government was not direct but was representative. In some of these political power was practically monopolized by a group of important families, the patricians; in others by the propertied class. Most of the cantons, therefore, were not democratic, but were governed by privileged classes. The central government consisted of a Diet, which really was a congress of ambassadors, who voted according to the instructions given them by the cantons that sent them. In the language of political science, Switzerland was not a federal state, but was only a federation of states. Its constitution was the Pact of 1815, which was the work of a convention which met in Zurich and whose deliberations continued from April 1814 to August 1815. Switzerland did not have a capital. The Diet sat alternately in three leading cities, Bern, Zurich, and Lucerne.

In Swiss institutions, therefore, the emphasis was put upon the cantons, not upon the confederation. This had been the case during the five hundred years of Swiss history, save during a short period of French domination under the Directory, and under Napoleon. The cantons retained all powers that were not expressly granted to the Diet. They had their own postal systems, their own coinage. A person was a citizen of a canton, not of Switzerland. Leaving his canton, he was a man without a country. Cantons might make commercial treaties with foreign powers. The Pact of 1815 said nothing about the usual liberties of the press, of public meeting, of religion. These

[1] Three of these were divided into "half-cantons," thus making in all twenty-five cantonal governments. A "half-canton" has the same powers in local government as has a whole canton. In federal affairs, however, it has only half the weight. Vincent, *Government in Switzerland*, 40.

matters were, therefore, left in the hands of the cantons, which legislated as they chose, in some cases very illiberally. Several possessed established churches, and did not allow any others. Valais did not permit Protestant worship, Vaud did not permit Catholic. Education was entirely a cantonal affair. Most of the cantons were neither democratic nor liberal, and it remained for the future to accomplish the unification of these petty states.

For about fifteen years after 1815 most of the cantons followed generally reactionary policies. Then began the period which the Swiss call the era of regeneration, in which the constitutions of many of the cantons were liberalized by the recognition of the classes hitherto excluded from power, and now becoming clamorous. The cantonal governments were wise enough to make the concessions demanded, such as universal suffrage, freedom of the press, equality before the law, before discontent appealed to force. Between 1830 and 1847 there were nearly thirty revisions of cantonal constitutions.

The same party which demanded liberal cantonal constitutions demanded a stronger central government. This, however, was not effected so easily, but only after a short civil war, the war of the *Sonderbund*.

As each canton possessed control of religion and education, it had come about that in the seven Catholic cantons the Jesuits had gained great influence, which they were striving to increase. The Radical party stood for liberty of religion, secular education, a lay state. It wished to increase the power of the central government, so that it might impose its views upon the whole confederation. For this reason the Catholic cantons were opposed to any increase of the federal power, and wished to maintain the authority of the cantons untouched, for only thus could they maintain their views. Religious and political passions finally rose so high that in 1847 the seven Catholic cantons formed a special league (*Sonderbund*), for the purpose of protecting the interests which they considered threatened. They regarded their action as merely defensive against possible attack. The Radicals were, however, able to get a vote through the Diet ordering the disbandment of this league. As the members of the league refused to disband, a war resulted (1847). It was of brief duration and was over in three weeks. The victory, which did not cost many lives, was easily won by the forces of the federal government, which were much more numerous and better equipped than those of the league. The *Sonderbund* was dissolved, the Jesuits were expelled, and the triumphant Radicals

proceeded to carry out their cherished plan of strengthening the federal government. This they accomplished by the Constitution of 1848, which superseded the Pact of 1815. This constitution, with some changes, is still in force. It transformed Switzerland into a true federal union, resembling, in many respects, the United States. The Diet of ambassadors gave way to a representative body with extensive powers of legislation.

The federal legislature was henceforth to consist of two houses: the National Council, elected directly by the people, one member for every 20,000 inhabitants; and the Council of States, composed of two members for each canton. In the former, population counts; in the latter, the equality of the cantons is preserved. The two bodies sitting together choose the Federal Tribunal, and also a committee of seven, the Federal Council, to serve as the executive. From this committee of seven they elect each year one who acts as its chairman and whose title is " President of the Swiss Confederation," but whose power is no greater than that of any of the other members. It was recognized that there should be a single capital, and Bern was chosen as such, on account of its position on the border of the German- and French-speaking districts.

Larger powers were now given to the confederation: the control of foreign affairs, the army, tariffs, the postal system, and the coinage. The cantons retain great powers, such as the right to legislate concerning civil and criminal matters, religion, and education.

The new constitution was ratified by three-fourths of the cantons and two-thirds of the voters, and was put immediately into force. It converted an ancient league of states into a strong federal union. It created for the first time in history a real Swiss nation. This is one of the triumphs of the nationalistic spirit, of which Europe has seen so many in the nineteenth century. It is also a triumph of another of the motive forces of the century, the democratic spirit. The reform of the federal constitution in a manner satisfactory to the democratic demands of the time was only possible after a reform in the cantons in the direction of democracy. The cantonal reform movement of the decade preceding 1848 was the condition precedent to the Constitution of 1848.

Since 1848 Switzerland has pursued a course of peaceful development, but one of extraordinary interest to the outside world. This interest consists not in great events, not in foreign policy, for Switzerland has constantly preserved a strict neu-

trality, but in the steady and thoroughgoing evolution of certain political forms which may be of great value to all self-governing countries. There have been developed in Switzerland certain processes of law-making the most democratic in character known to the world. The achievement has been so remarkable, the process so uninterrupted, that it merits description.

In all countries calling themselves democratic, the political machinery is representative, not direct, i.e., the voters do not make the laws themselves, but merely at certain periods choose people, their representatives, who make them. These laws are not ratified or rejected by the voters; they never come before the voters directly. But the Swiss have sought, and with great success, to render the voters law-makers themselves, and not the mere choosers of law-makers, to apply the power of the democracy to the national life at every point, and constantly. They have done this in various ways. Their methods have been first worked out in the cantons, and later in the confederation.

Some of the smaller cantons have from time immemorial been pure democracies. The voters have met together at stated times, usually in the open air, and have elected their officials, and by a show of hands have voted the laws. There are six such cantons to-day. Such direct government is possible, because these cantons are small both in area and population. They are so small that no voter has more than fifteen miles to go to the voting place, and most have a much shorter distance. These mass meetings or *Landesgemeinden* are not unwieldy, varying from 2,000 to 10,000.

But in the other cantons this method does not prevail. In them the people elect representative assemblies, as in England and the United States, but they exercise a control over them not exercised in these countries, and which renders self-government almost as complete as in the six cantons described above. They do this by the so-called referendum and initiative. In the cantons where these processes are in vogue the people do not, as in the *Landesgemeinde* cantons, come together in mass meeting and enact their own laws. They elect, as in other countries, their own legislature, which enacts the laws. The government is representative, not democratic. But the action of the legislature is not final, only to be altered, if altered at all, by a succeeding legislature. Laws passed by the cantonal legislature may or must be referred to the people (referendum), who then have the right to reject or accept them, who, in other words, become the law-makers, their legislature being simply a kind of

committee to help them by suggesting measures and by drafting them. The referendum is of two kinds, optional and obligatory. The optional referendum requires that a law must be submitted to popular vote if a certain number of the voters petition for it. The proportion varies in the different cantons, ranging from a twelfth to a fifth of all the voters. The obligatory referendum requires, as the name implies, that all laws, or certain kinds of laws, shall be submitted without the need of petition. The obligatory form is the more democratic, requiring, as it does, a direct popular vote on every law.

The initiative, on the other hand, enables a certain number of voters to propose a law or a principle of legislation and to require that the legislature submit the proposal to the people, even though it is itself opposed to it.[1] If ratified the proposal becomes law. The initiative thus reverses the order of the process. The impulse to the making of a new law comes from the people, not from the legislature. The referendum is negative and preventative. It is the veto power given to the people. The initiative is positive, originative, constructive. By these two processes a democracy makes whatever laws it pleases. The one is the complement of the other. They do not abolish legislatures, but they give the people control whenever a sufficient number wish to exercise it. The constitution of the canton of Zurich expresses the relation as follows: "The people exercise the law-making power with the assistance of the state legislature." The legislature is not the final law-making body. The voters are the supreme legislators. These two devices, the referendum and the initiative, are intended to establish, and do establish, government of the people, and by the people. They are of immense interest to all who wish to make the practice of democracy correspond to the theory. By them Switzerland has more nearly approached democracy than has any other country.

This system has been mainly developed since 1848, though its beginnings may be found earlier. Its growth constitutes the most important feature of Swiss political history in the last half century. It has been adopted wholly or in part in all of the representative cantons, with the exception of Freiburg. It has also been introduced into the federal government. In 1874 the federal constitution was revised, and at that time the federal referendum was established, and since 1891 a kind of federal initiative exists, that is, the people have the right to initiate

[1] The number is about the same, in proportion to the whole number of voters, as is required in the case of the optional referendum.

constitutional amendments, not ordinary laws, but, as no sharp line separates the two, the power is practically unrestricted.

The Swiss have not only sought by these devices to subordinate the representative system to the higher will of the people, but they have at the same time sought to perfect that system itself by making it a more exact expression of that will. The method advocated to accomplish this is proportional representation, by which minorities are given weight in legislatures in proportion to their numbers. This system has been adopted in several cantons, and its advocates urge its adoption in the others, and in the confederation.[1]

From being decentralized and undemocratic in 1815 Switzerland has achieved during the century a considerable degree of centralization, and has become the most democratic country in the world. It has made great progress in education and in industry. The population has increased over a million since 1850, and now numbers approximately four millions. This population is not homogeneous in race or language. About 71 per cent. speak German, 21 per cent. French, 5 per cent. Italian, and a small fraction speak a peculiar Romance language, called Roumansch. But language is not a divisive force, as it has been elsewhere, as for example, in former Austria-Hungary and in the Balkan peninsula, probably because no political advantages or disadvantages are connected with it.

The neutrality of Switzerland is guaranteed by the powers. From this fact, as well as from its central position, Switzerland has come to play a unique and important part in international affairs. It has become the seat of a number of useful international institutions — the Red Cross Society, whose flag is the Swiss flag with colors reversed; the International Postal Union, the International Telegraph Union. It has also played an important rôle in the international peace movement. It was in Geneva, in 1872, that the most important work of international arbitration of the nineteenth century was accomplished, that which settled the controversy between the United States and Great Britain which grew out of the *Alabama* claims. Since the World War Switzerland has become the seat of the League of Nations.

1 Vincent, *Government in Switzerland*, 75–83.

CHAPTER XXX

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES

DENMARK

During the later wars of Napoleon Denmark had been his ally, remaining loyal to the end, while other allies had taken favorable occasion to abandon him. For this conduct the conquerors of Napoleon punished her severely by forcing her by the Treaty of Kiel, January 1814, to cede Norway to Sweden, which had thrown in its lot with the Great Coalition. The condition of the Danish kingdom at the period of the opening of this history was deplorable, indeed. By the loss of Norway her population was reduced a third. Her trade was ruined, and her finances were in the greatest disorder.

The government was an absolute monarchy. Frederick VI was king from 1808 to 1839. Down to 1830 there was practically no political activity. The people were struggling to recover some measure of prosperity, the government was forced to pursue a quiet economical policy of routine to provide for the urgent needs of the state. The great war debt weighed heavily upon the nation. Not for a generation was it found possible to begin to reduce it.

But after 1830 a liberal movement developed of sufficient strength to necessitate some action on the part of the King. Thinking to quiet it by mild concessions, he established in 1834 four consultative estates — one for each of the provinces into which Denmark was divided — the Islands, Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein. These assemblies were to be chosen for six years by the landed proprietors, and were to meet biennially. They were to have the power to discuss laws and taxes, to present petitions, to criticise the government. But they had no real authority, as they were merely consultative. The king might follow their advice, or accede to their petitions, or not, as he chose. Their meetings were behind closed doors, and their debates were not published.

Obviously, such assemblies did not at all satisfy the demands of the Liberals, who desired a real constitution and a real parlia-

ment. This party had high hopes that the succeeding king, Christian VIII, who ruled from 1839 to 1848, and who came to the throne with a reputation for enlightened and progressive ideas, would launch Denmark upon a career of liberalism, but their hopes were entirely disappointed. The agitation, therefore, continued, and grew so strong that Christian finally decided to grant a constitution, but he died before promulgating it.

His successor, Frederick VII, issued a constitution in June 1849, which was limited to the Islands and Jutland, and did not include the duchies, Schleswig and Holstein. In 1854 Frederick promulgated another constitution, and in 1855 still another. The difficulty was that the question of a constitution was bound up with that vastly complicated problem of the relation of the duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, to Denmark. This problem of the duchies dominated Danish politics during the entire reign of Frederick VII, from 1848 to 1863, never solved, and always highly disturbing. Under his successor, Christian IX, who reigned from 1863 to 1906, the problem entered upon its final phase, leading, as we have seen elsewhere, to the war of 1864 between Denmark on the one hand and Prussia and Austria on the other. The result of that war was the loss of the duchies to the two powers by the Treaty of Vienna, October 30, 1864. The question of the duchies was thus settled as far as Denmark was concerned. For the second time in the nineteenth century Denmark suffered a dismemberment at the hands of the great military powers. This reduced her territorial extent by a third, her population by about a million.

Since that war Denmark has pursued a policy of internal development, undisturbed by foreign politics. A constitution was issued in 1866, a revision of that of 1849, and it remained in force down to the outbreak of the World War. By it a parliament of two houses was established, the Upper House or Landsthing, consisting of 66 members, twelve of whom were appointed by the king for life, the others being chosen by the large taxpayers for a term of eight years; and the Lower House, or Folkething, elected for three years by a wide suffrage.

For many years Christian IX ruled, relying on the Upper House in defiance of the wishes of the Lower. The dispute was over army reform and the budget, and the example followed was that of Bismarck in Prussia between 1862 and 1866. In the end the King was victorious. Constitutional government during these years (1873–1894) really existed only in name. Later the Radical party and, later still, the Socialist, increased greatly in

size and importance. Legislation along radical lines was enacted. In 1891 an old age pension system was established, extended by later laws. All over sixty years, of good character, are entitled to a pension, half of which is paid by the state, half by the local authority. There is no requirement of previous payments on the part of the recipients, as there is in Germany. Education is compulsory between the ages of seven and fourteen. The population of Denmark is over three million and a quarter. The area is about that of Switzerland.

Denmark had, throughout the nineteenth century and down to the Great War, extensive possessions — Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and the three small West Indian islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. Of these the most important was Iceland, 600 miles west of Norway, with an area of over 40,000 square miles and a population of about 80,000. Iceland was granted home rule in 1874, and had her own parliament of thirty-six members. In 1874 she celebrated the thousandth anniversary of her settlement. Since December 1, 1918, Iceland has been recognized as a sovereign, independent state united with Denmark only by a personal bond. Both have the same King, Christian X. The Danish West Indies, the so-called Virgin Islands, were purchased by the United States for twenty-five million dollars by a treaty ratified by Denmark December 22, 1916, and by the government of the United States early in the following year. The Faroes are not colonies, but parts of the kingdom. Denmark's only colony at the present moment is therefore the island of Greenland.

As a result of the Great War Denmark was destined to recover Northern Schleswig, lost in 1864.

The present king is Christian X, who has been on the throne since 1912, having succeeded his father, Frederick VIII, who reigned from 1906 to 1912.

A new constitution was adopted in 1915, and put into force in 1918, introducing equal suffrage in the elections for both Houses, men and women being entitled to vote under identical conditions, the voting age being thirty-five for the Upper House and twenty-five for the Lower. The former now has a membership of 75 and the latter of 149. The system of proportional representation has been adopted.

SWEDEN AND NORWAY

Both Sweden and Norway were affected by the course of the

Napoleonic wars. After the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, by which Russia and France became allies, Russia proceeded to gratify a long cherished ambition by seizing Finland from Sweden, thus gaining a large territory and a long coast line on the Baltic Sea. Later, Sweden, uniting with the Allies against Napoleon, was rewarded in 1814 by the acquisition of Norway, torn from Denmark, which had adhered to Napoleon to the end, and which was accordingly considered a proper subject for punishment.

The Norwegians had not been consulted in this transaction. They were regarded as a negligible quantity, a passive pawn in the international game, a conception that proved erroneous, for no sooner did they hear that they were being handed by outsiders from Denmark to Sweden than they protested, and proceeded to organize resistance. Claiming that the Danish King's renunciation of the crown of Norway restored that crown to themselves, they proceeded to elect a king of their own, May 17, 1814, and they adopted a liberal constitution, the Constitution of Eidsvold, establishing a parliament, or Storthing.

But the King of Sweden, to whom this country had been assigned by the consent of the powers, did not propose to be deprived of it by act of the Norwegians themselves. He sent the Crown Prince, Bernadotte, into Norway to take possession. A war resulted between the Swedes and the Norwegians, the latter being victorious. Then the great powers intervened so peremptorily that the newly elected Norwegian king, Christian, resigned his crown into the hands of the Storthing. The Storthing then acquiesced in the union with Sweden, but only after having formally elected the King of Sweden as the King of Norway, thus asserting its sovereignty, and also after the King had promised to recognize the Constitution of 1814, which the Norwegians had given themselves.

Thus there was no fusion of Norway and Sweden. There were two kingdoms and one king. The same person was King of Sweden and King of Norway, but he governed each according to its own laws, and by means of separate ministries. No Swede could hold office in Norway, no Norwegian in Sweden. Each country had its separate constitution, its separate parliament. In Sweden the parliament, or Diet, consisted of four houses, representing respectively the nobility, the clergy, the cities and the peasantry. In Norway the parliament, or Storthing, consisted of two chambers. Sweden had a strong aristocracy, Norway only a small and feeble one. Swedish government and society were aristocratic and feudal, Norwegian very democratic.

Norway, indeed, was a land of peasants, who owned their farms, and fisherfolk, sturdy, simple, independent. Each country had its own language, each its own capital, that of Sweden at Stockholm, that of Norway at Christiania.

The two kingdoms, therefore, were very dissimilar, with their different languages, different institutions, and different conditions. They had in common a king, and ministers of war and foreign affairs. The connection between the two countries, limited as it was, led during the century to frequent and bitter disagreements, ending finally in their separation.

Charles XIII, the ruler in 1815, having no son, had adopted the French marshal, Bernadotte, as Crown Prince. Bernadotte became king in 1818, and ruled as Charles XIV until his death in 1844. Under him only slight changes were made in the institutions of Sweden. He was opposed to reforms, and earnest in his resistance to the liberal parties. In an economic sense the prosperity of Sweden advanced considerably. Religious freedom was established. The debt was reduced. But the King would not consent to the chief demand of reformers for a radical change in the antiquated form of the Diet. Its division into four chambers played directly into his hands, as he could generally oppose one or two chambers to the others, thus himself exercising an authority practically free from control. The situation remained unchanged under his successor, Oscar I (1844–1859). Under Charles XV, however (1859–1872), this fundamental change was accomplished by the constitutional laws of 1866. The Diet was transformed into a modern parliament, consisting of two chambers. Representation by orders was abolished. Henceforth, there was to be an Upper Chamber, elected by communal councils for a term of nine years. As a high property qualification was required for membership, and as members of this house received no salaries, it really represented the noble and rich classes. The Lower Chamber was elected for three years, but, as a fairly high property qualification was required for voters, it also represented property. Indeed, only about eight per cent. of the people possessed the suffrage under this constitution. Members of this Chamber received salaries. This system went into force in 1866, and remained in force until 1909.

Under the next king, Oscar II, who ruled from 1872 to 1907, the relations with Norway became acute, ending finally in complete rupture. Friction between Norway and Sweden had existed ever since 1814, and had provoked frequent crises. The funda-

mental cause lay in the different conceptions prevalent among the two peoples as to the real nature of the union effected in that year. The Swedes maintained that Norway was unqualifiedly ceded to them by the Treaty of Kiel in 1814; that they later were willing to recognize that the Norwegians should have a certain amount of independence; that they, nevertheless, possessed certain rights in Norway and preponderance in the Union. The Norwegians, on the other hand, maintained that the Union rested, not upon the Treaty of Kiel, a treaty between Denmark and Sweden, but upon their own act; that they had been independent, and had drawn up a constitution for themselves, the Constitution of Eidsvold; that they had voluntarily united themselves with Sweden by freely electing the King of Sweden as King of Norway; that there was no fusion of the two states; that Sweden had no power in Norway; that Sweden had no preponderance in the Union, but that the two states were on a plane of entire equality. With two such dissimilar views friction could not fail to develop, and it began immediately after 1814 on a question of trivial importance. The Norwegians insisted upon celebrating as their national holiday May 17th, the date of their adoption of the Constitution of Eidsvold. The Swedes wished it to be November 4th, the day on which the King, Charles XIII, accepted and promulgated that constitution. The Norwegians then, in 1815, intended to manage their own internal affairs as they saw fit, without any intermixture of Swedish influence. But their King was also King of Sweden, and, as a matter of fact, lived in Sweden most of the time, and was rarely seen in Norway. Moreover, Sweden was in population much the larger partner in this uncomfortable union.

By the Constitution of Eidsvold the King had only a suspensive veto over the laws of the Storthing, the Norwegian parliament. Any law could be enacted over that veto if passed by three successive Storthings, with intervals of three years between the votes. The process was slow, but sufficient to insure victory in any cause in which the Norwegians were in earnest. It was thus, that, despite the King's veto, they carried through the abolition of the Norwegian nobility. Contests between the Storthing and the King of Norway, occurring from time to time, over the question of the national flag, of annual sessions, and other matters, kept alive the antipathy of the Norwegians to the Union. Meanwhile, their prosperity increased. Particularly did they develop an important commerce. One-fourth of the merchant marine of the continent of Europe passed gradually

into their hands. This gave rise to a question more serious than any that had hitherto arisen — that of the consular service.

About 1892 began a fateful discussion over the question of the consular service. The Norwegian Parliament demanded a separate consular service for Norway, to be conducted by itself, to care for Norway's commercial interests, so much more important than those of Sweden. This the King would not grant, on the ground that it would break up the Union, that Sweden and Norway could not have two foreign policies. The conflict thus begun dragged on for years, embittering the relations of the Norwegians and the Swedes, and inflaming passions until in 1905 (June 7th) the Norwegian Parliament declared unanimously "that the Union with Sweden under one king has ceased." The war feeling in Sweden was strong, but the Government finally decided, in order to avoid the evils of a conflict, to recognize the dissolution of the Union, on condition that the question of separation should be submitted to the people of Norway. Sweden held that there was no proof that the Norwegian people desired this, but was evidently of the opinion that the whole crisis was simply the work of the Storthing. That such an opinion was erroneous was established by the vote on August 13, 1905, which showed over 368,000 in favor of separation and only 184 votes in opposition. A conference was then held at Carlstad to draw up a treaty or agreement of dissolution. This agreement provided that any disputes arising in the future between the two countries, which could not be settled by direct diplomatic negotiations, should be referred to the Hague International Arbitration Tribunal. It further provided for the establishment of a neutral zone along the frontiers of the two countries, on which no military fortifications should ever be erected.

Later in the year the Norwegians chose Prince Charles of Denmark, grandson of the then King of Denmark, as King of Norway. There was a strong feeling in favor of a republic, but it seemed clear that the election of a king would be more acceptable to the monarchies of Europe, and would avoid all possibilities of foreign intervention. The new king assumed the name of Haakon VII, thus indicating the historical continuity of the independent kingdom of Norway, which had grown up in the Middle Ages. He took up his residence in Christiania.

On December 8, 1907, Oscar II, since 1905 King of Sweden only, died, and was succeeded by his son as Gustavus V.

In 1909 Sweden took a long step toward democracy. A franchise reform bill, which had long been before parliament, was

finally passed. Manhood suffrage was established for the Lower House, and the qualifications for election to the Upper House were reduced to the point that those enjoying an income of about $1,800 a year were eligible. By resolutions of Parliament adopted in 1918, 1919 and 1921 the constitution was further developed in a very democratic sense. Women now have the same voting rights as men. The voting age for the Lower House is twenty-three.

In Norway, every citizen of twenty-three years of age and who has been a resident of the country for five years, has the right to vote. Since 1913 women have been entitled to vote under the same conditions as men, and since 1915 they have been eligible to the cabinet.

Sweden has a population of about six million; Norway of more than two and a half million.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE DISRUPTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES

The Ottoman Empire, although it had been for a long time diminishing in size and in importance, was still very extensive in 1815. In Asia it included Asia Minor, Syria, the region of the Euphrates up to Persia, and the suzerainty of Arabia; in Africa, it comprised Egypt and the northern coast of the continent as far as Morocco. In Europe it possessed the whole of the Balkan peninsula, and north of the Danube the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. It stretched, therefore, like a huge crescent round the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean from the Adriatic nearly to Spain. This vast empire had been for some time in danger of being conquered by foreign powers. Russia had, since the time of Catharine II, been pushing her way southward, by seizing Turkish soil. At one time it seemed as if Russia and Austria, her two nearest neighbors, would divide the spoils between them, at another that Napoleon would direct his restless activity thither with damaging results. But the interests of European politics had kept these powers otherwise occupied, and had frustrated whatever designs they had had upon the Sultan's possessions. But there was another menace. The immediate danger was not from without but from within. The government of the Sultan was inefficient, its mechanism of control of its agents deplorably defective. The result was that in various parts of the empire those agents were using their power to found for themselves virtually independent states, with themselves and their children as the royal lines. A process of dismemberment was going on in Turkey such as had gone on in Germany in the Middle Ages under the feudal system. A large but loosely organized state was being broken up by the personal cupidity and ambition of its agents into small, compact, and energetic states. Thus Algiers and Tunis were only nominally parts of the empire, and the bond of vassalage attaching them to the empire was not in 1815 recognized by Europe. The Beys were real sovereigns. Thus, in Egypt, Mehemet Ali was really founding an independent monarchy, and his son, Ibrahim, was

already chosen as his successor. The process had even reached European Turkey, and, in Albania, Ali of Janina was endeavoring to accomplish the same thing. The military system of the empire, once the terror of Europe, was now in decay, both in discipline, in leadership, and in equipment. The main object for a century had been defense, and not offense, and even that was beyond the competence of the government.

This empire rested on a fundamental principle which, in the nineteenth century, was to prove a source of great weakness. Difference of religious belief was made the basis of the state. The population was divided into two classes, the Mohammedans and those who were not Mohammedans. The government had never attempted to fuse the two elements, but rather had always sharply differentiated them. The Mohammedans were the ruling class, and they were contemptuous of the others, to whom they applied the name rayahs, that is, unprotected herds destined only to serve.

That part of the Ottoman Empire which lay in Europe was the smallest part by far, yet it has had the most eventful history and has furnished one of the most intricate and contentious problems European statesmen have ever had to consider, the so-called Eastern Question. The Turks in their conquest of southeastern Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had subdued many different races; the Greeks, claiming descent from the Greeks of antiquity; the Roumanians, claiming descent from the Roman colonists of the empire; the Albanians, and various branches of the great Slavic race, the Serbs, Bulgarians,[1] Bosnians, and Montenegrins. Full of contempt for those whom they had conquered, the Turks made no attempt to assimilate them nor to fuse them into one body politic. They were satisfied with reducing them to subjection, and with exploiting them. They left them in a kind of semi-independence as far as administration was concerned, allowing them to retain their civil laws and their local magistrates. These subject peoples were permitted the free exercise of their religion which, for most of them, was the Greek form of Christianity, but they were despised.

1 The Bulgars, whose name is perpetuated in that of the present Kingdom of Bulgaria, were not a Slavic people but a Turanian or Tatar, akin to the Magyars and Turks. Crossing to the south of the Danube in the second half of the seventh century, they conquered a Slavic people previously settled there. But the same thing happened to them that happened to other barbarian invaders. They were assimilated by their subjects, whose language, moreover, they adopted. In language, in religion, in sympathies and aspirations they are Slavs.

While they enjoyed certain privileges they possessed no rights. Their property might be confiscated, their lives taken in some moment of anger or suspicion or cupidity on the part of their rulers. They were flocks to be sheared, rayahs, victims of a government that was arbitrary, rapacious, capricious, and unrestrained. These Christian peoples were effaced for several centuries beneath Mussulman oppression. They bore their ills with resignation as long as they thought it impossible to resist the oppression, yet they never acquiesced in their position. The Turks neither crushed nor conciliated. The subject peoples kept their own organizations which sometime might be used as weapons. There were two causes always present which might at any moment bring about a conflagration, race hatred and religious animosity. There were other forces, also, active from time to time, but these were always present and were alone sufficient to render the Turkish government insecure. The decay of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of Russia, and the vast fame of the French Revolution seemed to indicate that the time had come for revolt. The Serbs were the first to rise, — in 1804 under Kara-George, a swineherd. The Turks were driven from Serbia for a time, but they regained it in 1813. The Serbs again arose, and in 1820, Milosch Obrenovitch, who had instigated the murder of Kara-George in 1817, and who thus became leader himself, secured from the Sultan the title of "Prince of the Serbs of the Pashalik of Belgrade." His policy henceforth was directed to the acquisition of complete autonomy for Serbia. This, after long negotiations and strongly supported by Russia, he achieved in 1830, when a decree of the Sultan bestowed upon him the title of "Hereditary Prince of the Serbs." Thus, after many years of war and negotiations, Serbia had ceased to be a mere Turkish province, and had become a principality tributary to the Sultan, but autonomous, and with a princely house ruling by right of heredity — the house of Obrenovitch which had succeeded in crushing the earlier house of Kara-George. This was the first state to arise in the nineteenth century out of the dismemberment of European Turkey. Its capital was Belgrade.

THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The next of these subject peoples to rise against the hated oppressor was the Greeks. The Greeks had been submerged by the Turkish flood but not destroyed. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries they had experienced a great rein-

vigoration of their racial and national consciousness. Their condition in 1820 was better than it had been for centuries, their spirit was higher and less disposed to bend before Turkish arrogance, their prosperity was greater. There had occurred in the eighteenth century a remarkable intellectual revival, connected with the restoration and purification of the Greek language. The ancient language had become almost extinct for all practical purposes. It was used, indeed, by the clergy and by the learned, but the masses spoke it in a corrupted form, a dialect sadly mixed with all sorts of extraneous elements. Koraes, a Greek scholar, sought to purify the language of the people so that it would be possible for modern Greeks to read and understand the ancient classics, that thus all might be bound together intellectually by a sense of the common inheritance of a splendid intellectual past. He was remarkably successful so that it has been said that what Luther's Bible did for Germany, Koraes's editions of the classics, with their prefaces in modern Greek, have done for Greece. By this work the national consciousness of the people was greatly stirred and vivified. This was shown graphically in the single fact that the Greeks ceased to call themselves Romans (Romaioi), as they had done for centuries, and began to call themselves Hellenes once more.

As in Italy and Spain and Germany, disaffection with the existing state of things was fostered by secret societies. It was such a society, the *Hetairia Philike*, or association of friends, that began the Greek war of independence. This society was founded in 1814 after it had become clear that the Congress of Vienna would do nothing in behalf of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Its object was the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, and the re-establishment of the old Greek Eastern Empire, which had centuries before been overthrown by the invading Ottomans. The society relied upon gaining the support of Russia because of Russia's evident interest in the downfall of the Turkish power as likely to contribute to her own aggrandizement; also because of religious sympathy. The Russians and the Greeks belonged to the same branch of Christians, and Russia looked upon herself, and was looked upon by others, as the natural defender of Greek Christians wherever they might be. The *Hetairia* increased with great rapidity from 1814–1820 until it included most of the prominent Greeks whether they lived in the Morea, in the Danubian provinces, in Constantinople, in Russia or elsewhere. By 1820 it was supposed to have about 80,000 members. Many of the members of this association were

in the employ of the Tsar, a fact which gave great plausibility to its assertion that in the contest it was preparing it would receive the military aid of Russia. The association collected considerable sums of money, bought weapons, and only waited the favorable moment for beginning an insurrection against the Turks.

Thus there was extensive preparation for the war which began in 1821, and lasted until the Greeks had achieved their independence in 1829. During the first six years, from 1821–1827, the Greeks fought alone against the Turks. This period was followed by a period of foreign intervention. The war was one of utter atrocity on both sides, a war of extermination, a war not limited to the armies. Each side, when victorious, murdered large numbers of non-combatants, men, women, and children. The Greek war song, "The Turk shall live no longer, neither in Morea nor in the whole earth," shows the temper in which this people began its war of liberation. During the first few weeks they proved that this was intended to be no mere lyric but grim reality. The Turks who did not take refuge in the garrison towns were murdered with their families. The Turks immediately took their revenge. The Greeks in Constantinople were hunted down by the enraged Mohammedans, and on Easter Sunday, 1821, the Patriarch or head of the Greek Church, a great and revered dignitary of eighty years, was hanged in his ecclesiastical robes in front of the Cathedral, and various bishops were also hanged. Nothing could have more horrified the members of the Greek Church, who looked upon the Patriarch as Catholics look upon the Pope. Nothing could have so surely deepened the ferocity of the conflict. When the Greeks later took Tripolitza, hitherto the seat of Turkish government in the Morea, they rioted in fearful carnage for three days until few inhabitants were left alive, and a Greek leader could say "that as he rode from the gateway to the citadel his horse's hoofs never touched the ground." The Turks replied by the blood-curdling massacre of Chios, whose inhabitants had long been favorably known for their culture, prosperity, and happiness. The statistics are but rough, but it is said that out of 90,000 inhabitants, 23,000 were massacred, and 43,000 sold as slaves.

The war continued, ineffectually prosecuted by Turkey, which seemed at certain moments likely to crush the rebels completely, only to fail to do so by its own incompetence. This period was made still more wretched by the inability of the Greeks to

work together harmoniously. Torn by violent factional quarrels, they were unable to gain any pronounced advantage. On the other hand, Turkey, unable to conquer by her own force, called upon the Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, for aid. This ruler had built up a strong, disciplined army, well-equipped and trained in European methods, a force far superior to any which the Sultan or the Greeks possessed. Under Ibrahim, the Pasha's son, an Egyptian army of 11,000 landed in the Morea early in 1825, and began a war of extermination. The Morea was rapidly conquered. The fall of Missolonghi, after a remarkable siege lasting about a year (April 1825–April 1826), with the loss of almost all the inhabitants, and the capture the following year of Athens and the Acropolis, seemed to have completed the subjugation of Greece. Few places remained to be seized.

From the extremity of their misfortune the Greeks were rescued by the decision of foreign powers finally to intervene. The sympathy of cultivated people had, from the first, been aroused for the country which had given intellectual freedom and distinction to the world, this Mother of the Arts, which was now making an heroic and romantic struggle for an independent and worthy life of her own. Everywhere Philhellenic Societies were formed under this inspiration of the memories of Ancient Greece. These societies, founded in France, Germany, Switzerland, England and the United States, sought to aid the insurgents by sending money, arms, and volunteers, and by bringing pressure to bear upon the governments to intervene. Many men from western Europe joined the Greek armies. The most illustrious of these was Lord Byron, who gave his life for the idea of a free Greece, dying of fever at Missolonghi in 1824. As Greek fortunes waned this movement became more vigorous. The new king of Bavaria, Louis I, sent money and numerous officers. In France, Lafayette, Chateaubriand and others worked passionately for the Greek cause. Money, soldiers, arms, clothing, were sent in abundance by these volunteer societies of the west. Yet all this would have been insufficient to rescue Greece had not the monarchs of Europe brought the immense authority and power of their governments to bear upon the problem. Year after year the governments had refused to move. Metternich was no more a friend of revolution against the infidel Sultan than of revolution against the Holy Alliance. He wished to leave the Christians of Turkey to their fate, to let this revolt burn itself out "beyond the pale of civilization." "Three or four hundred thousand individuals hanged, butchered, impaled down there,

hardly count," he is reported to have said, and for several years he was able to prevent the Greeks from receiving the aid of any foreign government. But the Greeks, by holding out against all odds, gave time for changes to occur in the attitude of other countries.

England's foreign policy finally came under the direction of Canning, a firm friend of liberty abroad. Canning was opposed to the principles of the Holy Alliance. He also believed in the ultimate achievement of Greek independence, and he preferred to have the Greeks friendly to England rather than hostile. He also wished the preservation of the Turkish Empire as a bulwark against Russia in Eastern affairs. He did not wish Russia to intervene alone, and help the Greeks to independence, thus thereafter having the support of the new state. He was also influenced by the fact that English bankers had made heavy loans to the Greeks. It would be wise for England to interfere and bring this tangled question to a close favorable to her interests rather than to leave it to further hazard.

In Russia there was a change of monarchs. Alexander I died in 1825, and was succeeded by Nicholas I. The new monarch did not consider himself bound to the policy of the Holy Alliance. As soon as he saw England likely to take a hand in the Eastern Question his interest was not to let her do it alone. Ought England to be permitted to preëmpt the favor of the Greeks which they had been only too willing all along to give to Russia? Nicholas was indignant at the prospect. Furthermore, the public opinion of Russia was overwhelmingly in favor of intervention to save the Greeks. The motive was not the same as in the western countries, — the desire to extend human liberty, — the memory of Ancient Greece. The motive with the Russian masses was religious, a desire to prevent the Infidel of Constantinople from longer oppressing the members of the Orthodox Church to which they themselves belonged.

In France all parties, liberal and conservative, were united in favor of the Greeks, — the liberals because of the prospect of creating a new free state in Europe, and thus helping undermine the Holy Alliance, the royalists because they remembered the part the monarchy had played centuries before under Saint Louis in the Crusades against the infidels. Politicians also believed that here was a chance to raise the prestige of France in international affairs by the humiliation of Austria which would be one of the results.

Out of all these motives arose the Treaty of London of 1827.

By this treaty the three powers, England, Russia and France, on the ground that the conflict was of general concern owing to the injuries inflicted upon commerce, agreed to demand an armistice of Mahmud II and his consent to the erection of Greece as an autonomous state under Turkish sovereignty, to be therefore practically in the same situation as Serbia. The Sultan indignantly refused the armistice. The three admirals of the allied fleet presented an ultimatum to Ibrahim, which was rejected. The consequence was a naval battle at Navarino, October 20, 1827, a battle which arose accidentally, but which ended in the destruction of the Turko-Egyptian fleet. The issue of Navarino was not the independence of Greece. The Allies had not intended to fight a battle with Turkey, but only to force an armistice upon the combatants, and then to compel recognition of the autonomy of Greece under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The effect of the battle was greatly to encourage the Greeks, to delight the liberals throughout Europe, but to exasperate the Turks to a point where they lost all prudence. The Sultan demanded that the allied powers make ample reparation for the indignity and the damage which they had inflicted upon him while they pretended to be at peace. This was refused, though the new English ministry, Canning having recently died, shortly pronounced the battle of Navarino an "untoward event." The recriminations became so heated that the ambassadors of the Allies left Constantinople. The Allies could agree upon no definite policy immediately after Navarino. England refused reparation yet regretted the incident because it seemed to her that by weakening the power of the Sultan she was playing directly into the hands of Russia. England's policy was hesitating, cloudy, and unwise. She made no attempt to impose the Treaty of London, and let matters drift.

Meanwhile, the Sultan, losing his self-control, called upon the faithful in a violent manifesto to take part in a holy war. This manifesto named Russia as the cause of the whole insurrection, and was full of venom. Russia desired nothing better than a war with Turkey, which she forthwith declared April 26, 1828.

This Russo-Turkish war lasted over a year. In the first campaign the Russians were unsuccessful, but, redoubling their efforts, and under better leadership, they crossed the Balkans, and marched rapidly toward Constantinople. The French meanwhile had sent an army into the Morea, and had forced the Egyptian troops to leave the country and sail for Egypt. The Sultan was obliged to yield and the Treaty of Adrianople was signed with Russia September 14, 1829.

As the outcome of this series of events Greece became a kingdom, entirely independent of Turkey, its independence guaranteed by the three powers, Russia, England, and France. Russia gained a slight increase of territory in Asia, none in Europe. The Danubian principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, were made practically, though not nominally, independent. The Sultan's power in Europe was therefore considerably reduced. In 1833, Otto, a lad of seventeen, second son of King Louis I of Bavaria, became the first King of Greece. A new Christian state had been created in southeastern Europe.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

Russia emerged from the Turkish war with increased prestige and power. It had been her campaign of 1829 that had brought the Sultan to terms. Greece had become independent, and was more grateful to her than to the other powers. Moldavia and Wallachia, still nominally a part of Turkey, were practically free of Turkish control, and Russian influence in them was henceforth paramount. Several years later Russia was emboldened to attempt to extend her influence still further, and this attempt precipitated a reopening of the Eastern Question, and the first great European war since the fall of Napoleon I.

Early in 1853 Nicholas I, of Russia, judging the moment opportune, suggested to the English Government that the Turkish Empire was about to fall, and that it would be well for England and Russia to agree on the disposal of the property. "When we are agreed," he said, "I am quite without anxiety as to the rest of Europe; it is immaterial what others may think or do." He referred to the Turkish Empire as a sick man, a very sick man. The collapse of the Empire he felt to be imminent. It would be wise for the two powers most interested to arrange the division of the estate at once. He suggested that the European territories might be made into independent states, over which presumably Russia would have control; that England might have Egypt and the island of Crete, thus safeguarding her route to India; he himself disclaimed any idea of adding Constantinople to his dominions. The English Government declined to enter into a consideration of the plan, and nothing came of this suggestion of the division of Turkey.

For some time a quarrel had been going on between France, Russia, and Turkey, concerning the control of the "holy places" in Palestine, places connected with the birth and life of Christ.

and therefore of interest to Christians, particularly Roman Catholic and Greek, who were in the habit of making pilgrimages thither. This matter was finally arranged by negotiation, but the very day after the settlement of this dispute Russia peremptorily put forth a new demand upon the Sultan, namely the right of protection over all Greek Christians living in the Turkish Empire, of whom there were several millions. The demand was loosely expressed and might possibly, if granted, grow into a constant right of intervention by Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, that country consequently being reduced to a kind of vassalage to the former. This, at any rate, was the assertion of Turkey. The Sultan submitted this demand to the French and English Governments, which advised him to decline it. At once Russia sent troops into the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, Turkish provinces, in order to enforce the compliance of the Sultan (June 1853). The Sultan demanded that the Russians withdraw from the Principalities. The demand was rejected, and war therefore existed between the two powers, Russia and Turkey. Nicholas expected that the war would be limited to these two. In this he was shortly undeceived, for England and France, and later Piedmont, came to the support of the Turks, and the first general European war since Napoleon's fall began. Russia found herself at war ultimately with four powers instead of with one.

The motives that brought about this coalition against Russia are important. Englishmen looked upon Russia as a strong power trying to maltreat a weak one. They remembered that Russia had been the bulwark of conservatism in 1848 and 1849, that she had intervened to put down the Hungarians, no subjects of hers, who had almost won their independence. Many Englishmen were tired of the long peace and ready for a fight. War feeling was strong among both Conservatives and Liberals. Lord Palmerston, a prominent member of the Cabinet, desired war. A long-standing dread of Russian expansion into regions too near the route to India also influenced the opinion of Englishmen. The French Emperor, Napoleon III, was inclined to war for several reasons. He had a personal grudge against Nicholas I, who, forced to recognize him as Emperor in 1852, had sulkily addressed him at that time, not in the form usual among rulers, of "My Brother," but in the absurd phrase, in this case really insulting, of "My dear Friend." Moreover, the treaties of 1815 were in the main still intact and were a striking memorial of the downfall of the Great Emperor. To destroy these treaties, and, if possible, to requite the humiliation of Moscow, would be

a sweet revenge, and to throw military glory over his newly and trickily won throne would be a manifest advantage and a real pleasure. Piedmont joined the coalition in 1855 for reasons indicated above, hoping to win an influential friend for the nationalistic ambitions of Cavour.

France and England joined Turkey in demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Principalities. The demand was refused by the Tsar. The two powers then concluded a treaty with Turkey, promising military support, and engaging not to make a separate treaty. On March 27, 1854, they declared war upon Russia.

The Turks meanwhile had been fighting the Russians in the region of the Danube. The French and English now joined them. After a confused campaign the Russians were defeated and forced back over the Danube, and, in June and July 1854, they withdrew entirely from the Principalities. The cause of the war was thus removed. England and France had demanded the evacuation of the Principalities. They were now evacuated. But England and France had ulterior purposes, and consequently the war continued. They desired to humiliate Russia, to weaken her decisively, to prevent her definitely from increasing her power in southeastern Europe. Thinking to do this most completely, they invaded the Crimea, a peninsula in southern Russia, jutting out into the Black Sea (September 1854). The importance of the Crimea lay in the fact that Russia had constructed there, at Sebastopol, a great naval arsenal, and that the Russian navy was there. To seize Sebastopol, to sink the fleet, would destroy Russia's naval power for many years, and thus remove the weapon with which she could seriously menace Turkey.

The siege of Sebastopol was the chief feature of the Crimean war. That siege lasted eleven months. Defended in a masterly fashion by Todleben, the Russian engineer, and the only military hero of the first order that the war developed, Sebastopol finally fell after a murderous bombardment on September 8, 1855. Parts of this campaign, subsidiary to the siege, were the battles of the Alma, of Balaklava, rendered forever memorable by the splendid charges of the heavy and light brigades, and of Inkermann, full of stirring and heroic incident. The Allies suffered fearfully from the weather, the bitter cold, the breakdown of the commissary department, and the shocking inefficiency of the medical and hospital service. These deficiencies were remedied in time, but only after a terrible loss of life. The Russians suffered from the absence of roads and from the corruption of

officials, as well as from the weather. It took a month for soldiers to come the hundred and twenty miles from the northern point of the Crimean peninsula to Sebastopol. Tens of thousands of soldiers perished on the march from the various Russian cities southward.

Early in 1855 (March 2), Nicholas I died, bitterly disappointed at the failure of his plans. Throughout the summer of 1855 the state of Sebastopol grew steadily worse. The number of the killed was appalling, over a thousand a day. It was said by one of the victims of this siege "that statesmen who make wars lightly should be taken to see the hospital for incurable cases at Sebastopol." During the last twenty-eight days of the siege over a million and a half of projectiles were thrown into the place. The French excavations were over fifty miles in length. The long agony drew to a close, and on September 8, 1855, Sebastopol fell after a siege of 336 days, a siege which cost Russia probably 250,000 lives, and an expenditure far out of proportion to her resources.

The war dragged on for some weeks longer, but as most of the powers were anxious for peace, they agreed to enter the Congress of Paris, which met February 25, 1856, and which, after a month's deliberation, signed the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856. The treaty provided that the Black Sea should henceforth be neutralized, that it should not be open to vessels of war, even of those countries bordering on it, Russia and Turkey, and that no arsenals should be established or maintained on its shores. Its waters were to be open to the merchant ships of every nation. The navigation of the Danube was declared free. The Russian protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia was abolished, and they were declared independent under the suzerainty of the Porte. Russia was pushed back from all contact with the Danube by the cession of a small part of Bessarabia to Moldavia. The most important clause was that by which the powers admitted Turkey to the European Concert, from which she had been previously excluded, by which they also recognized and guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of that country, and renounced all claim on their part, separately or collectively, to intervene in her internal affairs. This action was taken, it was said, because the Sultan had, "in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a firman recording his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire." This treaty was signed by the representatives of Turkey, England, France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Piedmont.

Thus closed a war which cost several hundred thousand lives. There was an uneasy feeling in governing circles after the war that little had been accomplished by this large and horrible expenditure, and that that little was not likely to endure. Future events justified this premonition. Just fourteen years later, during the Franco-German war, when Europe was powerless to prevent, Russia announced that she would no longer observe the provision concerning the neutrality of the Black Sea, and in 1878 she recovered the strip of Bessarabia that gave her access to the lower courses of the Danube. The promise of the Sultan that the lot of his Christian subjects should be improved was ignored. Their condition became worse. And the guaranty of the integrity of his empire, and the promise of the powers not to interfere in his domestic administration were to ring hollow twenty years later. The Sultan gained in importance from this war; the French Emperor gained military glory and diplomatic prestige; the King of Piedmont was shortly to be amply repaid for his efforts by the aid of Napoleon III in his Italian policy. The Crimean war had this further result that, showing the inefficiency of the Russian government, it was a main cause of the wave of reform which swept over that country in the early years of the reign of Alexander II. As a solution of the Eastern Question the war was a flat failure.

FROM THE TREATY OF PARIS TO THE TREATY OF BERLIN

The Eastern Question was primarily that of the fate of European Turkey. Should that country be preserved intact or should it be dismembered; if the latter, what should be the status of the part or parts taken from the Sultan? By the middle of the nineteenth century the solution of the question had not progressed far. The only part that had become independent was Greece, the founding of which kingdom has been traced. The Greeks, however, were not satisfied with their boundaries and cherished the fervent ambition that they might annex other parts of Turkey in which members of their race were living, and even entertained the hope of Constantinople, the possession of which priceless position formed the very crux of the whole Eastern Question. Two other sections of European Turkey had almost attained statehood, though they were still nominally provinces of Turkey: Serbia and Moldavia-Wallachia. Both aspired to convert a semi-independence into complete independence. In Moldavia-

Wallachia a national spirit had been slowly growing up. The inhabitants, feeling that they were of the same stock, and ought to be thoroughly united, were growing accustomed to apply to themselves the single term, Roumanians. They were proud of their ancient origin, of their language, largely of Latin origin, and of their history. They felt that they were destined to be masters in their own house, not pawns to be used by Turkey or Russia. The impulse toward nationality, so striking and fruitful a characteristic of the century, moved them, as it was moving Italians and Germans. The Crimean war facilitated the realization of their ambitions. Though the Roumanians took no part in the war, they profited by it. By the Treaty of Paris all Russian rights of protection over the provinces were abolished, and though the Sultan still remained their sovereign he promised to grant an "independent and national administration." England and France wished to go a step further, and to recognize the two provinces as an entirely independent state of Roumania. There would be a manifest advantage in that such a state would constitute a buffer between Russia and Turkey, standing right athwart the way to Constantinople, which they believed Russia coveted. But Austria and Turkey blocked this suggestion for the time being. The powers decided, in 1858, in a conference held in Paris that, despite the wishes of the people for union, they should remain separate. There should be two princes or hospodars elected by representatives of the people, but invested with their powers by the Sultan. There should also be an assembly in each, but a kind of central committee should prepare legislation common to the "United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia," as they were officially called. This, of course, did not satisfy the inhabitants of the two Principalities, who felt that they were one in race and language and tradition, and ought to be one in fact. The Moldavians and Wallachians now proceeded to solve the matters to their taste, encouraged in this by Napoleon III, true to his favorite theory of nationalities. Each elected, early in 1859, the same man, Colonel Alexander Couza, as its prince. This double election accomplished the desired result. Thus the Principalities were united *de facto*. Austria was in no position to forbid this consummation as she was then involved in war in Italy. Later the two assemblies were merged into one, and in 1862 the Sultan recognized these changes. Thus the Moldavians and Wallachians had achieved their union, had assumed the name Roumania, and had chosen Bucharest as their capital. But it remained for them to attain complete

independence. They still paid tribute to the Sultan, from whom their prince received his investiture. The new ruler, "Prince of Roumania," a native of Moldavia, styled himself Alexander John I, but he was always known by his family name of Couza. He ruled seven years. They were years of great turbulence. The Prince was in constant conflict with the assembly, and ruled most of the time in defiance of the constitution. He alienated the influential classes of the clergy and nobility or great landowners, the former by confiscating the property of the monasteries, an act later vetoed by the powers unless the clergy should be indemnified, and the latter by freeing the peasants from their feudal dues, and transferring most of the land to them on the condition that they pay for it in fifteen annual installments. This was a beneficial social reform, somewhat resembling the liberation of the serfs in Russia. It created a class of about 400,000 small proprietors. But, of course, it made the nobles his enemies. The masses, on the other hand, thus benefited, were offended by the tobacco monopoly which Couza introduced. A conspiracy was formed which, in 1866, succeeded in forcing him to abdicate. Convinced by this experience that it was unwise to raise one of their own citizens to the position of ruler, the Roumanians decided to call in a foreign prince. They chose a member of the Roman Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family who became Charles I of Roumania. This German prince, who was destined to rule until his death in 1914, was then twenty-seven years of age. He at once set to work to study the conditions of his newly adopted country, ably seconded in this by his wife, a German princess, whose literary gift was to win her a great reputation, and was to be used in the interest of Roumania. As "Carmen Sylva" she was the author of poems and stories, published a collection of Roumanian folklore, and encouraged the national idea by showing her preference for the native Roumanian dress and for old Roumanian customs.

Charles I was primarily a soldier, and the great work of the early years of his reign was to build up the army, as he believed it essential if Roumania was to be really independent in her attitude toward Russia and Turkey. He increased the size of the army, equipped it with Prussian guns, and had it drilled by Prussian officers. The wisdom of this was apparent when the Eastern Question was reopened in 1875. The fact that she possessed an army of the modern type enabled Roumania to play an important part in the affairs of the Balkan peninsula.

In 1875 the Eastern Question entered once more upon an

acute phase. Movements began which were to have a profound effect upon the various sections of the peninsula. An insurrection broke out in the summer of 1875 in Herzegovina, a province west of Serbia. For years the peasantry had suffered under the gross misrule of the Turks. Turkey, almost bankrupt, resorted to heavier taxation, especially of her Christian subjects. The oppression became so grinding and was accompanied by acts so barbarous and inhuman that the peasants finally rebelled. These peasants were Slavs, and as such were aided by Slavs from neighboring regions, Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. They were made all the more bitter because they saw Slavs in Serbia comparatively contented, as they were largely self-governed. Why should not they themselves enjoy as good conditions as others? Religious and racial hatred of Christian and Slav against the infidel Turk flamed up throughout the peninsula. The Balkan peoples also were stirred, as were so many others, by the sight of Italy achieving her independence on the basis of nationality. The Turks did not succeed in stamping out this dangerous movement at its commencement, encouraged as it was by the Slavs of Serbia, Montenegro, and even Austria. Attempts were made by diplomacy to induce the Porte to make concessions sufficient to pacify the discontented Christians. The attempts failed, as the Christians placed no faith in Turkish promises and as the powers were not united in their demands, England rejecting the arrangement that seemed most likely to ensure peace by guaranteeing on the part of the powers the effective execution of the Sultan's promise of reform. (Berlin Memorandum, 1876.)

Meanwhile events occurred in Constantinople which greatly complicated the situation. In March 1876, the Sultan, Abdul-Aziz, was deposed by a palace revolution, and his nephew put upon the throne as Murad V. The new Sultan was shortly found to be, or at least was declared to be, imbecile, and was deposed after a reign of three months. Thereupon his brother, Abdul Hamid II, ascended the throne, a very resolute, subtle, and resourceful man. These rapid changes in Constantinople were due to a recrudescence of national and religious fanaticism in Turkey, to a feeling that Turkey should be for the Turks, that she should no longer be the sport of foreign powers, that she should control her own destinies without intervention. But the intervention of the Christian powers was becoming more and more inevitable because of this very revival of racial and religious fanaticism. They could not rest easy witnessing the

outrages committed upon their co-religionists. And just at this time those outrages attained a ferocity that shocked all Europe.

Early in 1876 the Christians in Bulgaria, a large province of European Turkey, rose against the Turkish officials, killing some of them. The revenge taken by the Turks was of incredible atrocity. Pouring regular troops and the ferocious irregulars called Bashi-Bazouks into the province, they butchered thousands with every refinement or coarseness of brutality. In the valley of the Maritza all but fifteen of eighty villages were practically destroyed. An official report to the English government of what occurred at Batak, a town of about 7,000 inhabitants, indicates graphically the style adopted and pursued. A Turk named Achmet Agha was ordered to attack it. "The inhabitants had a parley with Achmet who solemnly swore that if they gave up their arms not a hair of their heads should be touched. The villagers believed Achmet's oath and surrendered their arms, but this demand was followed by another for all the money in the village, which, of course, had also to be acceded to. No sooner was the money given up than the Bashi-Bazouks set upon the people and slaughtered them like sheep. A large number of people, probably about one thousand or twelve hundred, took refuge in the church and churchyard, the latter being surrounded by a wall. The church itself is a solid building and resisted all the attempts of the Bashi-Bazouks to burn it from the outside. They consequently fired in through the windows, and getting upon the roof tore off the tiles, and threw burning pieces of wood and rags dipped in petroleum among the mass of unhappy human beings inside. At last the door was forced in, the massacre completed, and the inside of the church burned. The spectacle which the church and churchyard present must be seen to be described; hardly a corpse has been buried. . . . I visited this valley of the shadow of death on the 31st of July, more than two months and a half after the massacre, but still the stench was so overpowering that one could hardly force one's way into the church. In the streets at every step lay remains rotting and sweltering in the summer sun. Just outside the village I counted more than sixty skulls in a little hollow. From the remains of female wearing apparel scattered about it is plain that many of the persons here massacred were women."[1] This official estimated that in Batak alone the number of killed was about 5,000.

The Bulgarian atrocities thrilled all Europe with horror.

[1] Baring's report.

Mr. Gladstone, emerging from retirement, denounced "the unspeakable Turk" in a flaming pamphlet called "Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East." He demanded that England cease to support a government that was an affront to the laws of God, and urged that the Turks be expelled from Europe "bag and baggage." The Disraeli ministry dared not lend its support in behalf of Turkey, as it would have liked to do, so vehement was public opinion. It did not, however, intervene in behalf of the oppressed Christians.

Serbia and Montenegro, in July, 1876, declared war against Turkey, and the insurrection of the Bulgarians became general. The Russian people became intensely excited in their sympathy with their co-religionists and their fellow-Slavs. Thousands of Russian volunteers enrolled under the Serb flag. But the Turks were able to overcome their enemies by force of superior numbers. Alexander II did not wish war, but on November 2, 1876, he said to the British ambassador that the present state of affairs in Turkey "was intolerable, and unless Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy, he should be obliged to act alone." He would act, not for self-interest, but solely in the name of humanity. He had not "the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople." Renewed attempts were made to settle the whole trouble by diplomacy. These attempts proved unsuccessful owing to the opposition of the Sultan, who was dominated by reactionary forces, and who felt certain that support would come from the west, particularly from England. He remembered the Crimean war.

Russia, tired of long drawn out and insincere negotiations, declared war upon Turkey, April 24, 1877. She had as allies Roumania, which took occasion to proclaim its entire independence of Turkey (May 21, 1877), Serbia, and Montenegro. The war lasted until the close of January 1878. Crossing the Danube and pushing southward, the Russians gained some successes, and seized one of the passes through the Balkans. But the key to the campaign was the control of Plevna. This place, situated between the Danube and the Balkans, was the center of an extensive system of roads through Bulgaria. The Russians could not safely pass south of the Balkans without controlling this strategic position. They had made the mistake of allowing the Turkish commander, Osman Pasha, to occupy and to fortify it. The Russians made three vigorous attempts to carry it by storm, but were repulsed with heavy losses (July-September 1877). It was evident that Plevna could not be taken by assault

but only by regular siege. Todleben, who had distinguished himself greatly as the defender of Sebastopol in the Crimean war, was now placed in supreme command. By October 24th the investment was completed by an army numbering fully 120,000 men. The siege was slow but was finally successful. On December 10th, Osman surrendered an army of 43,000 soldiers and seventy-seven guns. His defense had been very brilliant. He had detained for five months an army three times as large as his own.

The backbone of Turkish resistance was thus broken. Though it was mid-winter the Russians now poured through the passes of the Balkans, and marched rapidly toward Constantinople. On January 20, 1878, they entered Adrianople. The Sultan sought peace, and on March 3rd the Treaty of San Stefano was concluded between Russia and Turkey. By this treaty the Porte recognized the complete independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania, and made certain cessions of territory to the two former states. The main feature of the treaty concerned Bulgaria, which was made a self-governing state, tributary to the Sultan. Its frontiers were very liberally drawn. Its territory was to include nearly all of European Turkey, between Roumania and Serbia to the north, and Greece to the south. Only a broken strip across the peninsula, from Constantinople west to the Adriatic, was to be left to Turkey. The new state therefore was to include not only Bulgaria proper, but Roumelia to the south and most of Macedonia. Mr. Gladstone's desire for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe " bag and baggage " was nearly realized.

But this treaty was not destined to be carried out. It satisfied no one except the Russians and the Bulgarians. There was much opposition to it in the Balkan peninsula itself. The Greeks opposed it because it cut short the expansion they desired northward, particularly into Macedonia. The Serbs were opposed for a similar reason, as they wished a part of this territory now adjudged to Bulgaria. Many Serbs lived in Macedonia. The Roumanians protested vehemently when they learned that, in reward for their services to Russia at Plevna, they were to cede to Russia a part of their territory, Bessarabia, receiving an inferior compensation in the Dobrudscha, a region about the mouths of the Danube. But more important was the opposition of the powers of western Europe. They did not wish to have the Eastern Question solved without their consent. England particularly, fearing Russian expansion southward toward the

Mediterranean, and believing that Bulgaria and the other states would be merely tools of Russia, declared that the arrangements concerning the peninsula must be determined by the great European powers, that the Treaty of San Stefano must be submitted to a general congress on the ground that, according to the international law of Europe, the Eastern Question could not be settled by one nation but only by the concert of powers, as it affected them all. Austria joined the protest, wishing a part of the spoils of Turkey for herself. Russia naturally objected to allowing those who had not fought to determine the outcome of her victory. But as the powers were insistent, particularly England, then under the Beaconsfield administration, and as she was in no position for further hostilities, she yielded. The Congress of Berlin was held under the presidency of Bismarck, Beaconsfield himself representing England. It drew up the Treaty of Berlin, which was signed July 13, 1878. By this treaty Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania were rendered completely independent of Turkey. The Greater Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano was divided into three main parts, Macedonia, left as a part of Turkey under the direct authority of the Sultan, Eastern Roumelia, as a part of Turkey, but to be autonomous and to have a Christian governor appointed by the Sultan, and Bulgaria, to be still nominally a part of Turkey, but to be autonomous, with a prince to be elected freely by the Bulgarians, the election, however, to be confirmed by the Sultan with the assent of the powers. The various powers were not thinking of Turkey in all this, nor of the happiness of the people who had long been oppressed by Turkey. They found the occasion convenient for taking various Turkish possessions for themselves. Austria was invited to "occupy" and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina in the interest of the peace of Europe. Russia retained a part of Turkish Armenia, which she had conquered, and which included Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum. The Congress also forced Roumania to cede Bessarabia to Russia and to take the Dobrudscha as compensation. This made Roumania the enemy of Russia, as the district ceded was peopled by Roumanians, not by Russians. The powers recommended that the Sultan cede Thessaly and a part of Epirus to Greece, a recommendation only grudgingly complied with three years later. Before the meeting of the Congress, England had induced Turkey to permit her to occupy the island of Cyprus, and in return for this she undertook to guarantee the integrity of the Sultan's remaining dominions in Asia.

As a result of this war, therefore, three Balkan states, long in the process of formation, Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania, had become entirely independent of their former suzerain Turkey, and a new state, Bulgaria, had been called into existence, though still slightly subject to the Porte, and a new district, Eastern Roumelia, was assured a freer life, though denied union with Bulgaria. All this had been accomplished as a result of the intervention of Russia.

The Treaty of Berlin was not a final solution of the Eastern Question. In one of its most important provisions it did not endure ten years. The device of separating the Bulgarians north of the Balkans from the Bulgarians south of the Balkans, in spite of the entire racial and spiritual unity of the two, and the wishes of the two, of attempting also to make the latter forget that they were Bulgarians by the childish device of calling their province Eastern Roumelia, endured precisely seven years. In 1885 the Bulgarians took matters into their own hands, declared themselves united, and tore up this arrangement of the Congress of Berlin, and the powers were forced to look on in acquiescence. The other arrangement of leaving Macedonia in the hands of Turkey simply raised another question, the Macedonian, which from that day on was to be a source of constant uneasiness to Europe, a recurrent cause of alarm, frequently threatening a general conflagration. As far as humanitarian considerations were concerned this disposition of Macedonia was a colossal blunder. The Turks did not carry out the promised reforms, and the condition of the people would certainly have been greatly improved had Macedonia been a part of Bulgaria as provided by the Treaty of San Stefano. This determination of the fate of Macedonia, which was the essential difference between the two treaties, was one wholly deplorable. Owing to the rival ambitions of the western powers Macedonian Christians were destined long to suffer an odious oppression from which more fortunate Balkan Christians were free.

On the other hand, the benefits assured by the Treaty of Berlin were great and unmistakable. Before the Russo-Turkish war the population of European Turkey was about seventeen or eighteen million. As a result of the Treaty of Berlin, European Turkey was greatly reduced, and its population was only about six million. In other words eleven million people or more had been emancipated from Turkish control. This constituted an important partition of Turkey. Yet the powers had, in 1856, guaranteed the territorial integrity and the independence in

internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, a guarantee as farcical as many others made in the course of the history of this Eastern Question.

BULGARIA AFTER 1878

The Treaty of Berlin, while it brought substantial advantages, did not bring peace to the Balkan peninsula. The history of the various states after 1878, both in internal affairs and in their foreign relations, was agitated, yet, despite disturbances, considerable progress was made.

Bulgaria, of which Europe knew hardly anything in 1876, was, in 1878, made an autonomous state, but it did not attain complete independence, as it was nominally a part of the Turkish Empire, to which it was to pay tribute. The new principality owed its existence to Russia, and for several years Russian influence predominated in it. It was started on its career by Russian officials. A constitution was drawn up establishing an assembly called the Sobranje. This assembly chose, as Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, a young German of twenty-two, a relative of the Russian Imperial House, supposedly acceptable to the Tsar (April 1879).

The Bulgarians were grateful to the Russians for their aid. They recognized those who remained after the war was over as having all the rights of Bulgarian citizens, among others the right to hold office. Russians held important positions in the Bulgarian ministry. Russians organized the military forces and became officers. Before long, however, friction developed, and gratitude gave way to indignation at the high-handed conduct of the Russians, who plainly regarded Bulgaria as a sort of province or outpost of Russia, to be administered according to Russian ideas and interests. The Russian ministers were arrogant, and made it evident that they regarded the Tsar, not Prince Alexander, as their superior, whose wishes they were bound to execute. The Prince, the native army officers, and the people found their position increasingly humiliating. Finally, in 1883, the Russian ministers were virtually forced to resign, and the Prince now relied upon Bulgarian leaders. This caused an open breach with Russia, which was further widened by the discovery of an unsuccessful Russian plot to kidnap Alexander.

Meanwhile, the resentment of the Bulgarians of Eastern Roumelia at their separation from Bulgaria by the Treaty of Berlin steadily increased, and in 1885 a bloodless revolution was carried

through which destroyed this artificial arrangement. The people of that province expelled the representative of Turkish authority, and expressed their enthusiastic desire for union with Bulgaria. Prince Alexander was forced to choose between the Russians, whom he knew to be opposed to this aggrandizement of Bulgaria, and his own people and those of Eastern Roumelia, who were eager for the union. He chose the latter and became the "Prince of the Two Bulgarias." It was expected that international complications would result, that Europe would insist upon the observance of the Treaty of Berlin. But the moment for collective intervention was not propitious, owing mainly to the extraordinarily tangled internal political conditions in various countries. The wrath of Russia was great, and was shown in her recall of all Russian officers from the Bulgarian army, leaving the army demoralized in its leadership. Just at this moment, Serbia, claiming that the union of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria would overthrow the equilibrium of the Balkan states, jealous of the aggrandizement of her neighbor, and believing that her army was disorganized, and that the European nations would chastise her for her action in regard to Eastern Roumelia, suddenly attacked her. Bulgaria took up the gauntlet, enthusiasm fired her army, and, crippled as she was, to the astonishment of Europe, she expelled the Serbs, severely defeated them, and invaded their own country only to be stopped by Austria, which insisted upon a treaty between the combatants on the basis of the situation before the war (Treaty of Bucharest, March 3, 1886). Bulgaria gained no territory by this war, but she gained prestige. She stood before Europe in a new light, and the war really founded her unity. In the face of the unanimous desire of the people, it was seen to be futile to insist on the separateness of Roumelia, now swallowed up in Bulgaria. The powers protested against this unification, and would not recognize the change, but they refrained from doing anything further.

Russia, however, incensed at the growing independence of the new state, which she looked upon as a mere satellite, resolved to read her a lesson in humility by organizing a conspiracy. The conspirators seized Prince Alexander in his bedroom in the dead of night, forced him to sign his abdication, and then carried him off to Russian soil. Alexander was detained in Russia a short time, until it was supposed that the Russian party was thoroughly established in power in Bulgaria, when he was permitted to go to Austria. He was immediately recalled to Bul-

garia, returned to receive an immense ovation, and then, at the height of his popularity, in a moment of weakness, abdicated, apparently overwhelmed by the continued opposition of Russia (September 7, 1886). The situation was most critical. Two parties advocating opposite policies confronted each other; one pro-Russian, believing that Bulgaria should accept in place of Alexander any prince whom the Tsar should choose for her; the other national and independent, rallying to the cry of "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians." The latter speedily secured control, fortunate in that it had a remarkable leader in the person of Stambuloff, a native, a son of an innkeeper, a man of extraordinary firmness, suppleness, and courage, vigorous and intelligent. Through him Russian efforts to regain control of the principality were foiled and a new ruler was secured, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, twenty-six years of age, who was elected unanimously by the Sobranje, July 7, 1887. Russia protested against this action, and none of the great powers recognized Ferdinand.

Stambuloff was the most forceful statesman developed in the history of the Balkan states. He succeeded in keeping Bulgaria self-dependent. During the earlier years of his rule Ferdinand relied upon him, and, indeed, owed to him his continuance on the throne. He won the pretentious title of "the Bulgarian Bismarck." His methods resembled those of his Teutonic prototype in more than one respect. For seven years he was practically dictator of Bulgaria. Russian plots continued. He repressed them pitilessly. His one fundamental principle was Bulgaria for the Bulgarians. His rule was one of terror, of suppression of liberties, of unscrupulousness, directed to patriotic ends. His object was to rid Bulgaria of Russian, as of Turkish control. Bulgaria under him increased in wealth and population. The army received a modern equipment, universal military service was instituted, commerce was encouraged, railroads were built, popular education begun, and the capital, Sofia, a dirty, wretched Turkish village, made over into one of the attractive capitals of Europe. But Stambuloff made a multitude of enemies, and as a result he fell from power in 1894. In the following year he was foully murdered in the streets of Sofia. But he had done his work thoroughly, and it remains the basis of the life of Bulgaria to-day. The Turkish sovereignty was merely nominal, and even that was not destined to endure long. In March 1896 the election of Ferdinand as Prince was finally recognized by the great powers. The preceding years had been immensely significant. They had thoroughly consoli-

dated the unity of Bulgaria, had permitted her institutions to strike root, had accustomed her to independence of action, to self-reliance. Those years, too, had been used for the enrichment of the national life with the agencies of the modern world, schools, railways, an army. Bulgaria had a population of about four million, a capital in Sofia, an area of about 38,000 square miles. She aspired to annex Macedonia, where, however, she was to encounter many rivals. She only awaited a favorable opportunity to renounce her nominal connection with Turkey. The opportunity came in 1908. On October 5 of that year Bulgaria declared her independence, and her Prince assumed the title of Tsar.

ROUMANIA AND SERBIA AFTER 1878

At the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, Roumania declared herself entirely independent of Turkey. This independence was recognized by the Sultan and the powers at the Congress of Berlin on condition that all citizens should enjoy legal equality, whatever their religion, a condition designed to protect the Jews, who were numerous, but who had previously been without political rights.

In 1881 Roumania proclaimed herself a kingdom, and her prince henceforth styled himself King Charles I. The royal crown was made of steel from a Turkish gun captured at Plevna, a perpetual reminder of what was her war of independence. Roumania proceeded to create an army on Prussian models of about 175,000 men, built railroads and highways, and, by agrarian legislation, improved the condition of the peasantry. The population steadily increased, and in 1914 numbered about seven million and a half. The area of Roumania was about 53,000 square miles. While mainly an agricultural country, her industrial development had begun, and her commerce was more important than that of any other Balkan state. Her government was a constitutional monarchy, with legislative chambers. The most important political questions in the years before the war was a demand for the reform of the electoral system, which resembled the Prussian three-class system, and which gave the direct vote to only a small fraction of the population. In 1907 the peasantry rose in insurrection, demanding agrarian reforms. As more than four-fifths of the population lived upon the land, and as the population had steadily increased, the holding of each peasant had correspondingly decreased. A military force of

140,000 men was needed to quell the revolt. After having restored order, the ministry introduced and carried various measures intended to bring relief to the peasants from their severest burdens.

Serbia, also, was recognized as independent by the Berlin Treaty in 1878. She proclaimed herself a kingdom in 1882. For many years she had a turbulent history. In 1885 she declared war against Bulgaria, as has been stated, only to be unexpectedly and badly defeated. The financial policy was deplorable. In seven years the debt increased from seven million to three hundred and twelve million francs. The scandals of the private life of King Milan utterly discredited the monarchy. He was forced to abdicate in 1889, and was succeeded by his twelve-year-old son, Alexander I, who was brutally murdered in 1903 with his wife, Queen Draga, in a midnight palace revolution, and the new occupant of the throne, Peter I, found his position for several years most unstable. Peter I was of the house of Kara-George, which had ended its century-long feud with the house of Obrenovitch by exterminating the latter in the murders of 1903. While some progress was made along economic and educational lines, the condition of the country was far from satisfactory. A new and important chapter in the history of Serbia began with the Balkan War of 1912.

GREECE AFTER 1833

In January 1833, Otto, second son of Louis I, the King of Bavaria, became King of Greece, a country of great poverty, with a population of about 750,000, unaccustomed to the reign of law and order usual in western Europe. The kingdom was small, with unsatisfactory boundaries, lacking Thessaly, which was peopled entirely by Greeks. The country had been devastated by a long and unusually sanguinary war. Internal conditions were anarchic. Brigandage was rife; the debt was large. The problem was, how to make out of such unpromising materials a prosperous and progressive state.

King Otto reigned from 1833 to 1862. He was aided in his government by many Bavarians, who filled important positions in the army and the civil service. This German influence was a primary cause of the unpopularity of the new régime. The beginnings were made, however, in the construction of a healthy national life. Athens was made the capital, and a university was established there. A police system was organized; a na-

tional bank created. In 1844 Otto was forced to consent to the conversion of his absolute monarchy into a constitutional one. A parliament with two chambers, the Deputies being chosen by universal suffrage, was instituted. The political education of the Greeks then began.

From the reopening of the Eastern Question by the Crimean war Greece hoped to profit by the enlargement of her boundaries. The great powers, however, thought otherwise, and forced her to remain quiet. Because the Government did not defy Europe and insist upon her rights, which would have been an insane proceeding, it became very unpopular. For this reason, as well as for despotic tendencies, Otto was driven from power in 1862 by an insurrection, and left Greece, never to return.

A new king was secured in the person of a Danish prince, who became George I, in 1863, and who ruled until his death in 1913. That his popularity might be strengthened at the very outset, England in 1864 ceded to the kingdom the Ionian Islands, which she had held since 1815. This was the first enlargement of the kingdom since its foundation. A new constitution was established (1864) which abolished the Senate and left all parliamentary power in the hands of a single assembly, the Boulé, elected by universal suffrage, and consisting of 192 members, with a four-year term. Political parties have been little more than personal or local coteries, struggling for office as a means of livelihood. In 1881, mainly through the exertions of England, the Sultan was induced to cede Thessaly to Greece, and thus a second enlargement of territory occurred. This was in accordance with the promise of the Congress of Berlin that the Greek frontier should be "rectified."

In 1897 Greece declared war against Turkey, aiming at the annexation of Crete, which had risen in insurrection against Turkey. Greece was easily defeated, and was forced to cede certain parts of Thessaly to Turkey and give up the project of the annexation of Crete. After long negotiations among the powers, the latter island was made autonomous under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and under the direct administration of Prince George, a son of the King of Greece, who remained in power until 1906. A new problem, the Cretan, was thus pushed into the foreground of Greek politics, for the Cretans desired incorporation in the kingdom of Greece and would not rest content with anything less. This, however, the powers would not at the time permit.

Greece was not in sound financial condition. Her debt was

MAP ILLUSTRATING
The Rise of the Balkan States
English Miles
HUNGARY
RUSSIA
MOLDAVIA
Bessarabia
WALLACHIA
GREAT
Transylvanian Alps
BUKHAREST
Baragan
Dobrudja
BLACK SEA
Danube Delta
Belgrade
SERVIA
BOSNIA
Sarajevo
Herzegovina
Mostar
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
Little Balkan
Sofia
Philippopolis
EAST-RUMELIA
Thrace
Adrianople
Varna
Shumla
Rustchuk
Silistria
Constanza
Mangatia
Basardshik
C.Kali Agra
C.Emine
C.Iniada
Gef Burgas
Sliwno
Yamboli
Tirnova
Plevna
Shistova
Widin
Kraiova
Orsova
Turnu Severin
Passarowitz
Semendria
Shabatz
Kragujevatz
Ruwanitza
Alexinatz
Nish
Novibazar
Milrovitza
Leskovatz
Prisrend
Köstendil
Vranja
Üsküb
Mitrovitza
Ipek
Durazzo
Scutari
Antivari
Dulcigno
Cattaro
Ragusa
Meleda
Sabbioncello
Bocche di Cattaro
Drakova
Vevrokop
Xanthi
Kirk Kilisse
Tirnovo
Ghaskoi
Galatz
Braila
Reni
Ismail
Kilia
Belgrad
Fetjaps Wall
Sasova
Portitza Mouth
St George
Ternavoda
Ottenitza
Hermannstadt
Kronstadt
Fogaras
Lugos
Temesvar
Nagy-Kikinda
Arad
Hodmezo Vasarhely
Szegedin
Karlsburg
Neusatz
Peterwardein
Vershetz
Resitza
Bakau
T.Okna
Jassy
Pruth
Danube
Save
Drina
Bosna
Narenta
Bosnia
Slavonia
Croatia
Dalmatia
ADRIATIC SEA
Lake Scutari
Drin
Vardar
Maritza
Mesta
Struma
Bosphorus
Constantinople
Gallipoli
Dardanelles
Aegean Sea
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
42
44
46
20
22
24
26
28
30

Proposed Boundaries Treaty of San Stefano
Boundaries Treaty of Berlin
Vilayet Divisions
I Independent Principality from 1878
Kingdom since 1881
II Ceded to Russia 1878
III Austro-Hungarian occupation 1878-1908
Annexed to Austria-Hungary 1908
IV Independent Principality from 1878
Kingdom since 1882
V Autonomous Principality 1878
Kingdom since 1908
VI United with Bulgaria 1885
VII Ceded by Turkey to Greece 1881
VIII Ceded by Great Britain to Greece 1864
IX Since 1889 autonomous,
subject to the Suzerainty of Turkey.
IONIAN SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SEA OF CANDIA
AEGEAN
Cephalonia
Zakynthos
(Zante)
Corfu
(Kerkyra)
PELOPONNESUS
(MOREA)
ATHENS
Cyclades
CRETE OR CANDIA (KIRID)
Cythera
(Cerigo)
Rhodes
Karpathos
Limnos
Imbros
Samos
Chios
SMYRNA
ASIA MINOR
Aidin
Mytilene
(Lesbos)
Andros
Tinos
Naxos
Paros
Amorgos
Ios
Milos
Astropalia
Kos
Leros
Patmos
Mendelia
Lesbos
Tenedos
Dardanelles
Troy
Balikesri
Bigaditch
Kirkagatch
Bergama
(Pergamon)
Manissa
Lydia
Caria
Mughla
Rhodes
Longitude East 24 from Greenwich.
22
26
28
36
38
40

very large, having grown owing to armaments, the building of railroads, and the digging of canals. The country, however, advanced in population and much was accomplished in the direction of popular education. Her parliamentary history has been troubled by incessant factional disputes. During the reign of George I there were over fifty ministries. More Greeks lived outside the Greek kingdom than lived within it. They constituted Grecia Irredenta, which all Greek patriots aspired to redeem.

None of these Balkan states was satisfied with its existing boundaries. Roumania wished to include in the kingdom the Roumanians of Russian Bessarabia, and of eastern Hungary. The Serbs dreamed of a Greater Serbia, to include those of their race in Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern Hungary. Bulgarians desired the annexation of parts of Macedonia, or all of it. The Greeks desired Macedonia and Crete. They dreamed of a Greater Greece, dominating the Ægean.

Serb, Bulgarian, and Greek rivalries met in the plains of Macedonia, which each country coveted, and which was inhabited by representatives of all these peoples hopelessly intermixed. The problem of Macedonia was further complicated by the rivalry of the great powers, and by the revolution which broke out in Turkey itself in 1908.

REVOLUTION IN TURKEY

The Eastern Question entered upon a new and startling phase in the summer of 1908. In July a swift, sweeping, and pacific revolution occurred in Turkey. The Young Turks, a liberal, revolutionary, constitutional party, imbued, it was supposed, with the political principles of western Europe, seized control of the government, to the complete surprise of the diplomatists and public of Europe. This party consisted of those who had been driven from Turkey by the despotism of the Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, and were resident abroad, chiefly in Paris, and of those who, still living in Turkey, dissembled their opinions and were able to escape expulsion. Its members desired the overthrow of the despotic, corrupt, and inefficient government, and the creation in its place of a modern liberal system, capable, by varied and thoroughgoing reforms, of ranging Turkey among progressive nations. Weaving their conspiracy in silence and with remarkable adroitness, they succeeded in drawing into it the Turkish army, hitherto the solid bulwark of the Sultan's

power. Then, at the ripe moment, the army refused to obey the Sultan's orders, and the conspirators demanded peremptorily by telegraph that the Sultan restore the Constitution of 1876, a constitution granted by the Sultan in that year merely to enable him to weather a crisis, and which, having quickly served the purpose, had been immediately suspended and had remained suspended ever since. The Sultan, seeing the ominous defection of the army, complied at once with the demands of the Young Turks, "restored" on July 24th the Constitution of 1876, and ordered elections for a parliament, which should meet in November. Thus an odious tyranny was instantly swept away. It was a veritable coup d'état, this time effected, not by some would-be autocrat, but by the army, usually the chief support of despotism or of the authority of the monarch, now, apparently, the chief instrument for the achievement of freedom for the democracy. This military revolution, completely successful and almost bloodless, was received with incredible enthusiasm throughout the entire breadth of the Sultan's dominions. Insurgents and soldiers, Mohammedans and Christians, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Armenians, Turks, all joined in jubilant celebrations of the release from intolerable conditions. The most astonishing feature was the complete subsidence of the racial and religious hatreds which had hitherto torn and ravaged the Empire from end to end. The revolution proved to be the most fraternal movement in modern history. Picturesque and memorable were the scenes of universal reconciliation. The ease and suddenness with which this astounding change was effected proved the universality of the detestation of the reign and methods of Abdul Hamid II throughout all his provinces and among all his peoples.

Was this the beginning of a new era or was it the beginning of the end of the Turkish Empire? It will be more convenient to examine this question a little later.

CHAPTER XXXII

RUSSIA TO THE WAR WITH JAPAN

THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER I

Russia in 1815 was the largest state in Europe, and was a still larger Asiatic empire. It extended in unbroken stretch from the German Confederation to the Pacific Ocean. Its population was about 45,000,000. Its European territory covered about 2,000,000 square miles. It was inhabited by a variety of races, but the principal one was the Slavic. Though there were many religions, the religion of the court and of more than two-thirds of the population was the so-called Greek Orthodox form of Christianity. Though various languages were spoken, Russian was the chief one. The Russians had conquered many peoples in various directions. A considerable part of the former Kingdom of Poland had been acquired in the three partitions at the close of the eighteenth century, and more in 1815. Here the people spoke a different language, the Polish, and adhered to a different religion, the Roman Catholic. In the Baltic provinces, Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland, the upper class was of German origin and spoke the German language, while the mass of peasants were Finns and Lithuanians, speaking different tongues. All the inhabitants were Lutherans. Finland had recently been conquered from Sweden. The languages spoken there were Swedish and Finnish, and the religion was Lutheran. To the east and south were peoples of Asiatic origin, many of them Mohammedans in religion. There were in certain sections considerable bodies of Jews.

All these dissimilar elements were bound together by their allegiance to the sovereign, the Tsar, a monarch of absolute, unlimited power. There were two classes of society in Russia — the nobility and the peasantry. The large majority of the latter were serfs of the Tsar and the nobility. The nobility numbered about 140,000 families. Some of the nobles were very wealthy. It is estimated that 1,500 of them possessed more than a thousand serfs each, that 2,000 others possessed over five hundred each, while 17,000 possessed more than two hundred

each. But more than four-fifths of them, that is, about 120,000, were quite poor, with only a few serfs each. The nobles secured offices in the army and the civil service. They were exempt from many taxes, and enjoyed certain monopolies. Their power over their serfs was extensive and despotic. They enforced obedience to their orders by the knout and by banishment to Siberia. The middle class of well-to-do and educated bourgeois, increasingly important in the other countries of Europe, practically did not exist in Russia. Russia was an agricultural country, whose agriculture, moreover, was very primitive and inefficient. It was a nation of serfs and of peasants little better off than the serfs. This class was wretched, uneducated, indolent, prone to drink excessively. In the "mir," or village community, however, it possessed a rudimentary form of communism and limited self-government.

Over this vast and ill-equipped nation ruled the Autocrat of All the Russias, or Tsar, an absolute monarch, whose decisions, expressed in the form of ukases or decrees, were the law of the land. The ruler in 1815 was Alexander I, a man thirty-eight years of age. Ascending the throne in 1801, he played a commanding rôle in the later Napoleonic era. Under him Russia took a leading part in the politics and wars of Europe. Allied with Napoleon in 1807, he broke away from him in 1811, and from that time was his constant and powerful foe. In early life he had had as tutor Colonel Laharpe, a Swiss, who inspired principles of liberalism and humanitarianism in the mind of his quick and receptive pupil. For several years after his accession he followed a progressive and reforming policy. The times, however, were not propitious for any sweeping changes. From 1805 to 1815 Russia was almost incessantly at war, and it is estimated that she lost in these wars nearly a million and a quarter of men, most of whom died from sickness or the privations of war, rather than in battle. The national debt and the burden of taxation had necessarily been immensely augmented. Moreover, blocking the way of reform was an administrative service thoroughly honeycombed with corruption, so that even the official historian of the period after 1815 could only say, "Everything was corrupt, everything unjust, everything dishonest." Such conditions constituted a serious restraint upon the initiative and work of the ruler.

In 1815 Alexander I stood forth as the most liberal sovereign on any of the great thrones of Europe. In the reorganization of Europe in 1814 and 1815 he was, on the whole, a liberal force.

He it was who insisted upon reasonably generous terms to France, on the part of the victorious allies; who insisted that Louis XVIII should grant constitutional liberties to the French people; who, at the Congress of Vienna, favored, though ineffectually, the aspirations of the German people for a larger political life.

He showed his liberal tendencies even more unmistakably in his Polish policy. He succeeded at the Congress of Vienna in securing most of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he now transformed into the Kingdom of Poland. This was a state of 3,000,000 inhabitants, with an area less than one-sixth the size of the former Polish kingdom, but containing the Polish capital, Warsaw. This was henceforth to be an independent kingdom, not a part of Russia. The only connection between the two was in the person of the ruler. The Tsar of Russia was to be King of Poland. Alexander intended to make this revived, though incomplete, Poland, a constitutional state. He granted a constitution in 1815, which created a Diet of two chambers, to meet every two years, and to have the power to make laws and to examine the budget. He granted liberty of the press and of religion. The Polish language was to be the official language in the administration and in the army. Poland enjoyed freer institutions at this moment than did either Prussia or Austria. The franchise was wider than that of England or France. Apparently, also, Alexander considered his Polish experiment as preliminary to an introduction of similar reforms in Russia also.

Returning to Russia from Warsaw, Alexander showed in many ways his desire to be a progressive and beneficent ruler. He thought much on what was long the fundamental problem of Russia, the emancipation of the serfs. There were 16,000,000 peasants on the vast domains that belonged to the Crown alone. The condition of these he sought to improve. But the general problem was so vast, his own will so unsteady, that it was solved neither by him nor by his successor. It was, however, a fact of importance that a Tsar had conspicuously indicated that this was the great national evil, which must be removed before Russia could become either free or progressive. The Emperor's opinion could not fail to have a formative influence. Alexander devoted his attention also to healing the wounds and repairing the waste of the long wars. His activity was incessant and varied. He endeavored to make the administration efficient, and to hunt out and punish corruption, which had flourished abundantly during

his long absences and his preoccupation with foreign affairs and war, but his success was slight. Prison reform was undertaken. Hospitals and asylums received generous support. That famine might be avoided, in a country where transportation was very difficult owing to poor roads, he gave orders for the establishment in every district of magazines of corn. He encouraged foreign commerce.

In foreign policy, also, Alexander threw his influence on the side of liberalism, in France, in Germany, in Italy, even in Spain; supporting through his agents in those countries those who wished constitutional forms of government. Consequently, for some time, he was the main obstacle in the path of Metternich, the apostle of reaction. As Metternich, however, possessed the stronger character, and as Alexander was easily discouraged, the result of their rivalry was ultimately the triumph of the former. Metternich had exercised little influence over Alexander at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, but three years later, at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, he ceaselessly played upon the Emperor's essentially timid nature, pointing out the significance of liberalism, how it ended in anarchy, the loss of respect of all human authority, how in the interest of civilization it must be stamped out. Illustrations were forthcoming to point the argument; the election of Radicals to the French Chamber of Deputies; the actions of the German students; the murder of Kotzebue, one of the Tsar's own agents; the mutiny of one of the St. Petersburg regiments; the spread of secret societies. The Tsar was won to a policy of repression, and his support was after 1818 the main bulwark of Metternich's policy of intervention, which expressed itself in the various congresses and which made the name of the Holy Alliance a by-word among liberals. Events at home further altered the Tsar's domestic policy. He became disappointed over the failure of his attempts to give Poland constitutional liberty. Those attempts were always unpopular in Russia. Why should Poland, the old and dangerous enemy, be favored by generous concessions not awarded to Russia herself? Would not such liberty be used simply to build up the former nation to the detriment of Russia? Russian absolutists and reactionaries were opposed on principle to all constitutions, and feared that the Tsar's experiment might be a step toward the introduction of a constitutional régime in Russia itself. The actions of the Poles served this party well, for they took their liberties seriously, and the Diet criticised freely the proposals of the Government. The Tsar, feeling that those whom he had

favored were ungrateful, and swinging to the conservative side in general, began to cool. The Diet rejected in 1820 a measure submitted by the Government. Alexander then modified the constitution, and restricted the freedom he had granted by excluding the public from the sessions of the Diet and forbidding the publication of its debates. The liberal period of a brief five years was soon over.

The Poles replied by conspiring. Profoundly depressed by what he regarded as the ingratitude of the world, and skilfully terrified by Metternich's analysis of the unrest of the times, Alexander became more and more reactionary, and when he died, on December 1, 1825, he left an administration dominated by a totally different spirit from that which had prevailed in the earlier years. The period from 1820 to 1825 was one of reaction and repression throughout his dominions.

THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS I

Alexander left no son to succeed him. His nearest heir was his brother Constantine, who, however, had secretly renounced the crown. Alexander had designated his younger brother, Nicholas, as his successor. The documents, however, making this disposition had never been published. The result was confusion and uncertainty for some weeks. Nicholas refused to mount the throne, and took the oath of allegiance to Constantine. Some days elapsed before Constantine renounced his rights publicly. The opportunity was seized by many malcontents and by the secret societies which had grown up under Alexander. They attempted to effect a revolution, whose precise aim was not clear. This was finally put down by bloodshed in the streets of St. Petersburg. Punishment was meted out to the ringleaders with great severity. Several were hanged, others were banished to the Ural mines or to Siberia. This revolt of December (1825) only strengthened the hold of absolutism upon Russia by deepening the hostility of the new ruler to all liberalism, associated in his mind with disloyalty and anarchy.

Nicholas I was in his thirtieth year at the time of his accession. His reign covered a generation, 1825–1855, and was eventful. His training had not been in politics or administration, but in the army. His mind was practical, narrow, rigid, and exceedingly conservative. He sought to eradicate abuses wherever he discovered them, but in so vast and centralized yet ill-compacted an empire it was impossible for the Emperor to

control effectively the details of the government. His policy was uncompromisingly absolutistic, both at home and abroad. He was the great bulwark of monarchical authority in Europe for thirty years. He carried out systematically and persistently that scheme of reaction into which Alexander had drifted during the closing years of his reign. He sought to give an entirely Russian tone to every aspect of Russian life. His predecessors since Peter the Great had sought Russia's advancement in imitation of western Europe, in the introduction of western customs and ideals and institutions. Nicholas planted himself right athwart this traditional tendency. Russia must be self-sufficient; must find within herself the fundamental, active principles of her life.

For thirty years a system of remorseless, undeviating repression was steadily carried out. The two principal instruments employed were the secret police and the censorship. The former, under the name of the Third Section, possessed practically unlimited powers of life and death, could arrest, imprison, exile, or execute without let or hindrance. The censorship was elaborately and minutely organized, and was most effective in stamping out freedom of the press and of speech, though making itself ridiculous by the senseless zeal with which it pursued its work. Musical notes were investigated on the ground that conspirators might be using them as ciphers for malevolent purposes. It was decreed that books on anatomy and physiology should contain nothing that could offend the sense of decency. Punishments were of great severity. The most harmless word might mean exile to Siberia, without any kind of preliminary trial. The rigor of this régime increased as the reign wore on. To rivet it still tighter, that vigilance should never sleep, a committee was appointed in 1848 to watch over the censors, and later another committee to watch over the first. It has been estimated that in the twenty years between 1832 and 1852 probably 150,000 persons were exiled to Siberia, suffering fearful hardships on the way and after arrival, condemned, as they generally were, to work in the mines. In addition, tens of thousands languished in the prisons of Russia.

Needless to say, under such a system no such thing as a free press or a free reading public could possibly exist. In 1843 all the Russian journals combined did not have more than 12,000 subscribers. That Russians might not be contaminated by the pernicious liberal ideas of the west, their travel abroad was greatly restricted by a system of passports. These pass-

ports were expensive, and were only granted on the consent of the sovereign, and then only for a maximum period of five years. Any one outstaying the time permitted might have his property in Russia confiscated. On the other hand, the travel in Russia of foreigners was elaborately discouraged. Such travelers must obtain passports from the Russian government, must explain why they were visiting that country, and during their entire sojourn were under police surveillance.

Foreign literature of a liberal nature was rigorously excluded. While Nicholas I encouraged Russian literature in the forms that seemed harmless, while his reign was called the "Augustan age of Russia," rendered notable by the poetry of Pushkin, the novels of Dostoievski, Turgenieff, and Gogol, while he encouraged research in lines which he considered legitimate, and showed his humanitarianism by abolishing capital punishment, except for high treason, at a time when the English penal code was barbarous in its severity, and while he encouraged the building of railways, so that at the time of his death there were 632 miles in operation, his reign was, on the whole, one of repression and national stagnation. As we have seen, Russia was as completely as possible shut off from the outside world. No attempt was made even to connect the railways with the systems of western Europe. In later years, regarding educational institutions as "hotbeds of revolution," the Emperor limited the number of students at any Russian university, with the exception of those pursuing courses in medicine, to three hundred. The result was that in 1853, in a country whose population was about 70,000,000, there were only about 2,900 students. Religious persecution accompanied political and intellectual. Any one renouncing the Orthodox religion was punished with loss of property and with eight to ten years of hard labor. Any one attempting to convert an Orthodox believer was imprisoned from eight to sixteen months, and, for the third offense, was exiled to Siberia. Nicholas, like his predecessor, was alive to the evils of serfdom, and during his reign six committees were appointed to study the problem, but almost nothing was accomplished. "I do not understand," he once said, speaking as "the first nobleman in Russia," "how man came to be a thing, and I can explain the fact only by deception on one side and ignorance on the other. We must make an end to this. It is better we should give up, of our own account, that which might otherwise be wrested from us."

Nicholas's foreign policy was marked by the same char-

acteristics, and made him hated throughout Europe as the most brutal autocrat of Europe. Nicholas suppressed the Polish insurrection of 1830–31, abolished the constitution granted by Alexander I, and incorporated Poland in Russia, thus ending the history of that kingdom, a history of only fifteen years. He waged two wars against Turkey, previously described, one in 1828–9, and one in 1853–5. He interfered decisively to suppress the Hungarian revolutionists in 1849, and in German affairs he was a factor of importance. His prestige was great after 1849. Russia, alone of the great powers, had passed through the turbulent years of 1848 and 1849 without commotion. She had aided in the restoration of the established order elsewhere. Her army, on which nearly forty per cent. of her income was annually expended, was supposed by Nicholas and by many outside of Russia to be the best in Europe. The Crimean war, in which Nicholas became involved in 1854, proved the hollowness of this claim. That war was an overwhelming and disillusioning defeat for Russia. Sebastopol finally fell after a famous siege. Russia had lost more than 250,000 lives, and had incurred an enormous expenditure. Another campaign and the Empire might dissolve into the elements from which it had been created. The prestige of Russia, so overwhelming since Napoleon's flight from Moscow, was completely shattered. The people had acquiesced in the narrow, iron régime of Nicholas, consoling themselves with the belief that their country was the greatest in Europe, that their army was invincible, that their sovereign was the most powerful monarch on the Continent. The falsity of all this was now apparent. The Government was shown to be as incompetent and impotent as it was reactionary. The military organization was clearly as honeycombed with abuses as the civil. Though the soldiers were brave, the generals were incapable, the officials corrupt, the commissary department a field of endless robbery.

But in this great national humiliation lay the best hope of the future. As Prussia arose and reformed her institutions after Jena, so did Russia after the Crimean War. That war is a landmark in her history, as it inaugurated a period of extensive reorganization and improvement.

THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER II

Nicholas died in 1855, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander II, who ruled from 1855 to 1881. The new Emperor was in his thirty-seventh year at the time of his accession. He had received

a varied training, designed to equip him for rule. Of an open mind, and desirous of ameliorating the conditions of Russian life, he for some years followed a policy of reform. He relaxed the censorship of the press, and removed most of the restrictions which had been imposed upon the universities and upon travel. Particularly did he address himself to the question of serfdom.

To understand the significance of the Edict of Emancipation, which was to constitute Alexander II's most legitimate title to fame, one must first understand the previous system of land tenure. Nearly all, practically nine-tenths, of the arable land was owned by the crown and the royal princes, and by the one hundred and forty thousand families of the nobility. The land was, therefore, generally held in large estates. It was owned by a small minority; it was tilled by the millions of Russia, who were serfs.

The method of cultivation was as follows: each estate was, as a rule, divided into two parts; one part reserved by the owner for his own use, and cultivated directly under his supervision; the other assigned to his serfs. These serfs generally lived in small villages, going out into the fields to till them, returning to their villages at night. The village communities, or mirs, regulated for their members the cultivation of those lands especially allotted to them. The serfs did not own the land, but enjoyed the usufruct of it, were entitled to whatever they raised. In return the mir paid the landlord a fixed sum annually. About one-half of the mirs were on crown lands, one-half on lands belonging to the nobility.

Serfdom, previously abolished in all other European countries, still flourished in Russia, and was the basis of the economic and social life. The serfs numbered about 50,000,000, about 23,000,000 on the crown domains, about 23,000,000 on the estates of the nobility, and over 3,000,000 on the appanages of the imperial family and in private service as house domestics and attendants. The serfs cultivated, then, the lands allotted to the mir, and from what they raised they got their sustenance. But they also cultivated the portion set apart for the landlord's own use. They must labor for him three days a week. They were not slaves in the strict sense of the word. They could not be sold separately. But they were attached to the soil, could not leave it without the consent of the owner, and passed, if he sold his estate, to the new owner. The landlord had the right to inflict corporal punishment, which right, though legally restricted, was practically uncontrolled. If he considered any

of his serfs unduly troublesome he could usually get the government to force them into the army, or send them to Siberia. In practice, the authority of the proprietor was unlimited. The peasant had the use, but not the ownership, of enough land to support himself and family; but otherwise he was not his own master.

Serfdom was condemned on various grounds. It was morally harmful in that it offended the conscience of the age. Economically it had not proved successful. Two-thirds of the estates of private owners were mortgaged up to their full value, and while serfdom was not alone the cause of this, it was one of the causes. Yet the institution had influential support. The nobles looked upon their serfs as the chief source of their income. It was customary in speaking of a nobleman's wealth not to say that he possessed so many acres, or had an income of so many rubles a year, but that he possessed so many hundreds of "souls." It is no occasion for surprise, therefore, that although the Emperor, Alexander II, attacked the question immediately after the close of the Crimean War, several years elapsed before it was solved.

The crown serfs were in a better position than the serfs on private estates. Practically, their only obligation was to pay certain dues each year to the State or the imperial family, which were considerably smaller than those paid by the others to their lords. They were, in a sense, tenants, owing the equivalent of rent. To free them, all that was necessary was to abolish these dues, and to recognize the serfs as owners of the holdings, which they had been cultivating, and to grant them personal freedom. No one could question the right of the State to do what it would with its own. The liberation of these serfs was begun in 1859, though the process was not completed until 1866. Another class, those in domestic service, could easily be freed, but the class belonging to private landlords and attached to the soil presented greater difficulties, for it was not simply a question of giving them civil freedom, but it was a question of giving them land as well. The Edict of Emancipation concerned the serfs of private landowners, the nobles. Issued March 3, 1861, it abolished serfdom throughout the Empire, freeing about 23,000,000 serfs, thus winning for Alexander the title of "the Tsar Liberator." This manifesto did not merely declare the serfs free men. It undertook to solve the far more difficult problem of the ownership of the soil. The Tsar felt that merely to give the serfs freedom, and to leave all the land in the possession of

the nobles, would mean the creation of a great proletariat possessing no property, therefore likely to fall at once into a position of economic dependence upon the nobles, which would make the gift of freedom a mere mockery. Moreover, the peasants were firmly convinced that they were the rightful owners of the lands which they and their ancestors for centuries had lived upon and cultivated, and the fact that the landlords were legally the owners did not alter their opinion. To give them freedom without land, leaving that with the nobles, who desired to retain it, would be bitterly resented as making their condition worse than ever. On the other hand, to give them the land with their freedom would mean the ruin of the nobility as a class, considered essential to the state. The consequence of this conflict of interests was a compromise, satisfactory to neither party, but more favorable to the nobility than to the peasants.

The lands were divided into two parts. The landlords were to keep one; the other was to go to the peasants in the following manner: the house and lot of each peasant was to become his personal property; the lands surrounding the village were to become the property of the village, or mir, to be owned by the community collectively, but to be divided periodically among its members, according to the Russian fashion.[1] Such divisions were made by lot, and were merely temporary, for a period, varying in different districts, from three to twelve years, and varying also with the size of the family. Collective ownership of general farming land, private ownership of house and lot, were thus the modes of land tenure adopted at the Emancipation. But the lands, those going to the peasants individually, and those going to the mir collectively, were not given to them outright. The peasant and the mir must pay the landlord for their respective acquisitions. As they could not do this themselves, the State was to advance the money, which was to be paid back in instalments during a period of forty-nine years. The principle was the same as that applied later in the land purchase laws for Ireland. Thus in time the peasants would become individually and collectively the owners of a part of the soil, yet the former landowner would be paid for what was taken from him.[2]

1 This arrangement applied only to those regions where communal ownership was customary, namely the north, east, and south of Russia. Where individual ownership was the rule, as in Little Russia and Poland, the land was apportioned directly to individuals.

2 Domestic serfs were given freedom, but not land.

This arrangement was a great disappointment to the peasantry. Their newly acquired freedom seemed a doubtful boon in the light of this method of dividing the land. Indeed, the peasant could not see that he was profiting from the change. Personal liberty could not mean much, when the conditions of earning a livelihood became harder rather than lighter. The peasant ceased to be bound to the landlord, but he was bound to the mir all the more closely, because the mir was bound to the State for at least forty-nine years by its obligation to pay the State for the communal lands. This meant, concretely, a heavy land tax on each peasant. Was anything gained in becoming a kind of serf to the State at the moment of ceasing to be the serf of a nobleman? The peasants regarded the land as their own. But the State guaranteed forever a part to the landlords, and announced that the peasants must pay for the part assigned to themselves. To the peasants this seemed sheer robbery. Moreover, as the division worked out, they found that they had less land for their own use than in the pre-emancipation days, and that they had to pay the landlords, through the State, more than the lands which they did receive were worth. Moreover, as they were not permitted to leave the mir and seek their fortunes elsewhere, even the personal liberty guaranteed by emancipation seemed hollow. Evidently this could be no final solution of the land question for a country almost entirely agricultural. The agrarian question, indeed, became steadily more and more acute during the next fifty years, and was to constitute one of the most difficult problems in the revolution that later broke out. The peasant population in that time vastly increased, and the pressure upon the land consequently grew greater. In the early years of the twentieth century the peasant possessed on an average only half as much land as he had in 1861. He lived necessarily upon the verge of starvation.

The emancipation of the serfs is seen, therefore, not to have been an unalloyed boon. Yet Russia gained morally in the esteem of other nations by abolishing an indefensible wrong. Theoretically, at least, every man was free. Moreover, the peasants, though faring ill, yet fared better than had the peasants of Prussia and Austria at the time of their liberation.[1]

The abolition of serfdom was the greatest act of Alexander

[1] On the attitude of the nobility and peasantry toward the Emancipation see Wallace, *Russia* (Revised Edition 1905), 442–451. On general discussion of effects see Wallace, 452–490.

II's reign, but it was only one of several liberal measures enacted at this time of general enthusiasm. In 1864 the Emperor issued a decree establishing a certain measure of self-government. This decree was based upon investigations made by a commission appointed in 1859. Russia is divided into provinces and the provinces are subdivided into districts. In each district a popular assembly was now established, called the zemstvo, to be chosen by the landowners, the bourgeois, and the peasants in the villages. The district zemstvos were to choose representatives, who were to form provincial zemstvos. The zemstvos were to meet regularly once a year, and were to aid the Government in administration. They were not to be political bodies. It was not the intention of the Emperor to divide or reduce in any degree his autocratic power. They were to serve as a part of the local administration, discharging certain functions which the smaller areas, the mirs, could not adequately perform, such as the control of the public highways, primary schools and hospitals, and the taking of precautions against famine; in short, to contribute within strict limits to the material and moral well-being of the people. These zemstvos were introduced gradually during the next twelve years, from 1864 to 1876. "The zemstvo," says a leading authority, "has done a great deal to provide medical aid and primary education for the common people, and it has improved wonderfully the condition of the hospitals, lunatic asylums, and other benevolent institutions committed to its charge. In its efforts to aid the peasantry it has helped to improve the native breeds of horses and cattle, and it has created a system of obligatory fire insurance, together with means for preventing and extinguishing fires in the villages, a most important matter in a country where the peasants live in wooden houses, and big fires are fearfully frequent." [1]

Though not intended as political or legislative bodies, but simply as aids to the State in business matters, the zemstvos became, nevertheless, training schools in political co-operation. Though their activity was often interrupted, restricted, nullified, more or less, by the central government, yet they persisted, struck root in the life of the nation, and contributed to the political education of the people.

This reform in administration was followed by one in the judicial system (November 1864), based upon a study of the systems of Europe and the United States. The judicial organization was both corrupt and inefficient. Judges were poorly

[1] Wallace, *Russia*, 500–501.

paid, and might be removed at any moment; trials were conducted behind closed doors and in writing, a method which greatly facilitated bribery, a system favorable to the rich, oppressive to the poor. Henceforth, it was provided, that judges should serve during good behavior, that court proceedings should be public and oral, and that trial by jury should be instituted for criminal cases. Whatever its shortcomings, the new system was a great improvement on the old.

Other lesser reforms were also carried through at this time. The censorship of the press was somewhat relaxed, the universities were released from certain restrictions imposed during the reign of Nicholas I, and secondary education was improved. Schools emphasizing scientific education were founded. In 1858 the first high school for girls was opened, and in the course of six years nearly a hundred others were established.

This hopeful era of reform was, however, soon over, and a period of reaction began, which characterized the latter half of Alexander's reign and ended in his assassination in 1881. There were several causes for this change: the vacillating character of the monarch himself, taking fright at his own work; the disappointment felt by many who had expected a millennium, but who found it not; the intense dislike of the privileged and conservative classes for the measures just described, a dislike which could express itself in acts, inasmuch as the Tsar confided the execution of his measures mainly to them. As a matter of fact these measures were, in application, distorted and even partially nullified. The reformers, hitherto a solid body, now split up into groups. Public opinion, the motive force behind all these changes, divided and became less certain. The landlords, smarting under the loss of their serfs, the serfs disappointed at the loss of some of the land which they had been accustomed to cultivate, and indignant at having to pay for the land which they had acquired, were elements of disaffection.

Just at this time, when the attitude of the Emperor was changing, when public opinion was in this fluid, uncertain state, occurred an event which immensely strengthened the reactionary forces, a new insurrection of Poland. After the failure of their attempt to achieve independence in 1831 the Poles had remained quiet, the quiet of despair. As long as Nicholas I lived they were ruled with the greatest severity, and they could not but see the impracticability of any attempt to throw off their chains. But the accession of Alexander II aroused hopes of better conditions. The spirit of nationalism revived, greatly encouraged by the

success of the same spirit elsewhere. The Italians had just realized their aspiration, the creation of an Italian nation — not solely by their own efforts, but by the aid of foreign nations. Might not the Poles hope for as much? Alexander would not for a moment entertain the favorite idea of the Poles, that they should be independent. He emphatically told them that such a notion was an idle dream, that they " must abandon all thoughts of independence, now and forever impossible." He would continue his father's policy, as all that he had done had been " rightly done." In practice for several years, Alexander's policy was one calculated to agitate and arouse, without satisfying, the Poles. Concessions of a liberal nature were made them, only to be followed by acts regarded as oppressive or hostile. The result was that the irritation of the Poles increased, that misunderstandings multiplied, and that finally, in 1863, an insurrection broke out. It was in no sense as formidable as that of 1831. The Poles had now no army, no native government, no treasury. They had been since 1832 completely incorporated in Russia. At no time during this insurrection did they control even their capital, Warsaw, which remained in the power of the regular Russian officials and army. The fighting was entirely guerrilla in character. The aim of the Poles was to make Poland independent. This involved not only making the Poland of that day a nation, but adding to it the Lithuanian provinces to the east, formerly a part of Poland, but for ninety years, since the first partition in 1772, incorporated in Russia proper. At once the intense national feeling of the Russians was aroused by what seemed to threaten dismemberment of the Empire. Religious fanaticism was also aroused. The Poles were Roman Catholics, whereas the Russians belonged to the Orthodox Greek Church. Thus the Poles stood for schism in religion, as in politics. The Tsar, consequently, in his determination to crush this separatist spirit, had the support of tremendous national passions, and his campaign was conducted with vigor and without mercy. The only hope for the Poles lay in foreign intervention. In this they were bitterly disappointed. England, France, and Austria intervened three times in their behalf, but only by diplomatic notes, making no attempt to give emphasis to their notes by a show of force. Russia, seeing this, and supported by Prussia, treated their intervention as an impertinence, and proceeded to wreak her vengeance. It was a fearful punishment she meted out.

The deep-seated historic evil of Polish nationality was the

division of the people into two classes, completely alienated from each other — the nobles and the peasants. Indeed, the Poles were practically two peoples. The fusion of the two had never been consummated. The nobles were the dominant class, and were regarded by the peasants as despots and oppressors. As a consequence, the Polish people did not act together as a whole. The insurrection of 1863, like its predecessors, was the work of the nobles. The peasants remained inactive, unmoved by the appeals of those who turned to them only in adversity, but who treated them contemptuously and harshly in ordinary times. The Tsar determined to use this, the fundamental fact of Polish life, as a means of crushing the Polish nobility, the turbulent insurrectionary class, by making the Polish peasants friendly to Russia. This he accomplished by a decree of March 1864, which effected a sweeping agrarian change. Practically half of the nobles' lands were given to the peasants as freeholds. The peasants were released from all obligation to cultivate the estates which remained the property of the nobles. At the same time no change was made in the peasants' former right to use the nobles' forest and pasture lands, a right very indefinite and yet real. This right was now preserved to them as tending to win their good will still more, and also as likely to keep friction alive between the nobles and the peasants, which in turn would cause the latter to look constantly to the Tsar for support and protection. The lands taken from the nobles were to be paid for, not by the peasants alone to whom they were transferred, but by a general land tax, which fell upon all lands, that is, upon the lands left to the nobles as well as those now given to the peasants. The result was that the nobles would have to pay a large part of their own compensation, an ingenious method of punishment. The process amounted to a confiscation of a part of their property.

The clergy had supported the nobles in the insurrection. The Russian government punished them by suppressing most of the monasteries and confiscating their lands and by subjecting the priests to political supervision.

A process of Russification was now vigorously pursued. The Russian language was prescribed for the correspondence of the officials and the lectures of the university professors, and the use of Polish was forbidden in churches, schools, theaters, newspapers, on business signs, in fact, everywhere.

The consequences of the Polish insurrection of 1863 were felt in Russia as well. Those who desired a reversal of the Emperor's

previous liberal policies and a return to the old methods and conditions were greatly encouraged and strengthened. Not that the Emperor at once abandoned his liberal policy. The great measures concerning the administrative and judicial systems, already described, were promulgated even after this. But Alexander II, always vacillating, was troubled by these events. Reaction was hastened by two attempts to assassinate him, one in 1866, and the other in 1867. The Tsar, hitherto liberal, became reactionary. The execution of the reform measures described above was entrusted, as has been said, to those who were anxious to limit them, or completely to destroy them, and thus it came about that they were only partially applied, were robbed of some of their essential features. Universities again felt the weight of bureaucratic hostility. The achievements of the reform era were rapidly being undone, and Russia was slipping back into the old familiar ways. This reaction aroused intense discontent and engendered a movement which threatened the very existence of the monarchy itself, namely, Nihilism.

The more liberal-minded Russians had followed the reforming policy of the early years of Alexander's reign with great enthusiasm, and after the issuance of the decree establishing the zemstvos they hoped that the Tsar would advance further along the same path and would crown his work with a constitution, and with real parliamentary institutions for the whole Empire. Their optimism was doomed to speedy extinction. When the members of the zemstvos begged the Tsar to grant a representative constitution he rebuked them summarily for mixing in affairs not theirs. Shortly, the zemstvos were told that they were not political bodies, but merely business organizations, designed to attend to the economic interests of their districts. They were forbidden to express political views. They were to be merely administrative organs, subject to the officials of the central government.

The retrogressive policy of the later years of Alexander II created a widespread and bitter sense of disappointment and deception, and resulted in the rise of an opposition to the existing form of government. This feeling was to pass through several phases, but was constantly to become stronger. The first phase was the most pessimistic. The Russians were thrown in upon themselves once more, there being no room in the Russian state for liberal action. Reading the works of the more radical philosophers and scientists of western Europe, and reflecting upon the foundations of their own national institutions and conditions,

the "intellectuals," as these men were called, became most destructive critics, and were called Nihilists.

"The fundamental principle of Nihilism," says Stepniak, "was absolute individualism. It was the negation, in the name of individual liberty, of all the obligations imposed upon the individual by society, by family life, and by religion." Turgenieff defined a Nihilist as a "man who submits to no authority, who accepts not a single principle upon faith merely, however high such a principle may stand in the eyes of men." The Nihilists were extreme individualists who tested every human institution and custom by reason. As few Russian institutions could meet such a test, the Nihilists condemned them all. Theirs was an attitude, first of intellectual challenge, then of revolt against the whole established order. They did not properly form a party of action, but their reckless criticism of government, religion, marriage, ethics brought down upon them the wrath of the authorities. Alarmed, they fled to other countries. The term Nihilist, as a term of opprobrium, came to be applied by the conservatives to all shades and kinds of reformers, most inaccurately.

Forced to live abroad, mainly in France and Switzerland, the refugees came in contact with other advanced schools of thought. One of these was represented by Bakounine, a Siberian exile, who had escaped and was living in London. Bakounine was an anarchist who advocated the immediate destruction of all existing institutions, governments, churches, the family, private property, codes of law, in the interests of human freedom, "in order that," as he said later, "all these millions of poor human beings who are cheated, enslaved, overworked, and exploited . . . may henceforth and forever breathe in absolute freedom." Shortly, Socialism was grafted upon this hatred of all established institutions, this anarchy of Bakounine. In the place of the existing society, which must be swept away, a new society was to be erected, based on socialistic principles. Thus the movement entered upon a new phase. It ceased to be merely critical and destructive. It became constructive as well, in short, a political party with a positive programme, a party very small but resolute and reckless, willing to resort to any means to achieve its aims.

This party now determined to institute an educational campaign in Russia, realizing that nothing could be done unless the millions of peasants were shaken out of their stolid acquiescence in the prevalent order which weighed so heavily upon them.

This extraordinary movement, called "going in among the people," became very active after 1870. Young men and women, all belonging to the educated class, and frequently to noble families, became day laborers and peasants in order to mingle with the people, to arouse them to action, "to found," as one of their documents said, "on the ruins of the present social organization the empire of the working classes." They showed the self-sacrifice, the heroism of the missionary laboring under the most discouraging conditions. A typical case was that of Sophie Bardine, arrested for discussing a socialist pamphlet before a group of workmen. She had for several months been employed in a spinning factory, working fifteen hours a day, and sharing all the hardships of the other women — all this that she might get the chance to preach to them the new ideas. Our aim, she explained later in court, "was to arouse in the conscience of the people the ideal of a better organization, one more conformable to justice; to point out the vices of the present organization in order to prevent the return of the same errors." It is estimated that, between 1872 and 1878, between two and three thousand such missionaries were active in this propaganda. Their efforts, however, were not rewarded with success. The peasantry remained stolid, if not contented. Moreover, this campaign of education and persuasion was broken up wherever possible by the ubiquitous and lawless police. Many were imprisoned or exiled to Siberia.

A pacific propaganda being impossible, one of violence seemed to the more energetic spirits the only alternative. As the Government held the people in a subjection unworthy of human beings, as it employed all its engines of power against every one who demanded reform of any kind, as, in short, it ruled by terror, these reformers resolved to fight it with terror as the only method possible. The "Terrorists" were not bloodthirsty or cruel by nature. They simply believed that no progress whatever could be made in raising Russia from her misery except by getting rid of the more unscrupulous officials. They perfected their organization and entered upon a period of violence. Numerous attempts, often successful, were made to assassinate the high officials, chiefs of police and others who had rendered themselves particularly odious. In turn many of the revolutionists were executed.

All this redoubled the activity of the authorities, particularly of the dreaded Third Section of the police. In the course of a single winter, 1878–9, it is said that nearly 2,000 arrests were

made in St. Petersburg alone. Suspected persons were not allowed witnesses, and were often summarily executed. Thousands were arrested and sent to Siberia without trial, by simple administrative decrees. Finally the terrorists determined to kill the Tsar as the only way of overthrowing the whole hated arbitrary and oppressive system. Several attempts were made. In April 1879 a schoolmaster, Solovief, fired five shots at the Emperor, none of which took effect. In December of the same year a train on which he was supposed to be returning from the Crimea was wrecked, just as it reached Moscow, by a mine placed between the rails. Alexander escaped only because he had reached the capital secretly on an earlier train. The next attempt (February 1880) was to kill him while at dinner in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. Dynamite was exploded, ten soldiers were killed and fifty-three wounded in the guardroom directly overhead, and the floor of the dining room was torn up. The Tsar narrowly escaped because he did not go to dinner at the usual hour.

St. Petersburg was by this time thoroughly terrorized. Alexander now appointed Loris Melikoff practically dictator. Melikoff sought to inaugurate a milder régime. He released hundreds of prisoners, and in many cases commuted the death sentence. He urged the Tsar to grant the people some share in the government, believing that this would kill the Nihilist movement, which was a violent expression of the discontent of the nation with the abuses of an arbitrary and lawless system of government. He urged that this could be done without weakening the principle of autocracy, and that thus Alexander would win back the popularity he had enjoyed during his early reforming years. After much hesitation and mental perturbation the Tsar ordered, March 13, 1881, Melikoff's scheme to be published in the official journal. But on that same afternoon, as he was returning from a drive, escorted by Cossacks, a bomb was thrown at his carriage. The carriage was wrecked, and many of his escorts were injured. Alexander escaped as by a miracle, but a second bomb exploded near him as he was going to aid the injured. He was horribly mangled, and died within an hour. Thus perished the Tsar Liberator. At the same time the hopes of the liberals perished also. This act of supreme violence did not intimidate the successor to the throne, Alexander III, whose entire reign was one of stern repression.

THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER III

The man who now ascended the throne of Russia was in the full flush of magnificent manhood. Alexander III, son of Alexander II, was thirty-six years of age, and of powerful physique. His education had been chiefly military. He was a man of firm and resolute rather than large or active mind. He was profoundly religious, and had a deep sense of his responsibility.

It shortly became clear that he possessed a strong, inflexible character, that he was a thorough believer in absolutism, and was determined to maintain it undiminished. His most influential adviser was his former tutor, Pobyedonostseff, later for many years Procurator of the Holy Synod, a man who abhorred the liberal ideas of western Europe, and who insisted that Russia must preserve her own native institutions untainted, must follow without deviation her own historic tendency, which he conceived in a strictly nationalistic sense. The orthodoxy of the Greek Church, the absolutism of the monarch, were the fundamental tenets of his belief, — no coquetting with western ideas of representative government and religious and intellectual freedom. The opinions of this man are historically important because he was the power behind the throne during all of Alexander III's reign, and during the first ten years of his successor's, that of Nicholas II. Of those opinions two, significant and characteristic, may be quoted, the one concerning parliamentary institutions, the other concerning the press, supposed, in western Europe, to be two of the most powerful agencies of progress. "Parliament is an institution serving for the satisfaction of the personal ambition, vanity, and self-interest of the members. The institution of Parliament is, indeed, one of the greatest illustrations of human delusion. . . . On the pediment of this edifice is inscribed, 'All for the public good.' This is no more than a lying formula; Parliamentarism is the triumph of egoism — its highest expression." "From the day that man first fell, falsehood has ruled the world, ruled it in human speech, in the practical business of life, in all its relations and institutions. But never did the Father of Lies spin such webs of falsehood of every kind as in this restless age. . . . The press is one of the falsest institutions of our time." [1]

Under the influence of such an adviser, and under the sway of his own instincts and his indignation at the insolent demand of

[1] Pobyedonostseff, *Reflections of a Russian Statesman*, 35, 62.

the Nihilists that the murderers of his father be not punished, as they were merely "executors of a hard civic duty"; influenced, too, no doubt, by the general horror which that event inspired, and the warm evidences of loyalty which it called forth, Alexander assumed an attitude of defiant hostility to innovators and liberals. His reign, which lasted from 1881 to 1894, was one of reversion to the older ideals of government and of unqualified absolutism.

The terrorists were hunted down, and their attempts practically ceased. The press was thoroughly gagged, university professors and students were watched, suspended, exiled, as the case might be. The reforms of Alexander II were in part undone, the zemstvos particularly being more and more restricted, and the secret police, the terrible Third Section, being greatly augmented. Liberals gave up all hope of any improvement during this reign, and waited for better days.

Many of the subjects of the Emperor felt the hand of the oppressor with excessive severity. Under him began the persecutions of the Jews, which became so dark a feature of later Russian history. The chief home of the Jews in the modern world is Russia. Out of about eight and a half million Jews in Europe, over five million lived in that country. The Russian Jews had long been restricted to Poland and to the contiguous provinces of Lithuania, called the Jewish Territory, formerly a part of Poland. The Tsar, bigoted, and believing in a policy of Russification of all the varied elements and races of the Empire, looked with disfavor upon a people which held fast its own religion and spoke its own language and maintained its own customs. Under Alexander II the restrictions upon Jewish residence had not been rigorously enforced, and many were living outside the Jewish Territory. These were now ordered back, although suffering and hardship were the inevitable result. Anti-Jewish riots broke out in many places, costing many lives. The Government gave but slight protection; indeed, in many cases the officials appeared to encourage the outbreaks, so popular was Jew-baiting. To keep them out of the liberal professions decrees were issued limiting the number of Jews who might attend the secondary schools and universities — to from three to ten per cent. of the total enrollment according to the region, even though in some of these districts they formed a third or a half of the population. Utterly miserable and insecure, tens of thousands left the country. The great Jewish emigration to the United States dates from this time.

Elsewhere, too, in the Baltic provinces, where the dominant

element was of German origin, and in Finland, and particularly in Poland, the policy of Russification was vigorously applied. Alexander was offended by the sight within his Empire of religions, races, and languages not his own, and he steadily endeavored to suppress the variations. Thus by the close of his reign the attempt to force alien peoples to become thoroughly Russian was in process of execution. It was both political and religious. Apparently meeting with a large measure of success, its permanence or profundity was not clear. Widespread, intense, though silent, disaffection was aroused, which would surely express itself if the Government should ever find itself in difficulties. This policy sowed abundant seeds of trouble for the future.

While the policy of Alexander III was thus opposed to the intellectual and moral forces of liberalism, and while it was harshly oppressive to the religious dissenters and subject nationalities of alien race, in other directions it was progressive. The Tsar was sincerely interested in the material advancement of his people, and won the title of the Peasants' Emperor. He abolished the poll tax, which has been called "the last relic of serfdom" (January 1884). He partially canceled the dues still owed by the peasants in compensation for lands acquired at the time of the emancipation. He sought to encourage the peasants to emigrate from congested districts to more sparsely populated regions, for the question of subsistence was then, as it still is, a serious problem in Russia. The lands allotted the peasants at the time of their liberation were inadequate then, and became more inadequate later, owing to the rapid growth of the population. In 1815 the population was about forty-five million, in 1867 over eighty-two, in 1885 over one hundred and eight millions. This growth has been remarkable. In a land with endless agricultural stretches, widespread and terrible famines have frequently occurred.

The most important feature of Alexander's reign was the industrial revolution which began then, and was carried much farther under his successor. Russia had been for centuries an agricultural country whose agriculture, moreover, was of the primitive type. Whatever industries existed were mainly of the household kind. Russia was one of the poorest countries in the world, her immense resources being undeveloped. Under the system of protection adopted by Alexander II, and continued and increased by Alexander III, industries of a modern kind began to grow up. A tremendous impetus was given to this development by

the appointment in 1892 as Minister of Finance and Commerce of Sergius de Witte, one of the most salient personalities in later Russian history. Witte believed that Russia, the largest and most populous country in Europe, a world in itself, ought to be self-sufficient, that as long as it remained chiefly agricultural it would be tributary to the industrial nations for manufactured articles, that it had abundant resources, in raw material and in labor, to enable it to supply its own needs if they were but developed, that a diversified industrial life would have the further advantage that it would draw laborers from the soil already overtaxed, and would thus render the agrarian problem less acute. To effect this economic transformation, believing thoroughly in a protective tariff, he advised that duties be raised and applied on a wider scale. But that the process of building up the nation's industries might be rapid, it was essential that a large amount of capital should be invested at once in the various industries, and this capital Russia did not possess. One of the cardinal features of Witte's policy was to induce foreign capitalists to invest in Russian factories and mines. He was eminently successful in bringing this about by showing them that they would have the Russian market by reason of the protective system, and by promising, in many cases, large orders from the Government for their products. Immense amounts of foreign capital poured in, and Russia advanced industrially in the closing decade of the nineteenth century with great swiftness. But that these industries might flourish, the markets must be rendered more accessible so that customers could be reached. Russia's greatest lack was good means of communication. She now undertook to supply this want by extensive railway building. For some years before M. de Witte assumed office, Russia was building less than 400 miles of railway a year; from that time on for the rest of the decade, she built nearly 1,400 miles a year. The most stupendous of these undertakings was that of a trunk line connecting Europe with the Pacific Ocean, the great Trans-Siberian railroad. For this Russia borrowed vast sums of money in western Europe, principally in France. Begun in 1891, the road was formally opened in 1902. It reduced the time and cost of transportation to the East about one-half. In 1909 Russia possessed over 41,000 miles of railway, over 28,000 of which were owned and operated by the Government.

This tremendous change in the economic life of the Empire was destined to have momentous consequences, some of which were quickly apparent. With the introduction of modern

industry on a large scale came the rise of a large laboring class and of labor problems of the kind with which western Europe had long been familiar. An industrial proletariat sprang up in Russia as elsewhere, a new source of discontent. Cities grew rapidly, owing to the large number of workmen pouring into them. Two of these, Moscow and St. Petersburg, had over a million each. In the large factory towns the revolutionists had a new field of activity which could be more easily worked than the country districts. Here socialistic theories spread rapidly, as among the working people of the other countries of Europe.

All this, too, created a considerable body of rich "industrials" of the middle class, of capitalists, in short, a bourgeoisie which would not permanently be content with entire exclusion from political power or with obsolete, narrow, illiberal forms of government. Thus the political condition of Russia was rendered more complex by the addition of two new elements to the army of discontent. Looked at in this light, the reign of Alexander III is seen to be, not stagnant, but highly formative. Alexander was undermining his most cherished political principle by the new forces which he was liberating, and which in time were bound to spring the old iron framework of Russian life asunder. This fact partly explains the great unpopularity of Witte among the traditional ruling classes of Russia. A system resting on privilege and tradition cannot safely innovate even in the direction of extracting oil and iron from the soil, and spinning cotton and weaving wool. That the old system was being undermined was not, however, apparent, and might not have been for many years had not Russia, ten years after Alexander's death, become involved in a disastrous and humiliating war with Japan.

THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS II

Alexander III died in 1894, and was succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, then twenty-six years of age. The hope was general that a milder régime might now be introduced. This, however, was not to be. No change of importance was made in the Emperor's councilors. Pobyedonostseff, the very incarnation of narrow-minded, stiff-necked despotism, remained the power behind the throne. For ten years the young Tsar pursued the policy of his father with scarcely a variation save in the direction of greater severity. Nicholas early announced his intention to "protect the principle of autocracy as firmly and unswervingly

as did my late and never-to-be-forgotten father." A suggestion of one of the zemstvos that representative institutions might be granted was declared "a senseless dream," and the zemstvo was severely reprimanded. The government of Russia grew more oppressive, rather than less, as the century wore to its close. It was not a government of law but one of arbitrary power. Its main instruments were a numerous and corrupt bureaucracy or body of state officials, and a ruthless, active police. This being the system, an eminent Russian scholar, Professor Vinogradoff, could say in England in 1902, "Nobody is secure against search, arrest, imprisonment and relegation to the remote parts of the Empire. From political supervision the solicitude of the authorities has spread to interferences with all kinds of private affairs. . . . Such is the legal protection we are now enjoying in Russia." And again, "Such a government is not a fitting patron of law and justice. What it enforces is obedience to order, not to law, and its contempt of law is exemplified in every way."[1] Under such a system, men could be terrorized into silence, they could not be made contented. Disaffection, driven into subterranean channels, only increased, biding its time for explosion. The immense additions to the public debt and expenditure, occasioned by the extensive railroad building and the support of army and navy, involved heavier taxation which fell mainly on the poor, the peasantry, reducing them to destitution and despair. Of this the same Russian authority said, speaking of the appalling conditions, "In most cases the number of cattle and horses owned by the peasantry is decreasing. In some districts of the province of Samara, which counts among the granaries of Russia, there have been years when one-third, and even one-half of the population have been turned into mendicants. When the tax gatherer turns away in despair from such wretched people he fastens the more on those who still have something left. It may be said without exaggeration that for the majority of the Russian peasantry the primary object in life is to earn enough to pay the taxes, everything else is accident. The wonder is not at the lack of enterprise and thrift, but at the endurance which enables men to toil along in the face of such conditions."[2] The same witness quotes a Russian magistrate as saying that "there is no indignity which, in the beginning of the twentieth century, may not be inflicted on a Russian peasant."

[1] *Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century*, edited by F. A. Kirkpatrick, 266–267.

[2] *Ibid.*, 259.

The professional and educated man was in a condition almost as intolerable. If a professor in a university, he was watched by the police, and was likely to be removed at any moment as was Professor Miliukov, an historian of distinguished attainments, for no other reason than " generally noxious tendencies." If an editor, his position was even more precarious, unless he was utterly servile to the authorities. It was a suffocating atmosphere for any man of the slightest intellectual independence, living in the ideas of the present age. The censorship grew more and more rigorous, and included such books as Green's *History of England*, and Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. Arbitrary arrests of all kinds increased from year to year as the difficulty of thoroughly bottling up Russia increased. Students were the object of special police care, as it was the young and ardent and educated who were most indignant at this senseless despotism. Many of them disappeared, in one year as many as a fifth of those in the University of Moscow, probably sent to Siberia or to prisons in Europe.

A government of this kind was not likely to err from excess of sympathy with the subject nationalities, such as the Poles and the Finns. In Finland, indeed, its arbitrary course attained its climax. Finland had been acquired by Russia in 1809, but on liberal terms. It was not incorporated in Russia, but continued a Grand Duchy, with the Emperor of Russia as simply Grand Duke. It had its own Parliament, its Fundamental Laws or constitution, to which the Grand Duke swore fidelity. These Fundamental Laws could not be altered or explained or repealed except with the consent of the Diet and the Grand Duke. Finland was a constitutional state, governing itself, connected with Russia in the person of its sovereign. It had its own army, its own currency and postal system. Under this liberal régime it prospered greatly, its population increasing from less than a million to nearly three million by the close of the century, and was, according to an historian of Russia, at least thirty years in advance of that country in all the appliances of material civilization.[1] The sight of this country enjoying a constitution of its own and a separate organization was an offense to the men controlling Russia. They wished to sweep away all distinctions between the various parts of the Emperor's dominions, to unify, to Russify. The attack upon the liberties of the Finns began under Alexander III. It was carried much further by Nicholas II, who, on February 15, 1899, issued an imperial manifesto

[1] Skrine, *Expansion of Russia*, 1815–1900, p. 322.

which really abrogated the constitution of the country. The Finnish Diet was henceforth to legislate only concerning matters relating solely to Finland. All legislation of a general nature affecting the Empire as a whole was to be enacted in the ordinary way, that is, by the Tsar, who also said, "We have found it necessary to reserve to Ourselves the ultimate decision as to which laws come within the scope of the general legislation of the Empire." This practically meant that Finland was henceforth to be ruled like Russia. The Finns so understood it. The following Sunday was observed as a day of mourning. An immense petition was drawn up, signed within five days by over half a million people. The Tsar refused to receive it.

The process of enforced Russification was continued. The Finnish army was virtually incorporated in the Russian. Finnish soldiers, who had hitherto been required to serve only in the Grand Duchy, might now be sent to serve anywhere. Russian officials were appointed to positions in Finland previously filled only by Finns. Newspapers were suppressed or suspended. Finnish nationality was being intentionally crushed out. Intense was the indignation of the Finns, but three million people were powerless against the autocrat of one hundred and forty million. For the moment there were no signs of any possible relief. Grim despair seized the people. Temporary relief was to come as a result of the disastrous defeat of Russia in the war with Japan in 1904–5, a landmark in contemporary history.

To understand recent events in Russia it is necessary to trace the course of that war whose consequences have been profound and far-reaching, and to show the significance of that conflict we must interrupt this narrative of Russian history in order to give an account of the recent evolution of Asia, the rise of the so-called Far Eastern Question, and the interaction of Occident and Orient upon each other.

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